T. C. ISTANBUL KÜLTÜR UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES PARADIPLOMACY IN POST-CONFLICT FEDERAL STATES: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA MA Thesis by ABDISHAKUR MOHAMED WARSAME 2100008108 Department: International Relations Program: International Relations Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nazlı Çağın BİLGİLİ APRIL 2024 T. C. ISTANBUL KÜLTÜR UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES PARADIPLOMACY IN POST-CONFLICT FEDERAL STATES: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA MA Thesis by ABDISHAKUR MOHAMED WARSAME 2100008108 Department: International Relations Program: International Relations Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nazlı Çağın BİLGİLİ Members of Examining Committee: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bora BAYRAKTAR Assoc. Prof. Dr. Asena BOZTAŞ APRIL 2024 I ACKNOWLEDGMENT First anԁ foremost, I extend my genuine gratitude anԁ praises to Allah, the Most Merciful anԁ the Most Beneficent, for His unending blessings anԁ guidance that have been bestowed upon me throughout my lifetime anԁ, particularly, in the process of my educational journey. It is with humble acknowledgements that I sincerely express my great thanks to Asst. Prof. Dr. Nаzlı Çаğın Bilgili, my esteemed thesis advisor, whose patience and support have been the cornerstone of the initiation and outcome of this process of the thesis. Conceptualizing and structuring this thesis would not be easy without her instrumental knowledge, directives, and commitment. Further, my profound appreciation goes out to the chairperson and the board of trustees of the university, the financial affairs directorate, and most notably, Mr. Ahmet Şimşek. Without their generous assistance of fees discount, the fulfilment of my humble endeavor of studying simultaneous dual master’s degree programs in the university would have been an unattainable dream. I am equally thankful to the academic anԁ administrative staff of the International Relations Department for the privilege of pursuing my graduate studies amidst such a distinguished team. My family anԁ friends deserve special mention of their endless support and encouragement, which have been the pillars of my resilience and determination. In the end, getting here wouldn’t have been possible without the people who really believed in me and helped out financially, and others who offered encouragement every step of the way. To each one, I extend my sincerest appreciation. ABDISHAKUR MOHAMED WARSAME II DEDICATION To the cherished souvenir of my late father, whose longings and memories continue to guide me. To my mother, the beacon of wisdom and strength that has conducted me through the voyage of life. To my sister and her husband, who have provided unwavering support and love akin to that of a second set of parents. To my family, the existing and the soon to be joined, for their endless encouragement and belief in my dreams. ABDISHAKUR MOHAMED WARSAME III Üniversite : İstanbul Kültür Üniversitesi Enstitü : Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü Anabilim Dalı : Uluslararası İlişkiler Program : Uluslararası İlişkiler Tez Danışmanı : Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Nazlı Çağın BİLGİLİ Tez Türü ve Tarihi : Yüksek Lisans – Nisan 2024 ÖZET ÇATIŞMA SONRASI FEDERAL DEVLETLERDE PARADİPLOMASİ: SOMALİ ÖRNEĞİ Abdishakur Mohamed WARSAME Bu tez, Somali’nin karmaşık çatışma sonrası ortamında paradiplomasi fenomeninin ortaya çıkışını, gelişimini ve güncel durumunu inceleme amacına ulaşmak için ülkenin çatışma sonrası federal yapısının iç dinamiklerini kapsamlı bir şekilde analiz etmektedir. Çalışma, çeşitli akademik ve politika odaklı materyallerin nitel bir bakış açısıyla kapsamlı bir inceleme yapmakta ve El-Dessouki’nin (2018) açıklayıcı teorik çerçevesini benimseyerek yapısal iç değişkenlerin—hukuki çerçeveler, otonomi düzeyleri, hükümetler arası dinamikler ve kurumsallaşma—paradiplomasinin nasıl şekillendirdiğini detaylı bir şekilde incelemektedir. Analizin sonucu, dış politikanın yapımı ve yürütülmesinin merkezileştirilmesinin anayasal olarak belirgin olması gerçeğine rağmen, anayasal belirsizliklerin, tarihsel mirasların ve çatışma sonrası yönetim zorluklarının etkileşiminin, Federal Üye Devletlerin otonomi arzuları ile Federal Hükümetin egemenliğini koruma güdüsü arasında bir çatışma yaratarak, ulusaltı unsurlarının dışişlerinde açılımı için verimli bir zemin oluşturduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Dolayısı ile, bu tezde verilen yapısal analiz, çatışma sonrası federal ayarlar bağlamında yapısal iç değişkenlerin paradiplomasiyi şekillendirme merkezi rolünü vurgulayarak, Somali’de paradiplomasinin iç içe geçmiş boyutlarını ve parametrelerini açığa çıkarmaktadır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Federal Yapı, Paradiplomasi, Çatışma Sonrası Federalizm, Somali. IV University : Istanbul Kultur University Institute : Institute of Graduate Studies Department : International Relations Program : International Relations Supervisor : Asst. Prof. Dr. Nazlı Çağın BİLGİLİ Degree Awarded and Date : Master of Arts – April 2024 ABSTRACT PARADIPLOMACY IN POST-CONFLICT FEDERAL STATES: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA Abdishakur Mohamed WARSAME In this thesis, the domestic structure of Somalia’s post-conflict federal structure is comprehensively analyzed in order to reach the aim of examining the emergence, development, and current status of paradiplomacy phenomenon within the country’s intricate post-conflict settings. Employing a comprehensive review of diverse academic and policy-oriented materials through a qualitative lens, the thesis adopts El- Dessouki’s (2018) explanatory framework to scrutinize how domestic structural variables—legal frameworks, autonomy levels, intergovernmental dynamics, and institutionalization—shape paradiplomatic engagements. It uncovers that, notwithstanding constitutional intents to centralize foreign policy, the interplay of constitutional ambiguities, historical legacies, and post-conflict governance challenges fosters a fertile ground for subnational foreign engagements, further intensified by the friction between the Federal Member States’ autonomy aspirations and the Federal Government’s sovereignty assertions. Thus, the structural analysis given in this thesis, through underlining the central role of domestic structural variables in molding paradiplomacy within the context of post-conflict federal settings, unveils interconnected the dimensions and parameters of paradiplomacy in Somalia. Keyword: Federal Structure, Paradiplomacy, Post-Conflict Federalism, Somalia. V LIST OF FIGURES F1: The component of theoretical framework on the federal structure-paradiplomacy relation........................................................................................................................ 27 F2: The map of the Somali Peninsula and Somali ethnic limit in Horn of Africa ..... 33 F3: Segmentary affiliations in the traditional Somali society’s social structuration. Created by the author, drawing on the work of Samatar ............................................ 36 F4: The main elements of the socio-political moral order in the traditional Somali society ........................................................................................................................ 39 F5: Affiliations scheme in the traditional Somali society’s social structuration after the advent of Islam ........................................................................................................... 43 F6: Basic elements of traditional Somali moral order ............................................... 44 F7: Notable post-collapse national reconciliation initiatives..................................... 65 F8: The Map of the Federal Member States .............................................................. 76 VI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ARS : Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia CU : Constituent Units FGS : Federal Government of Somalia FMS : Federal Member States HDMS : Hizbia Digil Mirifle Somali or Hizb al-Dastuur Mustaqil al-Somal (Independent Constitutional Party of Somalia) ICU : Islamic Courts Union IGAD : Intergovernmental Authority on Development MoU : Memorandum of Understanding NCA : National Constitutional Assembly PFC : Provisional Federal Constitution SACB : Somali Aid Co-ordination Body SDM : Somali Democratic Movement SNL : Somali National League SNM : Somali National Movement SPM : Somali Patriotic Movement SRC : The Supreme Revolutionary Council SRRC : Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Committee SSDF : Somali Salvation Democratic Front SYL : Somali Youth League TFC : Transitional Federal Charter TFG : Transitional Federal Government TFIs : Transitional Federal Institutions TNA : Transitional National Assembly TNG : Transitional National Government USC : United Somali Congress VII TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT ............................................................................................ i DEDICATION ............................................................................................................ ii ÖZET .......................................................................................................................... iii ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... iv LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................... v LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................... vi 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................. 4 2.1. Federalism, Post-Conflict Federalism, and Federal Policymaking ................... 4 2.1.1. Federalism vs. Post-Conflict Federalism ................................................... 4 2.1.2. Federal Solution and Conflict Management .............................................. 6 2.1.3. Efficiency Determinants of Policymaking in Post-conflict Federalism ..... 9 2.2. Federalism-Foreign Policy Interplay and Paradiplomacy ............................... 10 2.2.1. Making Sense of Paradiplomacy: A Short Prologue ................................ 11 2.2.2. The Federal Structure and the Emergence of Paradiplomacy .................. 18 2.2.3. Academic Discourse on Paradiplomacy ................................................... 22 2.2.4. Paradiplomacy in Post-Conflict Federal Context ..................................... 24 2.3. Rooting Paradiplomacy to Federal Structure: Theoretical Framework .......... 26 2.4. Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................... 29 3. TRACING THE ROOTS OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT ............................. 32 3.1. The Socio-Political Structure of the Traditional Somali Society .................... 32 3.1.1. The Social Organization of the Traditional Somali Society ..................... 32 3.1.2. The Political Organization of the Traditional Somali Society ................. 36 3.1.3. The Advent of Islam and the Formation of the ‘Moral Commonwealth’ 42 3.2. Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial Transformations and Turmoils ..... 44 3.2.1. The Early ‘State-Building Culture’ and the Emergence of Clan-States ... 45 VIII 3.2.2. Colonialism and the Disruption of the Somali Socio-Political Order ...... 47 3.2.3. The First Republic and the Rise of Elite Rivalry ..................................... 50 3.2.4. Intensification of Clan-Affiliation Manipulation and State Disintegration in the Second Republic ........................................................................................... 53 3.2.5. The Mayhem Status of Post-Collapse Era ............................................... 57 3.3. Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................... 60 4. THE FEDERAL PRESCRIPTION TO THE SOMALI CONFLICT: ROOTS AND RAMIFICATIONS ......................................................................................... 64 4.1. Pre-Federal National Reconciliation Trajectory.............................................. 