Radyo, Televizyon ve Sinema Bölümü / Department of Radio, Cinema and Television

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    Approaches to othered identities and spaces in French cinema
    (2018) Erensoy, Scommairin Fulya
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    From the first to the third Critique: Non-conceptual content and the fate of the imagination
    (2020-04) Sakızlı, Selda Salman
    The faculty of imagination and its role in the Critique of the Power of Judgement are at the hearth of a very important controversy: Is aesthetic judgement conceptual? This is not a simple question to deal with since it is directly related with the cognitive claims in the Critique of Pure Reason. Different approaches, from analytic to continental traditions, from psychological readings of Kant to the advocates of philosophy of mind hold different views on this subject. This variety is a result of the status and the role of the imagination, and the kinds of syntheses it realizes which differs in the first and the second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. In the first edition, imagination is considered as one of the three fundamental faculties among sensibility and apperception, and it is the agent of the syntheses. However, in the second edition, imagination becomes a sub-faculty of the understanding and the syntheses are realized by the understanding. I claim that the A edition of the CPR is more accurate with the entire critical project. Although philosophers like Wilfrid Sellars,1 John McDowell2 and Hannah Ginsborg3 defend that non-conceptual content is not possible, I disagree with this view and see it as a result of taking the B edition, additionally, the debate concerning the third Critique is a repercussion of this. Moreover, these disputes are also related with holding the first and the third Critiques as having completely distinct contents which opens up another “battle field”. I claim that the first and the third Critiques are connected through the faculties, and Kant was very well aware of the fact that he utilizes the same faculties as he used to explain human cognition in the CPR. 1 See Wilfrid Sellars, “The role of imagination in Kant’s theory of experience”. University of Pittsburgh, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Wilfrid S. Sellars Papers, Box 39, Folder, 11, 1978 2 See John McDowell, Mind and World, Harvard University Press, 1996 2 See Hannah Ginsborg, “Was Kant a Nonconceptualist?” ? Philos Stud. 137, 2008, pp.65-77 4 A99-100 5 See. A89-91 /B122-123, Bl45 6 Robert Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001, p.52 7 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power ofJudgement, Trans. Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, 5:209 Concerning the conceptual and non-conceptual contents, the crucial point is the threefold synthesis, especially the synthesis of apprehension that aims directly empirical and pure intuitions4 in the first edition of the CPR, and which is revisited in the introduction of the third Critique. Kant stresses in several sentences that intuitions and thoughts are different and they cannot hold each other’s place.5 Since sensibility and understanding need to be separate in transcendental philosophy, there is the need to combine them with a third faculty which is the faculty of imagination. Although I am not in analytic tradition, I agree with Robert Hanna who takes the first edition of the Critique and indicates that imagination as the third faculty can both serve to the sensibility and the understanding6 by the threefold synthesis, and there is non-conceptual content in imagination’s relation to sensibility. As indicated above, the claim that there is non-conceptual content in the synthesis of imagination finds its supports in the third Critique. Besides the synthesis of apprehension, this claim becomes obvious in the free play between the imagination and the understanding that occurs without submitting to any concepts. Kant clearly indicates that the feeling of beautiful does not come from a concept nor it aims at one.7 And this is the reason why aesthetic feelings are always subjective, and thus we do not have any rules for aesthetic appreciation.
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    Imagination as Primordial Faculty in Ethichs a Fichtean Approach
    (2018-01) Salman, Selda; 260940
    In late eighteenth and early nineteenth century imagination has gained a respectable place in philosophy that it has not have before. Unlike previous philosophers, Immanuel Kant could be named as the one who initiated it, since in the first edition of his seminal Critique of Pure Reason he posits imagination as one of the three fundamental faculties besides sensibility and apperception, which is to say that imagination is a transcendental faculty. However, it was not Kant to proceed with imagination since he steps back from his ideas in the second edition as a result of the criticisms of psychologism. It was Johann Gottlieb Fichte, one of the prominent philosophers of German idealism, and a Kantian, who proceeded to make philosophical "experiments" with the power of imagination and based his philosophical system on this faculty. Fichte's understanding of imagination can be seen as a totality of the meanings Kant ascribed to it. In this sense, the most fundamental role of imagination for Fichte is that it is the faculty of synthesis. Fichte clearly states that without the power of productive imagination "nothing at all in the human mind is capable of explanation -and on which the entire mechanism of that mind may very well be based"1 and adds "... all reality -for us being understood, as it cannot be otherwise understood in a system of transcendental philosophy- is brought forth solely by the imagination."’ 1 Fichte, J. Gottlieb. The Science of Knowledge (1794). Trans, and ed. Peter Heath and John Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 188 ’ Ibid, p. 202 Fichte also builds the system of ethics with the principles of The Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) (Sittenlehre nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre), and the fundamental principles of Wissenschaftslehre are at work in morality and ethics. From this ground, I will claim that imagination is not only the fundamental faculty in theoretical philosophy but also the key faculty in the field of ethics which provides the "unity of subjectivity". The aim of this work is to suggest that Fichte by giving a central position to the power of imagination is able to posit a system where theoretical and practical philosophies are interdependent as a result of the functions of the imagination.
