

German Foreign Policy after Unification: 'Normality' or 'Assertiveness?'

Bianca Kaiser*

Abstract

This article discusses whether German foreign policy after unification in 1990 has become 'normal' or 'assertive'. To this end, a comparison is made between principles guiding German foreign policy during the post-war period up until 1989, and the post-unification period until the present. Whereas German foreign policy has generally been characterized by continuity, some developments have produced a paradigmatic change. The most important development in this regard is the 'out-of-area' discussion, which refers to the deployment of Germany soldiers outside NATO territory. However, the main contention of the article is that German foreign policy has neither become 'normal' nor 'assertive', but has rather developed into something 'new'.

Özet

Bu çalışma, Almanya'nın, 1990 yılında birleşmesinden sonra 'normal' mi yoksa 'iddialı' bir dış politika mı izlediğini incelemektedir. Bu amaçla, savaş sonrası dönemden 1989'a kadar geçen süre içinde Alman dış politikasını belirleyen prensiplerle birleşme sonrasındaki dönemden günümüze kadarki dönemde oluşan prensipler karşılaştırılmaktadır. Alman dış politikası genellikle süreklilik gösterirken, bazı gelişmeler paradigmatic değişimlere neden olmuşlardır. Bu anlamdaki en önemli gelişme, Alman askerlerinin NATO bölgesinin dışında çalıştırılması ile ilgili olan 'bölge-dışı' tartışmasıdır. Bu makalenin ana tezi Alman dış politikasının ne normal ne de iddialı olduğudur; aksine 'yeni' bir Alman dış politikasının geliştirilmiş olduğunu yönündedir.

Keywords

West Germany – united Germany – foreign policy principles – 'out-of-area' discussion – 'proud-to-be-German' discussion

Introduction:

The Cold War came literally to an end over night, when the Berlin Wall of the night of November 9, 1989. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl had announced repeatedly that national unification [1] – a long-term national objective since the unification of Germany after World War II – would not take place in his lifetime. Yet, it did do so just that and with remarkable speed, in less than a year. The two Germanies were united on October 3, 1990, after the 'Agreement on the Final Regulation concerning German Reunification' negotiations had been concluded on September 12, 1990. The so-called 'two-plus-four' negotiations [2] for unification were conducted speedily in accordance with the 'window-of-opportunity' approach of US President George Bush [3]. Helmut Kohl echoed this idea when he talked about 'favourableness of the hour' [4]. German unification was to be concluded as soon as possible before power relations would change in Moscow, closing the historic opportunity provided by Michael Gorbachev's reforms of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika'.

* Department of International Relations, Istanbul Kultur University 34191 Şirinevler / İstanbul

The Germans, like the rest of the world, were quite overwhelmed at the pace with which events were unfolding. Unification was completed in less than one year, and the *German Question* [5] returned back onto the international agenda. Many of Germany's friends and allies, especially in Western Europe, feared that a united, bigger Germany could revive old hegemonic aspirations. Especially Germany's enhanced geopolitical importance gave rise for concern. As the largest middle-European state, it had now become the 'West of the East, and the East of the West'. Economically speaking, West Germany had already been the strongest European economy and among the three strongest economies in the world. In addition, through unification it integrated the strongest economy among all Eastern European economies. In the words of one analyst the question was now: 'What kind of Germany would fit into what kind of Europe, so as to be neither too strong nor too weak for its European environment?'[6]

In the immediate post-unification period Germany demonstrated at every possible occasion that it had no future plans of disengaging from its European responsibilities and commitments. In terms of its wider foreign policy, united Germany repeated its determination to remain a civilian power, that is to say to build its power potential on economic strength rather than on power politics and military might. Germany has explicitly – to this day – ruled out the possibility of becoming a nuclear power. In so far, Kenneth Waltz' prediction in 1993 that united Germany would become a nuclear power has proved incorrect [7]. Yet, the biggest paradigmatic change in united Germany's foreign policy is that its military forces are now allowed to operate outside NATO-territory ('out-of-area' discussion), whereas before unification this had been, unthinkable.

