

T.C.
ISTANBUL KULTUR UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

**AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE BOKO
HARAM INSURGENCY IN THE NORTHEAST OF NIGERIA**

MA Thesis by

Hidaya Shehu Bello

1303024025

Department: International Relations

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Acknowledgment

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. All praise and thanks be to Allah, the Most Gracious the most Merciful, and the only owner of the day of Recompense. You alone we worship and you we ask for help, guide us to the straightway, the way of those on whom you have bestowed our grace, not the way of those who earned your anger nor of those who went astray, Amin.

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Abstract

Using the frustration-aggression theory, this research could assess the socioeconomic impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in the North East of Nigeria. This research was able to assess the find out that the Boko Haram insurgency has caused unbearable economic hardships in the North Eastern part of the country, and in extension in most parts of Nigeria. This research finds out that illiteracy/ignorance, unemployment, porous borders, arms proliferation, etc. have been the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria; its aftermath is underdevelopment, poverty, fear, drug abuse, more IDPs, etc. The importance of this research is that it will help further researchers who want to research similar topics. This research emphasizes that adequate reforms, policies and regulations have to be unified from the three tiers of Federal, State and Local governments of Nigeria; border security will have to be strengthened, and there should be qualified control of the inflow of arms into the country, educating the civilians on self-defence should also take as a focal point.

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ÖZ

Nijerya'nın Kuzeydoğusundaki Boko Haram İsyanının sosyoekonomik etkisini hüsransaldırganlık teorisi ile açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Boko Haram isyanının ülkenin kuzeydoğu kesiminde ve buna paralel olarak Nijerya'nın büyük bölümünde ağır ekonomik sıkıntılara neden olduğu bulgusunu değerlendirmektedir. Bu araştırma, okuma yazma bilmeme/cehalet, işsizlik, geçirgen sınırlar, silahların yayılması vb.' nedenlerin Nijerya'daki Boko Haram isyanının temel nedenleri olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bu durumun sonuçları olarak da az gelişmişlik, yoksulluk, korku, uyuşturucu kullanımı, yerinden edilme/iç göçe neden olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu çalışma, benzer konularda araştırma yapmak isteyen başka araştırmacılara yardımcı olması nedeniyle önemlidir. Bu araştırma, Nijerya'nın federal, eyalet ve yerel yönetimlerden oluşan üç katmanlı idari yapısında yeterli reformların, politikaların ve düzenlemelerin birleştirilmesin ve sınır güvenliğinin güçlendirilmesi, ülkeye silah akışının nitelikli bir şekilde kontrolünün yapılması ve sivillere yönelik öz savunma eğitimi gibi konuların odak noktası olması gerektiğini vurgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nijerya, Boko Haram, Hüsransaldırganlık Teorisi, İsyan, Uyuşmazlık.

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List of Abbreviations

IGR- Internally Generated Revenue
FGN- Federal Government of Nigeria
UN- United Nations
IMF- International Monetary Fund
AAH-Action against Hunger
UNICEF-United Nations International Children’s Fund
USAID-United States Agency for international Development
ICRC-International Community for Red Cross
FAO-Food and Agriculture Organization
ECOWAS-Economic Community of West African States
AU-African Union
NEMA-National Emergency Management Agency
NBS- Nigerian Bureau of Statistics
SEMA-State Emergency Management Agency
ECHO- European Commission Humanitarian Office
VBIED- Vehicle Borne Improvised Device
ECF-ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Framework
UNODC- United Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes
IDP- Internally Displaced Persons
BH- Boko Haram

Introduction

1.1 Background of Study

Nigeria is a complex democratic secular country located in West Africa, consisting of 36 states with one Federal Capital Territory (FCT, Abuja) that governs its citizenry under the 1999 constitution (as amended) as a nation-state (Ogbu, 2014). The modern state of Nigeria originated from British colonial rule, taking its current territorial shape with the merging of the Northern Nigeria Protectorate and the Southern Nigeria Protectorate in 1914 by a British colonial officer Lord Fredrick Lugard and became a formally independent federation in 1960. The country is rich in multi-ethnicity, inhabited by over 250 ethnic groups, with Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba being the 3 largest ethnic groups in Nigeria. Each of these groups was a nation in its own right before the imposition of British colonial rule. Many authors have argued that the imposition of the British colonial rule has an aftermath of ethnic division, multi-religious practices, and a narcissistic drive to do things away from the African norm of communal behaviors and altruism (Akintunde, 2018). The country practices two major religions: Islam, mostly practiced in the North and some parts of the Southwest of Nigeria, and Christianity mostly dominant in the Southeastern part of Nigeria. These differences made it almost inevitable for clashes to exist amongst Nigerians (Akintunde, 2018).

Nigeria encompasses more historic empires and cultures than any other African nation. These empires date back as far as the 5th century BC, when communities of the Jos plateau, living around the southern slopes were known for their magnificently expressive terracotta sculptures in a tradition known now as the Nok Arts/culture, from the Nigerian village where these figures were first discovered. The people of the Nok culture were Neolithic tribes who have recently acquired knowledge of iron technology spreading through southwards of Africa.

Jos plateau is in the center of Nigeria with a beautiful culture of arts, however, it wasn't the first extensive kingdoms of the Nigeria. More than a millennium after the Nok people existed in the region was the north and northeast of what is now known as Nigeria, growing their wealth through trade the north through the Sahara and northeast into Sudan.

In the 9th century, a trading empire grows up around the Lake Chad. Original center of the trade being located at the east of the lake, in the Kanem region (one of the 23 regions in Chad, named after the famous empire of Kanem), but it soon extended to Bornu on its western side. The ruler of Kanem-Bornu converted to Islam in the 11th century.

In the west of Bornu, along the northern border of Nigeria, is the land of the Hausa tribe. Strategically placed to control trade with the forest regions to its south. The Hausa people developed a number of small but stable kingdoms that were ruled within a strong walled city. These cities were often threatened by the larger neighbor's kingdoms surrounding the (Mali and Gao to the west, Bornu to the east). However, the Hausa traders benefited magnificently from being on the route between these empires. By the 14th century, they too were conquered and converted to Islam. The forest regions in the savanna grasslands west of the Niger, between the Hausa kingdoms and the coastal part of the country, the Yoruba people are the dominant tribes establishing two very powerful states.

The first of the two states being Ife, located on the border between the savanna and the forest. Ife flourished from the 11th century to the 15th century, famously known now for their sculptures. In the 16th century, a larger Yoruba empire emerged, located slightly further from the forest at Oyo. Oyo grows in strength during the 16th century by generating profits from trade, and developing a forceful cavalry. By the end of the 18th century the rulers of Oyo were controlling a region from the Niger to the west of Dahomey (a West African kingdom that existed from approximately 1600 until 1904 that is present-day Benin). Meanwhile, deep within the forests, the best of all the known kingdoms that have existed throughout the Nigerian history, the city of Benin, established itself in the 15th century. The city of Benin became a city internationally known for its beautiful cast-metal sculptures, in a tradition they inherited from the Ife.

The complexities of diverse religious and ethnic groupings have hugely affected the social relations amongst citizens. This has ranged from ethnic and religious clashes to political party rivalry and others that has birthed the violence, narcissistic and absolute disregard for human life, which was envisaged to the reality of Boko Haram insurgence from 2009 till date. Since the democratic rule of 1999, the aspirations and hope of the Nigerian citizenry for the dividends of

democracy lurking every nook and cranny of the Nigerian society seems to be invisible till date. The 22years of democratic rule in Nigerian has dashed the hopes of a flourishing democracy for its citizens with incessant national insecurity worsening the safety of Nigerians ranging from kidnappings, militancy, armed gangs, banditry to the most feared of; terrorist attacks (Akintunde, 2018).

This is some of the history of the empires that made up the beautiful cultures and tribes in Nigeria. These were cultures that had such strong identities that can still be seen visibly shining through as the pride of every Nigerian tribe, 'The lost story of kings and queens'. Nonetheless, this strong individuality in identities can also be said to be one a contributing factor to why Nigerians struggle to peacefully leave with one another in harmony, despite it being the national dream of 'peace and unity'.

Boko Haram's terror campaign began in 2009 and has since become one of Nigeria's most pressing security threats (Akinwotu, 2021). Even as the insurgency struggles to be eclipsed by growing conflicts between herders and farmers and religious clashes across the country; the group's ideological goal has evolved from simple proliferation for "Islamic puritanism in Northern Nigeria" to the establishment of an Islamic state in West Africa, especially in the Lake Chad region (IEP, 2015). However, its militant campaign began in 2002 as an uncoordinated and unsophisticated rebellion, but by 2015 it had gained the notorious nickname of "world's deadliest terrorist group" (Oyewole & Onuoha, 2018). Between 2008 and 2009 according to Ofonagoro (2010), the terrorist group's timid attacks on football matches, clubs and other small arms escalated to continuous outbreaks of inter-communal violence resulting to death of thousands that had international recognition from key insecurity fighters like IMF and United Nations and the need to curb the operations of Boko Haram. From late 2010, Boko Haram had advanced to adding Molotov cocktails and other simple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to their tactical list, which reflected their tactical advancements in the series of small IEDs deployed against Christian targets in Plateau state on the eve of Christmas 2010 (Ofonagoro, 2010).

The Boko Haram terrorist group was deep-seated in the Northeast region until it expanded to other parts of the Northern (northwest, north central) states and then later advanced to other parts of the country, carrying out waves of attacks on government infrastructures, police stations, schools,

army barracks, kidnappings, carrying out hits on government officials as well as killings of innocent lives and properties, displacing more than 2.6 million people and killing more than 100,000 since launching its military operations, forcing about 1.4 million people to flee their homes and disrupting their education (Gaffney, 2017).

Additionally, numerous armed assaults, small IED attacks in 2011, and improvised handmade grenades constructed in soft drink disposable cans were evident. They will frequently throw these explosives from moving motorcycles or strategically place explosives at targeted places. These types of attacks saw a shift in their style from June 16, 2019, when the terrorist group launched a suicide vehicle-borne improvised device (VBIED) attack on the Nigerian National Police in Abuja (VOA News, Voice of Africa News, 2011). A second VBIED was launched on the UN building in Abuja, in the city's diplomatic district on the 26th of August 2011 (VOA News, Voice of Africa News, 2011). This attack on the UN compound also marked a shift from its local targets on government infrastructure and attacks on Christian facilities to an international level. Perhaps, it could have even transformed to carrying out attacks on transnational infrastructure if not for the intelligence sharing that triggered warnings of an international hotel attack. Socio-economic activities have been gravely destabilized, increasing number of crimes and the destruction of lives and properties still persisting in the Northeast region, owing to the activities of the terrorist group. These activities can be attested to, by the number of people migrating from the Northeast region and the situation has made it impossible for the citizens to continue to carry out their legitimate businesses. Several attributable factors for successful dominance of the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria in the Northeast include socioeconomic, religious and political factors; high rate of poverty in the country that has rendered youths in the Northeast to be easily lured and enlisted as Boko Haram militants with the promises of money, worldly pleasures and heavenly salvations as they manipulate and brainwash them through misquoting the Quran as a tool in using their religion of Islam to justify their actions etc. (Amao, 2020).

Therefore, this study focuses on the niche of Boko haram's insurgency aftermath from the beginning but most importantly how their activities have and is still affecting the lives of those in the Northeast. Although some unpatriotic Nigerians have enhanced and collaborated with these miscreants to further cause havoc to the country, the government's efforts to eradicate this completely is still ongoing and never ending. This is going to include understanding the causes of

the insurgency because in order to understand a problem, one must always look at its history from its early stages to understand what went wrong and to understand the degree of damage the problem has caused. It will also take insurgency as a framework in order to provide a better understanding of the research through process tracing, it will go ahead to try understand the relation between terrorism and insurgency in order to try to place what Boko Haram can be identified or labeled. Lastly I will conclude with the socio-economic impact it has had on the lives of Nigerians and the northeast of Nigeria.

1.2 North Eastern Nigeria

Borno state was formerly known as 'Bornu' state and is mainly domiciled by 'Kanuri' people who are believed to be a welcoming and peaceful tribe. The state, like other states in Nigeria, has attempted to create an upbeat in its resources (including internally generated revenue (IGR)) through business ventures, education, culture, agriculture, peace and governance. Pre-insurgency, the state thrived averagely so wasn't as popular to other states of the country. Although the state is popularly known as the epicenter of Boko Haram criminalities and headquarters, many have argued that this is because of the state's position on the Nigerian map.

Despite the insurgency and other herder-farmer clashes, the state is blessed with huge vegetation and known for being a 'sudan savanna' (Akintunde, 2018), "commonly traded produce includes: the acacia (a source of gum Arabic), baobab, locust bean, shea butter, dum palm, and kapok trees" (Britannica, n.d.). "However, there is a region of Sahel savanna, mostly thorn scrub and with sandy soils, in the north. Prominent physical features include the Bornu Plains, the volcanic Biu Plateau, and the firki ("black cotton") swamps south and southwest of Lake Chad. The state is mostly drained by seasonal rivers flowing toward Lake Chad" (Point Blank, 2020). Maiduguri is the economic state capital, the largest city in Borno state.

1.3 Economic Development and the Northeast

Economically, pre-insurgency, Borno state is self-sufficient with subsistence farmers who produce local grains, livestock, and other consumables traded within its environs and border countries (Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) as mentioned earlier. Although not comparable to other states of the federation like Port Harcourt, Bayelsa, Enugu, and Kaduna, these consumables are expected to

generate extensively efficient resources for payment of salaries and other operational costs within the Borno state government but like other states in the country, this has not been so. Taxes and other IGRs (internally generated revenue) have been contributed to the center (FCT, Abuja) and shared inequitably on the basis of local government districts within the states (in form of monthly allocation) (Akintunde, 2018).

Borno state is made up of 27 local government districts: Abadam, Askira/Uba, Bama, Bayo, Biu, Chibok, Damboa, Dikwa, Gubio, Guzamala, Gwoza, Hawul, Jere, Kaga, Kala/Balge Konduga, Kukawa, Kwaya, Kusar, Mafa, Magumeri, Maiduguri, Marte, Mobbar, Monguno, Ngala, Nganzai and Shani. Borno state's ability to generate even more IGR to meet at par with other states like Lagos, Kaduna, and Bayelsa has further been frustrated by the insurgency. Its trade partners like Chad, Niger, and Cameroon have also been affected not only by the trade ties but also by the insurgency. For example, acacia species like gum Arabic, fish, and cotton as aforementioned are heavily traded and contribute 65% of the state's GDP (OCHA, 2021). Like other states in the northeast such as Adamawa and Bauchi, these agricultural products have been attributed as an additional source of livelihood since 80% of people living in rural areas in Borno, Adamawa and Bauchi are farmers (OCHA, 2021).

It is no gain saying that the lives of those affected by the insurgency in the northeast particularly Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe; even though many IDPs are returning to their villages in spite of the heated rise in Boko Haram activities in Niger state (Boko haram's district seizure in northern Niger state) and other environs, returning IDPs' source of livelihood is still at bay. This is because farmers cannot go to their fields for harvest or planting, many are uneducated and present national scarcity of jobs, inflation on money and food prices, poverty line increasing as activities of Boko Haram are on the rise as well as the government's unaccountable efforts to countering terrorism. According to Mamman (2021), many of these IDPs may have no choice but to join their victimizers' circle in order to survive. Other authors argue that only those who have been morally defunct by the psychological trauma of the activities of the terrorist group may be affected (Akintunde, 2018).

The porosity of the Nigerian borders has increased the economic aspect of trades and GDP in two ways: untaxed sales and profits, and open unrestricted borders. Nigeria's shadow economy is made

up of at least 65% where the majority are petty traders, and small and medium-sized enterprises (World Bank, 2021). In Borno, the borders have been porous for years with illegal smuggling of all forms of goods and the most rampant currently is unauthorized weapons on a daily basis despite several agencies created in the country to scrutinize and regulate these borders. Furthermore, the fear of farmers and herders' crisis aftermath has not only contributed to the scarcity of food in the country but similar to other states like Anambra and Abia, several suspicious smugglings have erupted with several persons apprehended (The Punch, 2021).

Many businesses in Nigeria have been unable to thrive due to capital unavailability, harsh economic environment, and heavy loan interest rates. Although SMEs thrive because of daily turnovers, banks and other lending institutions have been restricted from issuing loans to businesses in the northeast. Many businesses that have branches in the northeast cutting across primary, secondary, and tertiary business sectors have written off their investments, lay off staff and are unable to recoup payable interests on loans borrowed from financial institutions. The insurgents have burned down Banks and other notable business structures and so the business circle that is expected to continue can only do so when the environment in the northeast and its environs are at peace.

For security officers, aid workers, and volunteers who need basic and medical supplies, there are no markets, businesses, or schools open at this time. Anything needed within the northeast environs is brought in from other states in the country and abroad. Education generally has been disbanded to the extent that parents within the northeast fear the repercussion of enrolling their children in schools. About 10.1million children are out of school in Nigeria (Obiezu, 2021), the Minister of Education has blamed this on “the pandemic and insecurities around schools” (VOA, 2021). “The effects of illiteracy are but are not limited to: finite opportunities for employment or income generation and higher chances of poor health, turning to crime, and dependence on social welfare or charity. For a problem that can be solved with books and teachers, illiteracy remains remarkably expensive for too many countries” (Truman Centre, 2021).

