

Tukey's European Union Candidature and The Issue of Democratic Reform

Chris Rumford*

Abstract

Democracy and human rights are frequently perceived as barriers to Turkey's EU accession. The recent publication of the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis has done little to allay concerns that Turkey continues to resist the Copenhagen political criteria. It is argued that the lack of progress in aligning Turkey's domestic democratic norms with those of the EU is the result of divisions within the political elites.

Özet

Demokrasi ve insan hakları genellikle Türkiye'nin AB'ne üyeliğinde engel olarak algılanmaktadır. Müktesabata Uyum için Ulusal Programın son basımı Türkiye'nin Kopenhag siyasi kriterlerine uymamakta direndiğine ilişkin endişeleri giderecek pek fazla birsey ortaya koymamaktadır. Türkiye'nin yerel demokratik normlarını AB'ninkilerle uyumlaştırmada gelişme kaydetmemesinin siyasi elitler arasındaki ayrılık ve bölünmelerden kaynaklandığı iddia edilmektedir.

Keywords

Acquis Communautaire, Copenhagen criteria, European Union, Human Rights.

Introduction

The promotion of Turkey to official candidate status at the Helsinki summit of December 1999 has not only transformed Turkey's relationship with the European Union (EU), but has had a significant impact on the domestic political agenda, particularly in the area of democratic reform. The failure of the current coalition government - comprising the leftist Democratic Left Party (DSP), the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP) - to reach agreement on the scope and extent of reform has heightened public awareness within the EU that Turkey remains out of step with the rest of Europe in the areas of democracy and human rights. Such perceptions are reinforced by EU annual reports on progress towards accession, which routinely confirm that "Turkey does not yet meet the Copenhagen political criteria" [1, 2, 3].

In the early part of 2001 Turkey published its *National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis* (NPAA) [4], a crucial document in the context of EU candidature. The NPAA set out Turkey's commitment to and capacity for harmonizing with the EU in the pre-accession period. To most commentators within the EU the NPAA was a disappointment, falling well short of addressing adequately important issues such as cultural freedoms for minorities and the abolition of the death penalty. On this reading

* Department of International Relations, İstanbul Kültür University 34191 Şirinevler / İstanbul

the NPAA was a missed opportunity, failing to convince the EU that Turkey was serious about completing the reforms necessary for membership.

This paper examines developments in the field of democratic reform that have occurred in the year since the publication of the NPAA. It finds that Turkey has failed to make advances in key areas, and also that the prospect of the type of reform desired by the EU is not forthcoming, at least in the short term. However, there have been important developments in relation to democratisation which may have a broad impact upon Turkey's candidature, notably the decision by the Council of Europe's European Court of Human Rights to uphold the ban imposed on Refah Partesi by the Constitutional Court. In the first section we will review the recent history of Turkey – EU relations, mainly dating from the EU's rejection of Turkey's candidature at the Luxembourg summit of December 1997. The section that follows addresses key documents in the accession process: namely, the Accession Partnership document and the *National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis*. The paper then examines the areas of democratic reform central to Turkey's candidature and which have prompted critics to claim that "Turkey has failed the EU test."

Recent developments in EU-Turkey relations

One of the most striking features about Turkey's relations with the EU is that Turkey still tends to pursue integration according to norms which developed in the 1960s and 70s. Onis describes this as the "Ankara Agreement Syndrome," the failure to recognise the changes that have taken place within the EU over recent years, "resulting in a type of deep integration project which would have been inconceivable when the Ankara Agreement was first signed back in 1963" [5]. In other words, the EU, as distinct from the EEC, has a much wider field of activity than the common market, and integration is a multi-dimensional process. One of the main features of the "Ankara Agreement Syndrome" is the belief that the path to further integration will be trade-led and will centre on the customs union agreement which came into force in 1996. The optimism associated with the introduction of the customs union is summed up by one of the chief architects of the agreement on the Turkish side in the following terms.

The Customs Union is the most advanced form of relationship that the European Union has formed with a non-member country so far. If Turkey is to optimise this infrastructure, the customs union could pave the way for full membership. But perhaps more importantly it could give Turkey the "option" of being a full member [6].