Germany's new foreign policy has been characterized by some as 'normal', by others as 'assertive'. This article undertakes to address the following question: What have been the main developments in Germany's foreign policy throughout the last decade, and can they be called 'normal' or 'assertive'? A look at the 'out-of-area' discussion highlights these changes. It is an important part of Germany's external new self-definition after unification. The internal equivalent of Germany's search for a new identity after unification is the 'proud-to-be-German' debate, which will also be discussed briefly. In order to point out major developments, we will now turn to Germany's foreign policy principles before unification and, then, analyze whether and how they have changed since.

Germany's Foreign Policy Principles before Unification

West German foreign policy differed greatly from the foreign policies pursued by other large European states, due to the exceptional circumstances under which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had been founded after World War II. No German politician spoke openly of 'German national interests'. Anything that could give the impression of invoking the ghosts of nationalism was carefully avoided because of the 'burden of history' [8] that Germany carried. Yet, such interests did, of course, nevertheless exist. They were, however, not pursued through traditional tools of high politics, but rather through means of low politics such as commerce and international finance.

Most scholars are agreed that West Germany was a 'trading state', a formulation first used by Rosecrance [9]. On the other hand, Maull argues that Germany should not

be called a 'civilian power' without any reservations [10]. On the whole, German foreign policy is expected to play a key role in civilizing international relations in the future and, especially, in developing integrated effective structures of European collective security. Schwarz, on the other hand, traces political culture in Germany from former leaders, who were obsessed with power, to the time of unification [11]. He finds that contemporary Germans have almost forgotten about military and political power and are just relying on economic success and might. The term 'D-mark nationalism' reflects this view: Instead of embracing political patriotism – which the Germans could not do in the face of Nazi atrocities committed – they took pride in economic success as a substitute and often used economic leverage to achieve political ends. Hanrieder describes 'the exercise of economic might as the continuation of politics with different means' [12]. Gordon summarizes the main distinguishing characteristics of West German foreign policy under the following headings [13]:

1. Policy of Responsibility

Based on the FRG's unique historic responsibility, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Federal Republic's former Foreign Minister for almost twenty years, strongly emphasized the 'European peace task' [14] of both German states. The fears of Germany's neighbors regarding Germany's past and experience with National Socialism were to be respected and handled in the most sensitive manner. Nationalistic 'power politics' were to give way to a more humane and universal understanding of international politics. This was reflected in several ways, for instance West Germany had one of the most liberal laws for asylum seekers in the world, a constitutional ban on wars of aggression was introduced, the country's full integration into friendly alliances was ensured, and a ban on the export of weapons into areas of tension was set up [15]. West Germany portrayed itself as having learnt its lesson from history well.

2. Civilian Policy

The FRG was a 'trading nation' at heart. The symbol of West Germany's economic recovery and success after World War II was the D-mark. In this sense, the term 'D-mark nationalism' meant that the national symbol West Germans were most proud of was their national currency. Although West Germany had the largest West European army after 1955 and played a critical role as a deterrent on NATO's central front, it was nevertheless subjected to more restrictions than any other army within NATO. The Basic Law limited – and continues to do so - the tasks of the armed forces to 'defense purposes'. Before unification, there was broad consensus among political parties to interpret this formulation as a prohibition of any deployment of German troops outside NATO-territory. Furthermore, West Germany – like Japan – had pledged never to use or produce chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons [16].