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    Re- Constructingthe Limits Of Film Narrative in relation to the Concept of Identification through the Possibilities of Digital Cinema
    (2018-11) Taş Öz, Perihan; 111982
    Since the beginning of human history, the tradition of narrative has existed in different forms. Today, its most popular form is the film narrative. With the development of visual and aural technologies, the structure of the film narrative has transformed. Digital cinema has led to a revolution in the traditional production of film, where its primary effects were felt in the reconstruction of the boundaries of the film narrative. One of the most important elements of film narrative, which will be at the center of this study, is the concept of identification. Identification relates to the relationship the spectator forms with the film’s main characters. In this study, the possibilities and boundaries of film narratives, that have once again become the center of discussion with the advent of digital cinema, will be analyzed through the concept of identification. The first theoretical framework will be traced around Bazin’s theories on cinematic realism; while digital cinema and the concept of virtuality will be opened to discussion through the works of Manovich, Casetti, Frampton and Boudrillard. The process of identification cannot be given meaning through a rational paradigm, while at the same time is the most important element in understanding how the spectator perceives the construction of reality in the film narrative. This process had taken on a more complex structure with the advent of digitalization, as the way in which reality is experienced and the physical and philosophical experiences in themselves have come to the fore. This study takes this theoretical framework and looks at how digital possibilities have shifted the boundaries of film narrative and changed the process of identification, adding a physiological and philosophical dimension. This will be done through the analysis of the films Avatar (2009) and The Matrix (1999). The difference between the creation of reality and the way in which the spectator perceives this reality and the effects this difference might have will be undertaken in this analysis.
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    Revisiting heidegger on schematism
    (2020-03) Salman Sakızlı, Selda; 260940
    Although it is very short, the section on Schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most significant sections in the book. In a note dated 1797 Kant admits that that it is one of the most important and the most difficult sections in the Critique.' The basic claims of schematism can be observed in Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation dated 1770, although most of the theses of the Dissertation have changed, the claims and the importance concerning the schemas remained almost the same.1 2 As a matter of fact, even though Kant made considerable changes on the sections about the roles and functions of the faculty of imagination in the second edition of the Critique, such as the Deduction section, Schematism remains almost untouched. 1 Reflexionen, 6359, 18:686, pp. 393-394 2 See Karin De Boer, Kant’s Account of Sensible Concepts in the Inagural Dissertation and the Critique of Pure Reason. Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Intemationalen Kant-Kongresses, Ed. Violetta Waibel, Margit Ruffing, David Wagner, De Gruyter: Berlin, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110467888-021, 2018, p. 1015-1022 2 CPR, A138/ BlT1 4 See Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Trans. Richard Taft. Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, 1997, and Phenomenological Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, 2018 s CPR, A140/ B179 The main argument in schematism is subsuming the object (Gegenstand) under a concept and in that respect providing homogeneity between the appearances and concepts. This need appears as a result of Kant’s separation between the sensibility and the understanding and the clear distinction of the two concerning their roles and functions. As they have to stand apart there is the need to connect them in order to provide cognition. Kant states “Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter.”3 Kant calls this “mediating” representation, which is both intellectual and sensible, a transcendental schema, which is always the product of the faculty of imagination. Martin Heidegger, who interprets Kant in phenomenological tradition and stresses the importance of imagination in Kantian philosophy, also focuses on the Schematism section as one of the important parts of his interpretation.4 Heidegger suggests a new word, “schema­image” though he is aware of the fact that image is not a schema, but thus he approximates schema with image and excludes non-ocular experience. In this paper, I will criticize Heidegger’s interpretation of schematism since Kant is very clear about the difference between an image and a schema which are both the products of the imagination.5 But image is always the representation of a particular thing; on the contrary, schema is neither a singular intuition nor a concept.
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    The Function And Important Of The Narrator In Film : Narrative
    (Marmara Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi, 2012-01) Taş Öz, Perihan; 111982
    The relationship between audience and film narrative, as well as methods used in film narrative are changing according to the increasing possibilities born in film narration, in parallel with the developments in motion picture. Hence, the function and status of the narrator as a key element in film narrative takes on importance. The narrator, not only gives information on the world of the film to the audience, but also directs them. The narrative is formed according to the point of view of the narrator and the audience views and understands the film in accordance with this point of view.