According to OCHA (2021), Up to 5.1 million people are at risk of being critically food insecure in the next lean season, a level similar to the one of 2016-2017 when famine was looming over Borno State (June – August 2021). This means that the IDPs have a high chance of starvation and

ill health if measures are not taken as the situation persists. Furthermore, the number of people in need of urgent assistance in the north-east rose from 7.9 million at the beginning of 2020 to 10.6 million since the start of COVID-19 (OCHA, 2021). The economic downturn of this is:

- A. There is a huge drop in the number of people available to trade on daily basis compared to pre-insurgency
- B. Availability of raw materials, food products and local production and distribution will be truncated or of high cost
- C. High cost of basic survival elements including goods and services will be prevalent.
- D. Deteriorating security situations pose higher risk for aid workers to assist IDPs generally.

The most affected areas of Boko Haram activities in Borno are: Marte, Gwoza and Jere. “On the economic front, Nigeria’s North eastern region had suffered an estimated U.S. \$9 billion dollars, or N274.5 billion, economic loss as a result of Boko Haram’s insurgency as of 2017 (FAO, 2019). Additionally, the state suffered the highest loss of approximately U.S. \$5.9 billion (N180 billion) in 2018/2019 (OECD, 2021). The loss of agricultural production in the Northeast caused by Boko Haram activities was valued at US\$3.5 billion (N107 billion) (FAO, 2019). Borno State had 95% of the 450,000 houses damaged by Boko Haram in the region. Also destroyed were schools, hospitals, bridges and other critical infrastructures” (Gravenille, 2020). These have hampered the progress of citizens in these states, most especially basic amenities for survival depleting and heavily dependent on aid.

1.4 Insecurity in Nigeria

Nigeria has had its fair share of insecurity for decades. This has been attributed to porous borders, corruption, political instability, cultural beliefs, religion, misconception, mental health, unemployment, etc. A country that is domiciled with high insecurity challenges does not attract high direct investments and management of existing investments may be at jeopardy due to the human resources, infrastructures, business liaisons, and others. The disunity within the country for religious and cultural/ethnic division has worsened the insecurity levels in the country. The New

Humanitarian (2021) summarizes this as the “From the north to the south, life has become nasty, brutish, and short”.

Presently in Nigeria, there is an overwhelming feeling of insecurity amongst Nigerian citizens and the terrorizing effects of the activities of the fundamentalist group, Boko Haram on the socio-economic condition of the northern states of Nigeria has become so devastating that some financial institutions and other business ventures have closed down in many areas, thereby causing relocation of non-indigenes to their own states” (Okey, 2019). Insecurity in Nigeria has slightly diversified from what is known as ‘terrorism’ to banditry and others. This has caused a division in criminal activities within the country. Different categorizing of criminal activities in the country has made some criminality more important than others. Kidnappings with ‘ransom drops’ compared to petty thefts and Boko Haram activities have been tagged less than others even though they are all criminal activities generally. The group has claimed several lives and several displaced from their homes, businesses, career paths and livelihoods. Infrastructural developments have been murdered and the evasion of humanitarian helps from all parts of the world has been subjected to ‘deadly decisions’ as the group members see them as people who introduced western education and invaded the country’s prospects of being Islamized (Osagie, 2013). Despite the peaceful nature of Islam, the group has corrupted this view of peace and has declared war on those who pose to have nothing to do with the religion or opposes who may have one or two opinions outside their narrations.

The genesis of Nigeria’s insecurity as described by (Okey, 2019) is the ‘military’ coup series in the country, the Niger-Delta militancy that was received positively by the Nigerian government as an attempt to avoid trading violence with violence, where the federal government at the time of Former President Yar’Adua went for a dialogue approach to the issues raised by the militants on ‘resource control’ from the south to the ‘north’, however, these attacks have become more aggressive and violent as the militants are becoming more fearless in attacking government properties. Okey (2019) paper argued that the settlement of the issues raised by the then militants are still the same and being argued for and against by legislators from these areas but the amnesty agreements have given room for repentant Boko haram members to take the same route with a difference of killing innocent lives. Since then, according to Adelaja (2020, p.11), “the Covid-19 pandemic rattled Nigeria’s socio-economic landscape and highlighted serious gaps in the country’s

social protection system. Covid-19 also exacerbated challenges in the humanitarian response in Nigeria's northeast region, where the government's armed conflict with the Islamist extremist armed group Boko Haram, now in its 11th year, has left over 7.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance".

Furthermore, as reported by (Adelaja, 2020), from January to September 2020: there are millions of people in need of humanitarian assistance in the northeast as insecurity in the country by Boko Haram persists. Its splinter faction, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) continued to launch attacks against humanitarian, civilian, and military targets. It has been reported by (Adelaja, 2020) that at least 363 civilians were killed by the Islamist insurgents between the months of January and September. Authorities announced plans to send 1.860million IDPs and refugees back to their communities in Borno State in the northeast despite ongoing safety concerns. However, on August 18, just sixteen days after IDPs were returned to Kukawa Local Government Area, Boko Haram insurgents attacked the community and abducted at least 100 people (Adelaja, 2020). The federal government took on the mission of forced returns of Nigerian refugees from Cameroon.

In the northwest and also parts of the south, inter-communal violence continued as herder-allied armed groups and criminal gangs killed hundreds of civilians, kidnapped people for ransom, and raided cattle. Widespread sexual violence against women and girls, including an attack that led to the death of a student in May, spurred a national outcry prompting the authorities to declare a national emergency over rape and sexual violence in the country. Thousands of people with mental health conditions have remained chained and locked up in various facilities. These facilities include; rehabilitation centers, state hospitals, traditional healing centers, and both Christian and Islamic faith-based facilities (Adelaja, 2020).

The difference between kidnapping and abduction is the monetary gain attached to kidnapping while abduction in some cases may demand 'ransom drops', the victims are taken against their freewill, their human rights truncated and in some unfortunate scenarios, murder is committed (HG.org, 2021). The business of banditry and kidnapping (including abductions) of innocent citizens have been tied to the modus operandi of the Boko haram terrorist group. The porous borders, unemployment, corruption, greed, resource control at the center, disproportion of political positions, poverty, fanatic, chauvinism, etc., have also been other environmental factors considered

to be linked to these activities. Others have termed this to be a business venture, a means to an end that can only be their source of livelihood in the absence of social amenities including unemployment and security. The ‘jungle justice’ described by Agnès Callamard (Special Rapporteur, presenting a preliminary statement at the end of her 12-day mission to the UN, New York) by Nigerians who have had enough of ‘empty or half-baked’ security promises by the FGN (Federal Government of Nigeria) may be the repercussion of exhaustive patience by its citizenry.

Agnès Callamard also added that the overall situation of poverty and climate change adding to the crisis, if ignored, will create the ripple effects of unaccountability on a high scale level, which also has the potential to destabilize the sub-region if not the continent as a whole. In her speech, she also mentioned the nationwide, regional and global pressures Nigeria is being faced with, such as the explosion in population growth, climate change and desertification, an increased number of people living in absolute poverty and increasing proliferation of weapons. She claims these pressures to be reason enough to re-enforce localized systems and country-wide patterns of violence, many of which are already spinning out of control, including the armed conflict against the Boko Haram terrorist group in the northeast; the insecurity and violence in the northwest; the conflict in the central area known as the Middle Belt and parts of the south and northwest, between nomadic Fulani herdsmen and indigenous farming communities. She also addressed the popularity of organized gangs and cults in the south of Nigeria; killings during evictions in slum areas; general repression of minority and indigenous groups; and widespread police brutality.

The UN expert said there has been some positive signs in the midst of all these negativities, including progress against the extremist Boko Haram group and their affiliates, as well as a decline in allegations of arbitrary killings and deaths in custody at the hands of the military over the last two years. However, there has been little progress in terms of accountability and reparations for grave human rights violations in the past. She urges the Nigerian Government, and the international community, to prioritize as a matter of urgency, accountability and access to justice for all victims and addressing the conflicts between nomadic cattle breeding and farming communities, fueled by toxic narratives and the large availability of weapons. While some high-profile cases of killings by police have resulted in the arrest and prosecution of the officers responsible and others involving clashes between Fulani herdsmen and indigenous farming communities have been investigated in Benue State, she flagged that such examples of

accountability remain the exception. In almost all of the cases that were brought to her attention, during the visit none of the perpetrators had been brought to justice. The loss of trust and confidence in public institutions has prompted Nigerians into taking matters of protection into their own hands, which is leading to a proliferation of self-protecting armed militia and cases of 'jungle justice'. Ms. Callamard called on the Nigerian authorities "to look carefully into my findings", saying that she remains "available for further cooperation". Among the cities on her itinerary were Abuja, Maiduguri, Makurdi, Jos, Port Harcourt and Lagos.

Several questions of the beneficiaries, causalities and victims of the terrorist group's activities have sprung up over the eleven years of terror. The victims are known and made public, similar to the causality numbers and families but the culprits or perpetrators of these crimes are yet to be officially brought to justice. According to Lara (2021), her paper suggests that there are hidden beneficiaries positioned in high authorities within the country who are especially benefitting from these activities. Some conspiracy theories of 'cabals', 'hidden beneficiaries' and 'political premiers' are believed to have exploited opportunities through these criminal activities for their selfish gains while holding keys to solutions like equitable justice and an end to criminality (or to the barest minimum) have been sort to control and foster these crimes. Furthermore, the recent arson in Imo state on police headquarters by 'bandits' have been arguably said that the perpetrators are non-indigenes and unknown.

Governor Hope Uzodinma of Imo state has publicly declared that the true operators of the activities of these bandits are political office holders and should be publicly announced by security agencies rather than shield their shame. In a report published by Vanguard on the 24th of April, 2021, "Governor Hope Uzodinma of Imo State on Friday, charged the security agencies to publish names of those sponsoring banditry and terrorism in the country so as to shame such persons. The Governor also said that about 50 persons have been arrested in connection with the recent attacks of the Police headquarters and Correctional Services in Owerri, the Imo State capital. But the Imo State governor alleged that those behind the dastardly act were funded by disgruntled politicians, adding that it was a high time the names of the sponsors were made available to the press". The question that can be extracted from this is how much does tribalism have on shaming criminal persons in Nigeria? Does it truly matter where the perpetrators come from even if their actions are graver and can be regarded as capital offences?

It is no gain saying that the northern part of the country is the most affected with focus of the criminal activities by Boko Haram on core ‘food basket’ areas of the nation (Benue, Jos, Adamawa, Kano and Kaduna). The cut in food supplies, fear of farmers going to farms, religious fears, etc. have caused so many ripple effects on cash and food crops highly inflated, high transportation costs, high IDP numbers, etc. the insecurity in the country has blacklisted the country’s international viability for direct foreign investment for safety and returns on investment. The duration of how long the legal and justice system in Nigeria would truly serve those who have caused havoc for years may take longer than Nigerians had hoped for.

1.5 Statement of the Problem

The insurgency in Borno state, Northeast Nigeria is a multifaceted (shelter, health, security, education, welfare, living standards) one that has spread to all regions of the country presently (Olurounbi, 2021). Since 2009, food security in particular has been halted, the planting/farming process, raw material extraction, local production, branding, packaging and retailing/distribution has been completely disrupted (Jelilov, Ayinde, Tetik, Celik, & Olali, 2018). This has significantly affected local market prices as only determined farmers are left to continue trading their products from their farms to town where added risk is converted to money. According to (Jelilov, Ayinde, Tetik, Celik, & Olali, 2018) “Market poverty, farmers’ inability to plant, and the high cost of transportation to affected areas are some of the factors that have led to high food prices and limited availability.”

The incessant rise in numbers of insecurity cases has been overwhelming not only for frontline security personnel but also the general public. Prior to the kidnapping of 30 school children in Niger state and 300 children and teachers in Zamfara on the 26th of February, 2021 (BBC News, 2021), Boko Haram extremists confessed to killing more than 100 rice farmers in Borno admitting that this was a clap back to farmers cooperating with the Nigerian military (Olurounbi, 2021). The rice field in Garin Kwashebe was attacked on the day of a local government councillor election, which had not taken place for 13 years in the region since the insurgency (BBC News, 2021). According to SBM Intelligence, a Nigerian leading research consultancy, over 142 incidents in the Boko Haram insurgency in north-east Nigeria between January and November 2020 have occurred and a depicted average of 13 people per month lose their lives (Olurounbi, 2021).

The livelihood of Nigerians who typically earn daily income for sustenance with more than 50% of the Nigerian population living below poverty line at less than \$1.90 earnings per day and added insecurity, Nigeria is currently facing multifaceted national issues simultaneously. The factored addition of poverty, lack of education, fanatics, political instability and corruption have skyrocketed the purchasing power of insurgency in Nigeria. Many works of literature on similar topic as this have focused on the political and religious aspect, there are few literature focusing on the economic aspect, it is as a result of the need to further add to the existing literature on socio-economic aspect of insurgency that motivated this research.

1.6 Research Objectives

- A. The objective of this research is going to be to investigate the extent in which Boko Haram insurgency has hampered the socio-economic status of people living in the Northeast region of Nigeria, to analyze the socio-economic aspects of the motivation for Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria in order to shed light on the gravity of the insurgency.

1.7 Research Questions

- A. To what extent has Boko Haram insurgency hampered the socio-economic status of people living in the Northeast of Nigeria?
- B. What are the socio-economic aspects of the motivation for Boko Haram insurgency?
- C. What are the policy responses of the Nigerian government to tackle Boko Haram insurgency?

1.8 Significance of the Study

This study can prove useful to the Nigerian government in paying attention to the economic wellbeing of its citizens in order to keep them busy and prevent them from committing crimes. By extension, the study on Boko Haram and insecurity will provide stakeholders with data on how to manage or address insecurity and poverty-related issues because poverty and the activities that because insecurity is associated with rural people and less educated members of the society. Lastly, it can prove useful to economists, policymakers, and other academicians who are interested in researching the area further particularly as it pertains to financial reporting.

1.9 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study is limited to the socio-economic impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in the Northeastern part of Nigeria from 2012-2022. One of the very limitations is that the validity of the

results or findings is depending on the honesty and integrity of the existing literature providing the needed information. Also, the anticipated limitations of this study would be based on financial constraints; this simply identifies the in-availability of adequate funds to finance the study in order to have more satisfaction. Even at the expense of being financially handicapped, data, information, and materials would be sourced accurately in order to have a satisfactory findings and information for this study. Another limitation may be traced to lack of time.

The time span of the work will be consumed and given a little space of time because it is an individual project and this will make a huge limitation because time will be cut down for different causes and this will not be left out. With the aid of management knowledge, the time for and case would be outlined so as not to have a backward setback towards this study. Time management would be put to place. There is also limitation in movement when acquiring data for this research. Due to the sensitivity and danger in the areas most affected by the insurgence, I will be able to be on ground in the most affected areas of the northeast therefore, I will be relaying on open questionnaires to relevant people in the field for firsthand information from the people in these affected areas.

1.10 Methodology

The methodology section of this study attempts to provide “specific procedures or techniques used to identify, select, process, and analyze information” (Noes, 2021) relevant to this study and ultimately contribute to the existing literature on the subject of discourse. As aforementioned, this study investigates the socio-economic impact of the people in Borno state with in-depth qualitative analysis from reputable sources like JSTOR (Journal Storage Online Archive), and notable journals, publications, newspapers, and reports of renowned international and local press releases and news.

Despite the study being a qualitative analysis however, it did not ignore exploring quantitative methodology tool, focusing on case study. I decided to work with the case study approach in other to give a detailed examination of the historical episode in other to develop or test the historical explanation of the research. The research then uses the method of process tracing in other to explain the case study using the explaining outcome. The use of process tracing is for me to

uncover the evidence of casual mechanism that is at work and also to better explain the outcomes of these findings.

Process tracing is a tool of qualitative analysis that can contribute to the description of both social and political phenomenon in order to evaluate casual claims (David Collier, 2011). Close engagement with knowledge of the case using process tracing can provide a good understanding of the issue at hand because it focuses on the unfolding of events or situation over time. Theory building involves the analysis of whether two variables already known to us exist but are in the dark as to how they are connected.

The explaining outcome of process tracing involves using available evidence that already exists in order to backward trace from an already known outcome to uncover a casual mechanism that produced the said outcome. By using the explaining outcome, it will help to find an explanation to the connection that exists between the two variables. In the case of this study, the variables will be to understand what the socioeconomic impact of Boko Haram in the northeast is by first tracing backwards in order to find historically, what the causes that might have created these issues are and how it has contributed to the worsening of the socioeconomic life of the people living in northeast Nigeria.

Additionally, the primary source of data is collected through structured open questionnaires via emails from key stakeholders like political analysts, members of SEMA and NEMA, security personnel, managers of IDP camps, and researchers are considered. The open questionnaires are structured in a way that is precise, understandable, and data provided useable. This method was chosen in order to essentially retrieve unique answers from respondents.

1.11 Summary of Chapters

This study is segmented into five chapters. Chapter one contains the general introduction, background to the study, statement of the problem and the significance of the study, research objectives and questions, methodology overview, and definition of terms that guide the study. This section of the study highlighted the research problems expounded in the research questions derived from the research objectives. The background of the study provided a foundation from several researchers on the subject matter as well as the introduction of the study's niche to provide enabling

sphere for the gaps missing in the existing literature to be identified. The significance of the study identified the specific coverage of the study in terms of what the study identified as well as the rationale behind the chosen study and its addition to the body of knowledge.