3. Parochial Policy

Despite the worldwide engagement and presence of West German firms, the scope of action of West Germany's foreign policy was rather limited. The FRG was almost exclusively diplomatically active within Europe. In Eastern Europe, it tried to reach

across the Iron Curtain and establish contacts with the régimes of the German Democratic Republic and other East European states, including the Soviet Union (*Ostpolitik*). In Western Europe, it has influenced the development and enlargement of the European Community to a great extent by being one of the six, and it has ensured its special defense interests within NATO. Other than that, the FRG has practically been absent from the world political stage. It had neither colonies nor foreign military bases, nor did it become involved in Middle East politics. Kielinger observes that ‘Germany [was] guided (...) by the notion that the world wanted nothing more from it than a low profile in crisis situations and the continued profession of a lasting readiness for peace’ [17].

4. Multilateral Approach

The FRG tried to avoid the impression that it was pursuing national interests. It rather preferred to act in a multilateral context by stressing the shared nature of interests and by seeking the full support of its partners before acting. This strategy enabled the Federal Republic to meet its particular needs. Among these were NATO’s military strategy of ‘forward defense’, the 1954 treaties committing the Western Allied Powers to German unification, an agreement allowing trade with East Germany to be considered as intra-EC trade, *Ostpolitik* and, in the early 1980s, the deployment of American ‘Euro missiles’, not only to Germany but to other European countries as well [18]. Discussing West Germany’s position regarding the European Monetary System at the end of the 1970s, Hanrieder has come to the following conclusion [19]:

As usual, the Germans preferred a European institutional framework for implementing their national interests. They sought to avoid [...] the impression that they were seeking a national scope for action, or that they were trying to enlarge their political influence.

Germany’s New Foreign Policy

The answer to the question of whether united Germany’s foreign policy should be called ‘normal’ or ‘assertive’ shall be given after the analysis of two important discussions in the German public: the ‘out-of-area’ discussion and the ‘proud-to-be-German’ discussion, the first one being the more important one in this context. Both are significant for the formulation of Germany’s new self-understanding after 40 years of being closely observed by the rest of the world and facing implicit and explicit restrictions on the conduct of its foreign policy.

The ‘Out-of-Area’ Debate

West Germany’s foreign policy before 1989 differed greatly from the foreign policies of other states due to the exceptional circumstances under which the FRG had been founded after World War II. The FRG could only come into existence because the United States – a staunch believer in second starts – had already decided upon the orientation of the new state: a country firmly embedded in the Western Alliance and a core country in the new European integration process [20]. West Germany’s geopolitical significance as a front-line state vis-à-vis the ideological enemy Soviet Union and its satellites would be controlled by the Western Allied Powers through massive economic aid for reconstruc-

tion ('Marshall Plan' [21]) and sufficient security provided to help the country focus on the built-up of its economic potential. The label 'economic giant, political dwarf' was, thus, one often applied to West Germany.

During the unification process, Germany was busy assuring everyone that it would not strive for military might again. Public opinion – in line with Germany's historic responsibility – was strongly opposed to military engagement. This, however, started to change soon. Already in 1993, polls revealed that half of Germany's population – especially younger Germans – thought united Germany should participate in international military actions just as England, France, or America do; 62% believed that Germany should assume a more active international role [22].

On July 12, 1994, the German Constitutional Court ruled that there was no clear provision in Germany's constitution regarding a prohibition of the *Bundeswehr* in missions outside NATO-territory, as long as the *Bundestag* approves of such action with qualified majority. Previously, it had been believed that Article 87a of the *Basic Law* prohibited deployment of German forces outside territory by stating that the *Bundeswehr* serves only 'defensive purposes' [23]. In a historic vote in December 1995, the *Bundestag* voted for the deployment of German troops in Bosnia [24]. That decision was particularly a difficult one for the Green parliamentary faction since the Green party had developed in 1980 out of the peace movement and was running on a pacifist, non-military agenda [25]. The PDS – the reformed successor party of the former East German 'Socialist Party of Germany' (SED) – is still maintaining its resistance to any deployment of German military personnel abroad in parliamentary votes.

