

T.C.

ISTANBUL KULTUR UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

NEGOTIATING CYPRUS: THE MISSING DIMENSION

Master of Arts Thesis by

Niyazi Onur ÖZYURT

1800001401

Department: International Relations

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KISA ÖZET

KIBRIS'I MÜZAKERE ETMEK: EKSİK BOYUT

Niyazi Onur Özyurt

Kıbrıs Sorunu, küçük bir çember içinde, etnik bir çatışma olarak başladı ve çemberini genişleterek uluslararası boyutlara ulaştı. Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Kıbrıslı Türkler, kurucu ikili olmakla birlikte adadaki en kalabalık iki topluluktur. Tarihsel olarak başlangıç noktası taraflara göre farklılık gösterse de Kıbrıs'ta sorun 1950'lerin ortalarından itibaren şekillenmeye başladı. Bu sorun, 1960 uluslararası antlaşmalarıyla, Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti ile sonuçlandı. Ancak Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti uzun soluklu olmadı. Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti devam etti, ancak Kıbrıslı Türklerin hakları kağıt üzerinde kaldı. 1963 sonu ve 1964'te ki olaylar, taraflar arasında gelecekte yaşanacak derin güvensizliklerin de başlangıcı olmuş oldu.

Kıbrıs Müzakereleri, çözüm için yapılan çok sayıda müzakerenin genel adıdır. Federal devlet sisteminin çözüm adına görüşülmesi 1960'ların ortalarından beri devam ediyor. Ancak çözüm adına yaşanan yakınlaşmalar, çözüm dışında bir amaca hizmet etti. Federal ortaklığın taraflarca farklı yorumlanması nedeniyle Kıbrıs müzakereleri bir muamma haline geldi.

Sonuç olarak, Federasyon önerisinin tıkanıdığı ve yıllardır somut bir sonuca ulaşamadığı aşikârdır. Alternatif çözümlerin tartışılması gereken Kıbrıs sorunu'nda, Federasyon dışındaki öneriler ciddi bir değerlendirmeyi hak ediyor.

ANAHTAR KELİMELEER: Kıbrıs Sorunu, Kıbrıs Müzakereleri, Annan Planı

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ABSTRACT

NEGOTIATING CYPRUS: THE MISSING DIMENSION

Niyazi Onur Özyurt

The Cyprus Problem started as an ethnic conflict within a small circle and reached international dimensions by enlarging its circle. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are the founding duos and the two most populous communities on the island. Although historically the starting point differs according to the parties, the problem in Cyprus started to be shaped since the mid-1950s. This problem resulted in a Republic with the 1960 international treaties, the Republic of Cyprus. Only, the Republic of Cyprus did not last longevity. The Republic of Cyprus continued, but the rights of Turkish Cypriots remained on paper. The events of late 1963 and 1964 marked the beginning of insecurities at the far end between the parties to be experienced in the future.

The Cyprus Negotiations is the general name of the numerous talks held for a solution. Discussion of the federal state system for the solution has been ongoing since the mid-1960s. However, the rapprochements experienced in the name of a solution served a purpose, except for a solution. The Cyprus negotiations have become a conundrum due to the different interpretations of the federal partnership by the parties.

Consequently, it is apparent that the Federation proposal has been blocked and has been no concrete result achieved for years. In Cyprus problem, where alternative solutions may be discussed, proposals other than the Federation deserve serious consideration.

KEYWORDS: Cyprus Problem, Cyprus Negotiations, Annan Plan

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	i
KISA ÖZET	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vi
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Research Questions	5
1.2. Research Methodology	5
2. THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	6
2.1. From the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Cyprus	7
2.1.1. The Transition of the Island to British Rule	7
2.1.2. The Notion of the Nationalism in Cyprus.....	9
2.1.3. Towards the Republic of Cyprus	13
2.2. From the Republic of Cyprus to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus	15
2.2.1. Akritas Plan and the Thirteen Points	15
2.2.2. Bloody Christmas	17
2.2.3. What Happened in London Conference?.....	18
2.2.4. The United Nations and the UNFICYP in Cyprus	19
2.2.5. The United States of America and the Johnson Letter	20
2.2.6. 1967 Crisis	21
2.2.7. EOKA-B	23
2.2.8. 1974 Cypriot coup d'état and Cyprus Peace Operation	24
2.2.9. Geneva Conferences and Second Peace Operation	25
2.3. From the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to the Annan Plan.....	29
2.3.1. Turkish Federated State of Cyprus	29
2.3.2. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	29
2.3.3. Towards the Annan Plan.....	31

3. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM	33
3.1. Founding of the Republic of Cyprus	33
3.2. 1963-1967 Period	38
3.2.1. Acheson Plan	38
3.2.2. Galo Plaza Report	39
3.3. 1968-1974 Period	40
3.4. 1975-1983 Period	42
3.4.1. Vienna Talks	42
3.4.2. 1977 High Level Agreement.....	43
3.4.3. 1979 High Level Agreement.....	44
3.4.4. The Interim Agreement.....	46
3.5. 1984-1986 Period	47
3.5.1. De Cuellar's Draft.....	47
3.6. 1987-1992 Period	50
3.6.1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 649.....	50
3.6.2. The Set of Ideas	52
3.7. 1992-1994 Period	54
3.7.1. Confidence Building Measures.....	54
3.8. The Deadlock Period Before the Annan Plan.....	56
4. THE ANNAN PLAN AND UP-TO-DATE NEGOTIATIONS	58
4.1. Do the Expectations Match?.....	60
4.2. The Essence of the Plan and the Referendum	63
4.3. Up-to-Date Negotiation Process.....	69
4.3.1. Crans Montana.....	72
5. THE ALTERNATIVE: RISING TWO-STATE SOLUTION	75
6. CONCLUSION.....	88
BIBLIOGRAPHY	92

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

TFSC	Turkish Federated State of Cyprus
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	United Nations
EU	European Union
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
ECHR	European Convention of Human Rights
EOKA	Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
EOKA-B	Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston (Pro-Enosis Movement)
EP	European Parliament
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNBZ	United Nations Buffer Zone
US	United States
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı)

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

Concepts such as Conflict, War, and Peace are among the concepts we hear most frequently in international relations studies. In literature, war, in a short form, is characterized as wide-scale systemized violence between political units (Levy, 1983, pp. 50-53; Vasquez, 2009, pp. 21-30). In opposition, the state of not being at war is called peace. According to Johan Galtung, the famous name of peace studies, negative peace means the absence of organized forms of violence. This concept covers a broad spectrum, from the temporary cessation of wars to the permanent reconciliation of the conflicting poles. Based on this concept, the situation in which there is no war but permanent peace has not yet been achieved is called negative peace (Galtung, 2000). In respect, the Cyprus problem serves as a model of negative peace and needs to be addressed through negotiations.

A small island and a world-renowned problem incarcerated in it. When the Cyprus problem is mentioned, many thoughts appear in most people's minds, but the first argument that comes to mind is that the problem has not been resolved for a very long time and has continued. The Cyprus problem, being one of the most intractable conflicts in the world, remains unresolved for decades.

The Republic of Cyprus was a bi-communal independent Republic that emerged as a result of the convergence of inside and outside powers, the international treaties that formed the Constitution, the guarantor powers that guaranteed the security and the maintenance of the Republic, and the two communities that determined the state of affairs.

Cyprus, as a problem, is a *sui generis*, in which the United Nations and the European Union are engaged, under the guarantee of Britain, Turkey and Greece, also the interference of the United States (US), Russia and others. Under the name of Cyprus, many resolutions have been passed by the United Nations Security Council, among which were such critical ones that they directly affected the course of the

problem. Numerous mediations in Cyprus have been executed by United Nations secretaries-general, with minimal progress in the majority of these attempts, yet all without outcome.

The two most populous communities, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, compose almost all of the Island of Cyprus. There are two states that have sovereignty on the island. Northern Cyprus, as a de facto state, is located in the Northern part, 36% of the Island of Cyprus in the Mediterranean, since 1974. This part is recognized by only Turkey. The rest of the Island, except British Sovereign Bases, is under the Greek Cypriot Administration as the Republic of Cyprus, and the Republic of Cyprus rules the whole Island as a de jure (Hunt et al., 2021).

Since the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus, there has been no Cypriot government that serves both communities. Therefore, the two sides have developed their own governing bodies and have proceeded to negotiate under the roof of the United Nations. However, the Cyprus negotiations have always focused on solution proposals that include cooperation to a certain extent, reunification, and power-sharing. Today, there are two dissimilar peoples, two individual democracies, and two States on the island. The negotiation process, which started after the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus in 1963, has experienced both states willing to compromise only under the umbrella of Federalism, which was both their alternative option. However, the negotiations have not reached any results so far.

Although the Cyprus Problem differs historically according to the parties, it also differs in the issues that lie at the origin of the problem. For Turkish Cypriots, the Cyprus problem started in 1963-64. Due to the ongoing ethnic conflicts that started many years ago, the Partnership State collapsed and was replaced by a series of injustices that the Turkish Cypriots were subjected to. This version of the Cyprus Problem belongs to the Turkish Cypriots (Akgün et al., 2013, p. 29). Likewise, if you direct the very same question to the Greek Cypriots about the Cyprus problem, their answer will not be similar comparing to Turkish Cypriots. For Greek Cypriots, Turkey, in 1974, as an outside actor, came to the island and invaded one-third of the island, the established order was suddenly decadent, and unrest began (Mitsotakis, 2021).

Contrary to what is believed, the Cyprus problem started much earlier than the defended versions of the parties. According to academics, the Cyprus Problem started neither in 1963 nor in 1974. For them, the Cyprus problem had been already a problem since the vision and desire of the Greek Cypriots, Enosis, turned into physical action in 1955, and it drastically erupted also in 1963 and 1974 (Sözen, 2007, p. iii; Bryant, 2004, pp. 223-236; Akgün et al., 2013, pp. 25-26).

The bi-zonal and bi-communal Federation, whose foundations have been accepted by the parties as a common ground since 1975, was evolved in 2004 as the most comprehensive solution plan ever. The plan envisaged a federal and independent state. The United Cyprus Republic was the name of the new state that was envisioned to be established based on the federative structure formed between the Greek and Turkish constituent states. The plan was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots yet rejected by the Greek Cypriots. While the isolation continued for Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriot Administration joined the European Union as the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, the Annan plan has been both hope and failure for the Cyprus Negotiations at the same time. Finally, the Cyprus Negotiations, which took place in Crans Montana in 2017, came to an end under the framework of the Federation.

A bi-communal bi-zonal federation has long been considered the most viable alternative for Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. However, following how the structure of the solution has been interpreted within each community reveals baffling discrepancies on both sides, partly due to historically consistent preferences and partly due to the dispute's growth over time. Alternatives are currently being discussed for the 'deadlock' Cyprus problem, and many academics have already written articles on the rising Two-State solution. In the thesis, the contribution of history to the peace process and how the solution models negotiated so far could not generate peace in Cyprus will be discussed.

There are great numbers of sources related to the Cyprus Problem in the literature. Given the versatility and long history of the Cyprus Problem, there is a necessity to highlight; the thesis is an attempt to expand the existing academic literature on the Cyprus problem. For this reason, the researcher aims to contribute to

the literature by covering both the history of the Cyprus Problem and the history of the Cyprus Negotiations.

The thesis is divided into six chapters. The second chapter investigates the history of the Cyprus problem in order to understand how the spark of desired national theses turned into an aged international problem. This section will cover the period starting from the Ottoman Empire up until the Annan Plan. The third chapter analyses the negotiation process of the Cyprus problem with its all parameters and arguments. The third chapter also analyses the entire history of Cyprus negotiations, whether inter-communal or international, negotiated, progressed, rejected, since the beginning of the Cyprus problem. The fourth chapter focuses on the Annan Plan and up-to-date negotiations. This chapter investigates the process of the Annan Plan, 2004 Annan Plan referendum, its failure, and its aftermath until the end of the Crans Montana summit. The fifth chapter brings the discussion of an alternative by having specific discourses and identifies the possible arguments that lie behind the failure of the Cyprus negotiations. The fifth chapter mostly relies on the second research question.

It should be noted that the structure of the thesis depends on the research questions posed. The Cyprus problem is an inseparable mass, and it has multiple facets and dimensions. Therefore, the development of the problem should be laid out in one collective whole in a connected and uninterrupted fashion so the discussion of the negotiations can be smoothly elaborated. Moreover, the researcher discusses the main problem of Cyprus along with its multiple facets and history and development in one section, without any interruption to provide a clear picture of the main problem and other subordinate problems that were emanating from it in a collective mass, and the Cyprus negotiations in other.

Since there are no policy recommendations on this research, the writer dedicates himself to investigate and focus on the history of the Cyprus problem and its effects/relations with the Cyprus negotiation stances over the years, the Annan Plan process, and the latest attempts, chronological. In conclusion, the researcher will conclude his findings in order to have a complementary base to the research, it should be noted that Cyprus problem is a complicated one so the researcher will built his arguments under two major headings, yet avoid making policy recommendations.

1.1. Research Questions

This research is engineered by the two following questions;

1. How does the historical background contribute to the complication of the Cyprus issue between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots?
2. How could the peace process not generate any foreseeable solution to the Cyprus issue?

1.2. Research Methodology

The researcher built the thesis on the modest amount of literature that is accomplished in this niche area. To understand the Cyprus issue, a brief background of the conflict is presented in a historical fashion, where political, demographic, and ethnic elements had dramatically influenced and contributed to the complication of the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Within this perspective, the researcher will highlight the points of conflict between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot sides from different angles and their development and complication through the years till the current time that contributed to the stalemate situation. Having introduced such a background, the researcher will spotlight how these elements have been reflected in the political stances of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot sides during the peace process that was being held intermittently in the last few years. The analysis will be based on certain speeches of Greek and Turkish politicians, negotiators, journalists, and political analysts. Employing research questions along with the provision of a sequential background of the Cyprus conflict can provide important insights into possible grounds for a solution in the near future. Since the thesis is shaped with a qualitative research method, the data were collected by utilizing both primary and secondary sources.