On this reading, the EU is first and foremost a common market and therefore integration is fundamentally an economic affair. Through incorporation in the EU's single market and by demonstrating that Turkey's economy is robust enough to withstand the rigors of EU competition, membership will be secured. The introduction of the customs union perpetuated the belief that Turkey's integration would continue to be driven by greater trade flows and greater economic harmonisation. It was also believed that, in the context of possible accession, the customs union would underscore Turkey's status as the most economically integrated of the non-member countries. In short, that customs union was the closest form of economic integration with the EU short of full membership [7].

Despite the widespread belief in Turkey that the economy is sufficiently integrated (periodic economic crises notwithstanding), European Commission reports have regularly underlined deficiencies. The Copenhagen economic criteria state that membership of the Union requires both the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces. A recent Commission report concluded that despite the fact that considerable parts of the Turkish economy are already able to survive competitive pressures and market forces in a customs union with the EU, "the process of achieving a functioning market economy is not completed" [1]. While Turkey is reluctant to relinquish a trade-led vision of integration, the EU's expectations - rooted firmly in the Copenhagen criteria - are very much the result of contemporary concerns.

Nevertheless, Turkey-EU relations have developed rapidly since the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 denied Turkey full candidate status, ostensibly on human rights grounds [8]. It was a watershed in Turkey's relations with the EU and the process of integration which began in 1963 with the signing of the Ankara Agreement [9]. Turks were upset by what they felt was an unjustified and unprecedented denial of candidature, and incredulous that less than two years following the introduction of the customs union the EU door had been firmly slammed in their face [11]. There was widespread feeling amongst EU commentators that Turkey had been treated shabbily by the EU [12], particularly considering that a number of Central and Eastern Europe countries with weaker EU claims had been promoted ahead of Turkey and granted full candidate status.

In October 1999 the European Commission published a report in which it was recommended that Turkey be considered as a full candidate [13]. However, the report made it plain that Turkey did not meet the Copenhagen political criteria and stated that there were "serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities. Torture is not systematic but is still widespread and freedom of expression is regularly restricted by the authorities." The Commission's report was the prelude to the decision reached at the Helsinki summit which formally granted Turkey the status of candidate country. The Presidency conclusions of the Helsinki summit [14] made explicit the EU's position that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council was a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations.

There was no one single overriding factor in the transformation of Turkey's fortunes between the Luxemburg and Helsinki Councils. Rather, Turkey's enhanced status came about as the result of shifts in several important areas [5, 8]. First, and most important, at Helsinki there was a lack of outright opposition to Turkey's candidature. For the first time in EU history no country was determined to prevent Turkey becoming an eventual EU member. At Luxemburg, opposition to Turkey's candidature came from Greece, Germany and Luxembourg, then holding the EU presidency. Under Chancellor Schroeder German policy towards Turkey was very different to that pursued by Chancellor Kohl [10]. The Finns, as EU Presidents, proved to be more conciliatory and pragmatic than their Luxembourgish predecessors. There were other important factors. In the past, Greek lobbying harmed Turkey's aspirations, but the rapprochement between the Aegean neighbours in the aftermath of a series of earthquakes in the summer and

autumn of 1999 had a positive impact on Greek policy towards Turkey as an EU candidate. US lobbying and support for Turkey's EU candidature was also an important factor. According to Makovsky, "it is doubtful that the EU would have acted, however, had not Washington vigorously lobbied for Turkey's candidacy." He outlines three arguments employed by the US to persuade – "or shame" – the EU into including Turkey. The strategic importance of Turkey to the west; the boost that candidature would give to the professed EU goal of democratisation in Turkey; the EU's role in promoting tolerance towards the Muslim world [15].

The Accession Partnership

Significant developments during the year 2000 included the announcement of increased funding to Turkey as part of the pre-accession process - a doubling of financial resources on an annual basis - the figure for 2000 was expected to reach Euro 177 million [16] - and the publication of the European Commission's *Regular Report on Progress Towards Accession* [1]. The progress report reiterated that Turkey has still not fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria. In a contemporary address, the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement summed up Turkey's deficiencies in the following way.

We are still concerned about the inadequate respect for human rights and the rights of minorities as well as about the constitutionally enshrined role played by the armed forces in political life via the National Security Council. The situation of the Kurds has to be improved and the state of emergency still in effect in the 4 south-eastern provinces must be lifted [17].

The Commission's *Accession Partnership for Turkey* [18] outlined the priorities on which Turkey must focus in order to be considered for accession, thereby providing a detailed "road map" for taking the necessary short and medium term measures. The immediate priorities were identified as human rights, fundamental freedoms, the Copenhagen economic criteria, and capacity to adopt the *acquis communautaire*. The document once more reiterated Turkey's failure to meet the Copenhagen political criteria: "all candidate countries continue to meet the political criteria, except Turkey" [19].