Today, Germany is slowly shedding off old ties as well as images, especially that of being a 'political dwarf'. In February 2002, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has started to criticize the United States' unilateralism within the anti-terror alliance against the Al-Qaida network, Afghan Taliban régime and the 'axis of evil'. Fischer made his opposition clear by reminding the United States that 'democratic alliance partners are no satellites'. By using this image the United States has been put on par with the former Soviet Union, which was considered in the West to be an exploitative superpower dominating its Eastern Bloc satellites. This statement falls in line with the EU's increasing efforts to distance itself from America's global anti-terror policy and aim of establishing a more independent European profile. This process of increasing independence, especially from 'protector' United States, has been evolving throughout the 1990's. Led by an increasingly emancipated Germany – in conjunction with traditional ally France and, lately, Great Britain - the EU has embarked upon the road of evolving into a major international political actor, a fact which is exemplified by the formulation of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The beginnings of CFSP can be traced back to close German-Franco security cooperation. In 1988, the Franco-German Security and Defense Council was established [26]. In the same year, the first German-French brigade was set up, which was later joined by Dutch troops and then formed the origin of an evolving European army.

At the end of 2001, there were more than 7,000 German soldiers employed in various missions in the Balkans: approx. 1,900 in Bosnia, about 5,000 in Kosovo, and 600 in Macedonia. Apart from that, German soldiers have joined NATO and UN-forces in

Cambodia, Serbia, Somalia, Georgia, Chechnya, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia, Tachikistan and Ukraine, albeit mostly in observer-status and as medical personnel. In November 2001, Chancellor Schröder linked a vote on German participation in the coalition forces in Afghanistan to a vote of confidence in the Bundestag [27]. In this way, he intended to ensure the support of his Green coalition partner. Many Green parliamentarians were opposed to sending German forces to Afghanistan. However, voting against the motion would have meant a break-down of the red-green coalition. Eventually, 538 parliamentarians out of 581 in the *Bundestag* voted in favor of sending up to 1,200 German soldiers to Afghanistan [28].

The visit of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to Germany at the beginning of March 2002 has further helped to overcome Germany's reluctance to out-of-area engagement. In a historic speech in the *Bundestag* [29], Anan said that Germany is, due to its history, obliged to contribute to global peace. He made it clear that Germany's continued world-wide engagement is desired by the United Nations for the sake of international security and world peace. He further encouraged Germany to take over the lead of peace-keeping forces in Afghanistan. Yet, his offer was declined. The financial overburden of Germany's budget was cited as the main reason. Upon the request of the parties involved, Germany had previously hosted the Petersberg Summit near Bonn in November 2001, which brought together the different political factions of Afghanistan and, ultimately, produced the interim government under Hamid Karzai.

This description of some aspects of the 'out-of-area' debate reveals the long way Germany has come: from (domestic) opposition to any deployment of troops outside Alliance territory to the offer of heading an international peace-keeping contingent in a place as far away as Afghanistan. It appears, however, that the rest of the world has had less problems with seeing Germany undertaking military commitments within the Atlantic Alliance than Germany itself. At the time of the Gulf War, in 1991 Germany was still busy with assuring everyone that it had developed into a peaceful democracy and that no one had to fear anything from a united Germany. At the same time, the international alliance – especially the United States – expected Germany to contribute to the mobilization effort. Germany ultimately chose to contribute merely financially. The German public was not ready yet to risk the lives of their soldiers in international combat missions. However, the Germans have repeatedly been told that the times of protection by the Western Allies are over; that they must now equally shoulder the task of ensuring world peace. This is after all the basis for a prosperous German export-led economy [30]. Apart from this, however, there is still an ongoing strong reluctance to participate in such missions on moral grounds. This effort not to get involved in any military confrontation is a continuation of the 'burden of history' and special responsibilities derived from this.