Chapter two presents the review of related literature conceptually and empirically. Establishing familiarity with existing publications and research, this section ensured comprehension of most recently published knowledge on the chosen study as well as identified missing areas that the study could add to the existing body of knowledge. This highlights the example of the failed separatist movement that once took place in the history of Nigeria and also looks at other insurgencies in the history of Africa and the nature of these insurgencies and the type of insurgencies they fall under. It also looks at common characteristics of insurgencies. It goes further to explain the impact of insurgency in Nigeria, and explains the theoretical framework that was adopted for this research.

Chapter three goes deeper into talking about the history of insurgency, discusses the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on human security in Nigeria through the scale of (food and security, health, shelter, education and protection). It also discusses the socio-economic causes of Boko Haram in the northeast of Nigeria, through the scale of (income, employment, community safety, education and family support). It goes ahead to explain underlining relationships like religion and terrorism, population and terrorism, economic inflation and terrorism, repression and terrorism and lastly technology and terrorism. These underlying relationships try to understand the link between terrorism and the listed underlining relations above. The chapter also talks about the socio-economic aspect for motivation of the Boko Haram insurgency and lastly, the extent at which the Boko Haram insurgency has hampered the socio-economic status of the people in northeast Nigeria.

Chapter four discusses government policies have been put in place as a counter insurgency initiative to help combat terrorism. These operations include DDRP and OSCP programs put in place to open a safe corridor for repentant Boko Haram Members in the hopes of persuading high station Boko Haram members into repentance. It also discusses international collaborative efforts that have been in existence since the start of the insurgence and concludes the chapter with a personal view of the successes of these initiatives.

Chapter five focuses on the summary of all major findings in this research; this includes the impact of the socio-economic impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast of Nigeria, what my personal thought are on these findings, it also gives quite a number of suggestions for further studies in areas concerning the Boko Haram insurgency for future researchers.



Chapter One- Conceptual Framework

2.1 Insurgency

Various definitions of insurgency have been offered by scholars and theorists, some of which are closely related to one another while others are not, but all of which share common aspects, making it a challenging topic to study. Even though there are many different types of conflict, the term “insurgency” is still being used incorrectly and interchangeably, according to Moore (2007). According to him, it is understandable that “the interchangeability of words is understandable, given the different nature and flexibility of individuals who wage insurgency and the overlap characteristics of these types of warfare” (Moore, 2007:2). To understand insurgency, it may be helpful to begin by looking at what it is not. Insurgency can be understood first as what it is not. It is important to state that insurgency is not terrorism, subversion, guerrilla war, revolution, or coup d'états (Liolio, 2014; Curtas, 2006). However, insurgents have increasingly turned to terrorism as their primary tactic.” Rather than being synonymous with conventional war, today’s definition of terrorism includes acts of violence committed by individuals or groups rather than states. Terrorism, as an insurgency strategy, employs a variety of tactics to attain its objectives. Bombing, guerilla warfare, and kidnapping and abduction are a few examples (Hassan, 2014, p.10).

Because an insurgency is a political activity with a specific goal, this suggests that insurgents typically utilize terrorism to achieve their goals. Furthermore, O’Neil described insurgency as “a conflict between a non-ruling group and ruling authority in which the non-ruling faction consciously utilizes political resources and violence to demolish, reformulate, or maintain the base of one or more areas of politics.” For an insurgency to be successful it must be supported by a significant number of people; “insurgencies do not emerge if the public either supports the government or sees nothing to gain from fighting” (Curtas, 2006, p.1). He argues that insurgency remains to be a political not a military battle, therefore, believes it is not understandable to solve it purely through military solution without succumbing to a level of violence that is unacceptable to the modern global world.

2.2 Common Characteristics of Insurgence

As discussed, extracting from Hansen (2020), Ebim and Abisola (2022), insurgence is a violent political struggle in other to control people and resources. These groups are often in pursuit of

some common objective in order to undermine the legitimacy of an already existing government. Insurgents seek to:

- Obtain the active or passive support of the public. Not necessarily through sympathy but mostly through intimidation and fear they inflict on the population.
- Damage international support for the government and if possible, gain international recognition and or assistance for the insurgency.
- Undermine the ability of the government to provide its citizens with security and public services, notwithstanding utilities, justice, and education amongst others. They may attempt to unseat the government by providing alternative services to the people or want to portray the government as being impotent (De Luca, 2012).

2.3 Types of Insurgencies

To identify the types of insurgencies, we have to study the nature of the political goals the insurgents are trying to pursue. Whether these goals are transformational, in the sense that they aim for the revolution overthrow of the government, or they aim for a prosaic goal that is; persuading foreigners to leave their country and ‘go home’, insurgency has generally been categorized in three main types (Ebim & Abisola, 2022). These have long been the conventional wisdom among analysts of insurgency even if they differ in the ways they label them. Two of them were labeled by Brooker (2010) in his book as ‘separatist’ ‘revolutionary’ however, the third – insurgency against a state- was defined more in terms of the differences between religious, nationalist and locals examples than it was in terms of their opposition of being invaded colonially ruled by a foreign state or occupied. An appropriate label derived from the description of the Spanish guerilla’ landmark insurgency against Napoleons army; ‘the irregular fighter taking up weapons in order to expel invaders’ out of their state (Brooker, 2010).

The word “expeller” became an appropriate word in labeling insurgents fighting to expel a foreign state that is invading, colonially ruling or occupying the nation of an insurgent, their local or religious community, or their ideologically or traditionally defined home. The expeller type of insurgence has been the most common of the three mostly because of its prevalence amongst postmodern insurgencies. It has however been significantly less frequent in modern stateless

warfare despite it having quite a number of examples in recent years – this includes the anti-insurgencies against the British, French or Portuguese empires, the resistance movement against occupation by Nazi Germany, also the jihadist attempt to expel western crusaders from the Middle East (Ebim & Abisola, 2022).

The separatist type of insurgency on the other hand has more in common with the anti-colonial expeller insurgencies, if only for the desire they share to separate themselves from the local state in order to establish an independent state as similar to the anti-colonial demand for independence. The separatist type includes bands that are merely seeking some regional autonomy for their ethnic group's social groups or other sectarian groups not only secessionist bands seeking a fully independent state. Brooker (2010) gave example with the Eritrean-Tigray separatist alliance's victory over the Ethiopian state, where Ethiopia became a fully independent state while Tigray instead opted for a federal regional autonomy within the newly federalized Ethiopian. These warlord insurgencies are characterized by their nature of a feudal-like goal of creating 'a personal territorial freedom separate from existing state structures and boundaries' (Brooker, 2010, p.154).

As the Boko Haram insurgence is not the first type of insurgence Nigeria has had to go through, and although we can see from the nature of the separatist type of insurgency that Boko Haram cannot be labeled to be a type of this insurgence, that Boko Haram insurgence, Nigeria has actually experienced a type of this insurgence in its history with the civil war of 1967 otherwise known as the Biafra War. It was a separatist insurgence with a motivation and goal to separate from the country in order to build their independent Biafra state. However, it only ended with a bloody war and a loss of so many lives (Hansen, 2020; De Luca, 2012).

The mainstream perception of insurgence however seems to be focused on the revolutionary type; these are insurgencies that seek to overthrow an existing government in order to form a new state and state. Since the 1940s-80s public perception of revolutionary's focus on communism, the focus today has shifted to Islamist revolutionary insurgents and their desire in creating an Islamic state and or society. In both aspects of the communist and the Islamist cases, there has been an international aspect to their goals of a revolution, that is, the dream of spreading their ideology to other countries across the globe in order to become a worldwide phenomenon (Hansen, 2020).

A more important aspect to the revolutionary insurgencies is the overlap commonly found with the expeller type that occurs when they have to fight against both its local state and international states that assist the local state. A contemporary example of this overlap is the Taliban insurgency against the state of Afghanistan and the western military forces supporting it. However, some indistinctness can be found even in this case. These ambiguities or indistinctness can be found in whether or not the Taliban's revolutionary goals have been merged by those of the Pashtun ethnic/tribal separatism (Hansen, 2020). Categorizing Boko Haram as having a more revolutionary type insurgence believe will be more fitting even though that can also be arguable since we can find some discrepancies can always be found.

2.4 Insurgencies in Africa

Insurgencies in African states like Somalia, Sierra Leone, Congo, Sudan and Liberia have attracted the attention of new policy makers since 1990s as a new form of warfare (Collier, 2010). Rather than fighting in order to replace the existing government to replace them with more sufficient alternatives, these new warfare disrupt political order and render governments hollow rather than fighting for political reforms with their leaderships lacking cohesion in most cases. The style of fighting for these insurgents reflects their fragmented structures, defecting militias, an amalgamation of ethnic groups, local gangs' etc. with no specific ideology to sell or any comprehensive political programs compared to the commonly found anti-colonial anti-apartheid insurgents of the 1960s to 1980s that put in great effort in setting up liberated zones, mobilizing and administering population (Hodges, 2019). These new insurgents neither represent a large fragment of the population nor put into much effort into gaining popularity amongst citizens rather, are their actions largely geared towards protecting and enriching themselves at the expense of the wellbeing of the people amongst which they fight, their properties and security. This can be said to be the same for the situation in Nigeria as it sees the rise of banditry that are becoming more heavily armed and the militia in its southeast region (Onuoha, 2008).

Collier (2000) explained how the death of economic opportunities and weakening governmental institutions set a stage for insurgents that emerge as a kind of criminal initiative that serves the material and personal interests of their members. Insurgent leaders of this caliber do not possess

much option but to appeal to their recruits by tolerating their use of violence and being supportive of the self-interests of their recruits (Hansen, 2020).

2.5 Impact of the Insurgency in Nigeria

The number of deaths caused by Boko Haram in Nigeria between May 2011 and January 2021 is over 53,196 and counting, spread across the northern states of the federation in Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Kaduna, Plateau, Benue and Zamfara states (World Bank, 2021).




Figure 9- State most affected by Boko Haram's deadly attacks in Nigeria from 2011 to 2021. Source: World Bank Data (2021)

This has led to several families separated from each other and family legacies turn apart (Apeh, 2019). The fear of being raised within these areas including youth corps members and volunteers have been truncated. Aside this, the banditry tolls are skyrocketing and spreading to all parts of the federation making people live in fears of their own homes, communities and environs. Additionally, the highest toll death (as been recorded in as seen the figure 9) has been in Borno state as at January 2021 but this data excludes Jigawa, Kastina, Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto and Niger states. These have been irretrievable at the time of this study. However, the death tolls keep rising and the government's repetitive efforts have failed woefully and in spite of international efforts, this group has continued to destroy the lives of victims who have lost their families.

The high cost of living within these areas has increased immensely in terms of food, clothes and shelter. The high prices are as a result of unavailability of food and livestock; shelter being destroyed from constant attacks on safe camps constructed by aids. Aids have been thoroughly restricted from access to IDPs because of safety for international counter measures in order to forestall casualties in the cases of surprise attacks. The lifestyle of those displaced has been from poverty to degenerated poverty where they heavily depend on assistance from the Federal Government, international aids and contributors, etc. The economic disruption of activities within the north in general has been crumbling. Within the food basket of the nation: Benue state, the virtual death of economic activities from food and cash crops produced in the area have been obstructed by the farmer-herder clashes which have left many families hungry and starving to death. Thus, those who have survived have become refugees in their own country who are incapable of improving or contributing to the economic development of where they are domiciled or the country as a whole. Furthermore, the behavioral characteristics of people within these communities are also changing. They tend to withhold their financial resources and recent investment decisions that are ordinarily expected to foster economic growth and circle in the economy.

Unemployment is heightened in these areas. There has been an incessant rise in poverty due to unemployment and as such, poverty is highly prevalent. These displaced persons also include employed persons who are affected by the insurgency either as a termination of contract because of the insecurity or their businesses destroyed as a result of the insurgency. Additionally, affected areas have been starved of financial investments for a long time due to the diversification of funds to security and defense strategies running to trillions since 2011. Youths who are the most active workforce are rendered unemployable except they migrate to other cities of the country where the scarcity of jobs are also on the rise.

Social exclusion is one of the biggest impacts of insurgency in the northeast areas. As a result, risk adverse attitude is the order of the day in terms of where and who to go to for socializing and general decisions for leisure, pleasure and work (Akintunde, 2018). These further decrease the ability of an individual within these areas to be innovative or creative in interacting with others or sharing ideas. Furthermore, the country in itself loses its best minds to other parts of the world as those that can afford to leave join the statistics of emigrants in the country.

In addition, the economic growth of the economy is hampered generally as the inter-state trade is barricaded by the flow of goods most importantly in form of raw materials and others from the north to the other parts of the country. The north is suffering a great loss of investment, trade foreign direct investments and unemployment, hunger, etc. it is imperative that the FGN make countering yet productive efforts to restore the confidence of its citizens in the institution they revere for hope, peace, and stability (Apeh, 2019).

2.6 Conceptual Framework

This research adopted the concept of insurgency as a conceptual framework, categorizing insurgency, categorizing insurgencies into three main types and two different modes, which are the terrorist and the guerrilla mode. The difference between the two is mostly found in their nature of attacks, making it closely related to the strategy the insurgents pursue such as provocation strategy or propaganda. Distinction between the two modes may be summed up into whether their attacks are:

- A. Targeting security forces or
- B. Or targeting civilians.

In the case of Boko Haram, I find that they both have the nature of the guerrilla and terrorist mode, in that they stage their attacks on security forces, civilians and also government institutions, not that this is also not commonly found as there always seem to be a gray area between the two modes and therefore, throughout this research, you'll find an interchanging of the use of Boko Haram as both an insurgence and a terrorist organization. Yet, even in cases of dual-mode insurgence, there is usually a primary or fundamental mode that characterizes an insurgence into three modes, which are; the expeller, separatist or revolution, which I will address briefly later in this chapter.

2.6.1 The Frustration-Aggression Theory

Theory of frustration-aggression proposed by John Dollard and Neal Miller in 1939, which was further developed by Leonard Berkowitz in 1969, is the theoretical framework employed in this research. The theory states that violence is always a result of frustration and that that frustration always leads to some type of aggression (Leeds, 1978; Dollard, 1939). Angry people are born out of frustration, which in turn leads to animosity (an emotional readiness to aggress). As a result of

being angry, one develops hostile behavior toward others. The idea is applicable all across the world. In a study of political instability in 84 countries, Ivo and Feierabend (1968) used the frustration-aggression hypothesis they developed in 1972 and 1968.

People in fast-modernizing nations, such as Nigeria, become more aware of material progress when they become more urbanized and educated. However, because wealth spreads slowly, the growing gap between the rich and the poor exacerbates anger and leads to more violent outbursts. Frustration as a result of lack makes people aggressive and as a result makes them commit crime and violence. Employed people's absence from the workforce is a severe threat to democratic governance as well as the national security integrity, according to research by Akwara, Akwara Enwuchola, Adekunle and Udaw (2013). Young people's engagement in urban disputes and violence in Nigeria today as a result of a lack of employment options, for example. Lack of employment is linked to a rise in violent crimes such as sectarian terrorism and insurgency (Rotimi, 2011). In places where young people are unable to secure legitimate employment, they turn to illegal activities in order to make ends meet.

People, who are oppressed, discriminated against, socially isolated, or economically disadvantaged might occasionally resort to violence since the causes of violence and insecurity are often multifaceted. There is evidence to suggest that poverty and inequality are catalysts for violence, according to some experts (Aweke, 2012). Borno Nigeria and the poorer neighborhoods of cities like it are often high-crime regions, and according to Aweke (2012), 90 percent of all violence-related deaths have occurred in the world's less prosperous nations, including the city's poorer neighborhoods, including Borno state, Nigeria. As a result of the current economic climate, many young people are turning to crime, war, and violence as a means of subsistence. In Nigeria, national security is challenged by the involvement of unemployed youth in conflict situations, such as religious and ethnic strife. As a result, insurgency has become a growing problem in Nigeria. There are many unemployed people that transmit their animosity to the Nigerian populace because they believe the society dislikes them, and these types of people became insurgents as a result of this transferred aggression.

2.7 Boko Haram Insurgency: A Brief Exposition

Boko Haram is not the foremost militia group in Nigeria as there have been many other major groups and militias in Nigeria. The Maitatsine Fundamentalist sect from the North, the Odua People's Congress in the West, the Bakassi Boys and MASSOB in the East, the Militants and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta in the South, and so on and so forth (MEND). Boko Haram, an Islamic terrorist organization based in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, was founded in 2002 by Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda' wati wal Jihad, or "those committed to promoting the Prophets' teachings and Jihad" (Abolurin, 2012, p.261). "Boko" (Hausa) means "book" and "Haram" (Arabic) means "sin" or "forbidden" in Arabic. For this reason, Boko Haram is translated in both Hausa and Arabic languages to mean, "Western education is sin" (Gilbert, 2014). "In a sense it could be argued that Boko Haram, started as a fundamental Islamic sect that intends to supplant government structures that politicized, corrupted and bastardized proper implementation of Sharia in the north; and to install Islamic regime where Sharia law will be applied to the letters" (Idowu, 2013, p.86). Their goals are still a mystery, but they've stepped up their insurgency in the wake of the thousands of deaths and destruction they've caused. As their name implies, they are opposed to western education, yet the tremendous killings and property destruction they have caused contradicts that.