64 4.2. The Evolution of the Federalism Solution ...................................................... 68 4.3. General Overview of the Federal System in Somalia ..................................... 73 4.4. Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................... 77 5. PARADIPLOMACY IN SOMALIA’S POST-CONFLICT FEDERAL STRUCTURE: AN ANALYSIS............................................................................... 80 5.1. An Overview of Paradiplomacy in Somalia .................................................... 80 5.2. Examining the Emergence of Paradiplomacy in Somalia: Theory Application and Results ............................................................................................................. 86 5.2.1. Legal Grounds .......................................................................................... 87 5.2.2. Level Of Sub-National Autonomy ........................................................... 89 5.2.3. Intergovernmental Relations .................................................................... 92 5.2.4. Institutionalization.................................................................................... 94 5.3. Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................... 96 6. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 98 7. BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................. 102 1 1. INTRODUCTION Federalism, as a system of government, possesses distinct characteristics, the foremost being the division of sovereignty between a central government, which holds state sovereignty, and subnational governments, which enjoy a degree of autonomy. This bifurcation of governing authority within the federal framework, applicable to both policy formulation and implementation, instills the system with a delicate equilibrium. On one hand, this balance may facilitates smooth governance; on the other, it may predisposes the system to potential crises. Despite the relatively less structural issues encountered in established federations, the evolvement of federalism into a mechanism for conflict resolution in various nations, including Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia—the latter being the focus of this thesis—made the post-conflict federal arrangements confront with structural challenges. These structural challenges particularly manifests in practical implementation, policy making and in the clarity of roles between different governmental tiers. For instance, a critical area where these challenges manifest is in foreign policy formulation and execution, as the involvement of subnational governments in international forums—traditionally the purview of sovereign states— raises concerns about the potential for new crises in post-conflict nations. Consequently, given that the concept of paradiplomacy, denoting the international engagement of subnational actors, has garnered significant scholarly attention within the realm of international relations (El-Dessouki, 2018; Kuznetsov, 2015), its examination within the complex and intersecting context of federal frameworks in post-conflict settings is a significant and timely scholarly endeavor. Hence, this study, focusing on a structural level analysis rather than an examination based on isolated cases, attempts to evaluate the developments and impacts of paradiplomacy within a post-conflict federal settings in Somalia, through a detailed examination of its federal structure—encompassing operational, procedural, and legislative dimensions. The case of Somalia—transitioning from a unitary to a federal state system after enduring prolonged periods of conflict, characterized by political divisions, internal wars, and elite discord, culminating in the adoption of a federal solution in 2004— offers a unique lens to explore the emergence and influence of paradiplomacy in a post-conflict federal setting. Consequently, this research, focusing on a timeframe spanning from the formalization of the system to the present day, i.e., 2012 to 2024, 2 aims to dissect the dynamics of subnational entities engaging in international affairs against the backdrop of Somalia’s evolving federal structure. In alignment with this aim, the research is meticulously structured to encapsulate the subtleties of Somalia’s paradiplomatic activities throughout this period of transformation, elucidating the approaches through which regional states articulate their international interactions within a post-conflict federal framework. The noteworthiness of this study is underscored by a number of significant components, essentially typified within the examination of paradiplomacy’s impacts on both the sovereignty and integrity of the federal states, alongside an in-depth investigation of the unique characteristics relating to the country in question, Somalia. On the one hand, paradiplomacy challenges the traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty by presenting subnational governments as active participants on the international stage. This expansion beyond the control of central governments reflects the evolving landscape of international relations, where non-state actors assume roles traditionally reserved for nation-states, thus complicating the dynamics of foreign policy formulation and implementation in federal systems (Lequesne & Paquin, 2017). On the other hand, the examination of paradiplomacy within Somalia presents a compelling case due to the nation’s intricate federal structure which—stemming from it being characterized by its multifaceted structural and operational dynamics— furnishes an exceptional setting for probing the influence of post-conflict federalism on the birth and elaboration of paradiplomatic activities. This issue with federal structure of post-conflict Somalia gains tangible significance due to the emergence of multiple instances of paradiplomacy within the Somali federal experience, where the central government’s response has involved to extent of severing relations with countries that engage directly with its regions in some cases. Hence, considering the significance of paradiplomacy—ranging from theoretical presence to practical implications—this research aims to bridge the existing gap in literature pertaining to paradiplomacy within the framework of post-conflict federalism through the case of Somalia. The focus of this thesis is guided by the central research question, which inquires, how did post-conflict federal structure impact the emergence of paradiplomacy in the post- unitary federal state of Somalia? Therefore, it aims to analyze the emergence and development of paradiplomacy in the case of Somalia’s federal structure, using an 3 explanatory framework proposed by El-Dessouki (2018). According to this framework, the level and form of paradiplomacy are influenced by four main variables of domestic structure: legal grounds, the level of autonomy, the type of intergovernmental relations, and institutionalization. These variables are operationalized by several indicators, such as constitutional and statutory competences, decision-making, cooperative or conflictual patterns of interaction, and the existence of strategies, institutions, and offices for foreign affairs at the sub- national level. Additionally, to fulfill the thesis’s aim, a comprehensive review of academic, legal, and policy materials, including books, journal articles, reports, official publications, policy papers, and news outlets, will be conducted, adopting a qualitative research methodology. In order to achieve the objective of providing a comprehensive analysis of paradiplomacy within the framework of the federal structure in post-conflict Somalia, this thesis is structured into six chapters. After this introduction, the research moves to the second chapter which attempts to present and define the basic concepts of the studies as well as theoretical perspectives on federalism, post-conflict federalism, and finally paradiplomacy and its place in this context. Subsequently, in the third chapter, the roots of the Somali conflict are traced through providing a historical overview to understand the everchanging dynamics of Somali politics from traditional society all the way to pre-federal settings. In order to complete the background of the research and move on to the analysis, the background of the restructuring of the country following the conflict will be examined in the fourth chapter, taking into account the roots and consequences of the adoption of the federal system as a solution to the political conflict in the country, and the analysis of the federal structure itself. The fifth chapter serves as the analytical core of the thesis, conducting an in-depth examination of paradiplomacy within Somalia’s federal structure post-conflict as it begins with an overview of the phenomenon in the country and then applies the previously mentioned theoretical framework to analyze the phenomenon and draw findings. In order to address the outcome of the meeting of theory with practice within the scope of the study, the conclusion, the last chapter of this thesis, will include a summary of the major findings, an emphasis on the main implications, and recommendations for further research. 4 2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The primary focus of this research, as seen from the introduction above, fundamentally pertains to the outcomes resulting from the intersection and interaction among various concepts. This, therefore, necessitates an initial step involving the delineation of the positions of these concepts within the conceptual framework of the literature, alongside identifying the most appropriate methodological approaches to address the core problem of the research. Consequently, this chapter, and in order to lay down conceptual and theoretical basis for studying at hand, will provide a review of related literature on the main concepts of the study. Hence, the chapter is organized into three principal sections: the first section explicates the congruences and variances between traditional federalism and post-conflict federalism; following this, there is an in-depth exploration of paradiplomacy; and finally, the chapter concludes with a scrutinization of the theoretical underpinnings. 2.1. Federalism, Post-Conflict Federalism, and Federal Policymaking The initial step in developing the conceptual framework involves elucidating the distinctions and commonalities between post-conflict federalism—as the focus of this research—and notion of traditional federalism. Therefore, the intersection and divergence between these two concepts will be thoroughly examined in this section and, as a complementation to that, the academic discussions about federalism, conflict management as well as federal policymaking in the relevant literature will be presented. 