The 'Proud-to-be-German' Discussion

Another important discussion in Germany has been the 'proud-to-be-German' discussion. Stemming from Germany's historic past, it was politically not correct to be 'proud to be German'. An ongoing sense of responsibility over Germany's Nazi past is instilled in German pupils as they go through the education system [31]. The 'burden of history', that is to say Germany's critical confrontation with its experience of National

Socialism, has become an integral part of German political culture. Germans are continuously critically evaluating their history, because public wisdom has it that 'if we forget, history will repeat itself'.

It is in this context that the absence of an open declaration of German national interests can be explained. Despite the fact that these interests have always existed, they were not pronounced as such. Rather, multilateral approaches have become the routine way of problem-solving in foreign policy. Being the only available tool of achieving desired results, German politicians have developed an advanced ability to handle it. A generational change in attitudes can be observed in civil society, reflected in public opinion polls on various issues of foreign and European policy.

The 'proud-to-be-German' discussion of 1999 and 2000 testifies to this. It had been Chancellor Schröder who declared publicly that he is 'proud to be German'. He stressed the achievements that Germany has made as one of the biggest economies and consolidated liberal democracy, and that it has every reason to be proud of its foundations and successes. In this way, Schröder has helped to create a new image as well as self-image of 'being German'. The emphasis is not any more predominantly on 'the ugly, Nazi German' during the war, but rather on the post-war liberal and enlightened German. For the first time, Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer represent a leadership team without first-hand experiences during the Second World War: both were born and raised after the war. This allows both of them – with all due respect for Germany's historical responsibility – to conduct a more pragmatic foreign policy than has hitherto been possible.

German Foreign Policy Principles Revisited: Some Conclusions

Regarding the four established principles of German foreign policy, we can make the following observations and conclusions:

Policy of Responsibility: Germany's 'burden of history' and special responsibility resulting from it will continue. In that sense, we cannot talk about a 'normalization' of German foreign policy. There are two dimensions to Germany's particular situation and history: One is the collective memory of nations other than the German nation. It is up to the judgment of them to decide when Germany can return to normality. The other dimension is the Germans' sense of guilt over atrocities committed during the war. Continued confrontation with Germany's past is ensured through education policies carried out in the German school system, as well as a lively ongoing public debate. The rise – or rather increased public visibility – of extreme right ideology and acts of hatred against parts of the foreign population in Germany, or German population of non-German ethnic origin, as well as the current debate on immigration, ensure a continued public debate.

The 'proud-to-be' German discussion has helped to formulate a new sense of identity of which Germans can be proud, that is to say the image of a liberal and democratic German society. Yet, many analysts take above-mentioned acts of hatred as an indication that Germany's liberal and democratic society is under threat. In some instances it has appeared that the Germans themselves are less prepared to accept the fact that they are returning to normality than other nations. Yet, a certain kind of pragmatism appears to have spread in German politics in the last decade. This is due to a generational change in leading politicians and the general public. The pragmatic search for a new identity has sometimes upset non-Germans and has accordingly been interpreted to be 'assertive'.

One of the most prominent examples of this is the unilateral recognition of Slovenia by Germany on December 23, 1991. Former foreign Minister Genscher was at that time accused of dividing Yugoslavia [32] and much speculation was made about expansionist ambitions of the new Germany [33]. Regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons, it has been mentioned earlier that no policy change in this respect is foreseeable at the moment. On the contrary, the German government under the red-green coalition has only recently reached an agreement with German economic leaders about the gradual abolition of nuclear power over the next 30 years.

Civilian Policy: Since it appears unlikely that Germany will acquire nuclear weapons, it can be expected that a civilian policy will be pursued in the future. In fact, a civilization of international conflict, especially the emphasis on peacekeeping and conflict resolution as opposed to peace-enforcement, has been in the forefront of the foreign policy of the incumbent red-green coalition [34]. It must be said, however, that different political parties favor different approaches to conflict situations. In the future, it remains to be seen therefore which parties will be in charge of formulating Germany's foreign policy. Traditionally, the foreign ministry in Germany is given to the junior coalition-partner in a political system which has for several decades been governed by changing coalition governments. The smaller parties, and therefore 'candidates' for holding the Foreign Ministry, are the Green Party, the Liberal Party (FDP) and the reformed communist party PDS. None of these parties have so far revealed a tendency for aggressive foreign policy.