Recruiting has been aided by the fact that many young people have dropped out of school in order to join them because of the hardships they face, such as unemployment and frequent strikes. According to Olojo (2013), economic hardship has been a major motivator for violent radicalism, recruitment, and support for Boko Haram. Terrorism by OPC, INC and MASSOB may be explained in terms of politics and economy; however, the Boko Haram insurgency is a more complex issue that may be traced to a variety of factors (Idowu, 2013). He also blamed ethnicity, poverty/inequality, state crises, political culture and institutions, and foreign influences for the Boko Haram insurgency.

The insurgency has had a terrible and wide-reaching impact. Although many people and properties were destroyed, the country's economic situation was worsened because investors stopped investing and instead divested; food distribution was halted; tension between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria was sown, leading to distrust and antagonism; the north of Nigeria was massively depopulated, and the south was overburdened; infrastructures in the north that were

supposed to help the north were damaged or destroyed. The focus here is on the most essential aspects of man's survival.



Chapter Two-Socio-economic Aspects of the Motivation for Boko Haram Insurgency

3.1 History of Insurgency

Boko Haram is an Islamic movement incepted in northeast Nigeria (Borno state) in 2002, which originally was non-violent but metamorphosed into what is well known today. “The group was initially operating under the name “Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization” under the leadership of “Mallam Lawal” (IISS, 2011). The moniker “Islamic State in West Africa” came about in 2015 after the original group broke into factions and one of these factions held onto the original moniker (Adelaja, 2020).

Although the group’s violent nature was refueled by the 5-day arm combat between the security forces in Borno state and the terrorist group’s members that led to the death of their leader Mohammed Yusuf, some of the security personnel and its members (amongst others) (Shuaibu, Salleh, & Shehu, 2015); this resulted in envisaged rage and passion to war against politicians who have used them, the police and Islamic authorities since 2009. This was the quelling period of the group in which the Nigerian authorities claimed public victory only for the group to re-strategize and hit the nation hard in subsequent years (Akintunde, 2018; Emmanuel, 2018).

Mohammed Yusuf the founder of the new faction now called Boko Haram was born in 1970 in Maiduguri. His legacy has been radical, denied, and termed un-Islamic by the clerics he worked with in previous years. Although he was killed in 2009, he created a “religious complex” nicknamed “Markaz” that was described by the Muslim clerics as “irrational, illogical and extreme” (Shuaibu, Salleh, & Shehu, 2015). Markaz was a school where unprivileged Muslim families enrolled their children within Maiduguri town but were discovered as a charade to instill political goals, Islamize the country while imposing shariah laws, and recruit jihadists (Umar, 2013). After a series of religious crisis emerged in Borno state capital: Maiduguri, rumors of the group’s activities were slowly causing mayhem and the then governor of Borno state issued a state policy of all motorcyclists in the country be seen wearing helmets while on the road to prevent road accidents (IISS, 2011). This was a strategy to identify the extremists at the time because it was forbidden for them, they were identified and four of the members were killed and eighteen injured (Adesoji, 2010). The police swiftly declared war against them but the group responded with the “famous tirade entitled: ‘An Open Letter to the Federal Government’ in which he

threatened the government, urging them to respond within forty days with the view to a resolution between the government and the group, and failure to deliver this ‘view’ will result in ‘jihad’ operations commence in the country which only Allah can stop it” (Adesoji, 2010). The FGN ignored the threats and according to scholars (Adedire, Ake, & Olowojolu, 2016; Adesoji, 2010; Rebecca, 2015), the group enacted and rebuilt its walls from its ashes declaring war on the country.

As seen today, there have been several deaths reported and some unreported due to the unavailability of centralized database within the country on issues as pertinent as this despite international interventions for eleven years and counting.

The insurgency’s size and complexity grew significantly between 2011 and 2015 especially with steady series of assassination campaigns, suicide bombings, and massed attacks against both civilians and security forces after allegedly obtaining training and guidance from jihadist groups such as “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Shabaab” (Amao, 2020).

Its international attention resonated in 2014 when it kidnapped 276 girls in Chibok, Borno State, many of who are still missing (Akintunde, 2018). Boko Haram has publicly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State after it formed a statelet in Iraq and Syria (Allen, 2019). It started operations in the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, claiming a territory the size of Belgium (Apeh, 2019).

3.2 Impacts of Boko Haram Insurgency on Human Security in Nigeria

When violence is committed, the effects can be both heinous and far-reaching on the victims of such attacks. Analysis of the insurgency’s impact on human security will be done from an overall human security viewpoint in order to provide a better understanding of the impacts and the lengths at which they have affected the populace, with particular attention paid to food and nutrition, health, shelter, education, and protection.

3.2.1 Food and Nutrition

Some of Nigeria’s primary food-producing regions have been adversely affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. Agriculture, livestock, and fish are the mainstays of the Yobe, Adamawa, and Borno states that have been hardest damaged by the insurgency. Farmers are reluctant to go to their farms because they are afraid of being attacked. “No one can go a kilometer owing to terror,

most of them have fled their homes,” said Abba Gambo, a lecturer at the University of Maiduguri. More than 1.5 million people, especially farmers, have been forced to escape their homes by Boko Haram’s insurgency in the past year, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

In addition, trade lines between the north and south have been disrupted, making it difficult to transport and distribute food. There is a high risk of inflation due to food shortages caused by the insurgency, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria. Boko Haram appears to have halted the flow of beans, according to Eme et al (2014). Another problem is a shortage of pepper and tomato, which are two of the most commonly used foods in the country that originate in the North. As a result, food costs have risen precipitously. People who are lucky enough to receive a basket of pepper that used to sell for N4000-N5000 (depending on the quality of the pepper) now sell it for N8000 including transport charges and earn little or no profit once they have been sold in retailers, according to Osagie (2013:24): “If the terrorist groups violent attacks continue, the country will be plunged into a long-term state of chronic food shortages. Individuals and families will find it increasingly difficult to afford adequate and nutritious food for a long and healthy life as food prices continue to climb. Individuals are at risk of being hungry, becoming malnourished, or even dying as a result of this. In places most affected by insurgency and violence in general, malnutrition rates are high. Yobe and Borno states were found to have GAM rates of 15.5% and 13.6%, respectively, in a SMART Survey performed by the national government and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in spring 2014. The basic dangers to human security are posed by food and nutrition shortages, and the necessity of containing this insurgency cannot be overstated.

3.2.2 Health

People’s health is of the utmost importance. Violence kills more than a million people every year, according to the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 2002 report on Violence and Health, which was released on October 3rd, 2002. The Boko Haram conflict has killed a lot of people and injured a lot of others. On Monday, April 14, 2014, a bomb went off in Abuja’s Nyanya neighborhood killing at least 75 people and injuring at least 215 others (Awortu, 2015). Several people were killed and injured in two separate explosions that occurred on October 2nd, 2015 in Abuja’s Kuje and Nyanya neighborhoods. As the number of injured patients rises, health care facilities and hospitals are becoming overcrowded, putting undue strain on equipment and forcing medical

personnel to work longer hours to keep up. For example, studies from the University of Port Harcourt show that in addition to physical disabilities suffered by victims of violent crimes and warfare, mental illnesses such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety disorders related to drugs, schizophrenia, psychosis, and depression are common.

Insurgents may still have recollections of violence that disturb normal life patterns even if the rebellion is brought under control. Aside from health care centers and amenities, the cult has also demolished them. Workers in the healthcare field, who are also being targeted, have deserted their places of employment. Access to health treatment is becoming increasingly difficult for those in the Northeast affected by the Ebola outbreak. Since Boko Haram insurgents have targeted numerous health facilities and health workers in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, the health system in those states is barely functioning at all, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2014). In Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States only 37% of facilities were functional as of March 2014.

A cholera epidemic broke out in the Nigerian state of Borno in September 2014, and the medical charity Doctors without Borders treated 4,000 patients. As of September 16th, 2015, the official count at three camps for people displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency recorded 172 cholera cases and 16 deaths (The Guardian, 16th September 2015). Medical prescriptions were either insufficient or unavailable in Adamawa, according to an assessment conducted by the United States Agency for International Development (2014) in the Chibok neighborhood. In 2015, the Assessment Capacities Project (ACP) cited these findings.

Fees are levied on those that are available, limiting access to those who are impoverished. With more and more people fleeing the region for safer havens in neighboring states and countries, infectious diseases are on the rise (Musa, 2015). All of this occurred in a region that already lacked adequate resources. If this insurgency is not put down quickly, it will continue to have a negative impact on the health of the local population, increasing the risk of disease outbreaks. Having access to quality healthcare is essential for ensuring the wellbeing of everyone.

3.2.3 Shelter

Boko Haram's conflict has destroyed so many homes that it is impossible to count them all. Millions of people have been displaced by this devastation. The Boko Haram insurgency has displaced more than 2.1 million people in Nigeria, according to the International Organization for Migration. This group of internally displaced persons has relocated to host communities and is in

need of adequate shelter and long-term resettlement. Boko Haram insurgents would continue to expand the number of IDPs, resulting in serious security concerns if they are not dealt with. It was reported by the HNO (2014) that the majority of internally displaced individuals are residing in schools, churches, and makeshift shelters that are primarily unfinished buildings or dilapidated homes. Women in particular are at risk in many of the temporary housing options because of the lack of basic amenities such as running water and toilets as well as cooking facilities (HNO, 2014: 11). When such incidents occur, the individual's human security is compromised. Theft and rape are frequent occurrences, as is the spread of infectious diseases, with women bearing the brunt of the burden the majority of the time.

3.2.4 Education

As a result of Boko Haram's insurgency, schools and institutions have been targeted, with students and professors killed, abducted, and infrastructure destroyed. There has been a "direct and cumulative detrimental impact on children's access to education, the availability of educational places and supplies, and the ability of teachers" because of violence and instability, according to HNO (2014:8). The Boko Haram insurgency has claimed the lives of 600 Nigerian teachers, according to the National President of the Nigerian Union of Teachers, Micheal Olukoya, who spoke on Teachers Day on the 5th of October 2015. (Pulse.ng, 2015). 882 classrooms had been damaged or destroyed in the state of Borno by the end of August 2013; from June to September, all schools in Yobe were closed (Awortu, 2015). More than 200 female students at the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok were kidnapped on April 14, 2014, which has prevented parents from enrolling their daughters and wards in schools, and those who are already enrolled have been withdrawn. While these have happened in an educationally deprived region, subsequent attacks would further undermine it and the educational system as a whole, with more school dropouts, illiterates, and unemployed youths likely to be recruited as suicide bombers and terrorists in the near future. As a result, Awortu (2015, p.217) claims "violence tends to increase and persist in Nigeria when the rate of illiteracy and school dropout is high."

3.2.5 Protection

According to HNO (2014), an estimated 2.15 million men, women, girls and boys are experiencing physical and psychological trauma as a result of the insurgency. In recent attacks, youngsters,

particularly females, have been more manipulated. The terrorist group has conducted several deadly ambushes across the Nigerian border, and many of them used the use of women as a platform for multiple attacks. Health and maternal consequences of early child marriages are widespread. Insurgents' victims, particularly IDPs, are routinely left unprotected by humanitarian aid organizations. According to HNO (2014), there is a lack of camp management and protection for the IDP population. As a result, counter-insurgency has been marked by human rights violations. An ex-special adviser to Nigeria's Foreign Minister stated that "the Nigerian has fought against Boko Haram in the Nigerian way, attacks on the innocent, illegal searches and torture, extrajudicial killings, unlawful detention of suspects without trial, random burning of homes and farms; revenge attacks." This is a strategy for defeat. When it comes to fighting insurgents, "the military has alienated the people it is tasked with protecting, making it more difficult." The problem is that security personnel tasked with keeping residents safe from the Boko Haram insurgency have fallen short of their goals. As a result, citizens are more afraid, panicked, and frightened than ever before. Human safety and security are at stake, and any threat to protection must be taken seriously.

3.3 The Socio-economic causes of Boko Haram Insurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria

The is going to take a look at some of the causes that might have possibly contributed to the multi-faceted insurgency in Nigeria, particularly the northeast lasting this long at the expense of loss of so many lives. The factors used to measure these user socio-economic factors are community safety, employment, education, income and lastly, social and family support.

3.3.1 Socio-economic Factors

Socio-economic causes are factors that determine and modify human wellbeing and way of life. These include: "income, education, employment, community safety, and social supports" (County Health, 2021). For example, if employment satisfies a person's human needs including food, shelter, health, education and children's care, etc., it also reduces the individual's ability to save and meet "unpredictable economic distress" to enjoy the benefits or reaps of being employed in the long run. These needs are tagged as vulnerable, especially in a country like Nigeria where daily remittances for family and friends are essential to the culture and tradition; terrorism has identified these weaknesses and preyed upon to them recruit and cause havoc all over the world (Telford, 2020; Akintunde, 2018; County Health, 2021).

The main socio-economic factors identified in this study include education, social and family support, income, employment, and “community safety” (IEP, 2015) as listed above. These socio-economic factors considered for this study are described below:



Figure 2: Enabling Factors niched by Boko Haram Sect (Computed by Researcher)

A. Income:

Income as seen in (figure 2) above plays a part as a contributing factor that enables the survival of Boko Haram. Poverty has been an impairing reason why terrorism has easily penetrated into the shores of the country. Although (Mitra, 2008) argues that poverty is not the only reason for terrorism but are aligned with other contributing factors including education, personal characteristics of greed and religion. His work further elucidates the facts of terrorism as a “complex phenomenon, determined by the interaction of a milieu of social, economic, and political factors. These necessary factors such as the presence of a powerful leader and adequate finances, facilitating factors including unemployment among youths, precipitating factors (such as communal differences, economic exploitation, intensification of poverty, or unemployment), and perpetuating factors (e.g., suitable geographical terrain, policies of appeasement)”. Therefore, terrorism is not a single-factor effect but compounded with numerous factors that occur simultaneously and deviates an individual’s mind psychologically away from what he or she morally knows as right and wrong to a new norm.




Figure 3- Poverty Headcount Rate (Nigeria) by state. source: World Bank (2020)

The income earned by an average Nigerian is ₦339,000, lowest average is ₦87,500 and the highest is ₦1,510,000 (highest average) monthly (Salary Explorer, 2021). This invariably means that educated Nigerians are eligible to earn this than uneducated persons and monthly income also includes allowances for basic survival needs for housing, medical care, transportation and other benefits. From this, only about 50% of the educated population earn ₦339,000 while the other 50% earn less than ₦339,000 but the lowest average is ₦87,500 which also means several members of the Nigerian society earn less than the lowest average (Salary Explorer, 2021). From the lowest to highest average, these vary across sectors and job experiences, which means the higher the experiences, the higher, their income over the years (after 5 to 10years). “The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) recently released the “2019 Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria” report, which highlights that 40 percent of the total population, or almost 83 million people, live below the country’s poverty line of 137,430 naira (\$381.75) per year” (NBS Report, 2019). This is a consequent to food inflation, high-rise in taxes, amenity reward system, educational costs, transportation and devaluation of Naira.



Figure 4- Salary Comparison- Education and Experience, Nigeria. Source: Salary explorer (2021)




Figure 5-Average Salary Distribution Nigeria. Source: Salary explorer (2021)

Terrorism has been able to thrive in all of this but the question still arise that is every poor person in Nigeria vulnerable to playing a part in terrorism? This means that other factors including discontentment contribute to ordinary Nigerians participating or abetting terrorism. The element of income and resource inequality being preyed on by elites for terrorism is also a key factor all over the world (Mitra, 2008). The income of Nigerians within the varying sectors of the country have been said to deplete and have an inverse relationship with the basic needs and survival of an average Nigerian. With the depreciating value of Naira, terrorist activities have further reduced the paying ability of companies within the northeast rendering even more people poor and the poor, poorer. As measured by World Bank (2020), the highest poverty rate in the northeast is Taraba as sighted in figure 3, earning below the lowest average of ₦137,430 (\$381.75) per year (83million out of 208million population) (NBS Report, 2019) and ₦339,000 per month for elites (62.02 % of 208million educated and working in Nigeria (Macrotrends, 2021)). If persons are poorer, the government's efforts depleted and futile, some individuals may result to crime and extreme cases, terrorism (Adofu & Alhassan, 2018).

B. Employment:

Employment has been one of the biggest challenges in Nigeria as is seen sighted in (figure 2). Too many educated hands involved in crimes and sophisticated felonies have caused the country billions of Naira and destroying the international reputation of the country. The unemployment rate in Nigeria is set to reach 7.986% (World Bank, 2020, p. 1). The unemployment rates by state (figure 6) has been skyrocketing due to political, fiscal and monetary instability from policies to implementation and others. Other authors have linked “socio-economic factors and economic deprivation, demographic tensions, political order and political transformation, and ethnic and religious fractionalization” to terrorism (Okafor & Piesse, 2017; George, 2016). Furthermore, terrorist use these loopholes to niche their activities based on personalized gender facilitated through poor economic conditions, unbalanced distribution of resources, inequality, nepotism and religious fanatic to where Nigeria is today making 11 years of havoc caused by Boko Haram. Several recruits have been added to the terrorist group who are believed to be Nigerians (Amao, 2020) despite conspiracy theories emerging that the leaders and members of the sect are non-Nigerians. Similarly, other conspiracy theories agree that these are non-Nigerians but are abetted by Nigerians who profitably prefer the activities to escalate further regardless of how many economic, political and infrastructural damages caused (Akintunde, 2018).