The Partnership document was considered controversial for the way it dealt with the issue of minority rights, in the sense that it avoided mentioning the Kurds (the largest and most politically active of the minority groups, and one associated - in the form of the PKK - with terrorist activity in Turkey) by name. The following clauses in particular were interpreted as a major concession to Turkey, not least by the Turks themselves.

Remove any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting.

Ensure cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origin. Any legal provisions preventing the enjoyment of these should be abolished, including in the field of education. [19]

Although the EU Accession Partnership was shy of mentioning the Kurds by name the Commission's annual Regular Report, arguably the more important document, was much more forthright. The 2000 Report expressed the hope that promised reforms in the political sphere, the justice system and protection of human rights be "extended to all citizens, including those of Kurdish origin" [1]. The Report also criticized Turkish courts for continuing to "restrict the expression of views with which the State disagrees, notably

when it concerns the situation of the population of Kurdish origin" [1], and emphasized that "In the case of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, it should be mentioned that the expression of pro-Kurdish views is still vigorously fought by the Turkish State". As regards, cultural rights, while noting that broadcasting in Kurdish is sometimes tolerated, the report concluded that:

In the field of education (basic and extended education), no language other than Turkish is allowed for teaching purposes, except where explicitly authorized by the Ministry of National Education. Neither legislation nor practice should prevent the enjoyment of cultural rights for all Turks irrespective of their ethnic origin. This is of particular importance for the improvement of the situation in the Southeast, where the population is predominantly of Kurdish origin [1].

It is interesting to compare the formulations in the Accession Partnership with statements on comparable themes in the Progress Report. While the former makes every diplomatic effort to avoid offending Turkish sensitivities, and couches the targeted reforms in a language respected and understood by Turkey, the latter makes plain the Commission's dissatisfaction with the human rights situation in Turkey, particularly in relation to the Kurdish minority. The current coalition government in Turkey, and indeed Turkish political groups as a whole, are divided over the language of human rights. For many, the very use of the words "minorities" and "Kurds" is tantamount to encouraging separatism and division. For example, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the rightwing coalition member MHP (Nationalist Action Party), was quoted as saying that "cultural and ethnic rights can fuel ethnic clashes and division" [20]. The EU's emphasis on minority rights is perceived by many to be a threat to the Turkish state, and greater democratization is viewed with suspicion by certain sections of the political elites. "For years it was believed and accepted to some degree that full provision of freedom of thought and human rights would increase terrorist acts, spread fundamentalism, and further divide the country" [21]. The language used by the EU in the Accession Partnership is significant: voicing demands in terms respected by Turkey, where citizenship rights are understood in individualistic terms rather than in terms of the rights of minorities. The sensitivities are summed up by one commentator in the following terms: "Ankara is more likely to take the EU's human rights criticisms seriously when they discriminate explicitly between the individual rights of all Turkish citizens, Kurds included, and the collective territorial claims of Kurdish ethno-nationalism" [22].

It is a feature of Turkey-EU relations that just as certain political elites portray EU expectations as unwarranted intrusions into domestic politics, any sign that Turkey has managed to resist or delay harmonization with the EU is viewed as a cause for celebration. The language adopted by the Commission in the Accession Partnership was interpreted in this way. "Twenty four hours to go. No Kurdish and no minority," predicted the daily newspaper *Hurriyet* on the day before publication of the Accession Partnership [23]. Behind the nationalist posturing, leading Turkish politicians were making an effort to accommodate EU sensibilities. Immediately prior to the publication of the Partnership document the Deputy Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, made a statement to the effect that Turkey could be ready to grant broader cultural rights to Kurdish citizens [24]. The government and the military agreed that "efforts would be made to 'remove obstacles' to Kurdish-language broadcasting and education" [25].

Similar statements had been forthcoming the previous year. For example, following the Helsinki Council decision Foreign Minister Ismail Cem had indicated that Kurdish cultural rights were to be extended, particularly in the field of language and broadcasting. He identified the ban on Kurdish language broadcasting as an "obstacle to democracy and human rights" and said that "everyone living in Turkey should have the right to broadcast in their own mother tongue" [26]. However, this was not a view shared by then-President Demirel, who was quoted as saying that lifting the language ban would pose a threat to Turkey. "Protecting the official language is one of the musts of being a unitary state" [27].