2.1.1. Federalism vs. Post-Conflict Federalism The discourse on federalism, a concept characterized by its multifaceted nature— encompassing constitutional, political, social, economic, cultural, legal, philosophical, and ideological dimensions—has experienced a significant evolution over time. Notably, one of the most pivotal manifestations of these changes is evident in the emergence of post-conflict federalism, a development challenges traditional perspectives deeply entrenched in the principles of classical federalism (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011; Sayid, 2021). Historically, classical federalism, with notable examples including Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States, has 5 emphasized the importance of shared sovereignty, constitutional arrangements, and the coordination between independent governments (Choudhry & Hume, 2011). Conversely, post-conflict federalism, which emerges as a relatively novel field of study, has gained prominence chiefly in response to the unique challenges faced by states affected by conflict, aiming not only at the traditional objectives of federalism but also at the prevention of civil wars and secession (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). Classical federalism, rooted in the idea of political units coming together voluntarily, rests on a foundation of collective security and economic prosperity as catalysts for forming federations (Choudhry & Hume, 2011). It involves the creation of a constitutional pact among pre-existing political units, guaranteeing the autonomy of regions within a federation and allowing them to preserve self-government, thus offering the benefits of unity without imposing uniformity on diverse populations (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). The classical model, as expounded by prominent scholars in the field of federal studies, revolves around the distribution of powers, legislative and executive authority, revenue allocation, and constitutional amendment procedures to ensure regional consent (Choudhry & Hume, 2011). In contrast, the emergence of post-conflict federalism is marked by its distinct motivations, with the primary goal being the prevention of civil war or secession rather than pursuing public accountability or state efficiency (ibid). Unlike classical federalism, post-conflict federalism often arises in the aftermath of conflicts, with internal boundaries drawn to accommodate territorially concentrated national minorities, reflecting a shift from the voluntary coming together of political units to a more coercive state-building process (Chevreau, 2017). Consequently, the literature concerning post-conflict federalism, while underscoring its potential role in mitigating political fragmentation and conflicts within divided societies, it, on the other hand, underlines the field’s immense significance and the uniquely inherent challenges associated with its implementation in the aftermath of conflict (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). Accordingly, although a comparative analysis of classical and post-conflict federalism reveals certain parallels in systemic foundations and operational frameworks, it also unveils significant divergences in their foundational assumptions and objectives. For 6 instance, while classical federalism assumes the permanence of a political community formed by pre-existing units, post-conflict federalism contends with the complexities of divided societies, where ethnic and cultural differences are politically salient and persistent markers of identity (ibid). Moreover, the motivations for federal state formation differ significantly, with classical federalism driven by shared interests and economic or security gains, whereas post-conflict federalism seeks to address the painful legacy of conflicts, aiming to prevent renewed hostilities and facilitate the emergence of shared identities (Chevreau, 2017). Thus, to sum up, the traditional discourse on federalism, in its classical form, mainly examined examples from well-established federal states such as Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States, highlighting the constituent units’ voluntary “coming together” and factors such as collective security and economic prosperity as incentives for creating federations. However, the application of the accumulated knowledge from these examples to post-conflict countries and the promotion of federalism as a tool for resolving conflicts has led to a different outcome, namely: post- conflict federalism. Unlike classical federalism, which emphasizes voluntary association and shared sovereignty, post-conflict federalism shifts the focus to the necessity of peacebuilding and the specific challenges of “holding together” a divided society. The new instances of post-conflict federalism have, therefore, sparked new discussions in the literature on federalism (as will be seen in the next section) on whether federalism can be an effective way of resolving conflicts or if it will make these countries more fragmented. 2.1.2. Federal Solution and Conflict Management In reviewing the academic discourse on federalism as a conflict resolution mechanism in post-conflict federal states, a robust theoretical debate is clearly ignited within the scholarly community. Thus, a critical outcome of the review reveals that scholars grapple with the fundamental question of whether federalism serves as a viable peacebuilding strategy or exacerbates ethnic tensions, ultimately hindering the path to stability and national unity (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). Consequently, the dichotomy presented in the literature reflects opposing perspectives, with proponents emphasizing federalism’s potential to contain internal conflicts and opponents cautioning against its role in solidifying ethnic cleavages, potentially 7 fostering conditions conducive to secessionist movements (Brown, 2008; Chevreau, 2017; Loizides et al., 2011). Advocates of federalism as a conflict resolution mechanism assert that it offers a pathway to stability and unity in ethnically diverse post-conflict states. Hereof, Ted Gurr, among others, contends that federalism can prevent the breakup of countries into smaller, less viable entities by managing ethnic conflicts effectively (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). The argument extends to the transformation of ethnically heterogeneous regions into more homogeneous entities, as exemplified by the case of ethno-federalism in Ethiopia (Chevreau, 2017; Harun, 2020). Some of the proponents, including Michael Hechter and Yash Pal Ghai, posit that federalism can accommodate ethnic diversity by providing autonomy and addressing the demands of minority groups, thus averting calls for secession (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). In addition, federalism is viewed as a mechanism to protect and strengthen minority cultures and languages, as evidenced by India’s experience. Cooperative federalism is lauded for creating linkages between the central government and the periphery, fostering effective bargaining, compromise, and the normalization of relationships between previously antagonistic groups (Chevreau, 2017). Furthermore, federalism is seen as an institutional device that contributes to regime consolidation, enhances democratic processes, and guarantees accountability, civil competencies, and social capital (Harun, 2020). Proponents further contend that federal structures may effectively contribute to the de-escalation of existing conflicts and crises by preventing the emergence of violent separatist movements, offering them shared rule and relative autonomy instead (Chevreau, 2017; Harun, 2020). Finally, notwithstanding the recognition of occasional breakdowns in power-sharing arrangements, the resilience of federal systems as a governing mechanism is highlighted through the stance of proponents, with the European Union and post-World War II industrial democracies serving as exemplars (Loizides et al., 2011). Conversely, critics of federalism as a conflict resolution mechanism highlight potential dangers and drawbacks associated with its implementation. Ethno-federalist arguments caution that federalism may inflame local ethnic tensions, solidifying and perpetuating identities that were initially situational (Choudhry & Hume, 2011). The empowerment of ethnonationalist forces, according to Philip G. Roeder, sets the stage 8 for potentially violent secessionist movements, counteracting federalism’s intended purpose (Chevreau, 2017). Concerns also extend to the tendency for short-term political compromises, fostering center-periphery relations that may ignore long-term needs and create a precedent for escalating demands in future negotiations (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). Will Kymlicka adds that federalism might not necessarily empower minority groups, raising challenges in drawing boundaries congruent with ethnic and administrative realities (Chevreau, 2017; Harun, 2020). Last but not least, concerns are voiced regarding the potential escalation of ethno-regional rebellion and secessionism as a consequence of federalism, suggesting that federalism might contribute to conflict exacerbation, providing impetus to demands for greater autonomy (Brown, 2009). Moreover, in the realm of policymaking efficiency in post-conflict federal structures, the literature presents a complex picture with the proponents arguing that federalism, especially when intentionally cooperative, can create multiple layers of power, potentially fostering new alliances and transforming previously fractured relationships (Chevreau, 2017; Sayid, 2021). However, on the other hand, opponents contend that the constant struggle between centralization and secession in post-conflict federalism may lead to an unstable political environment, impacting policymaking by perpetuating conflicts over competing nation-state projects (Chevreau, 2017; Harun, 2020). To synthesis, a review of the existing literature shows a paradoxical picture, where some scholars contend that federalism can reduce the desire for secession by acknowledging and empowering minority nations, while others argue that post-conflict federalism shapes political identities, granting regional governments with coercive tools that may result in political instability, and thus, the diverse viewpoints underscore the complex nature of federalism’s effect on conflict resolution (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). Therefore, since the debate on federalism’s role in conflict management in post-conflict federal structure is marked by differing opinions and no definitive verdict is seen, it becomes evident that understanding the efficiency determinants of policymaking in post-conflict federalism (to be explored in the next section) is crucial for a comprehensive assessment of the outcomes of federal structures in these delicate contexts. 9 2.1.3. Efficiency Determinants of Policymaking in Post-conflict Federalism As seen above, a lot of academic debate has been generated by the question of how well federal systems can manage conflicts, as, while some scholars argue that it can prevent or solve disputes, others insist that it might encourage even more fragmentations. Consequently, with the potential threat of disintegration and secessionism faced by post-conflict federal states taken into account, this section delves into the literature on the determinants of an efficient federal structure with a specific focus on policymaking efficiency. Efficiency in federal policymaking, as conceptualized by Braun (2008), is defined as the capacity of a federal system to produce policies effective in addressing collective issues and accepted as legitimate by citizens. Central to this efficiency are the following determinants, as identified in the literature. First, the supremacy and entrenchment of a written constitution play a crucial role (Sayid, 2021), as this ensures that constitutional amendments are not undertaken lightly, protecting the balance of power between the central and regional entities and guaranteeing recognition of subnational units’ autonomy and powers (Harun, 2020). Subsequently, a constitutionally mandated separation of powers, including a supreme court, becomes imperative for maintaining this balance and ensuring the constitution’s supremacy (Harun, 2020; Watts, 2002). The distribution of power is a linchpin in federal efficiency where a well-defined allocation of legislative and executive authority between the federal government and constituent units, as well as a clear demarcation of responsibilities, helps avoid conflicts and power imbalances (Watts, 2002; Sayid, 2021). This allocation should be flexible yet consistent, reflecting regional preferences and needs, allowing for policy innovation and adaptation to changing circumstances (Braun, 2008). However, the importance of exclusive federal powers, particularly in areas of national significance (e.g., foreign policy), is underscored to prevent overshadowing by more powerful regional entities (Harun, 2020). Third, the existence of an independent judicial body is crucial for upholding the federal balance and resolving disputes (Watts, 2002; Sayid, 2021; Harun, 2020). A constitutional court, acting as an arbiter, ensures the sovereignty of each level of government and safeguards against transgressions, playing a vital role in interpreting and upholding the