CHAPTER TWO

2. THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Throughout history, Cyprus has been reigned by various regional powers and has received immigration from the Eastern and Western Roman Empires. Therefore, a very complex social structure has been formed on the island. People from Anatolia, the Aegean and Western Rome, Syria and even from Africa have created a heterogeneous social texture called ‘diversity’ in Cyprus (Mirbagheri, 2010).

Turkish sovereignty established on the island since 1571 with the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire. Cyprus has remained for 307 years under the rule of the Turks, the longest period of all time. After 1571, thousands of Turkish families from Anatolia also settled in Cyprus. Since the local people living in Cyprus were contented with the Ottoman administration and did not see religious pressure, they did not start a movement against the Ottoman administration and continued their lives as Muslim Turks and Greek Orthodox. Nevertheless, the social and cultural life between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots has always remained different, there was no marriage between Turks and Greeks, and the members of the two communities did not socially homogenize due to their religion. In the last century of Ottoman rule, Cyprus met the negativities of not being a homogeneous society more fiercely with the growth of national sentiments amid its non-Muslim subjects (Vatansever, 2010, pp. 1490-1494).

Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, occasionally, experienced turbulent relations after British Administration took over the control of Cyprus. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the exacerbation of Greek nationalism and the transfer of the Cyprus administration to Britain gave rise to hegemonic discourses and then actions. Sometimes with the support of Greece, Greek Cypriots resorted to uprisings and acts of terrorism to achieve their goals, while Turkish Cypriots struggled against it, and sometimes negotiations were held between the parties for a balanced reconciliation. In addition, after the 1974 Turkish Peace Operation, although there was no armed conflict in the Cyprus problem, peace remained in suspense (Olgun, 2020, p. 5).

2.1. From the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Cyprus

2.1.1. The transition of the Island to British Rule

The Ottomans' defeat in the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877, the rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, and the accompanying military failures had some historic consequences for Cyprus Island. In 1878, the temporary ceding of the control of the island by the Ottoman Empire to Britain can be regarded as one of the turning points of the problem.

The Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878 is important in terms of its results. In 3 March 1878, upon the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed (Dilek et al., 2011, p. 126). With the Treaty of San Stefano, the influence of the Russians on the Ottoman Empire increased and reached the potential of threatening the British colonial roads with the lands they took after the war. This situation exposed the possibility of harming British imperial policies. Therefore, Britain aimed to reduce the influence and rights which Russia had on the Ottoman Empire, by taking the Austro-Hungarian Empire with its side. As a result, Britain started diplomatic and military initiatives (Dilek et al., 2011, pp. 127-128).

The Ottoman Empire assigned the administrative control of the island to Britain in Istanbul on 4 June 1878, as required by the Cyprus Convention, in the face of the Russian threat (Açıkses & Cankut, 2014, p. 1243). According to this treaty, if the Russian Empire attempted to seize the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire in the Asian continent, the British Administration would provide arms aid to the Ottoman Empire. This treaty did not contain provisions that determined the interests of the Muslim people in Cyprus, the future of the state's movable and immovable properties, how Cyprus would be governed, and how long the British rule would be in the island. Therefore, an additional treaty was signed on 1 July 1878 and according to the treaty, if Russia withdrew from Kars, Ardahan and Batumi, which it occupied in the East, Britain would also evacuate the island of Cyprus (Vatansever, 2010, p. 1494). Britain had taken actions to strengthen its dominance on the island, although it is stated in the convention that the British administration will not be permanent on the island and this situation will disappear if certain conditions occur.

In 1914, in terms of the fate of Cyprus, a significant development took place. After the Ottoman Empire entered World War I alongside Germany, Britain unilaterally abolished the 1878 Treaty plus the Additional Treaty and annexed the island on 5 November 1914 (Yellice, 2012, p. 19). Being aware of the increasing value of Cyprus, Britain tried to legitimize the annexation of the island by using the Ottoman Empire's alliance with Germany as an excuse. Yet, the Ottoman Empire did not recognize the annexation of the island of Cyprus till 1923.

Britain, which annexed Cyprus in 1914, gave up on Cyprus to ensure Greece stood against the Central Powers. In 1915, Britain officially offered to give the island to Greece. However, this offer was withdrawn by Britain due to the rejection of Greece (Yellice, 2012, p. 20). Meanwhile, in 1917, while World War I was raging, Greece entered the war alongside the Allied Powers, fearing the occupation of the Central Powers.

Greek Cypriots had great enthusiasm for their homeland, which had won World War I. After World War I, Greece thought it could annex Cyprus, which it had previously rejected, to its land (Gazioğlu, 1997). When the island administration passed to Britain in 1878, some of the Turks migrated to Anatolia. The first wave of this migration movement continued until 1923's. The Greeks has seen this situation as an advantage and the pressure on the Turks who stayed on the island increased (Yüksel, 2009, pp. 164-166). Yet, at the end of World War I, while Greece asked Cyprus to be given to her, Britain began to question the island's standing in its strategic vision afresh.

After the Turkish War of Independence, the Lausanne Peace Treaty was signed. The Lausanne Peace Treaty is also very significant for Cyprus (Gazioğlu, 1997; Manisalı, 2002). Turkey — which the future of Cyprus has been or will be determined by those concerned — relinquished all rights of sovereignty in Cyprus; renounced all rights and dispositions on or pertaining to Cyprus; recognized the 1914 annexation. Additionally, Turkish Cypriots were asked to choose between Turkish citizenship and British citizenship. The second wave of migration continued for those who preferred Turkish citizenship (Yaka, 2011, p. 72). Britain legally guaranteed the full sovereignty it established with the 'de facto' annexation in 1914 with this treaty (Özersay, 2009, pp. 2-3).

The transfer of the island to Britain was exhilaratingly encouraging for the Greeks. Enosis, namely unification with Greece, would finally become real. British benefits on the island and Greek dreams of resurrecting Byzantium began to suppress each other. Meanwhile, Turkey began to stabilize its politicization and develop its nationalism as a new state. Until the mid-1950s, Turkey's activities on the island were almost non-existent. Acting under the decrees of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkish Cypriots tried to preserve their presence in Cyprus with anxiety (Tamkoç, 1988, pp. 42-43).

After 1925, with the British declaring Cyprus a colony, Britain's assessments on Cyprus flipped due to manoeuvres in world and Middle East policy. Britain's formal declaration of Cyprus as a Colony caused friction among the Greeks and the authority due to the expectation of receiving concessions from Britain (Özersay, 2009, p. 3).

On the one hand, the Greek Cypriots had assured continuity to their repression of the Turkish Cypriots, and on the other hand, they had accelerated their provocations against the Britain. An example of this is the outburst that followed the enforced tax increases in 1931. Upon the outburst, the Cyprus Government imposed restrictions by declaring martial law on the island. Naturally, Turkish Cypriots were also affected by these restrictions. Organizational movements, which were relatively stagnant during the period 1931-41, would be heard with a louder voice than before as soon as World War II was over (Hitchens, 2002, pp. 32-36).

2.1.2. The notion of the Nationalism in Cyprus

Enosis and Taksim caused the two communities not to be homogenized but also brought with it greater separations. These theses have evolved and become weaker over the years, but the state of communal dichotomy has not been equally weakened. Niyazi Kızılyürek, political scientist, professor of University of Cyprus and a member of EP; the people in Cyprus are too Cypriot to not fully adapt to Turkish and Greek identity, and too Turkish and Greek to be Cypriot (Kızılyürek, 2020).

As a reflection of the Turkish-Greek historical conflicts, two separate national theses were adopted in Cyprus. Among these theses, the national thesis of the Greek Cypriots, Enosis, aimed to unite with Greece rather than independence. The national

thesis defended by the Turkish Cypriots against Enosis, on the other hand, aimed to partition, that is, to have a certain part of the Island. What both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots fought for was not independence. Both sides dreamed of unification with their homelands. In fact, although this was not the first thought of the Turkish Cypriots, the counter nationalism they followed over time was remoulded due to the rebellions initiated by the Greeks on the island and transformed into two communities that built the same ethnic claims. There are two disparate theses constructed through hegemonic struggles and a phenomenon of Nationalism on which these theses are based. Therefore, it is necessary to comprehend the emergence of the theses of the two communities to understand the nationalist grounds and ethnic conflict in Cyprus (Akgün et al., 2013, pp. 26-27).

Nationalism in Cyprus would begin to find its form with the evolution of the motherlands, from a state to a nation-state, after the French Revolution. The birth of the Greek Republic embodied Greek nationalism in Cyprus. With the Ottoman Empire's recognition of Greece in 1832, the centuries-old Ottoman hegemony was interrupted. The process of adopting Enosis and instilling the Hellenistic mentality over large masses started after 1832 with the promotion of Greece, but the nationalist actions were suppressed until 1878, the transfer of Cyprus. So, nationalism gained serious momentum, in the structuring of the Greek education system amid the Orthodox in the 1860s, yet failed to establish itself (Akgün et al., 2005, p. 9).

Megali Idea, the foundations of which were laid in the 19th century, is simply Greece's ideology of bringing Byzantium back to its heyday (Daskalov & Marinov, 2013, p. 200). The Orthodox Church occupied a decisive stance in the spread and encourage of Enosis. Greece, which aspired to a large part of the lands owned by the Ottoman Empire, tried to realize its irredentist policy by hiding behind the Megali Idea. Churches in Cyprus made some preparations to promote the Morea Revolt, especially in 1821, but the intervention resulted in the execution of hundreds of Greek Orthodox and clergymen (Aktar et al., 2010, p. 157). Still, the formation of this national ideal damaged the relations of the communities living together in Cyprus and incommoded the people who lived in peace for years, namely, Muslims and Orthodox (Kalelioğlu, 2008).

On the other hand, Taksim is an antithesis created by Turks against Enosis and meant partitioning. The first strategic stance of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, maintained for a while, was the continuation of British rule. The thesis of partitioning the island between two entities was shaped under the strident slogan of 'Either Taksim or Death!' (Sözcü TV, 2020, 0:31). Until the Taksim thesis shaped in Cyprus, Turkey, along with the development of Turkish nationalism in direct proportion with the establishment of the Republic, unobtrusively assisted Muslims in Cyprus in education and building social identity. Turkish Cypriot nationalism in Cyprus, which arose as counter-nationalism in order to safeguard the rights and interests of Muslims, was guided by Kemalist values (Akgün et al., 2005, p. 11).

The Ottoman Empire desired to put into effect a nation-building plan in the years corresponding to the decline period. This plan aimed to create a combined identity, Ottoman. However, various nationalist movements developed by various ethnic groups in the Empire took an unstoppable rise upon the Balkan Wars and accelerated the disintegration of the Empire.

Since the structure of the Millet system was divided into Muslims and non-Muslims, the Turkish inhabitants of the island were known as Muslims. While Hellenism identity was evident among the Greek-speaking Orthodox, the identity of the Muslims did not develop. Meanwhile, the Muslims in Cyprus had to determine one of the options; to migrate or to acquire British citizenship (Aktar et al., 2010, pp. 61-97).

The annexation of Cyprus seemed an optimum price for Greek Cypriots. The churches, who had been working to achieve Enosis for years, revolted with propagandas. The revolts, which were small-scale at first, broke out in 1931. The delay and immaturity experienced in the nationalism of Turkish Cypriots quickly closed the gap as a natural reflex to Enosis. So, the latecomer, Turkish Cypriot nationalism, resisted the needs of Greek Cypriot nationalism until the adaptation of Kemalist values by Turks who refused to migrate (Lindley, 2007, p. 229).

Although there was a pause in the nationalist spirit during World War II, the demands for Enosis became stronger afterwards. The reacceleration of Greek Cypriot nationalism took place in parallel to the extensional effects of World War II, such as

the vanishment of colonialism. A plebiscite was held in 1950 under the leadership of the Church and Makarios in order to realize Enosis, and 96% of the Greek Cypriots asked for Enosis (Reading Eagle, 1972, p. 13). Britain clarified the status of Cyprus as "non-negotiable" and prevented the possible scenarios regarding the status of Cyprus before. One of the inferences made by the Turkish Cypriots as a result of this plebiscite was not to be a colonial material for another state.

On 1 April 1955, its foundations were laid during Makarios' visit to Greece in 1953; led by General Grivas; an armed terrorist organization known as EOKA came into its operations (Necatigil, 1996, p. 6). Since the sole target of this organization was to achieve Enosis, terrorist acts continued unabated until the Republic of Cyprus came into existence in 1960. EOKA's activities were only designed to sabotage but, from the very beginning, these activities turned into assassinations and collective or individual attacks. The Greek Cypriots acknowledged EOKA as the National Liberation Organization. The armed attacks carried out by the guerrilla forces were served under the name of National Liberation Struggle. The terrorist acts, which initially targeted only Britain, later took a stance on expelling the Turkish Cypriots from the island too. As Turkish Cypriots fought alongside the British against EOKA further increased the unrest between the parties. Terrorism, which brought Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots face to face, caused the parties to take hostile actions against each other (Keser, 2012, pp. 181-186).

In 1955, the armed acts in Cyprus, by EOKA, especially massacres, fire-raising and attacks have been progressive enough to retaliate by Turkish Cypriots. The resistance body called Volkan, which was more unorganized and unarmed compared to EOKA, continued its activities after a year or two under the name of the Turkish Resistance Organization. The main objectives of the Turkish Resistance Organization are; to become stronger in parallel to EOKA, to close the power imbalance with EOKA; to gather and systematize the current underground forces of the Turkish Cypriots into one body; to forge a link between the organization and its well-wishers in Turkey; and lastly, to place trust among Turkish Cypriots (Necatigil, 1996, pp. 7-8).

The oaths, calling to war or evoking war in Cyprus, demonstrated the degree of commitment of the parties to their national theses transparently. Makarios, Grivas,

and his battalion would sweat over the unification of Cyprus with the motherland and would protect the intelligence and information of the EOKA organization at the risk of their lives. The Turkish Resistance Organization, on the other hand, was engraved in their souls to die for the nation with the motto "Cyprus Turks are not a servant to the Greeks" and with the belief that it is 'right' to be a martyr for their home (Kızılyürek, 2013).

2.1.3. Towards the Republic of Cyprus

In the mid-1950s, diplomatic attempts made an impact as radical as acts of terrorism on the island. In the late 1950s, the principle of self-determination was an elevated question that both communities claimed to have on an equal footing. Makarios, who used every means to realize Enosis, escalated the actualization of the principle of self-determination issue to the United Nations in cooperation with Greece for the first time in 1954. There was no decision of the United Nations that came out in favour of the Greeks.