Figure 6- Unemployment rate by state. NBS (2020)




Figure 7- Unemployment rate, World Bank (2020)

C. Community safety:

Although community safety is categorically not a socio-economic factor but this has been used by notable international organizations like the UN, World Bank, IITA (International Institute of Tropical Agriculture), NBS (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics) and others to gather data at the grassroots. Nigerians' culture of living together (communist), communing and knowing each family heads has been in existence for centuries. Although this has slowly nosedived because of the lack of trust in neighbors or acquaintances as reports have shown that these acquaintances or neighbors have abetted the incessant crimes of banditry, kidnapping and Boko Haram. The communities especially in the rural and some parts of the urban areas have local security personnel who are known as 'vigilantes' and trusted than the police have been disbanded because of the sophistication of the Boko Haram terrorist group and has inversely created a wider gap of trust between the people and security personnel generally. The Boko Haram members have been reported to sometimes appear as military personnel to deceive their victims and parade themselves as justice and truth, which has increased the possibilities of them invading even the most dangerous areas heavily guarded by these vigilantes. Now, the neighborhoods' watch is slowly going in extinct, further creating a separation of community that was once trusted by Nigerians.

D. Education:

Education statistics in Nigeria stand at 62.02% (World Bank, 2021) as at 2018 of people above 15years of age who can understand basic statements and relate to their everyday lives. The other percentage are illiterates, a study conducted by Nigerian Bureau of Statistics in 2018 is 37.98% are uneducated (not necessarily illiterates). This is a huge percentage of the population that is susceptible to psychological manipulation, religious fanatic and mayhem. The hopelessness of the Nigerian population has refocused an opportunity set for the terrorist group to thrive in the country. According to (Mitra, 2008), the combination of ignorance, unemployment, illiteracy and poverty are deadly and can draw a person's desires and discontentment to be misled to joining a terrorist group like Boko Haram. Although there are very few literatures on how educated persons are at the core of Boko Haram in Nigeria, relative studies of terrorist groups in the Middle East have been reported to be more political than economic inequality (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2019).

The rationale for these has been attributed to greed for power, national resources and control of state's affairs both domestically and internationally.

E. Social and family support

The group resulting in social exclusion and separation of families has disrupted social and family support system: daughters/sons from parents, parents from children, wives and husbands. The psychological aftermath of victims in particular have limited their ability to involve themselves in productive social system that would ordinarily have been helpful in resuscitating others who may be weakened from their experiences. As aforementioned, the lack of trust within families and neighbors has heightened over the years of the existence of Boko Haram. People have been degrading their economic statuses to lower than it is so as to remain abstract, away from the preying eyes of Boko Haram and its sect members. In recent times, because of digital trailing of banking and monetary activities now modernized to the internet, the free flow of cash has been hampered and so international funding for the Boko Haram sect has been decreasing (Akinwotu, 2021). Their need for western education has relegated and extended to kidnappings and banditry where information of victims is retrievable from family and friends who are in need of "financial upgrade for somewhat immoral affluence" (Akinwotu, 2021: 11). Thus, the famous culture of Nigerians' running to the aid of neighbors and family have skyrocketed to raising funds for bandits and Boko Haram to finance their activities, purchase weapons and continue the circle to creating mayhem across the 36 states of the federation and its environs.

3.4 Underlying Relationships

Other socio-economic factors as identified by (Mitra, 2008), (Ekumaoko, Ezemenaka, 2020), and (Coccia, 2020) are explored in this study to reiterate the root causes of terrorism or the factors and relationship that has fueled the activities of terrorism in Nigeria. These are the relationship between religion and terrorism, politics and terrorism; and population and terrorism.

A. Religion and Terrorism

Nigeria has always had multi-tribal, ethnic, and religious conflicts. With a multi-diverse and cultural environment that consists of three major tribes: Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo with over 520 languages as discussed in the first chapter. There have been many ethnic and religious crises in the

past that has degenerated and envisaged a division in the country for a long time. Tribalism and nepotism have been the order of the day that has caused a division for equitable distribution of resources, political power, governance and control, etc.

Religion and terrorism have been researched by scholars and concluded to have an underlying relationship. The religious structure that exists globally also abets and conjugates the structure of the Boko Haram sect (Mitra, 2008). Each of these has leaders and dutiful followers who act on instructions laid down by their leaders. One is objectively known as moral and the other inhumane (Akintunde, 2018). The presence of a powerful leader as seen in religious settings is prevalent in the sect but underlying factors that have precipitated the occurrence and soar of the activities of the sect. Aside religion, these are ignorance, economic inequality, “war against globalization”, ethnic strives, segregation of varying religious beliefs, political inequality and high unemployment (Mitra, 2008). These have birthed the strategies to be undertaken and lead by terrorist group leaders in form of domestic and international networks through armed robbery, banditry and kidnappings to procure firearms and finance their operations (ibid).

Nigerians are high religious believers either as Christian, Muslim or traditional worshippers (atheist exist but uncommon). The need to rely on the supernatural to allow the natural to be transformed to personalized desires is prevalent in the country. The lack of basic amenities and other economic elements that should provide an average Nigerian with average living standards to work, be paid and have opportunities to save are not present. This has allowed opportunities for fanatics to have followers on all religious grounds and caused ethnic strives, disproportionate equality based on nepotism and religious standards. It is no gain saying that religion is not the only factor that has immensely contributed to the sect and its violent track records but because of the religious and cultural systems that exist in the country, it has accommodated and biasedly caused the true non-fanatic believers to be divided and aligning with side of injustice they have been made to believe. This may be attributed to injustice, economic imbalance, nepotism, etc.

Religion and terrorism have a clear-cut relationship but must be modified with other factors in order for it to be relevant, thus, this makes it difficult to measure the extent to which religion influences terrorism (Emmanuel, 2018). However, it is no gain saying that religion (extremism) is a birth factor to fanatic and as such a contributing factor that is used to attract persons who have

grievances against their governments, lifestyle or simply out of a repressive situation that was solely objectively determined by them (Butler, 2015).

B. Population and Terrorism

Nigeria is currently populated by 208.08million with a majority at ages 0-14 at 43.69%, 15-64 is 53.57% and 2.74% are ages 64 and above (World Bank, 2021) as mentioned in the first chapter. This shows that a huge percentage of the population is young and active people who can easily be recruited with the high unemployment, high prices, inflation, meager salaries, and low-income levels, etc. Averagely, terrorism burgeons in unique culturally influenced environments particularly with highly populated regions where economic deprivation and minimal economic development are prevalent (Coccia, 2020; Butler, 2015). These individuals are aggrieved with one challenge or the other and presented with choices that are expected to solve their problems and an easy way out.

When there are many idle hands, the active population is susceptible to the crime of all kinds and the extreme is terrorism. Worse off, women and children who grow up within terrorist communities only know death, war, and rage as moral standards (Emmanuel, 2018). Because of the existing divisions and unending insecurity in the country, increasing population, and disintegrated unity, the 'few' as described by Umar (2013) are minority Muslims that do not represent the entire Muslim population in the country. They have been able to multiply over the years by having children with their captives, the aggrieved persons who are Muslims and non-Muslims as well as persons who have lost hope in their country and have nowhere else to go (Umar, 2013).

In addition to the high population in the north particularly, the highest out-of-school children and incessant births have increased the number of children who are active members of the sect and appear innocent to others. The high population increases the unemployed statistics and a great opportunity for the sect to leach on for years to come.

Additionally, the spread of the Boko Haram sect members has been able to thrive in West and Eastern Africa because high populations of Muslims are domiciled there, unlike South and Central Africa who have low populated Muslim believers (Adofu & Alhassan, 2018). In other words, rather than spreading radical Islamist networks, the Islamists in Nigeria particularly are strategized

on converting Christians to Islam (Adelaja, 2020). Thus, the West, East and North African areas have become seedbeds of “Islamic fundamentalism in Africa” with attendant levels of violence. Also, both radical and non-radical Islamist groups have actively sought funding from foreign terrorist networks in order to strengthen their capacities in order to create an Islamic belt across Africa (Umar, 2013).

Although there are works of literature on politics and terrorism being related or having an underlying relationship, however, not much is relatable to Nigeria. Nigeria has a multiparty system with a change in political policies every four years or with the emergence of a new democratic regime. With this political instability, reports from Punch, dated the 27th of March 2019 state that “the sect is being financed by notable politicians who have selfish gains from the turmoil caused and the inflow of international funds remitted to the country would be at their disposal. The major intent is to destroy the reputation of a particular government in order to make the previous or next worse. Unfortunately, these have backfired with the uncontrollable number of deaths daily and helpless efforts to negotiate with terrorists as an option in a democratic era. Too sad.” (Sadiq, 2019)

C. Economic inflation and Terrorism

The consumer price index (CPI) is one of the metrics for measuring a country’s inflation rate. Nigeria is a country with an unstable currency, a volatile economy but with abundant resources often regarded as mismanaged or underdeveloped for the good of the nation and its citizens (Aladejare & Kolawapo, 2020). As shown in Table 1, the country’s inflation has been uprising since 2016 and is predicted to be as high as at 19.61% given the present factors of unemployment, higher poverty rate, unstable foreign exchange rates, and insecurity (Phebe, Osoji, & Fredrick-Nbani, 2020; World Bank, World Bank, 2021).

Periods	Inflation (%)
2011	10.84%
2012	12.22%
2013	8.48%
2014	8.06%
2015	9.01%
2016	15.68%
2017	16.52%
2018	12.09%
2019	11.40%
2020	13.53%
2021 ¹	19.61%

Table 1- Nigeria's Inflation rate (NBS, 2021)

Aside from the immediate psychological influence that may be noticed in the economic expectations that are problematic amid terrorist aftermaths, the primary concept of terrorism is to “intimidate or produce fear” (Akinloluwa, 2020). Economic expectations have a crucial part in the current macroeconomic models’ mechanisms especially- central banks, government leaders, and other public and private institutions rely heavily on expert estimates and market-based expectations when making choices (Ibid). Therefore, understanding how the fear climate created by terrorism influences such expectations and forecasts is crucial for effective policymaking. Additionally, terrorist acts have an impact on consumer and investor behavior, as well as a country’s equity investments (Nwokoma & Adefarati, 2021). These arise from foreign investments, foreign-based company ownership, and bonds.

When terrorists strike regularly, fear and insecurity take hold of people’s thoughts and begin to influence economic behavior, and the quality of economic projections, including both expert and market-based predictions (Ajudua, Majebi, & Odishika, 2020). Because the psychological impacts on expectations and emotions of doubt may be significant, the unique capacity to measure the impact of uncertainty rather than the unforeseeable consequences of negative shocks within an economy has a strong connection with the upsurge in activities that naturally deter an economy’s wealth and progress beginning from a shortage of skilled human resources, resources to finance their labor as well as policies that are expected to safeguard their actions profitably ensuring that

¹ Projected at 16.91% (Worldometers, 2021)

taxes paid back to the government are used to provide basic amenities for the citizenry (Adelaja, 2020).

Unfortunately, the persistent inflation in the country has worsened the living standards of lives of affected Boko Haram victims. In addition to losing their homes, families, and places of abode, they also have to face the harshness of the economy with little or no main source of income. The government ensures those within the IDP camps have sufficient meal packs and clothing daily but many who have returned or outside the IDP camps have either resorted to crimes or added to the elongating poverty line of people that cannot afford \$1.90 per day (WHO, 2021).




Figure 8- Nigeria's Inflation rate from 2006-2026. Source (IMF, 2021)

From the incessant terrorist attacks, as expressed by Abdulahi (2019) and Khalifa and Hassan (2020), there is a glaring depiction that the number of terrorist attacks has had one of the strongest explanatory powers for the relative predictive abilities of the predictions relative to the inflation forecasts in Nigeria (figure 8). Despite economic agents' risk-averse behavior², terrorism has a large influence on both components of market-based inflation projections- inflation forecast and risk premium. Regardless of the quantitative approach used to account for them, the number of

² Evident in withdrawn foreign investments and reorganized risk strategies from foreign investors. See

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=NG>

fatalities from terrorist acts especially in Borno, Gombe and in recent times, Kaduna has a greater impact on exchange rate estimates (Khalifa & Hassan, 2021).

D. Repression and Terrorism

There have been scholarly arguments on how much repression suppresses or stimulates violence, terrorism and extremism (IPSA-AISP, 2021). Davenport (2012) argues that while some academics claim that repression lowers terrorism by increasing the costs of dissidents participating in terrorist behavior, others argue that repression encourages terrorism by either cutting off peaceful channels of protest or inciting or intensifying grievances within a society (Phebe, Osoji, & Fredrick-Nbani, 2020). According to studies (Tausch, 2016; Phebe, Osoji, & Fredrick-Nbani, 2020) on the structural origins of terrorism, terrorist activity is more widespread under democratic regimes than in nondemocratic or illiberal regimes. Similar to the Nigerian democratic system of government, with evidences similar to that of Israel, the most widely accepted explanation for this phenomenon is that the administrative restrictions and protection of individual rights inherent in democratic political systems provide a more congenial environment for terrorists than illiberal regimes (IPSA-AISP, 2021).

Democratic political systems are known for their structural ordinance of providing their citizens civil freedoms, limiting policing, giving arrestee's due process and the rights of the accused, and permitting media freedom (Ajudua, Majebi, & Odishika, 2020). Although these factors attract the adoption of democracy, it also makes it easier for terrorist groups to create, plan, and carry out attacks (Ibid), claims credit for assaults through the media, and defend their terrorist network if members are apprehended. Argued by Peterson (2021), the same components that make a democracy vulnerable to terrorism also make it vulnerable to civil society and individual liberty but terrorist activity may be lessened in governments that can use repression more easily and extensively, such as dictatorships. Not soliciting for dictatorship, Peterson (2021) also agrees with analysts who suggested that countries can lessen their susceptibility to terrorist strikes by curtailing or redefining citizens' rights.

Nigeria, a democratic state, authors have raised insightful arguments as to the extent the nation truly practices democracy. In a true democratic state, laws are created by elected persons with human right considerations for freedom on the right to vote, liberty of expression and other civil

liberties that make elected persons accountable to their voters. The consideration of the poor is most importantly highlighted with more than enough to be given to all concerned so as to have a non-repressive society that only those governing have absolute power, without a doubt than the governed (Campbell, 2020).

For example, “state governors’ wealth has risen as a result of arm-twisting state legislatures to enact laws that make former governors regular recipients of exotic cars, mansions, and millions of naira in the name of retirement benefits, all at the expense of citizens”, which is also inhibiting where the issue of a ₦30,000 minimum monthly wage remains unresolved (Campbell, 2020). Citizens are being forced to pay more taxes³, which are then utilized to operate government rather than for infrastructure or the welfare of the people which also increases poverty levels⁴. Wherefore the increased starvation and unemployment, the poor have no access to good basic amenities including medical services, good roads, transportation, education, etc. Public officeholders who despite the salaries award projects to themselves, misappropriate public funds and are unaccountable for their actions in spite of the glaring benefits of a democratic system known for its transparency and civil liberty.

Ultimately, Masuku, Mlambo, and Ngwenya (2021) reiterate the essentials of a repressive government and agree with Peterson (2021), Campbell (2020), and Ajudua, Majebi, and Odishika (2020) that democratic systems already exhibiting repressive actions are highly susceptible to terrorist attacks, formation, and reproach. The current repression has further enabled banditry in the country from both non-state actors and unemployed persons adapting to the terrorist loophole, an aftermath of the sect’s activities and a slow government response. There are arguments as to whether or not the actions of the government buttering the aggressive response as seen in other countries more political than lawful reprimand, it is evident that the repression of state actors’ actions, policies and responses have contributed to the major security breaches and challenges Nigeria faces today (Masuku, Mlambo, & Ngwenya, 2021).

³ Personal income tax increased to 24.5% and VAT from 5% to 7.5% in 2020 without a corresponding drop in inflation and food prices (UNDP, 2021).

⁴ Current poverty level is 71% at \$3.20 per day threshold (World Bank, 2021)

E. Technology and Terrorism

Terrorism is planned and politically motivated violence perpetrated by non-state actors that have been elevated by technological advancements that have proven in recent times, more difficult to trace, eliminate, and predict. The importance of seamless information dissemination in terrorism is highly important to terrorist groups in order to finance, plan, and carry out operations. Although (Judith and Saunath, 2019) suggest that there is a limited link between terrorism and information flow, the impact of media coverage on terrorism sheds light on the relationship between terrorism and media attention. In terrorist activities, the communication-technology mix is a double-edged sword. Global terrorist groups have relied heavily on untraceable technology to recruit, coordinate, organize, and carry out operations against their intended targets especially since the dissemination of political ideas to a target audience is a critical component of terrorist action; advancements in communication technology will almost certainly aid terrorists beneficially (Judith & Saunath, 2019).