constitution (Watts, 2002; Harun, 2020). Finaly, efficient federal systems facilitate 10 collaboration through well-designed intergovernmental councils, which serve as safeguards against disruptive unilateralism (Braun, 2008; Schnabel, 2020; Watts, 2002). These councils, when properly institutionalized and producing binding outputs, ensure that policies are developed collaboratively, preventing imbalances in the distribution of power and reinforcing federal stability (Schnabel, 2020; Braun, 2008). They also promote information exchange, expertise sharing, and consensus-building among subnational and national entities (Braun, 2008). Nevertheless, it is worth noting there are inconsistencies and context dependent evidence in relation to the impact of federalism on policymaking effectiveness. Some studies find that federal systems perform better than unitary systems in terms of policy outcomes, while others find the opposite or no significant difference (ibid). Moreover, some studies suggest that the effects of federalism on policymaking efficiency vary depending on the type and sector of policy, as well as on the institutional and political features of each federal system (Schnabel, 2020). Consequently, it is hard to make general conclusions or recommendations on optimal design and reform of state systems with a view to improving the efficiency of their policymaking in various contexts, so that all cases are examined within an historical and comparative context taking into consideration the specific challenges and opportunities which exist for policymaking at any given time. In order for a successful federal structure for post- conflict state-building to take root, the determinants of policy effectiveness must be carefully assessed. These determinants, all of which have contributed to the delicate equilibrium needed to maintain national unity and avoid a risk of fragmentation due to post conflict federal structure, include constitutional frameworks, division of powers as well as the establishment of effective intergovernmental mechanisms. 2.2. Federalism-Foreign Policy Interplay and Paradiplomacy Having delineated the first two central concepts of this study—federalism and post- conflict federalism—the intricate interplay between federalism and foreign policy, along with the role of paradiplomacy within this dynamic, warrants further elucidation. Consequently, the section at hand is specified to an in-depth examination of the multilateral correlation among federalism, foreign policy, and, by extension, their impact on the concept of paradiplomacy. Hence, this section, through its four subsections, will review the conceptual foundations behind the emergence of 11 paradiplomacy and subsequently provide examples demonstrating its manifestation in several post-conflict federal states. 2.2.1. Making Sense of Paradiplomacy: A Short Prologue Prior to engaging with the interplay between the federal system, as a governance mechanism, and the concept of foreign policy, along with the role this interaction assumes within paradiplomacy, it is first prudent to establish a theoretical foundation for the phenomenon itself. Thus, this necessitates endowing the phenomenon with a brief theoretical dimension by delineating its conceptual contours and retracing its historical line and place within the discourse of the extant scholarly literature. International relations, as an academic discipline that has surpassed its centennial, has overcome numerous ‘methodological and doctrinal’ obstacles to gain recognition as a legitimate field of study. Despite the diversification of approaches and the broadening of analytical perspectives resulting from various theoretical debates since its inception, “the consideration of the international actor as equivalent to the subject of international law has been a constant” (Alvarez, 20201). Thus, in international custom, as observed in Article 7.2(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the research effort to identify the authority responsible for international affairs of states concludes with the historical fact that this domain falls under the exclusive control of nation-states, as required by the principle of protecting sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. To uphold this principle, it has been customary for the highest representative authority of the state, such as the heads of state or government, to take charge of foreign policy making and implementation, along with a single bureaucratic entity, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), ensuring that states “need to have a unified position toward the exterior.” Nevertheless, despite the historical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the centrality of foreign policy, recent decades have revealed, due to various factors, the emergence of non-state actors challenging traditional authority in the international arena (Schiavon, 2018, pp. 1–2). Given that one of the most important non-state actors lately are the sub-national/non- central governments or entities (or, as phrased by Kuznetsov (2015), ‘constituent units’), the phenomenon of “paradiplomacy is generally referred to in the academic literature as the involvement of the constituent units (regions) of national states in international affairs, such as the provinces in Canada, states in the US, autonomous 12 communities in Spain, the länder in Germany, the oblasts and the republics in Russia, and so on” (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 2). Despite the preceding definition having an encompassing capacity for most of the literature’s definitions of the phenomenon, there are other noteworthy definitions in various aspects, particularly the linguistic structure and semantic expression. For instance, Wolff (2007) offers a definition that emphasizes the phenomenon as a form of ‘capacity’ of non-central units, highlighting the necessity of bypassing the central authority for the maneuver to be considered parallel. He contends that “[paradiplomacy] refers to what one could describe as a foreign policy capacity of sub-state entities, their participation, independent of their metropolitan state, in the international arena in pursuit of their own specific international interests” (Wolff, 2007, p. 141). Furthermore, Cornago (1999) provides a more functional definition by stating that paradiplomacy primarily involves non-central entities foreign policy activities “[...] with the aim to promote socio-economic, cultural, or political issues, as well as any foreign dimension of their constitutional competences” (Castan Pinos & Sacramento, 2024; Cornago, 1999, p. 40). Therefore, when synthesizing all the definitions, the main conviction that emerges indicates that the phenomenon, although considered a newcomer in international relations studies, possesses an arguably sufficient amount of theoretical significance and practical implications to equip it with academic relevance. Following the elucidation of the phenomenon’s definition, there arises the necessity to expand and elaborate on its theoretical underpinnings, which were alluded to succinctly. Specifically, if we conceptualize paradiplomacy as a force guiding subnational entities, or constituent units, toward the international arena, addressing the question, ‘what constitutes the origins of this force?’ is crucial to locate the relevance of the phenomenon within the discipline of International Relations Studies. Though some scholars, such as the case of Chatterji and Saha (2017), starts the tale of the phenomenon from the post-WW2 pluralist debates, Carr (2023) delineates three historical motives attributed to the emergence of the phenomenon in the realm of international relations studies. These three vertical motives that have engendered paradiplomacy are stemming from a fundamental factor, which is the role of globalization, and they are: (1) “the post-1960s rise of global interdependence”; (2) “changing ideas of government responsibility” with philosophies inspired by globalization such as New Liberalism and New Public Management, which 13 encouraged decentralization; and (3) the evolution of the security concept “from military-centric ideas—which remain the preserve of central governments—to a broad ‘non-traditional’ agenda including terrorism, organized crime, human security, health and the environment” (Carr, 2023, pp. 142–143). The conclusion reached by Carr (2023)—grounding paradiplomacy in globalization—is supported by Alexander S. Kuznetsov’s (2015) earlier findings. Kuznetsov, one of the foremost researchers in this field recently, concluded that globalization and regionalization have enhanced the role of non-state actors, making the ‘high politics’ “[…] become less dependent on national state regulations, but more influenced by powers that have flourished tremendously in the last few decades on supranational and subnational (regional) levels.” Therefore, although initial scholarly focus on the interaction between globalization and international relations centered on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) as non-state actors, this paradigm shift has broadened the discussion to include a wider array of non-state actors in international relations. Consequently, actors such as supranational bodies, transnational organized crime (TOC), and even individuals (as seen in the phenomenon of celebrity diplomacy) have gained recognition. Thus, Kuznetsov argues that the academic discourse on transnationalism, and the debate on the state’s future role, have led to a form of erosion in states’ assertion of sovereignty—or, as he puts it, a “partial extinction of sovereign states as major global players.” He accordingly concludes that “in these circumstances, it seems absolutely natural that states are increasingly losing their traditional authority and sovereignty” (Kuznetsov, 2015, pp. 1-2). Even though the discourse of transnationalism questions the future of central government’s traditional control over sovereignty assertion, it may be misleading to proclaim that it has initially brought about a fundamental transformation in the traditional development and implementation practices of the foreign policies. The main reason here is that the fundamental schools of thought in international relations and their theories have not conceded, or more precisely, have not ceased to affirm, the traditional truth that states alone are the primary units of analysis, the principal actors in international law, and the direct subjects of the discipline’s analytical focus (Alvarez, 2020; Kuznetsov, 2015). Therefore, Schiavon’s (2018) assertion that “the number of internal actors participating in international issues has increased considerably, even though the national Executives maintain the constitutional power 14 to direct foreign policy and conclude international treaties,” appears to adequately explain the initial impact of the newcomer actors’ involvement in the practice of foreign policy. Similar to Kuznetsov’s (2015) proposition that these new actors—such as, supranational bodies, transnational organized crime, and even individuals—have initiated what can be considered a “partial extinction” of state’s traditional sovereign perception; Schiavon (2018) also argues that, although the impact on the state remains within arguably manageable limits, “the total control of the central Executive in foreign affairs has been increasingly challenged” by these actors in the international arena (Schiavon, 2018, p. 2). However, when sub-national entities, or constituent units (regions), entered the international arena as actors, it caused a significant disruption to the already eroded traditional foreign policy framework. The uniqueness of their impact lies in the fact that, unlike other emerging actors, “[...] subnational entities are the only actors who have a state-like nature [...].” Hence, the potential, or rather the risk, of subnational entities encroaching on and overlapping with the central government in its traditional spheres of influence—or, in other words, its domains of sovereignty practice and assertion—underscores the importance of examining