Regarding the possibility of Germany's substituting 'D-mark nationalism' with political forms of nationalism, this has obviously changed since Germany has replaced its national currency at the beginning of 2002 with the European currency, the Euro. It seems that, as the Euro is gaining popularity in Germany after initial widespread opposition to it, that an Europeanization of German monetary patriotism is to be expected. After all, Germany's consent to the Euro was a political bargain through which Chancellor Kohl gained French support for German unification at the Maastricht negotiations in 1991. In return, the Germans were allowed to host the headquarters of the European Central Bank in their own national financial center, Frankfurt, and determine the strict Maastricht criteria for admission into the Euro-zone. Consequently, it has been argued that the Euro is in fact the German D-mark 'in disguise'.

Parochial Policy: It has been pointed out that the 'out-of-area' discussion has opened up the possibility of deploying German military personnel in far away territories, such as Afghanistan. Whereas the main emphasis of German foreign policy used to be European integration, German-American relations and relations with the former Eastern Bloc (*Ostpolitik*), this has changed after unification as Germany has become more aware of its global responsibilities. It can be observed, however, that Germany still needs encouragement (such as Kofi Annan's statements before the *Bundestag*) by its main partners and allies to become active outside its former restricted area of activity. At the same time, the phenomenon of globalization is perhaps the strongest factor in Germany's growing worldwide engagement. Germany's economic presence had been a global one before, and now its political presence appears to be a – 'normal' - consequence of that. It is Germany's political influence that will prepare the grounds for a climate conducive to international trade, an area in which Germany has excelled for the last decades.

Because of the forces of globalization, the German economy is much more vulnerable today to instabilities not only in its immediate neighborhood, but worldwide. It is also in this context, that Germany has since 1992 sought a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council [35]. This is, of course, an indication that Germany does not only perceive of itself as a regional, European power, but as a world power which seeks to take influence at the highest possible level.

Multilateral Approach: Again, the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 by Germany has served as the basis for statements that Germany would now, after it had gained unification, leave its former strategy of multilateral action in favor of unilateralism. The European Community, however, recognized the two new states only three weeks later, on January 15, 1992 (arguably under German pressure). Germany's action, although perhaps not the best one in terms of foreign policy decisions, has to be analysed in the context of events at that time. Germany had just itself experienced national self-determination; Eastern Germans had voted with an overwhelming majority in favor of joining the Federal Republic of Germany. Most Germans, at that time, were convinced that any other nation should have the same opportunity of exercising this basic right of self-determination. The bloodshed that followed on the Balkans later was not being foreseen at that time, perhaps due to political shortsightedness.

In general, it can be said that multilateralism is still the first option in Germany's foreign policy conduct. Over the decades, Germany has perfected the art of negotiation and multilateral bargaining and, at the same time, carving out national gains. In terms of allegiance, however, it can be observed that Germany has become less dependent on the United States, but has instead chosen the European Union as its major focus of attention; this is valid for its economy, and increasingly for security affairs. Multilateralism has almost become synonymous with bargaining and policy-making in the EU. It has been particularly at the insistence of Germany that majority voting in the decision-making institutions of the EU has gained greater prominence, especially after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. Thus, Germany has ensured itself that it will not be able – at least institutional-wise - to dominate smaller member-states. In a way, the European Union has become more 'German' but, at the same time, Germany has also become more 'European'. In this sense, Germany should not be perceived as 'assertive', but neither has it become 'normal'. That is something that most people would not wish for, because of it the implications that associate post-war Germany with Nazi-Germany. There are indications that Germany has evolved into a 'new' Germany, although far from a 'perfect' society, as many Germans would agree. Sometimes, Germany's foreign policy conduct has been characterized as 'assertive'. This has something to do with the changed notion of 'power'. Increasingly, geonomics have equalled, or even surpassed, the importance of geopolitics. The fact that official opposition of France – to some extent of Great Britain – to German unification has been far greater than public opposition in those countries, may allow the conclusion that economic rivalry plays a much greater role than admitted by official statements. The nature of the problem, therefore, seems to be more one of 'economic assertiveness' than 'political assertiveness', the latter being the traditional understanding of the term. The Germans will have to be careful not to antagonize their economic partners and political friends through 'economic assertiveness'. The opportunities offered by political and economic cooperation should be well used by Germany, in its own best interest.