National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis

The publication of the Commission's Annual Report and the Accession Partnership document was followed by a concerted attempt by Turkish nationalists to foreclose the possibility of greater minority rights. In response to Mesut Yilmaz's suggestion that cultural rights could be granted to the Kurds, Sevket Bulent Yahnici, Deputy Leader of the MHP, ruled out any concession on Kurdish rights. He was reported as saying that he could not accept EU demands on Kurdish rights, and that it was not possible for Turkey to "discuss education and language rights until it wipes out terror threats" [28]. The division in the government, and in the country, over this issue was one reason why Turkey's National Programme was so equivocal on the issue of minority rights. The general verdict on Turkey's *National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis* was that it failed to demonstrate an adequate understanding of the changes needed to meet the EU's Copenhagen criteria. Initial reactions drew attention to its lack of commitment to reforms in the fields of minority rights, freedom of speech and the abolition of the death penalty.

While portrayed by the government as a fundamental revision of Turkey's political, economic and administrative structures, the NPAA was widely interpreted as an unduly conservative response to the EU Accession Partnership document. While dealing at great length with the technical and legislative changes needed to align Turkey's practices with those of the EU, the document chose to downplay the importance of democracy and human rights in the accession process. Of particular note, reforms in the field of Kurdish broadcasting and education were absent, sacrificed to the nationalism of the MHP [29]. Having said that, it is important to recognise that there are broader nationalist sympathies within all mainstream (secular) political parties and elites, and the ultra-nationalism of the MHP masks a more general nationalistic consensus that Turkey should choose her own path rather than be dictated to the EU, the IMF or whoever. As one Turkish commentator explains, Turkey is "torn between ... the west on one hand and its own values, traditions and individuality on the other" [30].

One of the purposes of the NPAA is to identify discrepancies between existing Turkish policy and legislation and that of the EU, and identify the means by which they can be harmonized. Included in this is an assessment of the problems, the costs and the administrative structures needed to produce the necessary revisions. On one level, the NPAA is a comprehensive comparison between current practices in Turkey and the EU, and a catalogue of legislation which needs to be revised and norms and practices to be

adopted. The timetable for carrying out the reforms is explicitly tied to necessary funding being made available, and the NPAA comprises an extended series of (unrealistic) requests for EU funding to make the proposals a reality. The bulk of the NPAA concerns itself with harmonization in areas such as free movement of goods, capital, services and persons; competition; common agricultural, transport and fisheries policies; taxation; economic and monetary union; industrial policy, and so on. These are not the areas on which attention was focussed following its publication. Understandably, media and public attention in Europe was focussed on Turkey's statement of intent regarding democratic reforms and human rights. The NPAA identified a review of the constitution as a priority, and a commitment was given to speed up harmonization with the EU *acquis* in relation to freedom, the fight against torture, human rights, participatory democracy, and the rule of law.

In respect of the death penalty, no timetable for its abolition was given. Nor was there any acknowledgement that this is a matter of crucial importance to Turkey's membership aspirations. For example, the widely-distributed executive summary makes no reference at all to the abolition of the death penalty. The issue is dealt with in a perfunctory manner in the main text (Section 1.2: Political Criteria) where it is stated that the Turkish Parliament (Grand National Assembly) is the body authorized to deal with this issue and that it will be considered "in the medium term". Concerning minority cultural rights, no specific mention was made of the Kurds. Section 1.2.9 "Cultural Life and Individual Freedoms," reminds us that the formal educational language in Turkey is Turkish, but that "this does not prohibit the free usage of different languages, dialects or tongues by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. This freedom may not be abused for the purpose of separatism and division," a statement which serves to reinforce existing restrictions on the freedom of speech.

The publication of the National Programme drew additional attention to Turkey's deficiencies as a candidate for EU membership. The accession process, in which Turkey is at only the earliest stage, increases the scrutiny under which candidate countries are placed. Domestic political events, internal disputes and reactions to European and global developments all come under the spotlight. In this context, a series of high-profile incidents - prison riots, the most recent economic crisis, the banning of another leading opposition party - did little to further Turkey's candidature, and consolidated Turkey's reputation as "reluctant Europeans" (since 1983, 21 political parties have been banned by the Constitutional Court). During the same period, developments outside of the EU's direct sphere of influence (the ECHR decision on the banning of Refah Partesi) have called into question the EU's automatic assumption that Turkey's democratic norms are always out of step with those in EU member states.