their participation in the international arena from multiple perspectives. This examination is particularly significant given that these entities are actively engaged at the international level nowadays, to the extent that they “sometimes even challenge the official foreign policy of their central governments through their statements or actions” (Kuznetsov, 2015, pp. 2-4). The inevitable significance of the phenomenon of paradiplomacy—i.e., the participation of sub-national entities in the international arena—imposes a multi- dimensional importance on both scholarly and practical circles. For example, Wolff (2007) asserts that “[paradiplomacy] is a conceptually and practically challenging development” for international relations as a field of study and for states as the traditional actors in the creation and implementation of foreign policies. Conceptually, the phenomenon challenges the entrenched belief within the discipline of international relations that sub-state actors are not within its purview; while, practically, it challenges the traditional notion of state sovereignty, which “in a sense, [is] hollowed out and perhaps fatally undermined if they have to share this essential prerogative of stateness” (Wolff, 2007, pp. 141-142). Moreover, while some scholars, such as Dubrovina and Salamov (2019), posit that paradiplomacy may emerges from a form 15 of consensus between the central authority—the national—and its constituent sub- national entities, others, such as Pinos and Sacramento (2024) present a contrasting viewpoint, contending that “paradiplomacy does not necessarily develop in harmony with the interests of the parent state.” They delve deeper into this argument by asserting that “any entity capable of delineating and advocating specific interests—and acting upon them—has the potential to antagonize the interests of another unit, irrespective of their inherent connection.” This potential, they argue, engenders “incongruent interests, and hence frictional dynamics,” wherein the foreign policies and interests of both parties—the national authority and sub-national jurisdictions—may exhibit disparities in both theoretical underpinnings and practical implementation (Castan Pinos & Sacramento, 2024, p. 195). Thus, particularly when considering that the foreign policies of subnational units may manifest as what Pinos and Sacramento (2024) describe as “subversive” policies, such as “pro-secession” paradiplomacy, it becomes evident that this phenomenon also assumes additional significance due to its inherent threat to the territorial integrity of the concerned state. Furthermore, recognizing the ramifications of the phenomenon is not limited only to the theoretical circles but also appears in practice by extending to the level of state policies. For instance, Carr (2023) posits that Australian foreign policy has traversed a historical trajectory characterized by what may be termed a tumultuous period. During this time, the proliferation of influential entities and communication channels within foreign policy frameworks—attributable to the standardization of paradiplomacy—has engendered cacophony and distortion in policy outcomes. Carr elucidates, “to the degree there are problems of hearing one voice clearly, [...] primarily owing to the predominant (national) soloist’s uncertainty regarding “which anthem to perform.” This predicament necessitated legislative action by the Australian government at the close of 2020, bestowing upon it the authority to veto agreements forged between sub- national entities and external actors. This measure was implemented “to ensure that Australia, not merely at a federal echelon, but encompassing all tiers of governance, articulates a unified stance” (Carr, 2023, p. 141). However, despite its theoretical and practical importance, paradiplomacy seems to be facing an issue, and perhaps a dilemma, of incorporation within the discipline of international relations. Despite the fact that paradiplomacy, as previously mentioned, presents a novel and clear challenge to traditional thinking in international relations to the extent that this challenge is “[...] 16 marking nearly a paradigmatic shift from the Westphalian concept of sovereign states as exclusively responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and war” (Chatterji and Saha, 2017, pp. 1-2), it cannot be said that the phenomenon has received the attention and prominence commensurate with its significance. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to state that Schiavon (2018) best expressed this dilemma of incorporation, noting that “paradiplomacy appears to be the elephant in the room in the discipline of international relations; it is there, it is growing, and very little attention has been given to explain its causes and consequences” (Schiavon, 2018, p. 1). When examining the underlying reasons for this situation, it is evident that “the rise of paradiplomatic activity, which has been recognized and normalized, [was not] seen as a displacement of the state but as its complement” due to the international relations discipline’s historical reluctance to recognize sub-national actors as legitimate. Additionally, the main focus regarding it in the international debates that took place in the aftermath of its theoretical emergence in the mid-1980s was discussing “the legality and relevance of “non-central governments” participation in international relations” instead of the questions of “how or why they did so.” Consequently, overlooking this phenomenon undoubtedly “hinders a more complex analysis of international reality” (Alvares, 2020, p. 1). Recognizing the existence of neglect, or as we have termed it, the “dilemma of incorporation,” of paradiplomacy of the discipline of International relation does not imply a complete absence of research efforts by international relations scholars. Despite the theoretical frameworks of major schools of thought in the discipline ignoring non-central units as active agents and thus their participation in the international arena—paradiplomacy—as a subject of analysis, its research legacy is advancing in short but steady steps. For example, Kuznetsov (2015) traces the historical roots of studies on the phenomenon as a field of scholarly inquiry and concludes that it has developed over four historical phases: (1) the 1970s, marked by the “transnational revolution in world politics” as a significant factor influencing its inception; (2) the 1980s, where the foundational conceptual, theoretical, and research frameworks began to bud, although it was criticized for its North American centrism; (3) the 1990s, during which the phenomenon gained a global dimension due to the rising role of non-central units, driven by factors such as the flourishing of globalization, regionalism, and the move towards European integration; and finally (4) 17 the 2000s, described as “a period when the study of subnational authorities’ activities in the international arena is decisively crystallized into a sustainable subdiscipline in contemporary political science” (Kuznetsov, 2015, pp. 34-44). An important conclusion drawn from decades of cumulative research on this phenomenon is the attempt to elucidate why and how sub-central units are involved in the international arena. For instance, Gürbey et al. (2023) cites a view on the driving roots of the phenomenon by echoing a conclusion saying that “paradiplomacy [is] being primarily driven by stateless nationalism or ethnonationalism, especially in the context of nations without states [and] thus, paradiplomatic activities are strongest in nationalist regions, such as the Basque Country, Wallonia, Catalonia, Flanders, or Québec” (Gürbey et al., 2023; p. 7). Schiavon (2018) further elaborates by compiling most of the arguments regarding the objectives, providing a comprehensive overview that suggests sub-national governments engage in international affairs for economic, political, or social (cultural) interests. Subsequently, he examines five specific objectives in greater detail: (1) “promoting local development” through “external economic promotion”; (2) “promot[ing] socio-cultural exchanges to project the sub- state unit’s distinct culture, values, or language” and forge links with their ethnic counterparts beyond borders; (3) pursuing political aims by “advancing local autonomy or even preparing for national secession or independence,” a notion also known as protodiplomacy; (4) “influencing regional or global policy debates in areas or issues in which they have a particular interest”; and (5) “”addressing common- border or regional issues, such as infrastructure, trade, investment, migration, development, and the environment” (Schiavon, 2018, pp. 7–8). On the other hand, in relation to the instruments employed by sub-national entities for paradiplomacy, Carr (2023) delineates the forms of paradiplomatic actions through identifying two distinct forms of paradiplomatic behavior by subnational units: (1) ‘Mediating strategies’, i.e., the pursuit of their interests through channels bypassing central authority such as “[...] lobbying federal leaders, cooperating with diplomatic networks such as embassies and national seats in multilateral forums, or encouraging national efforts aimed at an international audience”; and (2) ‘primary strategies’, i.e., non-national units’ resources mobilizing to engage in the international arena without passing through or coordinating with central authority—traditionally concerned with foreign policy (Carr, 2023, p. 143). Schiavon (2018) adds that subnational entities 18 utilize various tools, including: (1) concluding agreements, which range from “non- binding, sisterhood and inter-institutional agreements, to participating in local, regional and international networks and organizations”; (2) the diplomatic role of subnational leaders, through “receiving visitors from around the world and organizing international events” or “traveling to foreign countries on trade and investment missions to strengthen relations with their diaspora” and “concluding cooperation agreements or participating in regional or global meetings”; and finally, (3) providing an institutional framework for paradiplomacy by establishing “offices of representation of interests abroad” (Schiavon, 2018, p. 8). In conclusion, the traditional means of foreign policy-making and implementation, which are intertwined with state sovereignty, are being challenged by the risk of interference—paradiplomacy—posed by sub-national entities. Thus, examining this phenomenon is of significant importance, as Kuznetsov (2015) underscores its significance by stating, “it seems fascinating to study paradiplomacy because this phenomenon is not only the major variable for examining contemporary international relations, but also because subnational diplomacy is a crucial factor for understanding those problems related to the interpretation of sovereignty and processes of centralization/decentralization that are taking place within modern states today” (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 4). Therefore, this research attempts to contribute, even modestly, to the expansion of the study of this phenomenon by examining it within the federal structure in the post-conflict phase in Somalia. Thus, as this section of the research aimed to outline the place of paradiplomacy in the literature and highlight its conceptual meaning in general, the subsequent section will proceed to study the emergence of the phenomenon in the context of the interaction between federalism as a system of governance and the concept of foreign policy. 