References

- [1] In fact, Kohl used the term 're-unification'. The political implication – although not spelled out in as many words – was that the two Germanies should be united according to territory they possessed before 1939. This included Polish territory beyond the Oder-Neisse-line, which forms today's border between Germany and Poland. This implication produced severe protest from Poland and other countries, notably France. Other linguistic suggestions, taking into account these sensitivities, were 'unification' or 'new unification', referring to the unification of the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and German Democratic Republic (GDR). This article will use the term 'unification'.
- [2] The 'two-plus-four' talks included several rounds of talks between the 'two' Germanies and the 'four' Allied Powers United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain and France; Poland had observer status. The goal of these talks was to avoid a lengthy international peace conference as had been foreseen by the Yalta Conference of 1945. As a result of the concluded agreement, united Germany regained complete sovereign powers in external affairs.
- [3] For an overview of the road to unification see: Kaiser, K. (1991), "Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte" Bonn/Bergisch Gladbach: Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy; Thurich, E. (1991), "Der Weg zur Einheit", *Informationen zur politischen Bildung*, 4 (233), 30-39.
- [4] See Kohl's historic speech in Dresden on December 19, 1990, reprinted in: Thies, J. and W. Wagner, eds., (1990), "Das Ende der Teilung: Der Wandel in Deutschland und Osteuropa", Bonn, 256-58.
- [5] For a discussion on the different notions and dimensions of the *German Question* over time see: Kaiser, K. (1991), "Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte", Bonn/Bergisch Gladbach, 101-104.
- [6] Hassner, P. (1982), "The Shifting Foundations", *Foreign Policy*, 48 (3), 3.
- [7] Waltz, K.N. (1993), "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", *International Security*, 18 (2), 44-79.
- [8] On the effect of defeat or victory on a nation's character and self-esteem see: Noelle-Neumann, E. and R. Köcher (1987), "Die verletzte Nation: Über den Versuch der Deutschen, ihren Charakter zu ändern", Stuttgart, 25-26.
- [9] See Rosecrance, R. (1986), "The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World", New York.
- [10] See Maull, H.W. (1992), "Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik", *Europa-Archiv*, 47 (10), 269-78.
- [11] See Schwarz, H.-P. (1985), "Die gezähmten Deutschen: Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit", Stuttgart.
- [12] Hanrieder, W.F. (1991), "Deutschland, Europa, Amerika", Paderborn, 262-63.
- [13] Gordon, P.H. (1994), "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy", *Orbis*, 38 (2), 226-28.
- [14] See Genscher, H.-D. (1991), "Die Friedensverantwortung der Deutschen" in: H.-D. Genscher, "Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit", Berlin, 135.
- [15] *Ibid*, 27-30.
- [16] The participation of German firms in helping Iraq and Libya (among others) setting up plants for the production of chemical weapons is, of course, a different story since it was not an official policy. These practices of the private sector were possible through loopholes in Germany's export laws and, in some cases, the lack of tight supervision and enforcement of these laws.
- [17] See Kielinger, T. (1991), "Der Golf-Krieg und die Folgen aus deutscher Sicht", *Aussenpolitik*, 42 (3), 246.
- [18] See Gordon, P.H. (1994), "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy", *Orbis*, 38 (2), 228.
- [19] See Hanrieder, W.F. (1991), "Deutschland, Europa, Amerika", Paderborn, 358 (own translation).