The most crucial factor in the intensification of the attacks, especially between 1950 to 1959, was that Britain did not see Enosis as suitable for Cyprus and has followed a policy opposite to Enosis (Xydis, 1973, p. 63-65). Britain emphasized that the main arguments for exercising the right to self-determination should exist organically. Therewithal, Britain also reminded the Treaty of Lausanne and reiterated that Greece recognized the sovereignty of Cyprus. Later, Britain invited Turkey and Greece to the London Conference. The proposal rejected at this conference was substantial autonomy. The problems could not be resolved at the London Conference either. Yet, Britain's invitation to the government of Turkey to the London conference was considered a crucial point in demonstrating Turkey was a 'side' on the Cyprus issue. Immediately after the Cyprus case was discussed at the United Nations in 1957, Britain considered giving Cyprus self-government and then self-determination.

Turkey, until the mid-1950s, rather than intervene in the Cyprus problem or Turkish communities on the Island, has demonstrated a Cyprus policy which merely followed the events on Cyprus. Turkey followed this kind of policy for the purpose of avoiding any issue in order to protect its relations with Britain and Greece. Yet, Turkey argued externalizing Britain from Cyprus would cause an infringement on the

Treaty of Lausanne, and under these circumstances, the island should revert to Turkey (Bolukbasi, 1998, pp. 413-414). Also, one of the main reasons for Turkey to follow the passive policy on this issue was the desire to guarantee itself against Soviet aggression. However, Turkey has managed to solve this problem by entering NATO in 1952 and developed its national thesis in the last quarter of 1950s. Concordantly, Turkey also had to build some changes in its stance on Cyprus (Michael & Vural, 2018, pp. 65-67).

There was a Greek front that received zero progress in the United Nations and became aggressive after rejecting a poor proposal at the London Conference. Greece based its argument on self-determination to democratic majority rule. The reason for this was that she wanted this right to be recognized as a whole for the people of Cyprus. Another argument on the right to self-determination was the recognition solely by the Turks. Both arguments were the arguments that could not lead the island to be a new State within the usage of the right to self-determination. One meant the unification with Greece, and the other meant the transfer of Cyprus to Turkey (Tamkoç, 1988, pp. 41-54). Meanwhile, in 1958, Macmillan, the Prime Minister of Britain in that period, prepared a constitutional plan to solve the problem. It did not allow the realization of both the Turkish government's Taksim thesis and the Greek government's Enosis. The envisaged solution for Cyprus was the three states sharing sovereignty on the island, yet it was strongly rejected (Necatigil, 1996, p. 9).

The Cyprus problem was reconsidered in the United Nations General Assembly on 24 November 1958 and a conference was proposed between the three states (Balıkcıoğlu, 2016, pp. 55-56). Following this decision taken at the United Nations General Assembly, Britain, Greece, and Turkey came together at Zurich and the second London Conference. The most appropriate alternative was to form the International State of Cyprus (Tamkoç, 1988, pp. 49-50). In 1958, as a result of all these developments and the spread of the Turkish-Greek conflict on the island, initiatives were taken, and the parties were brought together; the Treaty of Zurich was signed on 11 February 1959, and the Treaty of London was signed on 19 February 1959 (Sarı, n.d.). The Cyprus Republic was established in 1960 with a consociational democracy upon the Zurich and London Treaties (Balıkcıoğlu, 2016, p. 57; Mengi, 2019).

2.2. From the Republic of Cyprus to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus

Until 1960, Cyprus Island lost a lot of Turkish citizens due to the colonial power, Enosis and EOKA, ethnic conflicts, and the pressures that resulted from these conflicts etc. One of the most current issues on the agenda in that period was the Cyprus Problem, with the proliferation of the actors of the problem in the island in 1960s. During the global trend in the world, which was Cold War, the Cyprus conflict was considered a threatening issue that needs to be addressed an immediate solution; otherwise it would bring the NATO allies face to face. The Cyprus problem was temporarily resolved by the 1960 treaties, yet the Republic collapsed in four years. Makarios has been engaged in activities to alter the 1960 Treaties. Greek Cypriots excluded the Turkish Cypriots from the common democracy state established in 1960. The Greek Cypriot side also tried to usurp the state by abandoning the agreement of living together on the island and governing the island together. Turkey and Turkish Cypriots never accepted this illegal and illegitimate state of affairs, causing an inability to exercise their rights as equal partners. Yet the disintegration resulted in a permanent division of the two communities, both in governance and de facto and divergence from each other.

2.2.1. Akritas Plan and the Thirteen Points

Akritas Plan is a plan prepared by Makarios, President of the House of Representatives Glafkos Clerides, Minister of the Interior Polykarpos Giorkatzis and famous EOKA member Nikos Sampson in order to destroy the Turkish population in the island, in 1963, and reach the national thesis Enosis. This plan was later published by a Greek newspaper named "Patris" as a genocide plan on 21 April 1966 with its details. Here, the aim of the Patris newspaper was actually to reveal Archbishop Makarios' intention. Shortly after the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, President Makarios established a special organization in cooperation with Greece, to put the plan into effect and achieve its goal. Polykarpos Giorkatzis the Minister of Interior and also one of the important names of the terrorist organization EOKA has been appointed as the head of this organization. Tasos Papadopoulos, the Minister of Labour and Social Security of the period, was appointed as the vice president of this secret organization. Glafkos Clerides was appointed head of the movement. This plan, approved by Makarios, named the

‘Akritas Plan,’ was distributed to top level leaders of EOKA before December 1963, on condition that it was top secret (Keser, 2011, p. 97).

Necatigil believes that the Akritas plan was a systematic plan, both political and military, that would later melt the bi-communality. According to him, this strategic plan had two goals. The first was to persuade the international community about the constitution because, for Greek Cypriots, it was impracticable; the second was to achieve hegemony over the Government of Cyprus (Necatigil, 1996, p. 27).

The Akritas Plan was extremely simple. The Turkish community had already reacted to Makarios because of his proposal to amend the constitution. There was an exploration about the Turks villages, streets, houses. This meticulously executed plan essentially showed that anything can be done for the sake of purpose. So, Akritas Plan is a plan that designed to destroy the Turkish Cypriots in the island and this led to the crisis and has become uncontrollable, also resulted to Bloody Christmas (Olgun, 1991, p. 29).

Between 1960 and 1963, Makarios criticized the London-Zurich Treaties as an injustice from the island's colonial past. On 30 November 1963, Makarios asked for a constitutional amendment in order to bring the Turks to minority status. So, Akritas plan also explains the object of the proposed of 13 amendments put forward by Archbishop Makarios for the revision of the Constitution.

The short form of the thirteen points was;

- Veto rights should be abolished.
- The vice president should be able to act as the president in case of a need.
- The president of the national assembly and the deputy prime minister should be elected by the entire national assembly.
- The vice president of the national assembly should be able to act as the president of the national assembly in case of a need.
- Voting systems in which separate majorities are foreseen for societies in the constitution should be abolished.
- Unified municipalities should be established.
- The judicial organization should be unified.

- The division of security forces into police and gendarmerie should be stopped.
- The number of security and defence forces should be determined by law.
- The employment rate of Greeks and Turks in public services and in the armed forces should be changed in proportion to the population.
- The number of members of the public services commission should be reduced from ten to five.
- The decisions of the public services commission should be taken by simple majority.
- The community councils should be abolished and a new system should be envisaged (Şener, 2013, p. 11-13).

However, if Turks wants to preserve its parliament, it should be free to do so. When the proposal was rejected by the Turkish government, the Greeks tried to get their requests by force, this situation accelerated the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus.

2.2.2. Bloody Christmas

Makarios transformed the 3-year reconciliation environment into a problem. The implementation of the plan to exterminate the Turks in December 1963 and the massacres that took place brought along many diplomatic initiatives and military operations. The political tension affected both sides and also reflected the social life, by all means. Turkish Cypriots were afraid of the Greeks due to their unstable demeanour and the desire of an attack. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots feared that a Turkish military action to the island, as a reaction to the plan might spoil their actions. Thus, the incidents took place on the evening of 21 December 1963, due to the clashes in a Turkish neighbourhood of Nicosia (Keser, 2011, pp. 97-100).

In the incidents, in which around four hundred Turkish Cypriots were killed, nearly 25-30 thousand Turkish Cypriots were forced to leave their homes and flee. More than a hundred Turkish villages have been evacuated (Ünal, 1999, pp. 49-50). Turkish Cypriots left their places and had to live without communication facilities in 3% section of the island (Robben & Suárez-Orozco, 2000, pp. 242-243). Upon this, thousands have migrated to Turkey. The incidents lasted around one week and

resulted in great destruction. The incidents turned into a civil war as in 5 to 7 days such a short period and called Bloody Christmas.

Turkey over these incidents, called for Britain and Greece administration in the framework of the 'Guarantee Treaty' for joint intervention on 25 December 1963. Turkey stressed the need to act together and warned the Britain and Greece administration about it. In 25 December 1963, Turkey also announced that if there would be still a negative response despite after all the warnings, they would send jets on Nicosia for the purpose of stopping the clash. Indeed, Turkey has sent jet fighters to the island and has gained the attention of international community here (Necatigil, 1996, p. 34).

Following the British proposal, London, Ankara and Athens called for an immediate ceasefire in Cyprus. The representatives of Turkey, Greece and Britain with the representatives of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have identified the Green Line in 30 December 1963 (Şener, 2013, pp. 14-16). On 1 January 1964, Makarios announced that he terminated all treaties that had established the Republic of Cyprus (Ünal, 1999, p. 50). The Greek administration acted as the Republic of Cyprus was theirs although it was not an official decision, and began to make decisions and moves on behalf of the whole island.

2.2.3. What happened in London Conference?

With the participation of the UN Secretary General, the guarantor states Turkey, Greece, Britain and later on the representatives of the Turkish and Greek communities came together at the London Conference in order to discuss the Cyprus issue in 15 January 1964. London Conference was held because of the request of the Britain and it is known as the third London Conference. For the first time, the sides expressed their (will) true purpose at the London Conference. Turkey, has expressed that the events are made of propaganda against the treaties, since the establishment day of the Republic of Cyprus. In addition, Turkey claimed that Greeks tried to create a system based on majority administration, and a system that welcomes Enosis. So, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots requested a federal structure because of the treaties that could not protect the rights of Turks. The Greek Cypriots claimed that the Constitution of Cyprus was very complex and therefore its implementation

failed in practice. Also, Greeks was insisting on the abolition of Turkey's guarantee and constitutional amendment. In addition, Makarios advocated establishing a Greek government, where the Turks could have minority rights instead of a partnership government. It was not possible for the Turks to accept this situation according to Turkish side. When the true intentions of the sides were revealed, it became clear that compromise was not possible (Ker-Lindsay, 2004, pp. 44-46). However, until a final solution was found, security had to be maintained in Cyprus. So, the Green line was the beginning of two separate de facto administrations in Cyprus. Consequently, the London Conference dissolved without a positive result. The only truth that emerged was that international conditions were changing and a solution as 1960 was not easy (Manisalı, 2002, pp. 44-46).

In the London Conference, there was a debate of sending NATO forces to Cyprus to ensure the order and security in Cyprus, but the issue could not be resolved due to the Greek Administration rejection (Ker-Lindsay, 2004, p. 48). Britain had assigned British soldiers to maintain order on the island while the Bloody Christmas events were taking place. However later on, Britain proposed that the island should be transferred to a peacekeeping force formed by NATO member states. Britain did this in order to avoid the responsibility and in order to ensure peace and security on the island (Ünal, 1999, p. 50). Turkey did not raise any objections to the proposal but this proposal was rejected by Makarios and Greece. Because Makarios thought that a NATO control would intersect with Turkey's benefits (Ker-Lindsay, 2004, p. 59).

2.2.4. The United Nations and the UNFICYP in Cyprus

As an international organization, the purpose of the United Nations is to ensure peace and protect security in the world, and to ensure economic, social and cultural cooperation between nations. In this sense, the first application about the Cyprus problem at the United Nations was made by Greece in 1954 on the right of the self-determination. Later, they dealt with the status of Cyprus in 1957. After that, the declaration of independence and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 with the London and Zurich treaties signed in 1959 issues took place in UN.

The exact date of the United Nations' physically involvement in Cyprus problem actually happened with the Green Line agreement and the failure of the London

Conference. UN Secretary General in that period was U Thant. On February 1964, the Turkish Government applied to the United Nations Security Council due to the intense Greek attacks. The discussions started in February and brought a bunch of decisions that will play a substantial role in the destiny of the island of Cyprus.

When the London Conference did not bring a solution to the island on 4 March 1964, United Nations Security Council resolution 186 envisaged that both communities should live in peace and prevent violence with the deployment of a peacekeeping force (Şener, 2013, p. 18). Another decision taken by the UN was to send a special representative to the island. Also, the UN asked the government of Cyprus to take all kinds of measures in line with this decision. The most important development to be derived from this is that the use of a term such as "Government of Cyprus" led to the perception of the Greek Cypriot administration as the Cypriot government by the world. This decision made it look like the Greek Cypriot Administration is the representative of all the Cypriot community. The Greek administration was recognized as the Republic of Cyprus (Vatansever, 2010, pp. 1513-1514). This situation created a kind of an outcome that was desired by the incidents of between 1960-64. Also, it revealed a contrary to the established constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. The arrival of the UNFICYP on the island took place on 27 March 1964 and the UNBZ established after UNFICYP came to duty (Şener, 2013, p. 19).

2.2.5. The United States of America and The Johnson Letter

After World War II, the United States of America was very interested in the Cyprus Island, and the main reason behind this enormous involvement was the importance of the strategic location of the Eastern Mediterranean in the bipolar world. In addition, the guarantor countries whose interests were in a clash in Cyprus were allies of the US and a NATO member. The British Empire, which started to dissolve from the Middle East with the decolonization, created a vacuum in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the US took the opportunity and directed itself to that geographically prominent region.