2.2.2. The Federal Structure and the Emergence of Paradiplomacy The literature on federalism and foreign policy reviewed in this regard unveils that the interaction between the two concepts brings forth intricated dynamics and tensions. Locating the source of this tension is not an arduous task, as the issue primarily revolves around the federal balance. This balance, as Schuetze (2009) described, involves maintaining the autonomy of each tier within the ‘duplex regimen’ of federal governance through the ‘architectural principle’ of striving to achieve ‘unity in 19 diversity’. Moreover, considering the point further emphasized by the Swiss statesman Alfred Escher (1819-1882) that “in federal systems, foreign policy should be characterized as external unity, internal diversity” (Schiavon, 2018, p. 3), it is evident that this situation—federal governance-foreign policy interaction—is fraught with significant challenges. Thus, this complex relationship is well-exemplified in Gambari’s (1991) reference to Kenneth C. Wheare’s remark on the inherent conflict between the federal governance tiers. Wheare, a seminal figure in federal studies, observed that “federalism and a spirited foreign policy go ill together,” emphasizing the potential challenges stemming from constitutional divisions of power within federal tiers, which, as mentioned, are often fraught with disagreement (Gambari, 1991, 113). Therefore, the discourse surrounding the management of foreign policy within federations mainly revolves around the assumptions of whether external affairs should be the exclusive domain of the national government or whether the states within the federation should have a more direct role in the international sphere (Ababakr, 2023; Gambari, 1991). For instance, Schuetze (2009) delves into that matter, discussing the abovementioned federal principle’s attempt to find “unity in diversity” and the resulting division of powers between the central and peripheral governments. Thus, he concludes that the tension between the doctrines of sovereign equality and dualism in the federal structures further complicates the international standing of federal states, leading to variations in how federations handle external affairs, such as “closed federations” acting like unitary states and “open federations” allowing member states to engage in treaty-making with third states (Schuetze, 2009). Furthermore, another angle which has gathered significant attention within the academic discourse in this vein emphasizes the complexities of power distribution and its impact on the making effective foreign policy in the federal states. As outlined previously, the essence of the debate centers on the equilibrium between central authority and subnational autonomy within federal systems and the consequent implications of this balance. Drawing on the literature reviewed, which includes a variety of scholarly sources, the discourse reveals the complexities of the two concepts, providing a variety of perspectives (Ababakr, 2023; Schiavon, 2018; Schuetze, 2009; Tierney, 2022). For instance, Tierney (2022) contends that the constitutional commitment to a federal union necessitates the central government’s possession of adequate powers to sustain an effective legal order and operate proficiently on both 20 domestic and international fronts. However, this inclination towards the centralization of power allocation, especially in matters of high politics, encounters resistance from the principle of constituent autonomy, which advocates for distributing powers to sub- state entities to enable meaningful self-governance. Consequently, the epicenter of this tension frequently converges on the sphere of international relations—a domain traditionally monopolized by the central authority within federal constitutions (Tierney, 2022). This dynamic unequivocally illustrates that managing external relations within federal systems is fraught with challenges, as divisions between governmental levels often complicate the processes of treaty-making, conducting transactions, and implementing agreements (Gambari, 1991). Hence, the division of powers between the center and the peripheries may constitute a motivating factor for the participation of non-central entities in foreign policy, potentially leading to ambiguity, rivalry, and disagreement between different government levels in most cases. Considering the importance of this possibility of confrontation is important due to the debate over central control versus unit autonomy extends to the constitutional division of powers, creating a fundamental question in the federal structure: who governs in the realm of international politics? Consequently, this apparent paradox can be explained by understanding that federal structure entails a form of sovereignty that is shared or divided, rather than unitary or exclusive, thus challenging the Westphalian international order and principles of international law (Lequesne & Paquin, 2017). Assembling the narrative, which examines the intersection of foreign policy-federal structure and their relationship to the emergence of paradiplomacy, comes to the conclusion that the emergence of a discursive space for exploring the contours of shared or divided sovereignty within the federal state has engendered a dynamic incentive for non-centralized actors to pursue their interests and agendas in the international sphere. Therefore, the traditional monopoly of central governments over foreign policy has faced challenges within federal structures, with federal units, such as states, cantons, and länder, have increasingly engaged in international relations, giving rise to paradiplomacy (Schiavon, 2018). Consequently, the phenomenon of ‘paradiplomacy’ has gained prominence in the federal studies literature, as it enables sub-state entities to shape the state’s international stance and, in some instances, assert their separatist intentions and distinct identity (Tierney, 2022). Even though the 21 phenomenon of paradiplomacy raises questions about the distribution of power in federal systems and prompts a reevaluation of who truly governs in the realm of international relations, a case of neglect of non-central governments as a significant actor is seen in the study of international relations; as the conventional focus on central governments marginalizes the significance of sub-state actors in shaping foreign policy (Lecours, 2002; Lequesne & Paquin, 2017). The exploration of direct causal relationships between the interaction of federalism and foreign policy, and the potential emergence of paradiplomacy from this interplay, is seen to have received empirical validation from scholars within the pertinent research community. For instance, according to Kuznetsov (2015), the main perspective of most scholars of paradiplomacy is that the diplomatic activities of sub- national governments are mainly driven by the profound changes occurring within federalism and federal intergovernmental relations. He further stressed that many research on paradiplomacy in the 1970s and 1980s indicated that it could be regarded as a “by-product” of federalism. This argument was highlighted by Kuznetsov in his six-questioned explanatory framework for the study of subnational governments’ involvement in international relations, where he addressed the first question of “what are the causes of the flourishing of the paradiplomatic activities of an examined region?” by identifying federalization and decentralization as the first “internal”/ “domestic” causes of paradiplomacy. He, therefore, pointed out that the emergence of paradiplomacy can be understood as a consequence of the evolution of inter- governmental relations within federal states (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 102). However, El- Dessouki (2018) advocates for caution in directly associating federalism, or decentralization more broadly, with paradiplomacy, given the observation that federal units within federal countries may abstain from international participation, while sub- national entities—such as cities in unitary states—may actively engage in international affairs, thereby challenging the notion of a definitive causal link between federalism and paradiplomacy. Finally, as seen, paradiplomacy creates even more tensions between central governments and sub-state governments, as the latter engage in foreign policy traditionally within the purview of the former (Schiavon, 2018). These tensions have fueled academic interest, prompting scholars to explore the consequences of paradiplomacy with some scholars arguing that paradiplomacy offers opportunities for 22 sub-state governments to establish bilateral and multilateral relations, represent their interests externally, and enhance their international status (Gürbey et al., 2023). However, examining specific case, Ababakr’s (2023) study of the Iraqi Kurdistan region illustrates the inherent conflict between federal states and sub-state regions which can escalate to the point where sub-state governments pursue increasingly autonomous and separatist foreign policy objectives (Ababakr, 2023). Consequently, there is ongoing debate on whether these international activities strengthen or undermine the national conduct of foreign policy (Schiavon, 2018). Hence, in conclusion, the intricate relationship between federalism and foreign policy unveils a tension between the two forces, central control and unit autonomy, as highlighted by Tierney (2022), revolves around the constitutional commitment to federal union while addressing the demands for constituent autonomy and, thus, this tension introduces the emergence of ‘paradiplomacy’ which further complicates matters by providing non- centralized actors with opportunities to shape international stances. Therefore, aiming for a further examining the impact on federal states, the following sections will scrutinize this phenomenon through the discussion of the related debates in the literature. 2.2.3. Academic Discourse on Paradiplomacy As demonstrated in the preceding sections, due to the fact that it is intricately linked to the sovereignty of the federal states, the phenomenon of paradiplomacy has sparked considerable academic debate that revealed four prominent discussions in the related literature. The first debate focuses on terminology and definition, whereas the subsequent one lays out the base motives the phenomenon. The third centers on the clash between the Multi-level Federal Governance School and the Centralized Federalism School, while the last scrutinizes the perspectives of the Proponents and Opponents of Paradiplomacy. First, the debate on defining paradiplomacy is multifaceted as, even though Ivo Duchacek and Panayotis Soldatos, considered by some to be the founding fathers of studies in this field, initially termed it as the external activities of non-central governments with international actors, however, alternative terms like “multi-layered diplomacy,” “constituent diplomacy,” “regional diplomacy,” “federative diplomacy,” and “trans-federal diplomacy” have been proposed. Despite these alternatives, 23 “paradiplomacy” has emerged as the widely accepted term, capturing the essence of sub-state governments engaging in paradiplomatic activities (Gürbey et al., 2023; Kuznetsov, 2015; Schiavon, 2018). Another aspect of the discussion concerning terms relevant to paradiplomacy was the term ‘regions,’ representing the counterpart in the equation of the phenomenon or, more accurately, the actor. Researchers utilized various labels including ‘regional government,’ ‘regional authorities,’ ‘constituent governments/actors/units,’ ‘non-central governments,’ ‘subnational governments/actors/units,’ ‘federated units,’ ‘constituent governments,’ ‘subnational governments/actors,’ ‘federated units.’ Since paradiplomacy is a phenomenon shared by both federal and unitary states, one of the major deficiencies of the mentioned terminologies is the difficulty in using the term ‘subnational governments’ for cities and municipalities in the unitary states. Therefore, Kuznetsov (2015) argues that “the concepts ‘region,’ ‘regional governments,’ ‘constituent government/unit,’ and ‘subnational government/actor’ are recognized as synonymous and will be used interchangeably.” Regarding cities and municipalities in unitary states, he suggested to “place actors on the municipal and lower levels separately from ‘region,’ and consider them as an independent category from ‘local governments’” (Kuznetsov, 2015, pp. 21-25). Subsequently, in the discourse between the multi-level federal governance school and the centralized federalism school, Lequesne and Paquin (2017) present a comprehensive exploration. Advocates of the multi-level governance approach, such as Brian Hocking, Ian Bache, Liesbet Hooghe, and Charlie Jeffery, argue that globalization and regional integration render centralized foreign policy obsolete, and thus they propose a model where both central and non-central governments cooperate, emphasizing the equitable distribution of powers. In contrast, proponents of the centralized approach, illustrated by Kenneth C. Wheare, Rufus Davis, and Fritz W. Scharpf, assert that centralization is essential for effective foreign policy, as according to them, paradiplomacy jeopardizes the state’s ability to make binding decisions, leading to internal conflicts and a compromised international image (Lequesne and Paquin, 2017). In the end, in their seminal work regarding the concept and the context of paradiplomacy, Chatterji and Saha (2017) underline the presence of various viewpoints within the literature concerning the debate between advocates and adversaries of the 24 phenomenon. While, on the one hand, proponents argue that paradiplomacy fosters cultural representation, decentralization, and democratization as it brings diplomatic practices closer to the people, enhances public engagement, and accelerates economic development through foreign relations, however, on the other hand, Opponents raise concerns about uneven institutional capacity, potential ethnic mobilization, and the need for central government coordination. The central state’s role in ensuring congruence between its foreign policy and paradiplomatic practices emerges as a critical factor and thus the potential weakening of state unity due to cultural and ethnic identity issues is a notable concern (Chatterji and Saha, 2017). Therefore, in short, paradiplomacy is advocated by some for its advantages in promoting cultural and ethnic communication, growth of the economy, and international partnerships, however, others criticize it for its dangers of internal turmoil, ethnic politicization, and the possible erosion of central power. The logical implications that arise from the discussions mentioned above are grounded on the fact that finding a balance between the autonomy of non-central actors and the consistency of the state’s foreign policy emerges as a vital challenge in the changing context of federal states. Thus, the following section, by surveying the manifestations of the phenomenon in the post-conflict federal states, will look at how the tension between federal levels affects foreign policy and the role of paradiplomacy in these countries. 2.2.4. Paradiplomacy in Post-Conflict Federal Context The discourse on paradiplomacy, as previously discussed, initially emerged in the 1970s, rooted in case studies examining the international activities of constituent units and the structural responses and organizational accommodations within established federal countries, including Canada, the United States, and Australia. Conversely, as the federal structure began to be viewed as a mechanism for addressing political conflicts in countries characterized by heterogeneity, novel perspectives and debates has rose regarding the extent to which the federal framework effectively addresses the underlying causes of conflicts, on one hand, and maintains state cohesion in the face of such conflicts, on the other. Given the significance of exploring these emerging challenges within the discourse on the operational aspects of the federal structure— particularly in the post-conflict phase and with a special emphasis on foreign policy— it is instructive to examine the responses of countries like Iraq and Bosnia and 25 Herzegovina. It is, therefore, hoped that these countries will give valuable projections to the problems of foreign policy making under the elucidated circumstances as they adopted a federal approach as a means to conflict de-escalation. The constitutional and legal provisions governing the external activities of regions within a federal system are, as elucidated in the previous sections, identified as crucial factors influencing the growth of regional paradiplomacy. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the legal and constitutional frameworks established in Iraq after 2003 is seen to have played a pivotal role in shaping the region’s paradiplomacy. The delicate federal structure, characterized by ambiguity and a lack of precise definition of external powers, has allowed the Kurdistan Region to engage in paradiplomacy, eventually evolving into protodiplomacy with a secessionist orientation—protodiplomacy (Ababakr, 2023). This transformation is driven by internal structural variables, nationalism, and a desire for independence illustrating how paradiplomacy can be a tool for subnational units to pursue secession, thus, shows the magnitude of maximum this phenomenon can reach in post-conflict conditions (Ababakr, 2023; Danilovich & Abdulrahman, 2017). Accordingly, this instance underlines the significant risk correlated with these diplomatic efforts in post-conflict contexts, manifesting in maximal situation of paradiplomacy’s potential culmination in the ultimate disintegration of the state. Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the foreign policy domain is constitutionally assigned to the state level, with the Presidency responsible for conducting foreign policy (Banović et al., 2021). However, the country’s complicated multilevel polity, characterized by power fragmentation and relocation, is seen to have resulted in challenges in the execution of foreign affairs. The existence of sub-national paradiplomatic missions and offices, such as those established by the Government of Republika Srpska Entity, further complicates the situation, as these entities pursue actions abroad outside the official parameters set by state-level institutions. Thus, the imprecise constitutional provisions on foreign policy implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina make it susceptible to the influence of ethnonational policies and interests (Hasić & Karabegović, 2019). The emergence of paradiplomacy as a critical factor influencing the trajectory of these federal structures makes the relevance of studying it in the post-conflict federal context 26 becomes even more. Paradiplomacy, as seen from the two case above, introduces complexities and challenges that necessitate a nuanced understanding of the interplay between federalism, foreign policy, and the actions of subnational units as it might be various factors such as driven by regional ambitions, nationalism, and a desire for independence. Therefore, it is resealable to of consider paradiplomacy in the analysis of the logical results of the interplay between federalism and foreign policy in the context post-conflict federal states, as it can have profound implications for the stability and integrity of these political entities. Finally, the two cases presented in this section from Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina are considered to illustrate the challenges of post-conflict Federal States with respect to their management of Foreign Policy as well as drawing attention to the consequences of paradiplomacy on its coherence. In Iraq, the Kurdistan Region’s paradiplomacy is seen as a preparation for secession, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, sub-national paradiplomatic missions complicate the execution of foreign policy at the state level. Given that the narrative in this section serves as a conclusion to both the presentation of the conceptual framework and the review of the general literature pertinent to this research, it effectively grounds the topic within an empirical reality, the forthcoming section will transition to introducing the theoretical framework selected for examining the problem at hand. 2.3. Rooting Paradiplomacy to Federal Structure: Theoretical Framework In addressing the central question of this study, “how did post-conflict federal structure affect the emergence of paradiplomacy in post-unitary Federal State of Somalia,” the approach adopted entailed an examination of the internal structure of the federal system as a mechanism for elucidation. The emphasis on structure within this analysis was not an arbitrary selection; rather, as elucidated by El-Dessouki (2018), the importance of comprehending the nexus between domestic configurations and foreign policy is paramount, given that the understanding of a nation’s foreign policies is predicated upon national structures that establish regulatory frameworks, and the objectives of its foreign policy. Thus, this study will answer the research question by applying the methodology propounded by El-Dessouki (2018), which predicates its focus on the quintessence of paradiplomacy from a superior vantage point, namely, the structures operative within the examined system, by exploring the degree to which the 27 local structures either facilitates or impedes its development, through a dissection of the local structure into four distinct variables: “legal grounds, level of autonomy, type of intergovernmental relations, and [the degree of] institutionalization” (El-Dessouki, 2018, 102). The model hand too was not a matter of arbitrary choice, but rather based on its alignment of most of the variables with the discussion in Section (2.1.3.) above, which explained how the efficiency of policy-making in the federal system is influenced by various factors in the post-conflict phase, such as the supremacy and entrenchment of a written constitution, the distribution of power, the existence of an independent judicial body, and the facilitation of collaboration through well-designed intergovernmental councils. Figure 1: The component of theoretical framework on the federal structure-paradiplomacy relation (El-Dessouki, 2018) This explanatory framework, as seen in Figure 1, consists of studying four variables in the internal structures of the countries studied. The first variable, legal grounds, concentrates on the constitutional and juridical authorities bestowed upon subnational units concerning foreign affairs, as delineated in pertinent statutes and ordinances. This variable is predicated on the hypothesis that the manifestation of paradiplomatic instances within a sovereign state may be elucidated through the prism of whether regional jurisdictions are endowed with constitutional capacities for engagement in the global sphere. Thus, it scrutinizes three facets germane to the distribution of authority between the central government and the peripheral entities, to wit: (1) constitutional and legal authorities pertaining to international relations; (2) national and regional 28 statutes and regulations relevant to foreign affairs; and (3) the degree of juridical authorization for entering treaties with external entities accorded to regional governments. Regarding the second variable, level of autonomy, it transitions from the premise that the presence of paradiplomatic instances unequivocally suggests that subnational entities wield a considerable degree of autonomy. This autonomy, potentially, affords them the capacity to exert influence upon the central government’s formulation of foreign policy, in the minimal scenario, or to enjoy a pivotal influence that empowers direct participation within the international sphere, in the maximal scenario. El-Dessouki (2018) points to an examination of the autonomy extent of subnational entities, utilizing indicators, of which the most significant, in the context of this research, is the authority to execute political decisions, for a more nuanced comprehension of paradiplomacy in the country being analyzed (ibid). The third variable, the type of intergovernmental relations, endeavors to elucidate whether the character of the relationship, be it cooperative or conflictual, amongst the central government and the peripheral governments, underpins the genesis of paradiplomacy within subnational entities. El-Dessouki (2018) herein addresses the dynamic between the governmental strata, a dynamic that quintessentially shapes our comprehension of paradiplomacy; for, within