On a global scale, technology, communication, and transportation developments have resulted in the seamless dissemination and extension of terrorist crimes (Dukur & Estene, 2021). As expressed by (Kahwaji, 2021), terrorism has received a fresh lease of life resulting from the new aspects of globalization, the erroneous assertions that technology is linked to globalization, and the opening up of national boundaries⁵. Terrorist groups such as Boko Haram have been able to coordinate, acquire and trade information, and reach out to previously unreachable populations because of advances in technology (Ibid). From another perspective, technical instructions for using new information technologies are readily available on search engines and YouTube, a wealth of information available for bomb assembly, poisoning, weapon construction, and mixing lethal chemicals (Kahwaji, 2021)

In the hands of terrorists, technology has increased the uncertainty about the dependability of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear explosives (CBRNE) (Animashaun, 2020). Some authors have argued that it appears technology advancements work more in favor of terrorists than they do for counter-terrorism efforts (Peterson, 2021; Akinwotu, 2021; Okey, 2019). Technology

⁵Covid19 border openings and SOPs

has made lives easier and more pleasant, yet certain technologies, such as CBRNE weapons, pose a threat to humanity when they fall into the hands of anti-social or terrorist organizations thereby posing deleterious difficulties for security forces to maintain control and enforce tactical strategies (Mahmood, Jetter, & Gurthum, 2021).

3.5 Socio-economic Aspects of the Motivation for Boko Haram Insurgency

In line with the objectives and research questions of the study, the review of concepts on socio-economic factors that have led to the insurgency and Boko Haram activities including the recruitment of young persons into the terrorist group have been categorized in subsections below.

The works of Gravenille (2020), Okeh (2019), Shaibu and Olu-Adeyemi (2020); Abdullahi (2020), Jelilov, Ayinde, Tetik, Celik, and Olali (2018) Ozoigbo (2019) Adofu and Alhassan, (2018) and Idika-Kalu (2020) are being used as a basis for this study and summarised below.

Gravenille (2020) examined the ‘impact of Boko Haram insurgency on the people of Borno state’, arguing that the impact of socio-economic development within the state is to be reviewed through people who actually experienced the group’s activities and are living post-experiences. Through a focus group made of ten interviewees, the study was able to draft themes of focus and concluded that the victims who suffered the adverse effects of Boko Haram insurgency, degradation of living standards and were categorized as one of the IDPs should not only be rehabilitated but also adequately catered for by the Federal Government. The central focus on the research was to understand the ‘implications of insurgency’ on the industrialization pursuit of the government in Borno state pre-insurgency and the ‘negative implications’ of the insurgency on the corporates within the state. The study concluded that by focusing on Borno state, it was able to identify the social, economic, and political impact of the terrorist group in the state. Consequently, the attacks on the villages of respondents have embedded fear, distrust amongst a peaceful communist village, aspirations and dreams, and unbearable losses that have redefined their social inclusion in a negative way.

Okeh (2019)’s study (similar to this study) examined holistically the socio-economic implications of development within the northern part of Nigeria especially from the point of view of growing business ventures and reputable institutions like commercial banks and factories shutting down

operations post-insurgency attacks because of the tagged term ‘unsafe’ for the north worthy of any form of investment. Furthermore, the study argued that many non-indigenes who settled in the north decided to return to their state of origins to restart their lives and abandoned worthy investments in the north, available for destruction by the sect. the study also identified religion differences as a contributing factor to the disunity in the north amongst the Christians and Muslims in the region. Although true believers do not cause havoc or harm to others, the author tagged them as being ‘brainwashed’, ‘deceived’ and ‘having mental disorder’ while paying attention to external factors of poverty, born into insurgency and psychological traumas. However, this study did not explicitly state what its definitions of socio-economic factors were and generally did not highlight the balance of how Boko Haram activities can be curbed or the victims’ living conditions as IDPs.

From a broader perspective, (Shaibu and Olu-Adeyemi, 2020) emphasized on ‘redefining human rights’ while examining the living conditions of IDPs in the north. It highlighted the facts of how many indigenes of the north have been subjected to being refugees in their own country, shipped to neighboring countries like Cameroon and being identified as displaced persons. Their study viewed the conditions of IDPs in camps of the thirteen states across the federation and concluded that the living conditions of IDPs in Nigeria were not fair enough and thus, depriving them of their human rights. The authors also blame agencies who act as intermediaries between international aid organizations, donation companies and relief materials. Many reports of corruption, siphoning and unaccountability have been the order of the day for IDPs. Conclusively, the study suggested that Nigeria should be alert of all the ongoing and subsequently ensure that the country’s international reputation was left salvageable. Similar to Okeh (2019)’s study, their study took a different perspective of explaining the socio-economic impact of Boko Haram insurgency from the eyes of the victims.

Abdullahi, Inusa, and Mustapha (2020), similar to the study of Granville (2020) and Okey (2019), examined side by side the economic development in the north pre and post-insurgency and Boko Haram activities. Their study highlighted the insufficient efforts on the part of the Nigerian government, some politicizing of international organizations and the extensive impact of the overall activities of Boko Haram within the region crippling the underdevelopment once being salvaged to worsening to nothing. The underdevelopment within the northeast with lowest education, IGRs and high out of school children’s statistics, the group’s activities has done more

damage and impacted the entire country. Examples of farming being one of the sustainable occupations of northerners has been shattered by the fear of farmers toiling the ground for harvests as they are specifically targeted either with IEDs or killed. Peace was the center for economic development in the north for this study and reiterated the need for not only collaborative efforts of Nigeria and other countries but also specifically, keeps the north at bay, below standards of other geo-political regions in the country.

From an agricultural business perspective, Jelilov, Ayinde, Tetik, Celik, and Olali (2018) measured the crop production and market availability to sell and distribute within the state and other geo-political zones in Nigeria based on situations of pre and post insurgency. The fractured channels of transporting some food produce from the north to the south and the rest of the country have been destroyed as only brave farmers go to their farms to watch their crops or residents of settlement areas who have abandoned their places of abode are afraid of revisiting a place, they once called home. Nigerians live on daily sustenance and the clash of herders and farmers including Boko haram activities have worsened and destabilized the smooth transition of groundnut for example from Borno to Lagos or Borno to Port Harcourt. Unlike Ozoigbo (2019), the root causes of insecurity in Nigeria were examined in his study. Ozoigbo (2019) argues that ‘no regard for rule of law, illiteracy/ignorance, unemployment, porous borders, arm proliferation, etc. have been the root causes of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria; and its aftermath are: underdevelopment, poverty, fear, drug abuse, more IDPs, etc. The study similar to Adofu and Alhassan (2018) failed to highlight the cause of the insurgency and how these causes have destroyed the agricultural sector of the north aside external factors of poverty and fanaticism.

Adofu and Alhassan (2018) highlighted two key aspects that may hamper a country’s growth: security and economic development. It focused on how insecurity in the northeast has worsened the economic development in the north, south and east of the country. Worse off, it has opened avenues for banditry, sophisticated kidnapping networks and other criminal activities. It also highlighted that greed, poverty, fanaticism and corruption have encouraged these activities to destroy the reputation of the country internationally and more so, insecurity and economic development are ‘hydra-headed’ problems that need urgent attention by the FGN. The study used ‘Pearson correlation, descriptive statistics and trend analysis and concluded that insecurity had an inverse relationship with economic development. Thus, it recommended that ‘community policing,

equitable distribution of resources' should be forwarded as priorities to the legislative arm of government in order to curb a new generation of banditry, assaults, insurgency and other crimes. Although this thesis does not conform to the methodology of their study, the study used evident uncorrelated variables for analysis and failed to highlight the key root causes of insurgency and only measured economic development through human development and failed state index. This thesis hopes to bridge this gap.

(Idika-Kalu, 2020) examined 'the socio-economic impact of Boko Haram insurgency in Lake Chad'. The study argued that the inception of Boko Haram activities from Maiduguri in Borno state spread across the environs of Lake Chad that had subsequently spread to other countries like Cameroon and Niger. This has left several citizens of the country poorer, deprived and dependent on livelihoods exclusively provided by aids. This has also resorted to high IDP statistics running to millions daily with incessant havoc wrecked by the insurgency at their places of abode. The study provided answers to the history, causes and impact of identified factors. However, the study was done for Lake Chad but identified young individuals born in the heat of insurgency, within the camps of the group as generations to be tackled with subsequently. Similarly, the study argued that radicalization is one of the key factors that has not only encouraged the terrorist group thrives in these communities but attributable to the lacks of economic provisions expected of the government. This thesis beyond Idika-Kalu (2020)'s study disintegrated the core values of what the insurgents want, why the attack on the scarce socio-economic development as well as the young individuals daily recruited not only born in the camps but others outside the 'red zones' of the insurgency (other geo-political zones).

3.6 To what extent has Boko Haram insurgency hampered the socio-economic status of people living in the Northeast of Nigeria?

There have been several incessant criminal activities, state vulnerability, economic downturn, and psychological trauma. The insurgency has had a significant impact on the region's socio-economic status, resulting in the loss of land, lives, livelihoods, and properties, as well as mass displacement (both refugees and IDPs), disruption of food security, deterioration of security, and, in many areas, complete lack of security (LPO 1). This has created an atmosphere that is unsuitable for

international and domestic investment in the area (as well as neighboring Nigerian areas) and neighboring nations (LPO 1).

As Boko Haram's act of terrorism worsens, fear is evident in northeastern Nigeria especially with the incessant victory remarks made by the Nigerian military. These claims that boko haram members are on the run are demonstrably incorrect and offer no solace to anyone (Mohammed, 2017). Psychologically, fear has been instilled in the Nigerian environment that the culture of trusting neighbors within a residential area has become a thing of the past (MP 3). The communitarian culture of relying on friends, family and other loved ones are slowly fading away. People now live fearfully of the known and the unknown in addition to killings of young people by the police, armed robbery, kidnapping, bad governance and corruption. In addition, the safety of people especially in the rural areas have been irredeemable. There are four federal (major) roads leading out of Maiduguri and as people are said to restrict certain movements around stated roads, only the "Maiduguri-Damaturu-Kano" highway is arguably deemed safe with not more than four kilometers away from their towns (Mohammed, 2017). Religious gatherings of all kinds have been restricted and almost abolished by authorities within Borno state for example in order to prevent potential attacks on religious gatherings. Nigerians' ability to find hope away from the perilous effect of bad governance and lack of basic amenities through religious set-ups in a mosque or church has been dashed severely. When religious gatherings hold, some members of these religious bodies stand guard in the event suicide bombers attempt to attack. The startling numbers of innocent lives wasted on a daily basis on all parts of the country is not only alarming but devastatingly encouraging migration of heavily resourced youths (intellectually and physically) to other parts of the world where their lives and talents are not truncated by the insurgency. Others who are unable to migrate abroad have migrated to other parts of the north including the south and west of Nigeria to find solace. Although this burdens the states they migrate to, as they become liabilities and susceptible to crime activities in order to survive. Furthermore, armed forces personnel have been accused of instilling more fear to the locals in affected areas who refuse to leave and relocate to the 'underserved IDP camps' (Abdullahi, Inusa, & Mustapha, 2020). It has been said that those who remain risk not only being plundered by Boko Haram, but also having their property and farm produce confiscated by the army on the grounds that they are in cahoots with the rebels (Juwonsola, 2020).

The poorly managed agricultural sector (UNR 1) (politically and economically) has been halted and has caused further damage to production and food availability that has hiked market food prices, increased inflation and overall, food scarcity. Farmers are afraid to visit their fields for harvests and markets where most of this farm produce sold have been shut down. Southern indigenes who are large business owners in these markets have many stalls for the exchange of these food produce for money. Many have relocated their businesses outside the northeast for the fear of losses from the operations of the sect. Several villages like “Damboa, Azir, Mungale, Multe, and Gumsiri” have been known to be the epicenter of farm produce source where the terrorist group steal or confiscate for their food supplies (Akinloluwa, 2020). Women, men and children who live on subsistence farming are unable to cultivate their foods consumed daily and currently depend on supplies from aids, alms or insufficient labor wages within the IDP camps.

Trust (MP 1) in the military and other security agents in the country has deteriorated to the extent that people prefer to safely hide away from the insurgency than stay within the confined ‘secured’ locations guarded by the military (Akinloluwa, 2020). The military is generally untrusted at this time as ordinary civilians are unable to distinct them from the sect as they all wear military uniforms. The military usually have nametags, hanged bars and others so as not to confuse the locals. However, this has proven abortive as about more than 70% of the locals are uneducated and cannot officially communicate in English language (Adelaja, 2020). Even though the military is not universally trusted to deliver the needed security, the most persistent conspiracy theory is that conflict entrepreneurs in the ‘military high command and the political class’ are orchestrating the eleven-year war (Ibid) and accused of fostering violence in order to enrich themselves at the expense of Nigerians’ lives and livelihoods (Akinloluwa, 2020). Despite a succession of sophisticated and modern weapon purchases, ranging from attack helicopters to an enormously expensive agreement with the United States for “ground-attack planes”, the military’s fighting capabilities appears to have remained unchanged, unsophisticated and positioned to be handicapped (Ekumaoko & Ezemenaka, 2020; Akinloluwa, 2020).

Similarly, there have been existing frictions between the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Borno (for example) and the military personnel. The distrust and accusations that some members of the CJTF are informants and members of the Boko Haram sect which has rendered the efforts of the military and the government in its entirety futile. The CJTF is a civilian vigilante group (the first

responders who man the roadblocks in cases of attacks) that act as a community safety group, oversees and communicates (informants) within the communities any suspected movements, associations or activities relatable to the sect. More than 1,680 members of the CJTF have been killed in the northeast and this has further weakened their morale to fight for the good cause of restoring peace and tranquility alongside the military (Adelaja, 2020). The evidence of whether or not there are Boko Haram informants amongst the CJTF are not available at this time, however, the community protectors are also made up of some petty criminals and miscreants who have united to fight a common enemy (Adofu & Alhassan, 2018). Unlike the military, the CJTF perform their duties as social works for their communities with no standard payments, insurance covers or incentives (Brenchenmacher, 2019). Within the IDP camps as reported by The Guardian Newspaper (2019), the environment of distrust about the ‘enemy within’ has further encouraged hostility between IDPs and new IDP residents.

Education has suffered a great deal from the activities of the Boko Haram. One of the worse situations is the University of Maiduguri that has remained opened amid the crisis. In 2017, suicide attacks on its staff; kidnappings and injured persons within the university had been alarming. Since early 2012, education has been the target of fatal attacks on a regular basis (TheNewHumanitarian, 2021). For example, the kidnapping of 276 female pupils in Chibok in 2014, over 300 school girls in Zamfara in February, 2021, dozens of pupils from an Islamic school in Niger state in May, 2021, etc. (TheGuardian, 2021). As a war strategy by the group, “western education is forbidden” (from its name) with direct links of western education and the secular system being blamed for the poor governance, corruption, ostentatious consumerism of the ruling elites, as well as their isolation and marginalization in the current Nigerian society (Ibid). Because the educated elites live examples of corruption, conspicuous luxury, and persecution of their uneducated countrymen and coreligionists, conspiracy theories suggest that this could be attributed to reasons why these elites are being targeted (Akinloluwa, 2020). Similarly, northern Nigeria is one of the regions with the lowest levels of education and human development in the world and the activities of the insurgency has further frustrated the government’s efforts encouraging people within this region to attend schools. Education is still the sole route out of poverty and despair for many youngsters in these regions despite the instilled fears by Boko Haram which has demoralized many struggling parents to withdraw their wards, adding to an already combustible combination of illiterate and jobless youngsters (MP 1, LGO 1)

Chapter Three- Government Policy Responses to Tackle Boko Haram insurgency

4.1 Policy Responses of the Government

The FGN has made efforts on its part to counter-terrorism. Several approaches to what, where, and how these measures are implemented is a part of the efforts citizens in the country are yet to understand. There have been several victories won by the military against tactical strategies construed by the group but the FGN is “yet to win the peace” (Allen, 2019). (Allen, 2019) believes this public declared victories might be part of the problem, somewhat political rather than a strategic policy detached to win the war once and for all. Because technical/military tactics cannot only defeat a terrorist group like Boko Haram, the need for Nigeria to swamp all resources simultaneously is necessary.

According to (Allen, 2019), her commentary pointed out that the premature claims of victory by Honorable Minister Lai Mohammed at a state brief in 2019 was “premature”. She pointed out that attacks and casualties have recently risen. Insurgents have caused 750 security force casualties in 2019 only, close to double that of any prior year. Thankfully, many officials appear to be finally waking up to the fact that the threat posed by Boko Haram is real and persistent (Brechenmacher, 2019). At a meeting of state governors, traditional rulers, security chiefs, community leaders, and academics, the consensus was that defeating the terrorist group would take longer than anticipated. Lt. Gen. Nigeria’s chief of army staff, Tukur Buratai, recently admitted that ‘Boko Haram and its likes cannot be defeated by kinetic military warfare’ alone.