With the formation of the Republic of Cyprus, the new period in Cyprus also proceeded in the same direction with the strategic and political plans of the United

States. In 1940s, the US thought that Greece did not have the stability to govern itself because of the internal issues they have in that period. The US started to openly support Britain with its decision not to make any changes in the status of Cyprus. Therefore, the US could benefit from the strategic position of Cyprus through the NATO member Britain. In this way, with the solution of the problem within the framework of NATO could prevent the increase in the Soviet population in the region. But after the incidents that occurred three years later, the US instead of being parasite to the problem, they highlighted that it would be a more objective and correct way to evaluate the attitudes of the two countries within the legal order. For them, both sides were NATO member, and in balance, both sides were equal. Yet, Greece killed innocent people, the Turks, in the island and this incident called Bloody Christmas in the history (Brands, 1987, pp. 348-355).

After an immediate intervention decision, taken by Turkey, the president of the US, Lyndon Baines Johnson, sent a letter to the prime minister of that period İsmet İnönü. The US considered a possible war in the region would clash against its interests. This letter is written in order to prevent the intervention in 5 June 1964. The content of the letter was, according to 1960 treaties, if there will be an intervention by Turkey to the island, it would cause to lead a Turkish-Greek war, and it was unacceptable by NATO. Johnson also wrote that before any act, Turkey should consult to the US. There was another point that Johnson mentioned in the letter, the intervention could create another intervention, but this time from Soviet Union to Turkey. In this case, NATO will be reluctant to defend Turkey and also United Nations would react harshly. At the end of the letter it was pointed that Turkey should not intervene to the island and if not there will be a call to the United Nations Security Council for taking all the necessary measures. All these parameters were expressed in a rude and aggressive way (Çelik & Özgöker, 2020, pp. 61-65). Finally, Johnson invited İsmet İnönü to the US to discuss these issues. Turkey has given up its decision on intervention. İnönü accepted Johnson's invitation and went to the US on 21 June 1964.

2.2.6. 1967 Crisis

Georgios Papadopoulos was the instigator of the 21 April 1967 crisis. The ultra-nationalist and anti-communist leader saw the Cyprus Island as a stepping stone to

achieve his aims. Papadopoulos first conquered the Greek administration with the military regime then needed a foreign policy success to get the support of the national public opinion and to consolidate his power (Armaoğlu, n.d.).

The crisis in 1967 was the repetition of 1964 crisis. But this time, there were some specific details that separate 1967 crisis from the crisis of 1964. After the status of Cyprus in 1964, the tension between the two groups never stopped. After the year of 1965, because of the tensions got worse and worse on the island, the pressure, illegal action and blockades for the Turkish community made the spread for the Turks to different parts of the island and caused the society to migrate and gather in certain regions. The military regime wanted to solve the crisis with diplomacy and negotiations and started to get together with Turkey in 9 and 10th of September 1967 in this way. The talks took place in Keşan and Alexandroupoli (Dedeğaç) but the NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, could not come up with a solution because Greece' argument was the island needs to be united with Greece. In return if Turkey accepts this unification, Turkey would gain a base on the island (Şener, 2020, pp. 279-282).

When the negotiations failed, the Greek Junta sent Georgios Grivas, who was an important face of EOKA, to Cyprus and violent actions began under the leadership of Grivas. Makarios was neither comfortable with becoming a part of a military dictatorship nor intend to initiate a Turkish invasion. So, he stayed silent and started to keep a distance for the purpose of Enosis. The behaviour of Makarios surprised both Grivas and the Greek Junta. Grivas and its military attacked the villages of Boğaziçi and Geçitkale on 15 November 1967 (Vatansever, 2010, p. 1514). This incident was perceived as a threat to both Turks and Makarios. While Makarios feared a possible coup attempt, the Turks thought of the vital existence of the Turkish Cypriots on the island. Turkey has demanded compensation of losses of the Turks and also requested a termination of the Greek attacks in Boğaziçi and Geçitkale villages. There were also requests about the removal of Greek troops and Grivas from Cyprus, and an increase in the number of UN Peacekeeping forces. If these requests were not fulfilled, Turkey would implement military sanctions (Hitchens, 2002, pp. 66-68; Şener, 2020, pp. 283-296).

Using the threat of force implementation by Turkey in the framework of coercive diplomacy strategy has worked well enough. In the crisis management phase, the

crisis was ended without the need to put this threat into an action and as a result of this, Grivas resigned from his position and the Greek troops were withdrawn from the villages. After this crisis, Makarios, by drawing a profile loyal to the independence of Cyprus, took a positive approach in order to stop the incidents. Consequently, the crisis of 1967 in the Republic of Cyprus did not modify the island's existing status (Şener, 2020, pp. 296-300).

2.2.7. EOKA-B

The post-crisis period of 1967 revealed more clearly that there were some disagreements between the Greece and Greek administration. Georgios Grivas returned to Cyprus, secretly, in August 1971 and tried to collect the armed groups on the island in one roof called EOKA-B organization. Until his death in 1974, the contention between Makarios and him continued. After the EOKA-B was established, terrorist actions became widespread. To realize Enosis, The Greece's Junta administration argued that the need of a military methods. On the other hand, Makarios' antithesis was if there will be an attempt of a military action on the island, Greece and EOKA-B would face with the Turkey's intervention. So Makarios knew that the impulsivity could cost them dearly (Kyle, 1997).

The purpose of the establishment of EOKA-B was to announce Enosis and deactivate Makarios by the Greek Junta. They thought it is feasible in either case with a fait accompli on the island. Nikos Sampson and EOKA-B, who took over the flag after the death of Georgios Grivas, made a coup d'état on 15 July 1974 against Makarios. Nikos Sampson, the leader of EOKA-B, declared the Greek Republic of Cyprus and he himself became the president of this Republic. The 15 July 1974 coup d'état was a Greek intervention in Cyprus. Thus, the constitutional order on the island was destroyed and an illegitimate military administration took the power in the island. During his very short authority, Nikos Sampson had killed thousands of Makarios supporters and be prepared to embark upon a genocidal movement against the Turkish society. Makarios, in order to distinguish the previous terrorist acts approved by his own, he then used the term called EOKA-B for the Greek Junta's actions that resulted in with the coup d'état, under the leadership of Nikos Sampson. However, these attempts have resulted in Turkey's intervention and has ended in disappointment for the unrecognized Sampson's administration (Kyle, 1997).

2.2.8. 1974 Cypriot coup d'état and Cyprus Peace Operation

Until the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, conflicts on a small scale that could not be described as a crisis in the island continued. In particular, Turkish Cypriots lived the fear of Enosis again and again with Sampson's takeover the administration of the island. This was deprecating for Turkish Cypriots, yet the coup was a coup against the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey's invasion to the island would be the hope to appease the fear a little bit on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots (Akgün et al., 2013, p. 114). Turkey this time, unlike the crises of '64 and '67 had faced losing the Cyprus Island and the Turkish Cypriot community inside of the island. As a result of the military coup in the Republic of Cyprus, made due to the differences of opinion between Makarios and the Greek military junta, Makarios decided to escape from the island as a last resort. The Prime Minister of the period, Bulent Ecevit, set out on 17 July 1974 to meet with Britain, in the face of this illegal move created by the Greek Junta' military coup. It was very important to weigh that Turkey first had wanted to solve the problem through diplomacy (Necatigil, 1996, pp. 90-96).

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community had to take an immediate action in order to maintain their rights and interests in the island after the unrecognized and illegal military coup that the Greek Junta did. The breakdown of the constitutional order, the violation of the founding treaties and the establishment of an illegitimate administration were the results of the military coup.

Ecevit's meeting with Britain ended negatively, after the talks made in London, Britain argued that the problem has to be resolved together with the United Nations or NATO. For this, no conclusion obtained about the joint intervention. While Ecevit was in London, US Secretary of state Kissinger's Deputy Joseph J. Sisco also came to London and met with Prime Minister Ecevit. Sisco also had a discussion with the Greek Junta to terminate the crisis. Meanwhile, Makarios called on the United Nations to condemn for the reckless moves made by Greece, he described the incidents as an invasion threaten the island' peace (Kissinger, 1999, pp. 197-218). The Greek junta administration did not even consider that there could be an intervention that might come from Turkey. They threatened Turkey as if there would be any military landing, we will make a military intervention. In addition, NATO warned the Greek Junta by publishing a declaration. Sisco engaged in a shuttle

diplomacy between Ankara and Athens. During his visit in Ankara, Sisco conveyed a message from Kissinger to Ecevit because of the concern that the United States of America has over the Cyprus Island. All the efforts were for reducing the tension in the NATO's southern flank. But Ecevit after receiving Kissinger' message, he replied back with these sentences (Kissinger, 1999, p. 223);

"Ten years ago again in one night like this, an American diplomat came and demanded that Cyprus should not be intervened. History is repetition if you do not derive lessons from your mistakes. In that time, you made the mistake of preventing the intervention. But we also made the exact mistake which is accepting your request. This time we will not make the same mistake we made before."

When the pressures on the Greek Junta did not yield with a result, Turkey gave the permission to begin the Cyprus Peace Operation on 20 July 1974. By doing this, Turkey did receive lots of condemns from the international field. But, the intervention, in other words 'The Cyprus Peace Operation', was Turkey' right to fulfill the obligations according to Article 4 of the Guarantee Treaty signed in 1959 (Dodd, 2010, p. 41; Toluner, 1977). It was obvious that an irreversible path has already been taken.

In 21 July 1974, The Turkish Armed Forces were advancing by breaking the resistance of the Greeks both from the land and from the air. The Cyprus peace operation had a wide impact on the international scene. The invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish Armed Forces led to resignations. The invasion forced the junta administration in Greece and Sampson' administration in the Republic of Cyprus resign. Immediately after the invasion of Turkey, United Nations called for a ceasefire in the same day. Resolution 353, adopted as a result of negotiations with the parties, emphasizes that foreign military forces in Cyprus must leave the island immediately. Also, the resolution highlighted that Turkey, Greece and Britain must start negotiating, to maintain peace and security on the island plus restitution the constitutional government to its own people (Necatigil, 1996, pp. 94-95).

2.2.9. Geneva Conferences and Second Peace Operation

Glafkos Clerides as an acting President took the seat of Nikos Sampson, which was vacated after the First Operation. Greece, which has been ruled by a military junta since 1967, altered, and Constantine Karamanlis was brought to the head of the

government in 1974, and there was a great change in Greek administration. The incidents experienced between 1967 and 1974 were being replaced by democracy. As a result of the incidents in Greece and Greek Cypriot' loss of the conflict, when the ceasefire was declared, the First Geneva Conference was held between 25 to 30 July 1974 with the participation of Turkey, Greece and Britain. The decisions discussed and taken at the First Geneva Conference, sum up (Uslu, 2003, pp. 139-141);

- Restoring the constitutional order of 1960 is a must so new preventions will be taken in Cyprus and all three Foreign Ministers agreed to comply for resolution 353 by the United Nations.
- In Cyprus, the parties will not be able to widen their areas under their control as of 30 July.
- Within the 30 July ceasefire line, a security zone will be established under the control of United Nations forces only.
- The Turkish and Greek sides will immediately evacuate the regions that they occupied and these regions will be under the protection of United Nations peacekeeping forces.
- Any forces, who under the Greek or the Greek Cypriot forces will withdraw from all Turkish regions. A security zone will be established around the Turkish armed forces and the UN Peacekeeping Forces will be the only force in the region.
- The UN Peacekeeping Force will be ensuring the control of mixed villages contained the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.
- On 8 August 1974, there will be Second phase of the Conference in Geneva and the parties will discuss to restore the constitutional order in Cyprus. In addition, Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders will be invited to this meeting.

The establishment of a federation within two regions, the declaration of demilitarized regions, and the immediate commencement of Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş to the post of Vice President was the expectations of the Turks at the conference. The Cyprus National Guard did not fulfill the articles agreed at the end of the conference. Turkey upon this situation, called for adherence to the articles of

the First Geneva Conference. The Turks in Cyprus must be guaranteed otherwise the Turkish army will not be able to withdraw from the island (Uslu, 2003, pp. 139-146).

Turkey's proposal was again the Federation model at the second phase of the conference. Accordingly, in his one statement, Ecevit said that the Greek and Greek Cypriots did not hear our proposal for the first time; our proposal was not something new to them. Responding negatively to the proposals, the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides were trying to gain prestige in the International arena after the alteration of the military regime, so they did not accept the proposals of the Turks and wanted to put the conference in a deadlock. While the second phase of the conference, in case of not getting a result as expected, Turkey was ready for the Second Operation. Thus, the operation started due to the failure of Second Geneva Conference (Uslu, 2003, pp. 141-146).

One of the most important provisions at the result of the Geneva Conferences was the acceptance by the parties of the existence of two administrations in the Republic of Cyprus which are "de facto" Turkish and Greek (Necatigil, 1996, pp. 96-105). It is included in as "there are two communities in Republic of Cyprus" the Resolution 3212 of the United Nations General Assembly. It was adopted on 1 November 1974 (Tamkoç, 1988, p. 137).

As a result of the ceasefire declaration on 22 July and the subsequent developments, the parties came together at the first Geneva conference and worked overtime to continue the ceasefire and reach a solution. In this context, Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom Foreign Ministers meet in Geneva conference, they began the process of negotiation, to be discussed for a solution. The Geneva conference started three days after the ceasefire was declared. After the agreement was reached on 30 July 1974, it was decided to meet for the Second Geneva conference on 8 August 1974. This conference was held also with the participation of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders. While the negotiations proceed, the Greek Cypriots' deviation from their intentions and the fact that the armed Greeks took Turkish villages hostage and persecuted the Turkish Cypriots increased the tension. Therefore, no consensus could be reached between the parties at the Second Geneva conference. Foreign Minister Turan Güneş contacted Ankara and called Prime Minister Ecevit to share the situation. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit announced

that the operation, which was suspended to seek for a solution to the conflict through diplomacy, started again when it was understood that these searches would not yield results. Thus, the Second Operation has begun on 14 August 1974, to eliminate the dangerous atmosphere in Cyprus as soon as possible (Necatigil, 1996, pp. 96-98; Uslu, 2003, pp. 141-146).