Issues in the field of democratic reform

The Turkish government has recently steered a package of reforms through parliament aimed at liberalizing laws relating to democracy, freedom of expression and human rights and bring them into line with EU requirements. As of January 2002, 34 Articles of the Constitution had been the subject of recent amendments, 22 of which were directly related to the requirements of the NPAA [31]. However, the reforms fall

of the Islamicists have always been viewed with great suspicion by Turkey's political elites, for whom Islamic politics can only mean fundamentalism. According to Kramer the ban on the Refah Party was "regarded by the Kemalist elite, especially in the military and the judiciary, as the appropriate way to deal a strong blow to political Islam in Turkey to keep the country on its secularist and Western track" [10]. What is especially viewed with mistrust is the language of liberal democracy to which Islamicist politicians increasingly resort and there is considerable debate regarding the extent to which the Islamicists actually believe in rights-based democracy or whether they are merely utilizing the discourse of rights for political advantage. For example, Gulalp takes the line that, "if Refah had come to power with enough of a majority to implement its program freely, there were strong indications that it might actually have pursued totalitarian policies" [40]. Not everyone shares this view. Ozbudun's position is that "it is unclear whether Refah seriously intends to establish an 'Islamic state' based on the *shari'a* (sacred law) or would be satisfied by certain, mostly symbolic, acts of Islamization in some areas of social life" [41]. For their part, Buzan and Diez hold that "much of the outcry about Islamisation is overstated" and draw attention to the effectiveness of Refah in local government.

The reactions of the old political establishment to these successes – for example, the banning of Istanbul's Mayor Recep Tayip Erdogan from politics for quoting a popular, albeit blood-filled poem – in some ways seem to be more fundamentalist than the Refah politicians themselves [42].

The ECHR decision notwithstanding, it would be a mistake to view Refah (and its successor parties) as monolithic in its (anti-)democratic views. Refah encompassed a "broad church" of views ranging from fundamentalist to liberal-democratic [43].

Reactions to the closure of the Fazilet Party pointed in the direction that Turkey is "failing the EU test"[44]. However, the issue has taken on a new dimension with the ECHR decision to uphold the Constitutional Court's ruling against Refah Partesi on the grounds that it was undermining secular principles. Three members of the banned party appealed to the ECHR in October 2000 claiming that the closure breached nine articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECHR ruling stressed the threat to democracy posed by Refah[45], and considered that the establishment of Islamic law was part of their political programme.

the sanctions imposed ... could reasonably be considered to meet a pressing need for the protection of democratic society, since, on the pretext of giving a different meaning to the principle of secularism, the leaders of the Refah Partesi had decalred their intention ... to institute Islamic law (*the Sharia*) [46].

According to the ECHR, Turkey did not violate human rights when it banned the Refah Party, a decision which has confounded most commentators' instincts regarding Turkey's rather casual approach to upholding democratic standards. The criticisms levelled at Turkey when the decision to ban the Fazilet Party was announced were much the same as those voiced three years earlier when the Refah party was banned. At that time it was widely believed that the ban would widen the gap between EU expectations and democratic practices in Turkey [47], and concern was raised regarding the ability of Turkey to uphold democratic standards of pluralism and freedom of expression.

Rather than positioning Turkey outside the European democratic fold, the

judgement of the ECHR has in fact confirmed that Turkey's democracy is aligned with European norms, and in doing so has bolstered the legitimacy of the Turkish state. Put simply, the ECHR has acknowledged that it is legitimate to ban political parties who constitute a threat to democracy. The decision of the ECHR confirms the Turkish state's position that the Refah Party was anti-democratic, not a view shared by many outside of Turkey at the time the ban was imposed. In terms of the EU's Copenhagen political criteria, the "stable institutions guaranteeing democracy" have received a significant endorsement.

Conclusion

In agreeing to adopt the *acquis communautaire*, which after all is the purpose of the National Programme, Turkey has undertaken not only to align legislation with the EU but also to accept that legislation introduced by the EU (over which Turkey, as a non-member, has limited influence) must be enacted at the national level. EU-Turkey interconnectedness is not limited to the legal and economic spheres. EU countries are not just connected through a single market but also a host of other areas – communications, cultural policy, education, law, welfare, security, justice, foreign policy and many more – in which the EU introduces standards and practices to which members and candidate countries must conform. Turkey is struggling to come to terms with this aspect of the EU [48].