(Brechenmacher, 2019) In her work, stated that The Nigerian case highlights the challenges of local-level stabilization efforts while working with a host government that lacks political commitment, coordination and capacity. Her work similarly argues that the FGN’s intervention is at a slow pace, international organizations did not intervene at the nick of time until 276 school girls were kidnapped, over six declared dead and 106 girls missing. The Nigerian government’s efforts have been characterized by international organization (AAH- Action Against Hunger France) as a country that has unsettled and unified strategy to tackle terrorism within its shores but with a “multidimensional response that tackles the drivers of insecurity in the region, including chronic weaknesses in service delivery, corrupt governance, and environmental degradation” (Brechenmacher, 2019), terrorism would be a thing of the past.

There are no publicly available strategies that have shown success rates for policies or actions put in place by the Nigerian government to implement counter-terrorism. Although Nigeria is a key player in ECOWAS, it has adopted some of the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Framework (ECF) strategies of *Prevention* (i.e., to prevent terrorism by identifying and deterring possible keys elements inducing terror activities), *Pursue* (to deal with occurred terrorism acts that offer a timely and effective response to prevent escalation including funding, training, recruiting) and *Repair* (repair damages by reconstructing affected places infrastructures and bring back trust and confidence from victims by assisting and protecting) (Emmanuel, 2018; Ekumaoko & Ezemenaka, 2020).

In the same vein, a less acceptable approach of negotiations has been spirally running across the federation and suspected armed persons have been linked to the Boko Haram terrorist group. These individuals have abducted school children, executed undergraduates, and kidnapped several persons for ransom either from the state or federal governments and their families (BBC News, 2021). In addition to ECF, road blocks are present in hot areas of the terrorist group, security personnel recruitment, billions of Naira attributable to security and defense sector, international strategies and collaborations, rehabilitation of repentant Boko Haram members, closure of borders, retightening of the borders and policies for the proliferation of firearms, etc.

These efforts are greatly intertwined and collective efforts to have effective counter-terrorism can only work when impending issues such as corruption, mismanagement, bureaucracy for official responses, and non-cooperating alliances amongst security personnel, among others are relinquished.

A. DDRP programs

One of the indigenous efforts put in place by the FGN in response to the current insecurity challenges is the DDRP scheme expected to attract the senior jihadist members of the group who are repentant and willing to turn a new leaf. Although this has generated much skepticism, (Adedimeji, 2021) has revealed that there are a lot more political gains in the use of the scheme than for the good of the nation. In the same vein, it has been attributed to have similar structural benefits to the program designed by Harris County in Texas called Drug Demand Reduction Program helping to “provide six-month residential substance abuse treatment integrated with

mental health treatment services to clients identified with co-occurring mental health/substance abuse through the CAC⁶“ (ANG, 2021).

The Nigerian internal security service, in collaboration with the army, runs a covert program known as “Sulhu”. Sulhu is directed at senior jihadist leaders, with the concept that these guys may be “converted” and then used to persuade other senior commanders remaining in the bush to defect, unlike the current “Operation Safe Corridor Program” that targets low-level jihadists and Boko Haram militants (Godfrey, 2021). In an interview conducted by Godfrey (2021), a former commander in Bama where Boko Haram had massacred hundreds of people, in their conversation wanted to be clarify on what his goals were and how the process worked (Ibid). Godfrey (2021) conversed with individuals who had been harmed by the commander and displaced people in general to get a sense of where they stood on forgiveness. His work showed the basic moral/strategic question of whether forgiving individuals for the sake of peace or treating people who have blood on their hands might be highly subjective (Adedimeji, 2021).

In another interview conducted by Martinez (2021), there are innumerable studies done on the subject of forgiveness, especially from the perspective of affected victims. Sulhu typically refers to swearing on a Quran and renouncing violence as part of the community’s forgiveness process (Martinez, 2021). According to some studies, only about 60% of people in the northeast would consent to reconciliation (Darele, Yoa, & Thiele, 2021). This includes women, who have been the most affected by sexual assault, and in places where significant violence has occurred. Over time, people’s perspectives on reconciliation change. As stated in his work, Martinez (2021) believes that people who say, “Sure, we should forgive,” have the potential to reminisce on the harm caused by the violence and hurt and change their minds the next day (Ibid). He further explained that many interviewees were eagerly willing to push forgiveness forward not because they were genuinely ready to associate with the repentant but simply out of obligation placed by the FGN to ensure the community accepts them and the need for the violence or war to end (Darele, Yoa, & Thiele, 2021).

⁶ Children Advocacy Centre, Texas. See <http://www.mccsyuma.org/index.cfm/military-family/behavioral-health/ddrp/>

As pointed out by Roxanna (2021), there are setbacks to the Sulhu scheme. First, the Sulhu program features a peace and reconciliation component that the present administration is yet to execute (Roxanna, 2021). Most importantly, revealing the truth and making amends is a good thing but as a covert program, the community should be included, and not separated from the Operation Safe Corridor Program (OSCP) (Martinez, 2021). Secondly, there is a lack of financial resources. Fighters passing through Sulhu are awarded companies and a monthly payment, which has enraged locals. This indignation extends to the Operation Safe Corridor where populist politicians have portrayed it as a “privileged group of killers” (Roxanna, 2021). The repentants are given vocational training and psychological care before being released into communities with little or no state resources enough to cater to the needs of the citizens generally (Ibid). People are enraged by this inequity: people who complete a DDR program return to neighborhoods where victims have received no assistance or governmental support (Godfrey, 2021; Roxanna, 2021).

Olukunle (2021) argues that although Nigeria receives foreign support from the EU, UN, and US OSCP may gain more support if it were better handled and more transparent. Many belonging to OSCP are low-level Boko Haram militants or were apprehended due to being in the wrong place at the wrong time (Amao, 2020). People are terrified because, at the military barracks in Giwa for example, there are people who have nothing to do with Boko Haram (Iyanda, 2021). In a way, the OSCP has thankfully cleared the Giwa barracks and ended the injustice by removing individuals who shouldn't have been there in the first place (Olukunle, 2021).

From another angle, Ifedayo (2022) agrees with Iyanda (2021) that there has to be a better method to fight this insecurity war. OSCP and Sulhu are seen by some as good counterinsurgency strategies but truthfully, ex-commanders passing through Sulhu have not publicly proclaimed their rationale for leaving the sect and other studies have argued whether there is an ideological shift or simply a desire to escape the wrath of their mistakes or decisions (Ifedayo, 2022). There is fear that fleeing ex-commanders may have been on the wrong side of a political disagreement in the bush or had committed crimes and had no choice but to flee. It appears that claiming an ideological change of heart is a low-risk strategy to escape and get support but presents a more precarious strategic decision for state actors (BBC News, 2021).

De-radicalization has been proven to be ineffective. In some ways, this is merely a technique of removing and peeling away those who have already decided to convert (Roxanna, 2021). As a result, it is not hardened jihadists who are being expelled and converted to something else. Some Boko Haram members who have completed OSCP dislike the de-radicalization components because it involves high esteemed imams who claim to know better (Oshita, Alumona, & Onuoha, 2019). As stated by Iyanda (2021), “You don’t have more understanding or religious knowledge than I do, and we don’t agree with your interpretation”. From statistics, Iyanda (2021) adds that the repentant appreciated psychosocial help more than the de-radicalization phase of therapy where the Nigerian Army is willing to support converted militants. Peterson (2021) however argues that this may seem noble but may have an underlying motive for the military to simply cut down on the men fought on battlegrounds rather than the holistic change the entire nation is after.

Ifedayo (2022) also points out the disadvantage of exposing ex-leaders to military settings and camps, which might lead to the Sulhu program becoming an open communication route for certain Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) commanders. Also, the prospect of a political accord or a Taliban-style arrangement is dicey as the strategy somewhat entails the strategic decision of the FGN to support an enclave in the northeast which may not be generally supported by civilians (Phebe, Osoji, & Fredrick-Nbani, 2020).

Compared to other African countries battling insecurity and extremism, Nigeria has one of the most modern DDR systems in the world (SaharaReporters, 2022). It was supposed to be considerably more advanced at first, especially from the standpoint of Dr. Fatima Akilu, one of the founders of the program (Adedimeji, 2021). As a former executive at the Office of the National Security Adviser, her vision for DDR was a “complete transformation of society” (DCAF, 2021). She envisioned the program would be incorporated and extended to not only the sect members in the forests but also within the educational and legal systems. As exclaimed by Dr. Fatima Aliku, there have been too many innocent killings and an alternative to this is desired by the entire country (Darele, Yoa, & Thiele, 2021). She further exclaimed that the success of the program cannot be secluded to Northeast Nigeria but rather, as a part of the rest of Nigeria, it should be welcomed to further portray unity (DCAF, 2021). Roxanna (2021) argues further that the northeast stands to be hugely political and worsened by the fact that President Mohammed Buhari is seen as promoting sectarian interests, subjective but very strongly promoted on social media.

B. Operation Safe Corridor Program (OSCP)

The FGN launched OSCP in 2016 to welcome voluntary defections from the Boko Haram terrorist group (UNHR, 2021). The program, which is part of a nationwide effort to reduce militant activity in the country's northeast, is having difficulties. Authorities funnel far too many people fleeing Boko Haram regions into the program, incorrectly mislabeling them as militants, cluttering the system, and alienating funders (Amao, 2020; Roxanna, 2021). More concerning are reports from program participants who claim to have witnessed sometimes lethal circumstances at the institutions they travel through on their way into OSCP, a cause for alarm in and of itself, as well as a deterrent to anyone who might follow in their footsteps (Godfrey, 2021).

The reintegration of repentant Boko Haram members into society may be dicey. The OSCP is considered to be divisive, with detractors claiming that it equates to terrorist amnesty (Olukunle, 2021). In order for OSCP to succeed, the FGN will need to properly filter away civilians, safeguard participants, and reintegrate graduates into society more efficiently.

While some funders and authorities anticipate that the initiative would help thousands of the group's member's defects, it has failed to recruit the proper people (Solomon, Adamu, & Ciroma, 2021). Many of the hundreds of people who have completed or are presently completing the program are not from the intended population rather, they are people who rebelled against sectarian oppression and were falsely labeled terrorists by security forces and routed into OSCP after being detained. A broad spectrum of other people has been drawn to the program, including juveniles accused of being child soldiers, a few high-level jihadists, and alleged rebels who say they were forced into it against their will after the government attempted but failed to prosecute them (Khalifa & Hassan, 2021). Some financiers are wary of investing more in the program because they are concerned that Nigeria is not spending its money on the intended beneficiaries (Iyanda, 2021). Shockingly, Iyanda (2021) explains that many program participants are subjected to deplorable treatment after they are taken into prison by the FGN. Many former OSCP detainees have described living conditions as deplorable, notably in the network of detention centers where they were detained before being transferred to the program's facility⁷ (UNHR, 2021).

⁷Mallam Sidi camp is one of the OSCP facilities in Gombe state

Willing repentant/participants were kept in government institutions for up to three years, with little or no contact with family members, without food, and given no specific schedule for when they may be merged in confinement in OSCP centers where circumstances are better than at ordinary internment camps⁸.

It is clear that the initiative has the potential to be successful but may have had a messy reintegration since 2016 (UNHR, 2021). Its very existence encourages sect recruits to leave a struggle that many have grown to believe is fruitless (Ibid). Several OSCP graduates attested to the public information campaigns via radio broadcasts or leaflets dropped by Nigerian military aircraft were key factors in convincing them to defect, an option they had not considered before because they were afraid of being killed by security forces if they turned themselves in (Iyanda, 2021). Knowing there was a way out persuaded a number of those who had become disillusioned by endless war, the violence perpetrated by the factions to which they belonged, the threat of internal purges and punishments, and the injustice and poverty they faced while jihadist leaders and their followers were on the run (Amao, 2020; Iyanda, 2021).

Encouraging reintegration, foreign partners including the UN and IMO have created spheres for OSCP graduates and OSCP graduate alumni through a therapeutic path that further enabled their smooth transition into society. Since 2018, things have improved from the messy start, with officials focusing more on ensuring that people who leave “Mallam Sidi” have a smoother transition back into society. Authorities have ramped up attempts to link people who will shortly graduate with family members and local officials ahead of their release, facilitating phone conversations as well as visits to the center by relatives and local officials (UNHR, 2021). With the help of certain foreign partners, a separate transit center for OSCP alumni has been opened in “Maiduguri’s Shokari neighborhood” in addition to Mallam Sidi to help expand and accommodate more OSCP participants for the future ahead (Ibid).

Although both DDRP and OSCP are great initiatives, the lack of transparency and holistic integration of the populace especially those in the northeast may have already caused some integration issues and distrust amongst communities. To eliminate this, safe and secure reintegration strategies are imperative. Improved screening methods, detention protections, reintegration investments, and a public relations effort aimed at gaining political and public

support might make the program more appealing to both contributors and potential repentant (Olukunle, 2021). To avoid this potential program becoming a dead end, institutions designated by the FGN needs to be restructured in terms of resource accountability, policy and welfare.

C. International Collaborative Efforts

Numerous countries of the world outside Nigeria have been battling terrorism for years. Some are inconsistent in duration yet dangerously lurking the shores of their borders. In Africa, as described by US department of State Reports of 2019, “Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda” (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2019) have been identified to be battling with terrorism in addition to narcotics, drug and human trafficking, SALW, money laundering, etc.

Although Nigeria’s under-resourced, overstretched, and the corruption-plagued military has struggled to consolidate its gains. Civilians in many parts of the northeast face ongoing threats from both insurgent attacks as well as counterterrorism operations. The Rampant corruption and ineffective coordination in the system have hampered the Nigerian government’s civilian response to the crisis, with various federal, state, and local elites benefiting from the continuation of the crisis (Brechenmacher, 2019). International partners for counter-terrorism in Nigeria have insisted that the cooperation of Nigeria within its sub region and outside it need collaborative efforts to destroy the existence of the terrorist group in the country. The prevalent reaction of the government and others in the sub-region was described by (Brechenmacher, 2019) as lacking “an effective political infrastructure and cooperation has been primarily externally driven”.

Collaborative efforts of Nigeria and the international organizations can be dated back to the inception of Boko Haram activities in 2011. Nigeria is only one of the bases of the world and as Adedire, Ake and Olowojolu (2016) put it, recent operations of the terrorist group have international affiliations who have some ideologies and rationale behind the havocs caused and so, the need for Nigeria to expand its tentacles for help within international communities who have experience with combats and weapons, legacies of tackling terrorism and its operations. These efforts are also extended to food, medicine, water, shelter for displaced persons and officials; funds for counter-terrorism, and supportive programs sponsored by these international organizations.

Some of the organizations include Action against Hunger (AAH), United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), and United States Agency for international Development (USAID), United Nations through UNDP, World Bank, International Community for Red Cross (ICRC), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), European Union, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and African Union. These organizations amongst many have a unanimous goal: to fish out the perpetrations and threats to Nigeria's sovereignty and to also assist in countering the havoc wrecked on innocent citizens in the country. The activities of Boko Haram have, therefore, wrecked the border, regional, bilateral and international peace and security between Nigeria and its neighboring and African border countries. Amongst several counter-terrorism strategies, "terrorism is expected to be curtailed by cutting off their sources of contact/funds, identify their sources of supply of arms and basic essential to terrorists" (Adedire, Ake, & Olowojolu, 2016). For example, "some of US government's counter-terrorism strategies are effective democracy, denying of weapons, and sanctuaries of rogue states, building institutional structures, control of base and landing pads of terrorists." However, Adelaja (2020) argues that the aftermath of these collaborative efforts could render them futile if the Nigerian government fails to counter the root causes leveraged by Boko Haram. This ranges from poverty to inequitable distribution of resources, nepotism to religion, etc. the resources of the Nigerian government are also expected to be used to its full capacity to support these efforts such as: "power, military, external alliances, encrypted communications, etc.

The operations of these efforts are still ongoing even though, several speculations of how much efforts are truly being invested in countering terrorism is questionable (Adofu & Alhassan, 2018; Akintunde, 2018).

As many policy responses have been put in place as a form of counter insurgency in other to tackle and put an end to the Boko Haram insurgence, it is a whole different issue to say that these responses have been a success or a failure for the Nigerian government. The idea of having repentant going free does not sit well with Nigerians. It is hard for the average Nigerian to fully understand how a runaway Boko Haram member can be let to go free after going through rehabilitation. However, this does not mean it is a policy response that is bound to fail. With enough educating of the public of this program, Nigerians might learn to be accepting of this policy although it is not going to be easy. To say the OSCP program has been a success so far might be a

stretch for now as mentioned earlier, so far the government has not really been successful in recruiting the Boko Haram members they initially targeted the program at the same time, it will surely be useful for the government if and when they are able to extract relevant information from these repentant Boko Haram members.

International collaborative efforts on the other hand have proven to be quite successful. As Nigeria is not the only country facing the issue of Boko Haram terrorism, joining efforts with chad and other neighboring countries faced with the insurgency has been beneficial in running out Boko Haram from within Nigerian borders and, making sure they do not find refuge by running to hide in the border country. As these initiatives of joint operations with countries like chad have been active for years now, more is to be seen from the collaborative efforts as the war against terrorism continues.

Conclusion

To summarize and discuss my major findings for emphasis, this study designed ten open survey questions that attempted to provide relevant and relatable answers to each research question, extracted based on the objectives for this study. The questions were divided into two parts and each focusing on one part or the other of the niche of the subject of discourse. There were corresponding ten respondents from different fields, sectors and positions across the country. As aforementioned, these individuals were contacted via telephone in order to further simplify the interpretation of the information presented in the questions and their answers were provided through emails and other e-platforms. The confidentiality agreement was presented to these respondents and their conditions specified that they remained anonymous for this study. Their identities and responses for this study are abbreviated as shown in Appendix B.