Unlike the First Operation which took place on 20 July 1974, the Second Operation has been labelled as an 'occupation' by the international community. Turkey intervened for the second time in Cyprus to stop the massacres committed by the EOKA-B, the military junta and the National Guard in Cyprus. The Second Operation which lasted three days in total resulted in the Turkish Armed Forces advancing in the North of the Island and securing the Turkish Cypriots. So, The Turks have had the control of the northern part of the island and was declared a ceasefire on 16 August 1974 (Tamkoç, 1988, pp. 98-102).

In the Geneva Declaration approved by the parties on 30 July 1974, creating a security zone was one of the decisions taken. With the 1974 Operations after the coup, the Green Line border, whose foundations were laid in 1964, was expanded. As a result of the developments, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force became the only power that controls the region and did not have an entry ban. So no other force other than UNFICYP could enter the Green Line and cross the border. This region, which was created in order to prevent any violation that may come from the two forces, is also known as the UNBZ that actually divides the island into two "de facto".

In fact, all these developments did not solve the problem, unfortunately, it only added a new dimension to the problem. Turkish Cypriots had already been politically marginalized by the Greek Cypriot Administration. When the parties unable to reach a solution at the Geneva Conferences, Turkey took the decision to progress, and occupied approximately 36% of the island with the Second Operation and secured the Turkish cognates in the northern part (Necatigil, 1996, p. 101).

2.3. From Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to the Annan Plan

2.3.1. Turkish Federated State of Cyprus

The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was established on 13 February 1975 and the head of this Federated State was Rauf Denктаş. The main purpose of TFSC has been determined as unification with the Greek Cypriot community within the federation structure based on a bi-zonal geographical basis. The UN condemned Denктаş' statement of the requirement for a bi-zonal federation. Also the international community and the Republic of Cyprus rejected the declaration of TFSC. The declaration of the State also expresses the transition of the Turkish Cypriots from administration to a State at the same time (Akgün et al., 2005, p. 36).

After the declaration of TFSC, between the years of 1975-1983, the two sides, the Turkish Cypriot community and the Greek Cypriot community, made negotiations, yet no result was obtained because of the differences of opinion. Turkish Cypriot community wanted the establishment of a two-zone federal structure, and also the Turkish Armed Forces to continue to be on the island in terms of the security of the Turks. The Greek Cypriot community argued that the Turkish Cypriots were the minorities and had no right to self-determination. Instead of the agreement, Greek Cypriots made decisions against the Turks and resorted to the UN for whole of the island under the Greek sovereignty. With the effect of the UN resolution, the Turkish Cypriots used the only option left on 15 November 1983. By using the right to self-determination, Turkish Cypriots established its own free, independent state in the North and declared it to the international community. Thus, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established. With the establishment of the TRNC, the actual/physical situation on the island was legalized (Tamkoç, 1988, pp. 115-118).

2.3.2. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

After the Federal State proclamation made by the Turkish Cypriots in 1975, inter-communal negotiations started by having an auspices of the United Nations. These negotiations continued for a long time until 1983. A striking development took place in 1983 and while the negotiations were continuing, the decision of the United Nations on 13 May 1983 with the number 37/253 was seemed supportive the Greek

thesis. The content of this decision was; there are some expressions such as that the Republic of Cyprus has the right to use sovereignty and control over the whole of Cyprus, the demand for the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Cyprus and the people of the Republic of Cyprus. Greek Cypriots often voiced this claim 'The People of the Republic of Cyprus' in the talks. Here, while talking about the people of the Republic of Cyprus; it was tried to give the impression of a "minority" for the Turkish Cypriots. TFSC and Turkey rejected the decision. This resolution denies the existence of the Turkish Cypriots on the island and the founding partner rights of the Turkish Cypriot people in the 1960 Republic (Dodd, 2010, pp.145-147).

Following this incidents, the TFSC declared on 17 June 1983 that the Turkish Cypriot community had the right to self-determination. Shortly after, the TFSC declared that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established on 15 November 1983 (Tamkoç, 1988, p.118). Rauf Denktaş was elected as the President of the TRNC. So now, there are two state Presidents, at equal level, that could negotiate the Cyprus Problem. The establishment of the TRNC has been a very important development. Because of the declaration of the TRNC has now officially revealed the two different state structures in Cyprus. Thus, the de facto division that has been going on in Cyprus for a period has become official in a sense. The Greek Cypriot Administration, Greece, the international community and also the UN reacted unfavourably to declaration of independence made by the TRNC. By adopting the Resolution 541 after three days from the establishment of TRNC, the United Nations highlighted that the TRNC is legally void. In addition, the resolution 541 calls on the member states of the United Nations not to recognize TRNC and thus, the established Republic was declared an illegal state. Plus, it is written that the Republic of Cyprus is the one and only authority in the island (Dodd, 2010, pp.150-151). The UN Charter clearly states that "All people have the right to self-determination, if they can freely determine their political status and follow economic, social and cultural developments freely" (Necatigil, 1996, p. 205). So, the resolution 541 created an obstacle which is contradictory for the TRNC and its independence (Necatigil, 1996, pp. 203-204). Turkey, in this context, is the only country that recognizes the TRNC's independence. The proclamation of the TRNC did not cause any change in the federation thesis of the Turkish Cypriots. In fact, this move, according to Turkish Cypriots' claims, was a bridge move made for the 'two states' to

be able to talk about the Federation. After the proclamation, the Turkish side called on the Greek side to start negotiations.

2.3.3. Towards the Annan Plan

In 1990s, the number of parties in the Cyprus problem increased. The Cyprus problem became increasingly more complex as a result of the Greek Cypriots' application for full membership to the European Union on behalf of the whole island. The purpose and desire of representing the entire island made opening a new character in the problem.

The period after 1983 is the most intense period of negotiations on behalf of the Cyprus problem. This intensity increased in 1990 and after, when the Greek Cypriot Administration wished to include the EU into the problem. Along with the Greek Cypriot Administration's desire to join the EU, a new embargo has been added to the embargoes that arose with the TFSC and continued with the establishment of the TRNC. The Greek Cypriots, who spent a series of negotiations with distractions between 1983-1990, wanted to strengthen their hand with the European Union application. On the other hand, the United Nations continued to take steps to solve the problem.

The EU accepted the Greek Cypriot membership application in the mid-1990s, and the Greek Cypriots since then become a candidate country as the Republic of Cyprus. Greek Cypriots, who received a candidate status, focused entirely on this development rather than being interested in negotiations as of 1995. Another important development in these years was the Greek side's armament and the Joint Defence Agreement signed with Greece. The Greek Cypriot Administration has taken many thoughtless steps without having a discussion with the Turkish Cypriots. The entry into force of this strategic agreement is just one example. Finally, the missile crisis experienced between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot Administration, brought tension escalated. The missile crisis is a crisis where Greek Cypriot Administration decided to purchase S-300 missiles from Russia. The Greek Administration who purchase S-300 missiles, in order to protect itself as a result of the superiority established by the Turkish Armed Forces in 1974 and the defeat of the Greek Cypriots, faced with heavy reactions made by Turks. It ended in 1998 when Greece took the missiles by giving weapons in return. Together with the ongoing

negotiations and the inadequacy of the solution proposals brought by the two sides to the table, to solve the problem, The Annan Plan, which is the most important and the most comprehensive plan seen in the Cyprus Problem (Akgün et al., 2005, pp. 41-43; Sitalides, 2019; Hannay, 2005, pp. 70-83).



CHAPTER THREE

3. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

The Taksim thesis, in opposition to Enosis, brought along controversy. Greek Cypriots adhered to line up with the unification argument and Turkish Cypriots along with the partition argument. While Britain, upon the application of the Greek Cypriots to the UN regarding their right to self-determination, emphasized that Turkish Cypriots also hold the right to self-determination and that there is no claim that may be deemed as void. As a result of the clashes between the two peoples, the idea of independence of the island was born as a midcourse against Enosis, which was defended by Greeks, and Taksim defended by Turks. The Cyprus problem, which had great repercussions in the international community, turned towards a rest with the support of the great states. The establishment of an independent state in Cyprus provided an irresistible solution, even if it did not fully satisfy the parties. The Constitution, guaranteed by these treaties in 1960, was based on the equal political rights and status of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island. Thus, both people have international legal personalities; both are equally subject to international law.

3.1. Founding of the Republic of Cyprus

In the first week of February 1959, Prime Minister of Turkey Menderes and Foreign Minister Zorlu, Prime Minister of Greece Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averoff met in Zurich. They agreed on the principles on which Cyprus' international status and the constitution will be based and signed at the Zurich Treaty on 11 February 1959. The Zurich Treaty consist of three stages, these are; The Treaty on the Basic Structure of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, The Treaty of Alliance and The Treaty of Guarantee. The treaty, which gave the independence to Cyprus, had to be submitted to the approval of the representatives of Britain and the two communities on the island. Thereupon, the parties came together in London to discuss the initial treaty signed in Zurich. After the discussion on some additional points, the Treaty of London was signed on 19 February 1959. It has been accepted by the Turkish and Greek representatives that the three Treaties signed in Zurich will

constitute the Republic of Cyprus. Britain has announced that they will transfer the lands in Cyprus, except the military bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, to the Republic of Cyprus and recognize the independence of Cyprus. Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece have agreed to Britain's announcement about Akrotiri and Dhekelia bases. The treaty signed in London ensures the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in the light of international law with the Guarantee and Alliance Treaties. The outcome of the London Treaty was a positive foundation for Turks. Makarios, the representative of Greek Cypriots, was happy with the result of the London Conference because the partition of Cyprus between Turks and Greeks would be an irreversible step towards achieving Enosis. Yet he was totally unsatisfied about the Constitution. Consequently, it was a win-win situation for the two communities. The subjects agreed in Zurich were detailed in London, so the parties declared the Republic of Cyprus on 16 August, together with the Treaty on its establishment and the memorandum they signed. A new state was established in Cyprus, and the criteria under which the state will continue to exist has been clarified with the treaty. The fundamental articles of the Constitution determined by the Zurich Treaty are based on the equality and cooperation of the two communities. The constitution is internationalized. The two communities on the island are the two founding partners of equal status. The first President and Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus were elected President Makarios and elected Vice President Dr. Fazıl Küçük (Necatigil, 1996, pp. 9-14).

According to the Treaty on the Basic Structure of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, n.d.);

- The State of Cyprus is a republic to be governed by a presidential regime. In the Republic of Cyprus, the President will be Greek, and the Vice President will be Turkish. Greek Cypriots will elect the President on their own, and Turkish Cypriots will elect the Vice President on their own. The official languages of this independent state are Turkish and Greek.
- The President and the Vice-President have the executive power. The executive duty will belong to the council consisting of 7 Greek Cypriots and 3 Turkish Cypriots ministers. The President and the Vice-President will be able to veto the decisions of this council exclusively.

- There will be 50 members in the Cyprus parliament and 70% of these members will be Greek and 30% will be Turks. The legislative power will be exercised by the House of Representatives, which comes separately from the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities, and the Communal Chamber, which is elected by each community within itself.
- 30% of the civil servants who carry out public services will be Turks and 70% will be Greeks. 60% of the army will be Greeks and 40% will be Turks.
- The Supreme Constitutional Court should consist of two Greeks, a Turk and an impartial judge. The Court President shall be impartial judge, who shall have two votes. The court constitutes the highest organ of the judiciary.
- Turks and Greeks will have separate municipalities in the five largest cities of Cyprus. Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Lefka and Paphos.
- The independence, territorial integrity and the constitution of Cyprus is guaranteed by a treaty as the new state of Cyprus and finalized between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Britain and Turkey. In addition to that, the treaty of military alliance is also finalized between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Both of the documents will have the constitutional power. Also, the last paragraph will be added to the constitution as the "Fundamental Article".

In one of the articles included in this treaty was the expression of ‘the Guarantee and Alliance Treaties will be included in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.’

According to the treaty of Guarantee (Treaty of Guarantee, 1960);

- The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to maintain its independence, territorial integrity and security, and to provide the respect for the constitution. In part or in whole, The Republic of Cyprus is liable for not to enter into any integration with any state politically or economically. Directly or indirectly, the Republic of Cyprus prohibits any action which would result with unification or division of the island, including the encouragement and help to the occurrence as well.
- Turkey, Greece and Britain, considering the obligations under the first article, recognizes and guarantees the independence, territorial integrity and the

security of the State of Cyprus, as well as the state of affairs finalized with the fundamental articles of the Constitution. Likewise; Turkey, Greece and Britain undertake to prevent the will of unification or division within their own authority and interests.

- The Republic of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, under the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, undertake to respect the unity of the territories under the sovereignty of Britain, and at the same time guarantee Britain to exercise its rights.
- In case of a breach of any provision of this Treaty; Turkey, Greece and Britain in order to provide the respect to the provisions, undertake to consult with each other for the purpose of taking necessary actions and measures. If one of the three guarantor states does not have an opportunity to act together or in consultation, they retain their right to act exclusively with the intention of reconstitution the state of affairs created by this treaty.

Britain is not included in this treaty. The Alliance Treaty, which is a complementary to the Guarantee Treaty (Treaty of Alliance, 1960);

- The Republic of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece will cooperate for their joint defence, and also, they will consult among themselves on the issues emerged by the defence in question.
- Directly or indirectly, The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or encroachment on independence and territorial integrity for the Republic of Cyprus.
- In accordance with the spirit of this alliance, a tripartite headquarters will be established in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.
- The numbers of the participation in this tripartite headquarters are as Greece 950 military personnel and Turkey 650 military personnel. The Republic of Cyprus, the President, and the Vice-President may request to increase or decrease the Greek and Turkish troops from the Greek and Turkish Governments jointly.
- Turkish and Greek military personnel will supply the training and discipline of the army of the Republic of Cyprus.

- The Command of the headquarters will be undertaken alternately, for a year by a Cypriot, Turkish and Greek General, who will be appointed one by one, by the Governments of Greece and Turkey or by the Republic of Cyprus' President either the Vice President.

Also some of the important articles that the Treaty on the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (Treaty of Establishment, 1960); the parties on this treaty, was the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and Britain.

- The first article formed the Republic of Cyprus borders. Except for the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, Cyprus covers the Cyprus Island and the others in the coastal zone.
- To this end, The State of Cyprus is obliged to cooperate fully with Britain to ensure the security and effective functionality of military bases.
- The parties in the treaty are obliged to cooperate in the joint defence of Cyprus.
- Under the ECHR, the State of Cyprus is obliged to ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms to all under its jurisdiction.