Moreover, there is a "growing reluctance to accept what is seen as European interference into Turkish sovereign affairs" [10]. Turkish political elites continue to propagate the fiction that it is desirable to maintain national integrity through resisting the unwanted interference of international agencies. The fear of "outside interference" runs deep in Turkish politics and is not simply a nationalist reflex. Kemal Dervis, Economy Minister and self-confessed advocate of "Third Way" Blair-Schroeder centre-left politics, said of the criticism occasioned by the closing down of the Virtue Party, "we as the government do not want foreign financial institutions and other states to interfere in Turkey's domestic affairs" [49]. As Onis points out, Turkish politics elites exhibit a "certain inconsistency or dichotomy" to the issue of EU membership. They "would like to obtain the benefits of full-membership without necessarily delegating any power, authority or sovereignty over what they consider to be purely domestic political issues to Brussels or the EU itself" [50]. To a large extent this inconsistency is determined by the nationalist posturing which is de rigueur in Turkish politics. The influence of the military over the National Security Council and political life more generally ensures that Turkey's response to the EU-driven need for democratic reform always displays a nationalist complexion. Although officially an advisory body, the MGK has applied a great deal of pressure on a succession of civilian governments (for example, the "postmodern coup" which deposed Refah Partesi from government in 1997). The EU is concerned that despite recent changes to the composition of the MGK there is "little sign of increased civilian control over the military" [2]. It is in this sense that we should understand the National Security Council's claim that "the European Union's democratic requirements go too far and are 'not in line with Turkey's reality'" [51].

Tukey's European Union Candidature and The Issue of Democratic Reform

References

- [1] European Commission, (2000), "Turkey (2000) Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession", http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/report_11_00/pdf/en/tu.pdf
- [2] European Commission, (2001), "2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession", http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/tu_en.pdf
- [3] The EU summit in Copenhagen in 1993 established conditions which applicant countries should fulfil if they wish to join the EU. These conditions became known as the "Copenhagen criteria." Politically, the country must have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities. In economic terms, the country must have a functioning market economy and the capacity to handle competitive pressure on the Union's internal market. Administratively, the country must have public authorities capable of implementing and enforcing EU law.
- [4] Prime Ministry, Secretariat General for EU Affairs, (2001), *Turkey: National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis*. Ankara, Prime Ministry.
- [5] Onis, Z., (2000), "Luxembourg, Helsinki and beyond: towards an interpretation of recent Turkey-EU relations", *Government and Opposition*, 35: 4.
- [6] Duna, C., (1997), "Turkey and Western Europe: state of the union", *Private View*, Winter.
- [7] Kramer, H., (1996), "The Turkey/EU customs union: economic integration amid political turmoil", *Mediterranean Politics* 1(1).
- [8] Rumford, C., (2000), "From Luxembourg to Helsinki: Turkey, the politics of EU enlargement, and prospects for accession", *Contemporary Politics* 6 (4).
- [9] Turkey has tended to interpret the Ankara Agreement as envisaging Turkey's eventual accession to the EU. In fact, what is stipulated is that "As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community"[10].
- [10] Kramer, H., (2000), *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- [11] Onis, Z., (1999), "Turkey, Europe, and paradoxes of identity: perspectives on the international context of democratisation", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Summer.
- [12] See for example *The Guardian*, 16 December 1997 and *The Economist* 20 December 1997.
- [13] European Commission, (1999), "Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession: Composite, 13 October", <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement>
- [14] European Commission, (1999), *Euromed Report* 3, 16 December.
- [15] Makovsky, A., (1999), "Turkey: Europe-bound?", *Policywatch*, Number 429, December 15.
- [16] European Commission, (2000), "Commission proposes new steps to further implement the pre-accession strategy for Turkey", Press Release IP/00/839, July 26.
- [17] European Commission, (2000), "Strategy paper, accession partnership with Turkey and progress report", Speech to European Parliament, Brussels, 8 November. SPEECH/00/419
- [18] European Commission, (2000), "Accession Partnership for Turkey", <http://www.eureptr.org.tr/english/ap2000forturkeyextract.rtf>
- [19] European Commission, (2000), "EU Flash", Press Release, 8 November. Representation of the European Commission to Turkey. www.eureptr.org.tr
- [20] *Turkey Update*, 14 November 2000. <http://www.turkeyupdate.com/backissues.html>
- [21] Birand, M.A., (2000), "Will Turkey be able to meet the Copenhagen criteria?" *Challenge Europe Online Journal*, 8 June. http://www.thepec.be/Challenge_Europe/top.asp
- [22] Hodge, C.C., (1999), "Turkey and the pale light of European democracy," *Mediterranean Politics* 4(3).
- [23] *Reuters*, 7 November 2000.
- [24] Yilmaz "described the Kurds as "citizens who have different characteristics", thus avoiding the term "minority" which the Turks say does only applies to non-Moslem communities" *Turkey Update* 14 November 2000. <http://www.turkeyupdate.com/backissues.html>
- [25] *Financial Times*, 26 February 2001. According to *The Economist* of January 11 2001, in November 2000 "the national intelligence chief, Senkal Atasagun, said it was in Turkey's interest to lift the ban on broadcasting in the Turkish language."
- [26] *Financial Times*, 15 December 1999.
- [27] *New York Times*, 27 December 1999
- [28] *Reuters* 22 January 2001. Yahnici also equated the demands of the EU with those of the PKK, and said that "the EU had become an 'arm' of this separatist party" (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 January 2001).
- [29] *The Guardian*, 21 March 2001; *Financial Times*, 13 July 2001.
- [30] Sami Kohen, quoted in *Financial Times*, 13 July 2001.
- [31] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2002), "Turkey-EU relations: post-Helsinki phase", <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/latest.htm>
- [32] "Activists reject Turkish reforms," BBC News, 7 February 2002 http://bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1807000/1807548.stm