The answers provided were to provide insights for discussion and interpretation by the researcher. From the interview answers provided by respondents, the following are the analytical categories retrieved:

A. Socio-economic status

B. Investment Opportunities in Borno

C. Community/State Solutions

These categories are explored and examined from the responses retrieved from the open surveys and then further analyzed in the section below.

Terrorism and insurgency are different agendas that may sometimes be used interchangeably. However, terrorism is a method where violence is centrally used as a weapon of control in pursuing a political goal while insurgency is an institutionalized (unofficial) political movement that focuses on toppling an existing regime or government (Adedire, Ake, & Olowojolu, 2016; Ekumaoko & Ezemenaka, 2020). Many authors (Akintunde, 2018; Idika-Kalu, 2020; Akinwotu, 2021) believe that Boko haram desires to Islamize the country by causing havoc and division in an existing multi-cultural environment like Nigeria. In Nigeria, Boko Haram has been viewed as a combination of

both terrorism and insurgency due to their use of violent methods and intent to overthrow the existing sovereign order and institutionalize themselves.

It goes without saying that researchers have over time, attempted to understand the rationale and specifically highlight a variable or factors that can be solely attributed to terrorism. Butler (2015) identifies key factors attributable to terrorism such as religion, social inequality, democratization, education and existing human rights violation. Terrorism is multifarious and extremely dynamical because its stalwarts use mind games as well as deceitful methods to portray Islamic fanaticism as real. These have subsequently metamorphosed to extremism as seen today albeit the existing division amongst the tribes, cultures, states and geopolitical zones of the country have regained grounds farther than what it used to be. Nigeria battles with corruption, favoritism and political non-transparency amongst others. This has created huge loopholes that have made the country an international case study for the wrong reasons.

At inception grievances portrayed by Boko Haram terrorist group were seen as drivers from the root causes of terrorism (economic, social and political), however, the drivers for the group's activities have changed overtime and has increased to more violence and extremism that has caused a lot of confusing analysis as to what may have been the true rationale of the terrorist group (Umar, 2013). Umar (2013) has further argued that the military tactics and strategies are still very useful but it does not address the root causes. If these are not resolved, similar national and transnational insurgencies like this are yet to erupt and would continuously give room for better and stronger groups like the Syrian ISIS or Pakistan Al-Qaeda. The Boko Haram terrorist group has also paid several allegiances to these foreign terrorist groups who have also publicly declared that the group is being funded and supported with weapons to destroy anyone or government that may oppose them. Additionally, it is well known that many of the leaders and commanders of this terrorist group are highly educated and affluence individuals who are wealthy and powerful but with majority of their stalwarts, recruits and members uneducated and unemployed. These people are also used as strategic outlets to divulge their false ideological orientations, train to use weapons and also ensure a steady route for an organized cell network that infiltrates anywhere easily (Tukur & Fausat, 2015; Umar, 2013; Iyekekpolo, 2018).

This study focused on understanding and assessing the extent to which the socio-economic status and livelihoods have been truncated by the aftermaths of the insurgency in the northeast. It has also been discovered that these activities have birthed other criminalities within the country known as bandits and kidnappers who have also been argued to have links to the Boko Haram terrorist group.

The study used a qualitative research design that created open surveys and provided data that has been extremely insightful to the subject of discourse. From the government's perspective, efforts are being put in place to curb insurgency and counter-terrorism is used as an avenue to reduce the number of casualties in the long run. From the populace's perspective, the efforts of the FG are not sufficient because of the incessant attacks on livelihoods, lives, and properties in general. This has subsequently resulted in fear, loss of trust in the government, hopelessness, and social exclusion.

Key socio-economic factors identified in this study are education, income, social and community support, community safety, and employment. Although there are other affected socio-economic factors, these have been chosen as important and most affected. Additionally, the unending insecurity has crippled agriculture, and subsistence culture in the northeast, leading to severe food scarcity in certain areas within the region.

The effects of these socio-economic factors to the lives of Nigerians go deep. The effect it has had on children's education as explained in the second chapter is a huge setback not just for the future of the Nigerian economy but also the lives of the young people, both as children and especially as adults when they finally grow. As the girl child education has always been a struggle the Nigerian government has been trying to promote in rural areas, having seen the little progress that has been made being squashed by the insurgents is a blow to the future of the Nigerian youth. The process of rebuilding so going to be like all over is for the government, and who know how long it might take this time around to ensure that every child is given a quality education. It will definitely be a dream comes true but a dream that I don't think we'll be seeing across all states of Nigeria anytime soon. The state government of Bornu has made strides in rebuilding schools for the IDP's but not much is to be said for the children still leaving in small villages. Hopefully as the Nigerian

government continues to push back these insurgents soon these children might be able to see the light at the end of the tunnel.

Unemployment rates have skyrocketed especially with the impact the recent pandemic has made of world economies. The aftermath of this pandemic has not spared Nigeria in the effects it has had. Therefore, a lot of employed have found themselves suffering from lack of available jobs. Add that to the already existing number of unemployment and it becomes a disaster. Farmers that work to earn a living by selling their produce have also be deeply affected by the insurgence as explained in the second chapter as they do not have the privilege of peacefully working their farm lands. So many stories of farm owners being kidnapped by bandits have become the norm as well. Therefore as farmers face the wrath of Boko Haram, they are at the same time being faced with the possibility of being taken away at their farms by bandits for ransom. These worsening situations seem to be endless for the average Nigerian. A lot of revenue has been pushed into the agricultural sector in Nigeria by the current administration in the hopes of making Nigeria agricultural produce being sufficient for the country in other to cut down import of agricultural produce, however, these endless setbacks of Boko Haram attack and banditry continue to hinder the progress of the federal government.

Social and community support as mentioned in the paper is not what it used to be. The trusting nature of families to look after one another has been badly affected by the insurgence. Because of fear of who to trust, people are now left to look out for themselves and be skeptical of others around them especially their kid which is very different from the usual trust that ones neighbor will look out for the others children in his absence. People are also wary of new settlers in the community since one cannot be too careful in trusting the story given by a new neighbor. This comes from experience of having people settle in with the intention of disguising in other to obtain information on the people in the neighborhood.

Communal safety is a basic right of every citizen in a country however; this is a basic right that has sadly not been met by the government of Nigeria. In my opinion, I believe its save to say that no Nigerian today feels absolutely certain of his safety at all times in every part of the country. With rising number of smaller arm groups like the bandits and kidnappings going on it's save to say that communal safety has been shattered by these insurgents. There's just a common feeling

of mistrust of ones surroundings as he goes about his daily life. This is not to say that there is no safe place in Nigeria today, however, the uncertainty of what can happen at any given moment not necessarily buy attacks carried out by Boko Haram but by the rise of these banditries as they keep getting stronger.

The income of a person is what determines the type of live he leaves. When a person has a earns a income he can rely on, his social life the immediately different to that of a person that has very little and close to none, especially when there is family involved. When a man has enough to take care of the essential needs of his family that is (good healthcare, education shelter, amongst other social amenities), these factors immediately reduces the chances of falling into the hazards faced by a low income family. When man cannot feed his family, or cannot take his children to a hospital to be taken care of when sick, resulting to the death of this child, the effect that can have on a man cannot be understated. These are basic amenities that every citizen should be able to have access to. However, the situation becomes even worse for the low-income household when the government hospitals he can rely on for affordable healthcare have been devastatingly destroyed by the insurgence. The hospitals that are still proving services on the other hands are overflowing with patients from attacks if not that then it's the fact that there are very limited number of doctors in these hospitals that are overworked by the endless inflow of patients they can hardly meet up with. The situation keeps getting worse for the low income household and these are factor that can possible push a man to easily join the insurgents, if not for nothing the for him to b able to provide for his family.

On the other hand there is the destruction of shelter, homes, workplaces, leisure places by the insurgence that might take a very long time before they can be rebuilt to their full capacity. Also a lot of homes in Bornu have been left abandoned by families relocating to other states in search of greener pastures. Some of these people have no intention of going back because they have set themselves up in these new cities they move to, and uprooting a whole family again after finally being settled in a place they feel save might not be an easy thing to do.

A big blow to the state government of Bornu and federal government of Nigeria is the crippling of investments in Bornu and Nigeria as a whole to some extent, as a result of the insurgence. Due to the growing insecurity in Nigeria, foreign investors have been thinking twice before investing in

Nigeria due to crowing fears of the situation in Nigeria internationally. I have notices also that people looking in from outside always hear the worst of the situations as a result of how the media portrays these events. For someone leaving in the US for example, hearing about the ongoing events in Nigeria would immediately believe he will get killed the moment he sets foot in the country and this is the case for any country that might be experiencing any type of insecurity. I remember being in Istanbul when the coup attempt of 2016 took place (Al Jazeera, 2017). I had my phone firing up as my family called to confirm I was safe. The news coming out of Turkey at the time was frightening to the international world observing the situation, however I honestly do not remember it being as bad as anybody calling to check on my wellbeing after the first few days. To my surprise, the next day after the coup people were out and about, I for one had breakfast at a mall which left me in disbelief of how fast things could go back to normal but that will not be the same for people watching from other countries. I believe this is the same for Nigeria. People are scared to hear a family member of theirs is travelling to Nigeria however the moment they do arrive, it's a whole different feeling so long as you did not mistakenly find yourself in the deadly zone of the far northeast which will be hard to believe one can mistakenly go there seeing as it is hours away from the capital city of Abuja or the busy west-central city of Kano that is always booming with business both local and international. Nevertheless, investment in the state of Bornu have drastically dropped as it is the most badly hit by the attacks of boko haram, affecting the states revenue generation.

Historically, tranquil environments have shown they are best for growth economically, politically, and environmentally. Consequently, Boko Haram's existence has been detrimental to the long-term national development of Nigeria, therefore, it is essential that all hands must be on deck to maintain peace and put an end to it. It is clear that Nigeria has struggled to make economic and technical advancements particularly since terrorism would only make the situation of the country before its existence worse.

Despite several conspiracy theories about sponsors and supporters of the terrorist group within the government and international organizations/NGOs, unhappy relationships within the IDP camps with rising grievances on inequality undermined military tactics, weapons, and welfare have been linked to worsening the present situations of those affected by the insurgency. The aforementioned factors have also been linked to the rationale behind the increasing number of members of the

terrorist group from poverty to inequitable resources within the country. However, these factors cannot be categorically harnessed as the real causes but can be said to be contributing factors to young people especially joining the terrorist group. The study was able to give a detailed status of unemployment rates, income levels and minimum wage, state IGR and agricultural statistics for Borno and other states in the country.

It is no gainsaying that Nigeria is blessed with available resources, manpower, and human resources but has been downplayed economically, socially, and politically by its own citizens especially those with political power. These loopholes have enabled Boko Haram to leech on these downturns and wreak havoc within and outside its shores. Consequently, foreign investments have been halted, social amenity provisions diverted and the wellbeing of innocent lives shattered. The end of the insurgency from the root causes to the aftermath can only be solved by especially the FG with other interested parties in a transparent, swift, and sophisticated manner that would minimize casualties and until then, it will continue to be the Nigerian dream to have a country devoid of Boko Haram insurgency to be able to travel all the beautiful diverse cultures of Nigeria without fear of being kidnapped or killed by insurgents.

Religious fanaticism is a weapon of destruction used by the terrorist group to attract ignorant, uneducated or grieved persons (especially youths) to the group. The reason for the thriving operations of the terrorist group is because of the religious culture present in Nigeria. As aforementioned, Nigeria is a very religious country and regardless of the twisting of truth of religious teachings to suite their narrative, the moral of the decisions to support or not support the terrorist group and all it stands for is solely dependent on an individual's ability to objectively discern wrong from right and vice-versa.

For future research, one of the limitations of this study was its focus on the northern part of Nigeria; however, there have been reported cases of terrorist activities in other parts of the country with root causes still being researched. Other root causes established by some researchers like (Armstrong and Nwadike, 2022) are fascism, the anti-abortion movement, and tax resistance was exempted from the study. Other parts of the country including the east, west, and central states could be reviewed from this perspective. Education was a key factor in the causes of terrorism, however, future research could attempt to match the relationship between education and

indoctrination for children, modernization versus foreign policy effects, and state failure versus nationalism.

The dynamics of the Boko Haram activities are changing towards innovation and sophistication yet keeping the political whims at bay. These innovations and sophistications worsens the damages to Nigerian citizens and environment, the changing complexities of these security challenges on security personnel within the country including the military can be a case study for future researchers.

Because of the fragility of the Nigerian political system, exploration of economic opportunity, increasing inclusion in governmental activities can also be an area of exploring by researchers, this would ensure better awareness of the public to the allocation of resources and development. This will also promote accountability of the government and support the vulnerable situation of the country at this time. These would strengthen government while also providing a substantial mechanism for reducing terrorism, elimination of youth unemployment, etc. (Youth programs that engage them in meaningful and productive activities including vocational trainings, apprenticeships, and other entrepreneurial initiatives are examples of this. Such programs can assist in reducing frustrations).

Socio-economic inequality has been a pending issue in Nigeria. This has caused ‘minorities’ within the country to disintegrate from the unity once held together as: ‘beauty in diversity’. Therefore, in order to curb transnational crime, terrorism and reduce socio-economic inequity, Future researchers can look into researching the collaborative efforts Nigeria has been partaking in with other sub- regional organizations, like the AU and ECOWAS who have relatable African heritage and can gain a thorough understanding of terrorist groups’ operational strategies better than international organizations. Future researching can explore the ideas of whether it will be more beneficial for Nigeria to focus it’s corroborative efforts more towards regional organization than international organizations. Maybe, more dependence on regional strategies unique to the environment especially with porous borders of Chad, Cameroon and Niger might prove to be more fruitful to all the regions affected.

Similarly, the heavy dependence of Nigeria’s security strategies around the international strategies can also be further explored. A reason why Nigeria is faced with the inability to also explicitly

have a unified strategy for tackling terrorism within its shores also needs proper attention. This is because multi-strategies can be politicized, maneuvered and corruptly taken advantage of by those who prefer to see the nation state at its most vulnerable state.

The welfare of military personnel who have been fighting the war of terrorism should also be appreciated in all ways and those who have lost their lives in the course of war should be recognized as national heroes. In other to do this I believe honoring them through writing about their struggles and successes might help their families in finding closure and might even seem patriotic. This is imperative as the public opinion on the efforts put in by the FGN is seen more as a ‘shadowy project’, futile efforts that only serves to boost the profile and status of political leaders rather than the fight for the nation’s sovereignty and peace.

Furthermore, gender inequality, modern slavery, including risk factors and targeted violence theories could be explored in comparison to other extremist affected countries like Iraq, Iran, Mali, Syria, Somalia, etc.

MSC Thesis Questionnaire Survey

Name: Hidayat Bello

Address: Abuja, Nigeria

Dear Sir/Ma,

I am currently pursuing a Master's degree at Istanbul Kultur University, major in International Relations on the topic: "An Assessment of The Socio-Economic Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency in The Northeast of Nigeria".

The purpose of this study is to assess the socio-economic factors that have been drastically affected in communities of North East Nigeria: (focus on Borno state) by the insurgency. It also focuses on the methods and resources exerted by the FGN in order to curb insurgency in these areas. I believe the results will not only be of value to individuals, officials, Humanitarian bodies and Nigerian Government but will also help other researchers and international bodies to make better decisions through the results/discussions and identify the kind of information, incentives, and assistance essential to making the livelihoods of indigenes in the northeast less cumbersome despite the continuous feisty conditions of security experienced in these areas.

You are part of a representative of 10 sampled open survey comprising of both officials and volunteers designated with one responsibility or the other in the northeast. Your attitudes and opinions are critical to the success of this study. I sincerely recognize the value of your time, and appreciate your efforts for this cause. Individual responses are anonymous and data will be held in confidence. I hope to hear from you as regards the responses to these questions. Please take 15 minutes to complete this survey and submit it via email as agreed at your earliest convenience.

Thank you for your time.

Yours Sincerely,

Hidayat Shehu Bello.

Open Survey Questionnaire

Part I

1. Are you aware of the Boko Haram terrorist groups and how long they have been in Nigeria?
2. Where do you think is the most affected state and region in the country?

3. What is your opinion on the impact of their activities so far on the northern region and the rest of the country?
4. What socio-economic factors have been affected the most and why do you think so?
5. If you had the opportunity to invest in Borno state, what would it be and if no, why?

Part II

6. Do you believe something can actually be done despite the destruction of the livelihoods of displaced persons in all affected areas particularly Borno state?
7. Do you agree that the Nigerian government is doing all that it can at the moment to eradicate insurgency in general in the north?
8. Young people have been reported to be recruited daily as a result of poverty or reborn from rape and captures, do you agree there is a way out? Can you please suggest any?
9. If you were to advice the Borno state government on practical strategies and methods to reduce the impact of these activities on the people who have been affected, what would they be?
10. Reports have highlighted the number of people living in the state to be drastically reduced to what it used to be. If you were to advice the federal government, what do you think can be used to encourage displaced persons to return home if all measures are implemented successfully?

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