The State of Cyprus was born as a result of the reconciliation of the demands of the three states claiming rights on the island and the two communities living on the island. After Makarios and the Greek side claimed that the 1960 treaties were imposed, the invalidity of treaties started to be discussed (Akgün et al., 2005, p. 21). Turkish Cypriots saw the concrete results of these allegations in 1963 with the Akritas Plan. The Bloody Christmas, following the Akritas Plan, broke out at the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964, which caused the destruction of the State of Cyprus and was described as a civil war.

There was no Cypriot State before the Treaties, which meant self-refutation of the claim made by Makarios. In order to be able to say that the treaties are void as Makarios' claim "enforced by force," there should be two parties that have the state qualifications under international law at the time of signing the treaties. However, the Republic of Cyprus was Britain's successor. In other words, in the period until 1964; Turks were accepted as a minority and removed from the government, the civil servants were forced to leave their governmental positions, and many more such reasons which were previously agreed upon have been corrupted with various

excuses. This situation was formed before the thirteen-point proposal with the request of Makarios for the constitutional amendment (Olgun, 2020, p. 15).

On top of that, when the Greeks started to make mass attacks against the Turks, the Turkish military units left the camp where they were located and took up a position to protect the Turks. Makarios claimed that Turkish unity threatened the integrity of the country, which was a clear violation of the treaty. For this reason, Makarios declared in April 1964 that he terminated the Alliance Treaty. However, the Greeks who initiated the attacks do not have the right to claim violations. The displacement of Turkish troops does not constitute an essential violation. Since the purpose of the movement was to prevent attacks. For this reason, it is also following the Treaty of Alliance and the spirit of the other treaties, which aims to preserve the integrity of the country. In addition, the Treaty of Alliance was made in order to prevent external attacks against the State of Cyprus. Last, the Treaty of Alliance and other treaties have not been concluded for a certain period of time, and the parties have not been granted the right to terminate or withdraw. Article 182 of the Constitution specifies that the Fundamental Provisions could not be revised in any way by amending, adding, or removing them. Therefore, any amendment to both these provisions and the 1959-60 Treaties would require the consent of all parties to those treaties. In any case, Makarios and the Greeks were freed from the colony and got one step closer to Enosis, which was the only reason they gave their consent to the Cypriot State created in 1960 (Bryant, 2004, pp. 223-236).

3.2. 1963-1967 Period

As a result of the terrorist incidents in 1964, UNFICYP was placed on the island. The years 1963-1968 were the years when external powers were involved in the incident. The UN and the US appointed mediators to the island to resolve the clash between Greeks and Turks.

3.2.1. Acheson Plan

Turkish Prime Minister İnönü and President Johnson met in Washington, after Johnson's invitation in June 1964. It was stated in the joint declaration that the US accepted that the 1959 Treaties were still current. Also, the US emphasized that such conflicts can be resolved through negotiations, so there was a consensus of opinion

with Turkey on this issue. In addition, it was decided to appoint Dean Acheson, as a mediator of the US, as an intermediary for the solution of this problem (Richmond, 1998, p. 92).

Dean Acheson, in July, met separately with the Turkish and Greek sides and started the mediation process in Geneva. In the plan, prepared by Acheson, as a result of the negotiations; the plan offered a region to Turkey that is known as Karpaz Peninsula, and Turkey would have the sovereign rights of that region. Locations outside of this region in the island would join with Greece. Kastellorizo Island, in exchange for the Enosis, would be given to Turkey. At the same time, minority rights would be granted to the Turks. Cyprus would be divided into local governments, of which two or three would be left under Turkish supervision. Makarios rejected this plan, as he did not approach any plan that would exist Turks on the island (Sözen, 2008, p.72; Michael, 2009, p. 28).

The battle in the area of Kokkina interrupted the plan. The Kokkina attack, which was launched in August under the leadership of Grivas, was a difficult process in which the negotiation environment was tried to be preserved in order to ensure peace and tranquillity while the civil war continued. The Government of Greece assured Greek Cypriots that only if the situation became indefensible, then they would assist an armed intervention against Kokkina. It was indeed, and the Greek troops landing on the island. Turkish troops reacted with the help of their jets, who made a warning flight in the area. The battle in the area ended through a ceasefire call from the United Nations. However, the Acheson Plan remained inconclusive.

3.2.2. Galo Plaza Report

Another mediator Galo Plaza started to study for the mediation on behalf of the United Nations after the failure of the Acheson Plan. The report prepared by Galo Plaza in 1965 suggests that the parties in Cyprus should start negotiations as soon as possible. This suggestion was beyond his mandate, his title, as a mediator.

The things that Greek Cypriots want is that; in exchange for the Turks to be accorded minority rights and autonomy in particular issues, the Cyprus to be a unitary state, the guarantee and the alliance treaties to be removed, and the right of self-determination to be accorded. From this point, they were planning to reach

Enosis. However, Turks, on the other hand, wanted a federal system based on the two communities. Galo Plaza prepared a report after hearing the requests of both parties. Plaza presented its draft comprising his opinions to the parties on 26 March 1965 and brought it under the roof of the UN Security Council. Galo Plaza, who made pretentious statements in his report and who thinks that the legal status created by the constitution can change, accordingly, adopted the Greek position and proffered minority rights to the Turks. The thesis that defends any kind of partition was dismissed by him. Although this report was pleasing by the Greeks, it was rejected by the Turks. The major obstacle of the Greek's position to Turks was to deprive the Turkish community of the rights accorded to them and enforce the discriminatory strategies (Michael, 2009, pp. 28-29).

When the tensions that escalated in 1965 flared up in the report presented by Plaza, the Cyprus Crisis of 1967 became inevitable. According to the Greeks, after the military regime came to power, there was only one proposal for a solution, which is Enosis. In line with their interest, the Cypriot National Guard aimed to finish their work previously started. But, on the contrary to expectations, the Greek forces, which had been violated the founding treaties and who had no right to be on the island, were asked to leave. Cyrus Vance, the US mediator, began a shuttle diplomacy between the parties (Richmond & Ker-Lindsay, 2001, p. 81). The threats of the Turks to intervene had yielded results. Negotiations started between the Turks and Greeks living on the island first, then these negotiations turned into Denktaş-Clerides negotiations widely in the following years.

3.3. 1968-1974 Period

Since 1968, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have sat at the negotiating table through their representatives, free from international actors. The first of the 6-year inter-communal talks was in Beirut, outside of the island of Cyprus. Rauf Denktaş was representing the Turkish side, and Glafkos Clerides the Greek side at the negotiation table. Although the talks between the representatives of the two communities were interrupted from time to time, they continued until the 1974 coup d'état. The talks started on creating a framework based on an independent republic, aiming to find different solutions to constitutional clashes. The allegation was; if the constitutional problems were resolved, only then, the founding treaties could be

started questioning. While the Turks advocated regional autonomy, the Greeks were seeking to protect this order shaped after the crisis and pressure for a unitary state in opposition to the regional autonomy argument. The conclusion that both sides sought to draw from the inter-communal talks was fundamentally different. While the Turkish side was looking for a solution that would end the ‘whole’ problems from the negotiations, the Greek side thought that the problems should be solved separately and step by step. This was one of the most crucial factors towards preventing the two sides from meeting on the common ground (Sözen, 2008, p. 74).

Grivas, who ignored the negotiation process and returned to the island, started to form the organization called EOKA-B. In the intercommunal negotiation process, it could not be said that Greece, whose internal affairs was depressed, was pro-diplomatic. Moreover, the meaning and influence of Makarios for Greek Cypriots was indisputable, so a strategy to be executed independently from Makarios was an action that is outside of the power of Clerides. Likewise, Denktaş did not have an option either that he could act on his own without consulting with the Turks. That is, the representatives of the parties, the lack of intentions to compromise the position they defended, failed the efforts of the United Nations (Javier, 1997).

The negotiations, which ended in 1971, started in 1972 when the parties were convinced by the United Nations, as a result of long efforts. On behalf of the positive course of the negotiations, the United Nations representative and Turkish and Greek representatives also took place in Nicosia. However, no results were obtained from the quintet talks. The reason for Clerides' withdrawal was Ecevit, who defended the federation thesis. After the failure of the talks, the Cyprus military coup d'état in 1974, then the Cyprus Peace Operation took place.

Fazıl Küçük resigned from his position as the Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus during the negotiation process, and Rauf Denktaş was elected instead. Makarios continued as the leader of the Greeks until the military junta made a coup d'état to the administration. After the coup d'état, Turkey, as the Guarantor power, precipitately started diplomatic initiatives and stated that there should be an intercede for Cyprus without wasting time.

3.4. 1975-1983 Period

In 1972, the term of the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant expired, so he was replaced by Austrian diplomat Kurt Waldheim. Parties that were failed in the inter-communal talks gathered again to meet in Vienna after the 1974 coup d'état and ensuing intervention.

3.4.1. Vienna Talks

The Vienna talks, which started in 1975, were held under the supervision of the fourth Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim. The representatives were Glafkos Clerides for the Greek Cypriots and Rauf Denktaş for the Turkish Cypriots. These two also held the negotiations as the representatives of the parties in the 1968-1974 inter-communal negotiations. On Cyprus problem, the factor that influenced the talks was above all the characters of the leaders or representatives, so the duo Denktaş-Clerides have always maintained their positions even though they did not follow a harsh policy, and also they did not avoid negotiation.

The biggest problem arising from the 1974 events was the displacement of the people living in Cyprus, regardless of their ethnic identity. The division of the island in two meant the destruction of the people of Cyprus from their homes, lands, and their material and spiritual things. There were still Greek Cypriots living in the north of the island and Turkish Cypriots living in the south. Entry and exit from one side of the island to the other was prohibited.

The only major compromise that emerged from the Vienna talks was on the population exchange. Accordingly, Greek Cypriots could either move to the south of the island or sustain their lives in the north, as they wish. Turkish Cypriots who resides in the south will be able to migrate to the north of the island (Bryant & Hatay, 2020, p. 62). The crucial elements of this treaty (United Nations Security Council, 1975);

- All Turkish Cypriots who live on the south side will be allowed to cross to the Northern part only if they want to. The United Nations will provide the

management and assistance of this transition process, which should take place until September 1975.

- Rauf Denktaş confirmed that; all assistances will be provided to Greek Cypriots residing at the North of the island so that this process does not affect their lives further. These necessities are such as education, health care, freedom of movement, practicing their religion and etc.
- The Greek Cypriots who currently live in the Northern part and wish to move to the South of the accords of their own will be allowed to do this without any coercion or without questioning.
- UNFICYP will retain the right of access to the Greek Cypriot villages, so it has no ban to access to villages in the Northern part. The Greeks in the North who want to cross to the South will be able to pass through the UN.
- If needed, many Greek Cypriots currently living in the South could be transferred to the Northern part in the context of giving priority to family reunification.

After the 1974 intervention, there were now two separate regions on the island. UNFICYP was at the point that divided the island into two. Therefore, the bi-communal federation thesis has been replaced by a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation for the Turks. The Greek Cypriots believed that a federation system as the Turks defended would not be possible due to the violation of the founding treaties by the Turks occupying the north of the island. This proposal, which started to be discussed in the last part of the Vienna talks, also remained on the table.

3.4.2. 1977 High Level Agreement

During these years when Waldheim's goodwill initiatives yielded results, the parties met in 1977 to discuss in-person. The head of Turkish Cypriots Denktaş met with his equivalent Greek Cypriot leader Makarios, to revise the preceding talks. In-person talks achieved the four crucial points that will guide the process of future negotiations. The importance of these points was its guidance for future negotiations, and both parties agreed and signed it together. This summit agreed upon 12 February 1977. The outline of the summit was (Sözen, 2007, p. 5);

- The system under consideration is the bi-communal Federal Republic, an independent and unaffiliated.

- Economic viability or land ownership and productivity should be negotiated considering the region under the administration of every community.
- Considering the basic foundation for a bi-communal federal system and specific practical complexities which may emerge for the Community of Turkish Cypriots, questions of principles such as freedom of settlement, freedom of movement, freehold right and other certain subjects are arguable.
- Given the bi-communal character of the state, the powers and functions of the central federal government will preserve and protect the unity of the country.

Being "bi-zonal" was not addressed, but some implicit inferences were made in this regard. Turkey's approach was already in this direction after the intervention in 1974. As a consequence, the agreed issues laid the groundwork for the next summit, which is known as the Denktaş-Kyprianou summit.

3.4.3. 1979 High Level Agreement

The whole of the decisions that came out of the 1977 summit was the cornerstone of the summit between Denktaş and Kyprianou in 1979. In this process, upon the efforts of General Secretary Kurt Waldheim, the parties sat at the table again. A draft with ten arguments was obtained by referring to the summit with Makarios and the decisions made from this meeting. This draft was later signed by the parties as an extended version of the 4-argument agreement previously accepted by first acting then elected President Kyprianou and the head of TFSC, Denktaş. The ten arguments mentioned (Sözen, 2008, pp. 75-76);

- Restarting the intercommunal talks, on 15 June 1979, was decided.
- Makarios-Denktaş guidelines, agreed on 12 February 1977, and the United Nations resolutions on the Cyprus problem will be the reference of the talks.
- The fundamental freedoms and human rights of the nationals of the Cyprus Republic must be respected.
- The content of the talks will be all regional and constitutional issues.
- The issue of the resettlement of Varosha under the UN auspices will be carried out simultaneously with the start of the consideration by the addressees of the constitutional and regional directions of a comprehensive solution, and priority will be given to conclude with the agreement. The

agreement to be reached on Varosha will be executed without waiting for the results of the negotiations on other dimensions of the Cyprus problem.

- It was decided that both sides should refrain from any behaviour that would jeopardize the conclusion of the negotiations in terms of goodwill, striving to return to normal conditions and mutual trust, and pay particular attention to the practical precautions to be taken in the first place.
- Among the topics to be discussed were issues such as "demilitarization," this subject is among the plans expected to be implemented.
- The Cyprus Republic must be sufficiently guaranteed for the issues such as sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and non-alliance. Thereby, any form of division or separation and full or partial unity with any other country could not occur.
- Inter-communal negotiations will be a process of continuous and constant, so it is essential to be continuity and sustainable without any delay.
- Nicosia will be the place where the intercommunal negotiations will be held.