the context of a cooperative relation, subnational entities engage under the aegis of the central authority, whereas, within the ambit of a conflictual relation, especially when the domestic structure hinder or undermine regions’ international activities, subnational entities assert their presence on the international stage as a manifestation of defiance against the central authority, or as the author articulates, to “internationalize the domestic conflict.” Finally, the fourth variable, institutionalization, posits that subnational actors engaged in paradiplomacy exhibit significant levels of institutionalization internationally within the realm of foreign affairs. This is manifested through the development of foreign policy strategies, the establishment of foreign policy institutions—i.e. regional departments/ministries concerned with foreign affairs—and the maintenance of permanent representations abroad, distinct from the diplomatic missions sanctioned by the central government. The significance of this variable, as elucidated by El-Dessouki (2018), resides in the premise that the degree of paradiplomatic institutionalization within a region offers insights into the predominant motivations underpinning subnational foreign policies. This, in turn, provides indications concerning the 29 orientations of these entities, which may pivot around political ambitions—i.e. secession—economic objectives, or cultural aspirations—i.e. cross-border interactions with a common ethnicity group (ibid). Ultimately, the explanatory theoretical framework selected for this master’s thesis is drawn from the synthesis of critical insights derived from the theoretical contributions of El-Dessouki (2018), it is anticipated that this framework will adequately address the central question of the study, which is to examine the impact of federalism adoption in Somalia on the emergence of paradiplomacy. This thesis will analyze the origins and the objectives paradiplomacy in post-conflict federal state of Somalia by exploring the domestic structure of the federal system of Somalia with the objective of addressing the central question of this thesis, which was, “how did post-conflict federal structure affect the emergence of paradiplomacy and the fragmentation of foreign policy in post- unitary federal state of Somalia.” Thus, in pursuit of this objective, the four domestic structure variables proposed by El-Dessouki (2018)—namely, the legal grounds, the level of federal member state’s autonomy, the status of intergovernmental relations, and the degree of institutionalization—will be discussed to elucidate the structural underpinnings of the emergence of paradiplomacy. 2.4. Concluding Remarks This сhарter, which аttemрts to elucidate the key сonсeрts аnԁ рresent the theoretical bаsis of the research, exаmineԁ the interасtion between federalism аnԁ рost-сonfliсt federalism аnԁ, thereby, that interрlаy’s implications for the determinants of раrаԁiрlomасy. Initially, regarding the differences and similarities between federalism and post-conflict federalism, the analysis has reached a conviction that the evolution of federalism from classical to post-conflict federalism constitutes a considerable change in the motivations underlying national state formation. Classical federalism, with its emphasis on voluntary associations and shared sovereignty, differs from post- conflict federalism that responds to the problems of conflict afflicted states by focusing primarily on averting civil war and secession. In addition to that, the main distinction between classical federalism and post-conflict federalism is not based on their theoretical framework and conceptualization, but on their modes of creation and specific challenges. According to Alfred C. Stepan’s typology of federalism (Choudhry & Hume, 2011), classical federalism can be categorized as “coming-together” 30 federalism while post-conflict federalism can be seen as “holding-together” federalism. Subsequently, a discussion has emerged in the reviewed literature concerning the role of federalism in resolving conflicts in post-war federal states, with advocates arguing its potential for promoting stability, unity and accommodating divergent identities; and, critics, on the other hand, express concerns about worsening tensions which are fostering conditions conducive to secessionist movements. In this regard, a key aspect that attracted scholarship attention was the effectiveness of policy making within the structure of federalism. The determinants of efficient federal structures, as explored in the literature, encompass the supremacy and entrenchment of a written constitution, the clarity of power distribution, the existence of an independent judicial body, and the facilitation of collaboration through well-designed intergovernmental councils. However, the literature examined regarding the impact of federalism on policymaking effectiveness appears to be pointing out the need for all-encompassing and the context- based assessment and consideration of specific challenges and opportunities in each case. Furthermore, a multifaceted interplay between central control and subnational autonomy in the federal structure is revealed in the study of federalism and foreign policy. The tension, as illuminated by scholars like Tierney (2022), emerges from the constitutional commitment to federal union while accommodating demands for constituent autonomy. The phenomenon of paradiplomacy, an emerging dynamic space in which noncentralized actors shape international policies, is created by this complex relationship. The academic discourse surrounding paradiplomacy presents two significant discussions: (1) The clash between the multi-level federal governance school and the centralized federalism school, which highlights the debate over the relevance of centralized foreign policy in an era of globalization; and (2) the perspectives of proponents and opponents of paradiplomacy, which delve into the advantages and challenges posed by subnational actors engaging in diplomatic activities. The importance of striking a delicate equilibrium between the autonomy of non-central actors and the consistency of national foreign policy is underlined in both discussions. 31 Finaly, examining paradiplomacy in the context of post-conflict federal states, as illustrated by cases in Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina, adds another layer of complexity. The obstacles revealed by field experiments to the effects of paradiplomacy to the federal structures in these countries, ranging from the fragmentation of the cohesion of foreign policy decision-making to separatist tendencies, point out and emphasize the fragility of the federal equilibrium in the post- conflict phase with the importance of examining the effects of paradiplomacy in other cases of post-conflict federations. As evident, in the context of an evolving environment for international relations in federal systems, which remains subject to constant review and debate, it is more relevant than ever that a thoughtful study be carried out on how paradiplomacy affects sovereignty, state unity and the effectiveness of foreign policy implementation. Thus, this thesis will, using the theoretical contribution of El-Dessouki (2018) presented in the proceeding section, analyze the impact of the federal structure in Somalia on the emergence of paradiplomatic activities by the constituent units by analyzing the domestic legislative and operational structure of the Somali federal system, considering the specific challenges of post- conflict federalism and the factors that affect the effectiveness of political decision- making within it. 32 3. TRACING THE ROOTS OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT In this chapter, an in-depth examination of the multifaceted socio-political and historical factors shaping the conflict landscape in Somalia is conducted, grounded in Samatar’s (1992) hypothesis that understanding Somalia’s collapse requires scrutinizing the transformations in its social structure. Accordingly, for the aforementioned purpose, this chapter scrutinizes the social architecture of traditional Somali society, elucidates the manner in which this structure concurrently functioned as a political system, and subsequently delineates the influence of Islam in augmenting this traditional socio-political order. After this general picture of the traditional system, the chapter will discuss the factors that led to the political conflict under study by considering the impact of subsequent transformations of this traditional system as a result of the inputs of the early state-making period, colonial legacies, and post- colonial state formation. In short, this сhарter attempts to estаblish аn explanatory frаmework for the аnаlysis of the genesis аnԁ evolution of the сonfliсt in Somаliа, and thus, ultimately, рursuing to furnish а сomрrehensive insights into its founԁаtionаl саuses аnԁ the ԁynаmiсs eliсit its рersistenсy. 3.1. The Socio-Political Structure of the Traditional Somali Society This seсtion аttemрts loсаte а frаmework for сomрrehenԁing the funԁаmentаl trаԁitions аnԁ ԁynаmiсs of Somаli soсiety by exрloring its historiсаl roots, trаԁitionаl soсiаl orgаnizаtion, аnԁ рolitiсаl orԁer. Consequently, in pursuit of this objective, this section initially delineates the historical trajectory of the conventional societal framework of the Somali populace, subsequently scrutinizes the political ramifications inherent in the societal structuring within the traditional milieu, and, ultimately, assesses the repercussions stemming from the advent of Islam on this archetypal socio- political order. 3.1.1. The Social Organization of the Traditional Somali Society The Somali Peninsula (seeing in Figure 2), also referred to as the Horn of Africa, emerges historically as a critical juncture in the global trade nexus, pivotal in the early interactions between Africa, Asia, and Europe. As the homeland of the ancestors of the Somali people, its significance stretches back 7000 years, marking it as a cradle of 33 human civilization (Abdullahi, 2017). Furthermore, a pivotal indicator of this region’s geographical salience was its paramountcy in ancient transmarine economic systems, a significance underscored by its integral function in the exchange of highly sought- after commodities, including frankincense, myrrh, and spices, ardently desired by ancient civilizations such as the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Mycenaeans, and Babylonians. The Land of Punt, located in the northeastern Somali Peninsula, epitomizes this era of economic vibrancy as, notably, the fleet dispatched by the fifth Pharaoh of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt Queen Hatshepsut (c. 1507–1458 BC) in 1478 BC, memorialized in the temple of Deir el-Bahri, and the fact that the region was called “God’s Land” by the queen underscores the Somali Peninsula’s early international significance (Abdullahi, 2017; Cassanelli, 1982). However, a palpable historical void exists in the Somalis’ historical records between the first and seventh CE centuries, where a dearth of historical documentation leaves a gap in understanding the fate of these once-flourishing cities and civilizations (Abdullahi, 2017). Figure 2: The map of the Somali Peninsula and Somali ethnic limit in Horn of Africa (Lewis, 2004). 34 The Somalis have a lineage tracing back thousands of years, forming a distinct ethnic unity in the Horn of Africa, the Somali Peninsula, extending from the Awash valley in Ethiopia to beyond Northern Kenya’s Tana River (Fox, 2015; Lewis, 1993; Webersik, 2004). However, the aforementioned historical gap was, in one way or another, a prime contributor to the scarcity of quantitative sources concerned with studying the historical course of the social and political development of Somali society. Therefore, the first known record of the term “Somali” was in an Ethiopian hymn celebrating King Negus Yeshaaq’s (1414-1429) victory over the Adal Sultanate—a multiethnic medieval (15th-16th CE) Muslim Sultanate based in the city of Zeila, northern of moder