- [20] See Ziebüra, G. (1982), "Europaidee und Supranationalität in der Westdeutschen Aussenpolitik", reprinted in: H. Haftendorn et als. (eds.), "Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", Berlin, 136.
- [21] The European Recovery Program, or 'Marshall Plan' which was named after US Secretary of State George C. Marshall, was proposed and funded by the United States to promote Europe's reconstruction. It ran from 1947-1951 and amounted to US\$13.2 billion, or nearly US\$90 billion if measured in 1990's dollars.
- [22] See Asmus, R.D. (1993), "Germany's Geopolitical Maturation", Santa Monica (CA): Rand Corporation; Institut für praxisorientierte Sozialforschung (1993), "Einstellungen zu Akuellen Fragen der Innenpolitik 1993 in Deutschland", Mannheim.
- [23] For a discussion of arguments brought forward against deployment of German forces outside NATO see Kaiser, K. (1991), "Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte", Bonn/Bergisch Gladbach: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik, 112-14.
- [24] For a discussion of the 'out-of-area' debate from a moral perspective, see the interview with Fischer, J. (1995), "Es geht um die moralische Seele", *Die Zeit*, August 11, 8. For a description of Germany's paradigmatic change in foreign policy regarding deployment of military forces see: Pond, E. (1996), "Germany Finds Its Niche as a Regional Power", *The Washington Quarterly*, 19 (1), 34.
- [25] See interview with Fischer, J. (1995), "Es geht um die moralische Seele", *Die Zeit*, August 11, 8; and "Grüne uneins über möglichen Einsatz", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 14, 1995, 2.
- [26] For a detailed analysis of Franco-German security cooperation see: Schmidt, P. (1989), "Der Deutsch-Französische Rat für Verteidigung und Sicherheit", *Aussenpolitik*, 40 (4), 370-81.
- [27] For Schröder's explanation of why he linked the vote on the deployment of German troops in Afghanistan to a vote of confidence see: Schröder, G. (2001), "Schröders Rede zur Vertrauensfrage", *Spiegel Online* <<<http://www.spiegel.de/druckversion/p,1588,167955,00.html>>> of November 16.
- [28] See: "Überwältigende Mehrheit für Afghanistan Mission", *Spiegel Online* <<<http://www.spiegel.de/druckversion/0,1588,174226,00.html>>> of December 22.
- [29] Annan, Kofi (2002), "Nachhaltigen Frieden schaffen", UN press-communication UNIC/456/Korr 1 of January 28.
- [30] In Germany, every two in three jobs are in, or depend upon the export sector.
- [31] However, as a manifestation of Germany's pluralistic society, radical and non-radical right-wing activism and ideology is also an integral part of German political culture. Whereas right-wing ideology has always been present, radical activism has sharply increased after unification. For further information see: Keithly, D.M. (1994), "Shadows of Germany's Authoritarian Past", *Orbis*, 38 (2), 207-23; and Stöss, R. (1993), "Rechtsextremismus und Wahlen in der Bundesrepublik", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, March 12, 50-61.
- [32] See Axt, H.-J. (1993), "Hat Genscher Jugoslawien entzweit? – Mythos und Fakten der Aussenpolitik des vereinten Deutschlands", *Europa-Archiv*, 48 (12), 351-60.
- [33] See Horsley, W. (1992), "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins: A Critique of German Foreign Policy", *Millennium*, 21 (2), 225-41.
- [34] See for instance Joschka Fischer's peace proposals for the Middle East in April 2002.
- [35] See speech by former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel before the 47th UN General Assembly on September 23, 1992; Kinkel, K. (1992), "Wir wollen unsere Streitkräfte den Vereinten Nationen zur Verfügung stellen", *Vereinte Nationen*, 40 (5), 160-62.