After the second half of 1977, Spyros Kyprianou, who was also the 2nd President of the Republic of Cyprus, reached the position of President of the Republic of Cyprus. Kyprianou, who came to power after the death of Makarios, followed a policy followed long before Makarios' death, as he was a conservative leader. Makarios had shaped his political vision since he became an adult and entered politics (Smith, 2002).

As a consequence, the Security Council expressed that they had been unpleasant with the unilateral declaration made by the TFSC. The Secretary-General had taken a new role to bring the parties agglomerate and urged on them to cooperate. This summit was a confirmation of the guidelines in the 1977 agreement between the parties. In this process, which started with Vienna and continued affirmative to a degree, the parties signed their signatures at least for the continuity of the talks, and at this point, they created a written base showing that consensus could be reached. But agreeing on principles and arguments was not enough to conclude that a complete agreement was reached. The basic perspectives on the substance of the problem were still far apart. This, unfortunately, caused the path to the solution to be

blocked at certain points. Hence, no conclusions could be drawn between 1975-1979.

3.4.4. The Interim Agreement

With the initiative of the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, Deputy Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, and the UN Special Representative for Cyprus Hugo Juan Gobbi to revive these talks, which remained fruitless, the parties came together again in August 1980. A year later, approximately, Waldheim prepared an appraisal report, and the opinions in this report are formed the provisional arrangements. Hugo Gobbi presented the text containing the Secretary General's appraisal of the situation regarding the last point reached to the parties. This document was an appraisal, in a sense, that aimed at accelerating the negotiations rather than proffering propositions for a solution (Olgun, 2020, p. 57). In November 1981, when the talks revived, the text was formally presented to representatives of both communities. Contrary to Greek Cypriots, who ratified this proposal with the thought that it could create a good dialogue ground, the Turkish side endorsed it with the idea that it could form the basis of the negotiations (Sözen, 2007, p. 6).

Shortly after the report presented by the United Nations, who was the chief architect of this gathering, and his commissioned Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, there was negativity in terms of the course of the talks. Kyprianou's question marks for continuing the talks drove the condition to be stalemated. One of the most crucial causes for Kyprianou's retreat immediately after a concurrence was reached on the principles is, began when the Greek administration provoked the Greeks from 1981 by a prime minister who advocated Hellenistic ideals. In this period when hegemonic discourses began to prevail, the establishment and maintenance of an atmosphere of peace would be directly proportional to the cessation of mutual intimidation. Because, in the report presented in 1980, the notions of bi-zonality and safety were expressly underlined in writing for the first time. The arguments, whose constitutional aspect is federal and regional aspect is in the form of a bi-zonality, were already one of the most important arguments discussed between 1975- 83. Later, the lack of stability on the agreed issues bruised the way to a solution and caused the bilateral relations to wear down (Hoffmeister, 2006, p. 63).

3.5. 1984-1986 Period

In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot community, utilizing its right of self-determination, made this decision due to the blockage of the roads leading to a solution. The aggressive attitude, followed by the other side, strengthened the hand of the Turks in utilizing self-determination to some extent. Kyprianou was giving the impression that it was far from negotiating style, with the wind of the support he received from the Greeks. During this period, another of the most important claims was that Kyprianou could not accept the Rauf Denktaş as his equivalent. But with the proclamation of the TRNC, this excuse should have disappeared because; Rauf Denktaş had become the President of the TRNC. Unlike it ended up with Proximity Talks. The resolution 37/253 taken by the United Nations, after the deteriorated relations, was in the interest of the Greeks, but the Turks declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and legalized the current situation "de facto," in the Cyprus problem. Meanwhile, the reactions that came with the announcement of the TRNC by the Turks were of course on many issues. An independent state was established and this caused great repercussions in the international community. In fact, the main problem was that there was no common definition of the problem. Therefore, there was a clash of interests. The willingness to take actions to protect their own interests on both sides caused them to interpret the notions according to their legal and political tendencies. The 1984-1986 period started with these equations.

3.5.1. De Cuellar's Draft

The action by international actors not to recognize this independent state, which is resolution 550, required the UN Secretary-General to start the negotiation process immediately (Richmond, 1998, p. 181). After the appointment of De Cuellar for the position of the UN Secretary-General, he studied both summits regarding, to cumulate the factors from the Denktaş- Makarios and the Denktaş- Kyprianou. Plus, De Cuellar proffered to amalgamate the previously discussed arguments with a draft plan for solving unsolved problems. Therefore, the result would be the finalization of the search for a solution that would cover the whole of the problems. The meetings were started in 1984.

Crucial points of this outline (Tamkoç, 1988, pp. 123-124);

- The Federal Republic, which would consist of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot community, would have two regions or federated States, and its members would be national of this Federal Republic.
- Since Turkish and Greek tongues are used on the island, Turkish and Greek would be the Federal Republic official languages.
- The flag of this Federal Republic would be objective, and the anthem would be an agreed one.
- It would be revealed what kind of system the Federal Republic would adopt in terms of its powers and functions.
- The representation of the legislative assemblies would be formed of a lower one with 70% ratio Greek Cypriots and 30% ratio Turkish Cypriots, and an upper one both 50% ratio for each community, and this would form the Federal Republic' legislature organ.
- The presidential system would be the governing mechanism of the Federal Republic.
- The equal political status of both communities and the unity of the country would be represented by the President and the Vice President. The Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice President, acting with or without, would protect the right of veto, regardless of an administrative decision or any law.
- Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot ministers would form the Cabinet of the Federal Republic with a ratio of 7 by 3.
- Finally, a Turkish, a Greek, and a non-Cypriot member would constitute the members of the Federal Republic Constitutional Court.

The template created here enabled the parties to better focus on some details in order to determine the tendency of the Proximity talks because both sides were satisfied with the skeleton of the draft. The "Federal Solution Structure" shaped with this outline was the most detailed and underlined written text of the negotiation process at the point reached. After deciding the signature day, which was meant as January 1985, the parties left the meeting with their contentment (Ker-Lindsay, 2011,

pp. 53-54). After a while, when Kyprianou's refusal to sign the De Cuellar draft, De Cuellar repaired the "cracks" in the draft that existed according to the Greeks, then the draft was retransmitted to the Greek Cypriots. Rauf Denktaş, as a reaction, replied to De Cuellar that the Turks do not look very favourably on the revised draft, reiterating that the negotiations should be approached with a holistic solution perspective.

Coming to the parties with another written text in 1986, De Cuellar claimed that it was a written text that could be considered as an integrated whole, referring to all of the problems that could not be reconciled since the process he took over as proximity talks. As distinct from the other written texts negotiated and agreed before (Sözen, 2008, p. 80);

- Under the new order to be achieved, the Cypriot state would have two communities in the legal order and two zones in the regional order, and the ratio of Turkish Cypriots in the land order would be "29 plus."
- The police force would be its own forces in both communities.
- Sufficient guarantees would be decided, and an agenda set up for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and factors. This operation has to be processed before a provisional government was formed.

Kyprianou rejected the draft and its content, claiming that the definition of "integrated whole" is not a sufficient guarantee. He offered two options, the first of them; an international congress, a guaranteed one, on the withdrawal of troops. Latter; Another summit meeting to be held with the enforcement of the movement rights, settlement rights, and freehold rights in practice. Conversely, the Turkish defence is vital for the Turkish Cypriot community to keep its existence and to preserve security, so the Turkish side reiterated its sensitivity in this matter. One party did not accept the draft as it will give rise to division, while the other party expressed that they are not against the federal solution, their readiness to approve the draft under the conditions stated earlier. This dilemma concluded that no result would be possible under this draft (Tunkrová & Saradín, 2010, p. 76).

3.6. 1987-1992 Period

The Cyprus problem, which remained stagnant after 1986, broke its silence with Vassiliou, who used the Cyprus problem as an instrument in the election campaign in 1988. Vassiliou, the President of Greek Cypriot, who won the election race from Kyprianou, entered a new negotiation period with Denktaş in 1988. The discourse of Vassiliou, who emphasized that everything was progressing on track before the occupation and that there was no such a term as the "Cyprus problem," showed in a way that the blame discourse remained for both sides. Vassiliou, acted in a way that actually confirmed his words as if the stance of the Turks to the problem was not a matter (Vassiliou, 2010). Meanwhile Turkey, to keep pace with economic and political trends, had adopted a more effective foreign policy after the changing conjuncture in the world. Özal, the President of Turkey, sought to achieve a solution for the wrong perceptions that emerged by falling more on the Cyprus problem both on behalf of his country and on behalf of the TRNC, which is only recognized by his country.

3.6.1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 649

The content of the solution ideas that de Cuellar formed in 1989 upon the parties' request to continue negotiations; leaving the notions of minority or majority aside, it was to meet in a collective order which the foundation of political equality, whereby the communities regain the peace. Not only Cuellar but also Vassiliou opposed Denktaş, who put forward the idea of discrete sovereignty, which was fundamentally at odds with the arguments that were agreed upon and tried to be built since the mid-70s. The argument was there, equality of the two communities will constitute the sole sovereignty of the federal state, and the character of this sovereignty is one-body-based. De Cuellar also presented these arguments in his report before and after the adopted UN resolution 649 (Michael, 2009, p. 122; Olgun, 2020, pp.83-84).

The Security Council resolution 649 appointed on 12 March 1990. To summarize the resolution 649 (United Nations Security Council, 1990);

- It particularly ratifies resolution 367 of 1975 and also promotes the arguments achieved in 1977 and 1979.

- It specifies full support for the endeavours of the Secretary General to fulfill its goodwill mission regarding Cyprus.
- It asks the presidents of the two communities to carry on their endeavours so that they can make an inference to be agreed on by the two sides, to form a federation in the light of the 1977 and 1979 summit agreements.
- It calls both parties to collaborate at the ground of "equal foundation" with the Secretary-General to achieve a general framework agreement promptly as decided in 1989.
- It seeks to acquire a quick progression for the negotiations, so to do that possible, the UN invites the Secretary-General to sustain the goodwill mission and to help the sides by making recommendations to make the debate easier.
- It expects the parties to refrain from any behaviour that would exacerbate the negotiation environment created.
- It seeks to actively monitor the negotiation environment and the effort in progress.
- It asks the Secretary-General to provide a report by 31 May 1990 to keep informed the Security Council of the progression towards the improvement of an acceptable structure necessary for a comprehensive agreement that developed as a consequence of the start of the talks.

Based on the recommendations of the Secretary-General, the decision, which deemed appropriate negotiation between the two sides on an equal basis, was found to modify some perceptions previously formed. In particular, formal discourses such as "the presidents of the communities" or "the two communities" were the most crucial details in breaking down these perceptions (Sözen, 2007, pp. 169-170). In fact, this decision was a formal written resolution on which both sides could go into detail rather than the agreed 1977 and 1979 arguments, giving the opportunity to study extensively. This decision came after the period when the parties tried to prove themselves to the other about the hegemonic discourse and tried to impose these discourses, and created a conversation environment for the first time in both communities to talk about what they understood from the potential federation. This gave the birth of the opportunity to speak of the true desires of both leaders, whatever the outcome (Michael, 2009, pp. 122-123).

There was no result acquired from the meetings between Vassiliou's elections as a President in 1988 until the UN resolution 649 taken in 1990, plus Denktaş' re-election as a leader was the main excuse for Vassiliou's application to the European Union for the membership in July 1990. Vassiliou, who could not achieve a harmonious negotiation process with Denktaş, made a move that would take the Cyprus Problem to a completely different dimension, a move that was not within the approval of the Secretary-General and Denktaş. Regardless of the reason for the application, there were many points that invalidated the application.

The first impression of Turkish Cypriots on the application was; Cyprus is a bi-communal island. Although the Greek Cypriot side has managed to assimilate a reputation of 'Republic of Cyprus' on their behalf, the perception does not give the right to have a say on behalf of the whole of Cyprus in a significant formation such as the European Union. Membership of a divided island in the European Union should not be possible since the bi-communal foundation was laid with the 1960 treaties. Even if the island was not divided, the subject of the definite apportionment of power between the two communities is included in the Constitution and in the treaties that make up the Constitution. As a consequence, the application of the Greek Cypriot Administration to the European Union by introducing itself as the legitimate government of Cyprus is against the international law, and it should mean the nullifies of the application. The Turkish Cypriots, who argued that the solution should be discussed over the resolution 649 of the United Nations, thus made it clear that the meeting should not be aimed at a draft outside this argument.

3.6.2. The Set of Ideas

Reacting to the application, the Turkish Cypriots said that the application was made to represent the whole of the Island and that this was contrary not only to the 1977 and 1979 arguments but also to the 1960 treaties (Sözen, 2008, pp. 82-83). Greek Cypriot Administration, who made an ex parte application and appraised the Turkish Cypriots as minorities, had no right to represent the entire island. The Greek Cypriot side, which highlighted that Denktaş was unacceptable because he had contradicted the arguments he had signed when he raised the subject of discrete sovereignty, was now making applications that would contradict the arguments previously signed. In fact, this situation not only damaged the environment of trust

that was tried to be re-established as a result of long efforts but also turned the intentions of the parties into positions formed by using the behaviours of the other party. Thus, the European Union has mushroomed as a new actor involved in the Cyprus problem.

The label 'not seeking for a solution' was the term used by both sides for each other. Özal took the first concrete step in his active foreign policy discourse with the proposal of quadruple talks, believing it would be influential for the solution of the problem. Potential quadruple talks, aforementioned, would comprise between Turkey, Greece, Turkish Cypriots, and Greek Cypriots. Meanwhile, the United Nations was continuing to fulfill its duty of mediation and strive for the solution operation of the problem. Özal's idea of quadruple talks was accepted as favourable by the United Nations. The commencement of "The Set of Ideas" breathed to be discussed with a United Nations resolution taken in 1992 (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, n.d.).