- [33] *Financial Times*, 13 July 2001. At the time of the ban the Fazilet Party held 102 of 550 seats in parliament and secured 15 percent of the vote in the 1999 general election. In the local elections contested at the same time the Fazilet Party won 488 municipalities, including 17 urban centres.
- [34] *Financial Times*, 24 June 2001.
- [35] Human Rights Association of Turkey, (2001), Press Release: "Parti kapatma ve ifade özgürlüğü" 27 June, www.ihd.org.tr/basin/bas20010627.html
- [36] Mazlumder, (2001), Press Release: "Fazilet Partesi de Kapatildi" 23 June, www.mazlumder.org.tr/haber/Ayrinti.asp?HaberNo=29.
- [37] Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (2001), Press Release: "Ban on the Fazilet Party in Turkey contradicts Human Rights and democratic principles" 26 June, www.euomedrights.net/english/emhrn-documents/pressreleases/26_06_2001.htm.
- [38] European Union, (2001), "Declaration by the presidency on behalf of the EU on the closure of the Fazilet Party in Turkey" http://www.eu2001.sc/cu2001/news/news_read.asp?iInformationID=16275
- [39] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 June 2001.
- [40] Gulalp, H., (1999), "The poverty of democracy in Turkey: the Refah Party episode", *New Perspectives on Turkey* 21, Fall.
- [41] Ozbudun, E., (1996), "Turkey: how far from consolidation?", *Journal of Democracy* 7(3).
- [42] Buzan, B. and Diez, T., (1999), "The European Union and Turkey", *Survival* 41 (1)
- [43] Onis, Z., (1997), "The political economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey: the rise of the Welfare Party in perspective", *Third World Quarterly*, 18 (4).
- [44] "Fazilet Banned, Repression Triumphant," *The Economist*, 30 June 2001.
- [45] *The Economist*, 14 March 2002 claimed that the idea that Refah wanted to introduce Islamic law was "thinly supported" by evidence.
- [46] ECHR, (2001), "Judgement in the case of Refah Partesi (The Welfare Party) Erbakan, Kazan and Tekdal v Turkey", www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2001/July/RefahPartesi2001jude.htm
- [47] Dorsey, J.M., (1998), "Turkish court ban on Islamic Welfare Part boomerangs, widening gulf with EU", *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, March. www.washington-report.org
- [48] Rumford, C., (2001), "Human rights and democratization in Turkey in the context of EU candidature", *Journal of European Area Studies*, 9 (1).
- [49] *Reuters*, 23 June 2001.
- [50] Onis, Z., (2001), "An awkward partnership: Turkey's relations with the European Union in comparative-historical perspective", *Journal of European Integration History*, 7 (1).
- [51] *Turkey Update*, 22 June 2000, <http://www.turkeyupdate.com/backissues.html>