The new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali formulated the final shape of the Set of Ideas, then brought the parties together and propounded the draft. As in the arguments contained in the previous drafts, the Secretary-General emphasized that the agreement will not be accepted if there is no sharpness for the parties on all the arguments of the Set of Ideas. The perspective of the draft was the importance of the totality of the draft. Another remarkable proposition of the draft is that the independent issues surrounding the perimeter of a draft whose totality has not been agreed upon will remain out of place. The main argument of the solution advocated by the Set of Ideas was through the federal structure. This federal structure would be composed of two federated states and proposed the protection of the 1960 treaties. For the Turkish side, the way to a solution has been always the scope of "all" of the problem was preferred. For this reason, the Turkish Cypriots also reflected their determination on the solution by showing the intention of maximum concessions they will show in order to preserve the totality of the solution to be arrived and also to leave the table with satisfaction for both communities. The content of the Set of Ideas was (Hoffmeister, 2006, pp. 68-70);

- Displaced people
- The Constitutional aspects

- Regional adjustments (land)
- General goals
- Guidance precepts
- Safety and the guarantees
- Economic development and protections

The Set of Ideas was composed of 100 arguments that could not provide a remedy to the problem as regards to Greek Cypriots, and the most fateful reason for the Greeks for rejecting the Set of Ideas was the continuation of 1960 treaties and the irrationality of being a separate unit within the federal formation. In contradistinction to the Greek Cypriots mentality, Turkish Cypriots pointed out that if some arrangements were applied on approximately 89 arguments, they did not have any problems on the remaining arguments, and they were ready to shake hands. In addition to the fact that the problems regarding the land and displaced people were not resolved yet, when Clerides, known for his opposition to the Set of Ideas and focused on the European Union membership, won the 1993 elections, the Set of Ideas remained insoluble (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, pp. 54-55).

3.7. 1992-1994 Period

As a consequence of a strong lack of confidence between the two sides, no reconciliation could be reached, and the goodwill mission of the Secretary-General between 1990 and 1993 remained in the air without proceeding it. In the last quarter of 1992, in November, Secretary-General underlining 'there is a lack of confidence' in the document he reported and noted that it would not be possible to talk about a solution unless the mutual distrust environment melts (Sözen, 2007, p. 13).

3.7.1. Confidence Building Measures

The arguments generated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations were in the nature of stopping the cold winds blowing between the two sides. The trust problem was targeted to be overcome by the Confidence-Building Measures that had positive arguments for both sides. The annex had (Sözen, 2008, pp. 85-86);

- It invites the parties to collaborate competently, especially in increasing water resources due to the short and long dated water issue in Cyprus.

- It asks a collab on the matter of education, to reinforce the relationship of sincerity and camaraderie between the two sides.
- It asks collective activities for the sides such as culture and sport, and also it asks a common usage for the area of Çetinkaya in the Buffer Zone.
- It asks meeting for the heads of the two sides.
- It seeks permission for the journalists of the two sides for traversing the border only if they show their identity cards given by the United Nations, and also a room for the journalists of the two sides in Ledra Palace Hotel.
- It demands the two sides' Commerce and Industry Chambers to create and improve trading plans together by a meeting.
- International help would be useful for the two sides justly.
- It seeks collaboration on the matter of health and the environment.
- It seeks an organization of the collaboration about the electricity, bearing in mind that in the north side the electricity generator will be up and running in a short time.
- About the free movements of goods, it seeks an inter-communal collaboration in Pyla, similar as decided likewise in Varosha.
- It looks for collaboration between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot representatives in the checked buffer zone of Nicosia, where the parties are nearest to one another.
- It seeks Varosha to open to use for mutual trade and contact under the executive of the United Nations, and the main goal in doing this was to create a sort of free zone where goods and services could be traded.
- Again under the executive of the United Nations, it seeks the airport of Nicosia to open to use to passenger and cargo transportation.
- Again about the buffer zone, which in the check of the United Nations, it seeks parties to collaborate with the UNFICYP for expanding its all of the areas.
- The Turkish and Greek Cypriot spokespersons will discuss at regular intervals to put forward the extra Confidence Building Measures for execution by the two sides.

The Confidence-Building Measures, which was a hot topic as of May 1993 and was targeted to be an intermediary, was a supplement covering in terms of

humanistic, economic, and communal arguments. But in 1994, due to the Greek Cypriots application, the 'export ban of the TRNC' judgment given by the European Court of Justice and affecting a large part of the TRNC's total exports was in a nature that removed the positive arguments included in the Confidence Building Measures. As a consequence of the decision taken by the European Court of Justice, Turkish Cypriots highlighted the treatment was biased and unsupportive considering the rights of the Turkish Cypriots (Sözen, 2007, p. 15).

Greek Cypriots focused on the EU, and on the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots wanted to prove the existence of their community to the world public opinion. Turkish Cypriots defended the Federation model with two zones based on two communities, while Greek Cypriots considered deadlock as a solution. The two leaders who were trying to be brought together for the last time through the United Nations, Clerides' request from Denktaş to support the unilateral application to the European Union, and Denktaş' rejection of this request, left the Confidence Building Measures fruitless, in the last quarter of 1994. As a consequence, the decision made by the Greek Cypriots and their progress in line with this decision, and the Turkish Cypriots claiming that this decision was wrong and the Greek Cypriots could not agree at all, showed once again that the intentions and efforts of both sides were in different directions (Bölükbaşı, 1998, p. 429).

3.8. The Deadlock Period before the Annan Plan

As soon as the new Secretary-General Kofi Annan took office in 1997, he started digging the Cyprus Problem with the motto of carrying the negotiations with a new dynamic and energy. Although Kofi Annan did not make great strides on the problem in the first years of his duty, in the following years, he would present the most prominent plan in the history of the Cyprus Problem to the parties for negotiation.

Clerides and the Greek Cypriot Administration took two-three-year time out and entered a non-negotiation process in the Cyprus Problem due to the endeavour to gain a place in the European Union. The first contact of the Greek Cypriot Administration, which continues to work in line with its interests, with the Turkish side in this non-negotiated period, took place in New York, then shortly after in Montreux, July then September 1997. However, subsequent to these negotiations, the

decision by the EU ‘commencing the full membership negotiations’ about the Cyprus Republic led to some changes in the TRNC’s stance on the Cyprus Problem. The chief of these changes was that the Turkish side’s position against the problem is now the Confederation (Ker-Lindsay, 2005, p. 22).

The Turkish side announced its position, namely the Confederation proposal (Ker-Lindsay et al., 2011, pp. 22-23), to the other side in New York on 3 December 1999, the beginning of the period when the negotiations were tried to be activated. Mediated talks, which lasted for about a year, were managed by Annan or, if he was not, by his Special Advisor Alvaro De Soto. The Secretariat received Denktaş’ proposal for the Confederation, in which various characteristics of the Cyprus problem were included in detail. During the talks, Kofi Annan made a clarification corroborating that the parties on the Island are politically equal, not representing the other (United Nations Security Council, 1999, para. 5). Following this clarification, the parties stopped the talks since the Greek side highlighted that an agreement that envisions the partnership is meaningless, and the Turkish side thought the thesis they presented was reasonable since there are two separate sovereign states and two separate people. This detail carried the solution process to the Annan Plan.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. THE ANNAN PLAN AND UP-TO-DATE NEGOTIATIONS

After closing the negotiations with negativity in 2000, the signals there would be some meetings in 2001 were received with the mediation attempts under the framework of the goodwill mission. Continuity of the negotiations was important for the parties to break the recurring habit of leaving the table without any results.

In 2001, President Denktaş made a call to the Greek Cypriot leader Clerides to meet face to face on the island. Accepting this call, Clerides had a meeting with Denktaş in December 2001. As a consequence of the goodwill images drawn during the meeting, an appointment was made in early 2002 to discuss the comprehensive solution. Considering the EU's enlargement calendar, this step represented a crucial improvement within the United Nations. This appointment, which was set up for direct talks in January 2002, was arranged through the United Nations without preconditions and in search of a comprehensive solution (Olgun, 2020, p. 128).

With the understanding that 'no agreement can be reached without reaching an agreement on every issue,' leaders tried to find out which opinions could be exchanged through negotiation and which could be unalterable. They have tried to clarify their positions related to the solution of the Cyprus problem in an environment where the parties also resort to subjective judgments while expressing their views and try to break the opposing side's view by explaining these relative thoughts. The direct meeting was a meeting where the insistence of the parties on their positions continued, and the effort to convince the other party was intense, dominated by familiar sentences, and ideas were debated rather than bargaining. The Greeks were trying to suppress the Turkish side by asserting that 'the 1960 Republic is still going on'. In October 2002, Annan hosted Clerides and Denktaş in New York, which was the last time the parties came together before the Annan Plan. Making some statements after the meeting, Kofi Annan reiterated; "reaching a solution is not easy at all, and the problem is complicated" (Annan, 2015).

Denktaş urgently underwent surgery due to the health problems he experienced after the New York talks. Since no significant progress was made in the name of a

solution before the Copenhagen Summit to be held on 12 December 2002, Annan introduced the Comprehensive Solution plan to the Cyprus Problem on 11 November 2002 to both sides (Olgun, 2020, pp. 136-137). The aim was to prevent this situation from becoming an inextricable condition after the Summit. The Annan Plan, as its name suggests, was named after the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Annan also introduced a copy of the plan to the Guarantor countries.

Although Annan and his colleagues seem to be the protagonists of this plan, it is a product of the goodwill mission and mediation efforts of the United Nations, especially after the 1974 Operation. With this plan, without ignoring the framework arguments previously created, the aim was to form a clearer plan that concludes the negotiation process. This plan, aimed at protecting the rights of both sides, would meet the positions of the parties to a certain extent. The parties' trying to act by knowing the red lines of each other, and the dominance of the mediators on the subject, and all the agreement texts, arguments, framework studies that have been spoken up until the Annan Plan, was created groundwork. Because the aim of this plan, which includes the arguments of the other two agreements texts (de Cuellar Draft, Ghali's the Set of Ideas), which have been discussed many times until today and agreed in the light of the 1977 and 1979 agreements, is to be a more comprehensive alternative, namely the third text, was to present (Sözen, 2007, p. 17).

The plan had the latest and the final version on 31 March 2004. The list of Appendices of the Plan has six sections, and these are (The Hellenic Resources Institute, 2004);

- Foundation Agreement
- Constituent State Constitutions
- Treaty on subjects associated to the new state of affairs in Cyprus
- The Draft Act of Harmonization on the Conditions of the United Cyprus Republic's Accession to the European Union
- Subjects to be presented to the United Nations Security Council for Decision
- Measures to be Taken In April 2004

4.1. Do the expectations match?

The expectations of the parties at the plan are another aspect of the operation, the main difference of the positions of the parties is (Sözen & Özersay, 2007, pp. 125-126);

- The issue of Cyprus's future political system
- The issue of Guarantorship
- The issue of three freedoms
- The issue of the military status of Cyprus
- The issue of displaced persons
- The issue of Turkish settlers/ immigrants
- The issue of territorial adjustment
- The issue of European Union membership

So what exactly were their perspectives on both sides towards the problems that existed?

Based on the above problems, the reasoning of Denktaş and Clerides towards the Annan Plan was not parallel to each other. The issue of the future state system, which is one of the most important issues, was the biggest block in front of the parties' reconciliation. Throughout the negotiations, great efforts were made in order to have positive progressions on this issue. The way they look at the issues regarding the Island was on a different angle and different display since the feedbacks that they gave to the United Nations for Annan I.

A Cypriot State together with the international personality and single sovereignty was the expectation of the Greek Cypriots. So the preference of the Greek Cypriots was a unitary state and single citizenship. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots defended the thesis, in which two separate sovereign and politically equal states could form a Confederation, bi-zonal and bi-communal, in order to clarify the actual situation on the island. The Turkish Cypriots stated the Confederation would possess a single international personality, but it would simply be sovereign as constrained by the constituent states. Unlike the single sovereignty expected by the Greek Cypriots,

Turkish Cypriots advocated that each community should have discrete sovereignty (Sözen, 2008, 89-92).

The Greek Cypriots envisioned the issue of representation should be negotiated according to population proportions. Greek Cypriots envisioned achieving this through a standalone federal system characterized by a federal constitution, the active participation of the interlocutor communities in the decision-making process. The most crucial point in the representation issue was sustainability. A system regulation without unity means a non-working representation mechanism and major problems again in the future. Opposing the standalone, strong, and central federal system envisaged by the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots highlighted that there is the possibility of one community dominating another due to the inequality that may arise if the population proportion is taken as a basis, and yet there should not be such a possibility, therefore, if the population proportion is the criteria, then the proportion of the representation should be fifty to fifty. This equal proportion, caught by fifty-fifty, was a proposal for a structure of close collaboration and coordination between the (con) federal institutions of two individual but apposed states. Supposing there is a disagreement, this would be founded by an international treaty signed by the TRNC and Greek Cypriot Administration, by an alternative dispute resolution which is arbitration (Sözen, 2008, p. 92).

The action to be taken on the territorial issue was obvious for the Greek Cypriots. Their propositions were very clear. They demanded a significant part of the territory owned by the Turkish Cypriots be left to them. Except that, there was a requisition about the displaced persons, and this was 'the right to return for all displaced persons'. The territorial issue, in other words, the territorial claims of the Greeks or their wish to take over territory from Turkish Cypriots, was not a fresh argument for the Turkish Cypriots. For this reason, Turkish Cypriots were prepared for the actions that could be taken or demanded by the Greeks on this specific issue. Emphasizing the actuality that people have settled in the intervening time, as an opposing opinion, the Turkish Cypriots called for respect for the bi-zonality, including the territories currently owned. In addition, there would be a consideration of a minor territorial adjustment throughout a no-man's land, again to respect the bi-zonality (Sözen, 2007, pp. 20-21).

The Greek Cypriot proposal on property rights included the complete return to the owners who were deprived of their properties or their lands. Accordingly, the three freedoms have to be absolute, total, and complete, with the displaced persons right to return. Briefly, Greek Cypriots sought an order in which they used to live before. While the Greek Cypriots were looking for an order to make the property issue applicable as they wished, in the meantime, the Turkish Cypriots contended the property issue and three freedoms should be limited, for the respect of the bi-zonality, by an inflexible control mechanism (Sözen, 2007, p. 21).

About the issue of the military, the Greek Cypriot position was the 'demilitarization' that has been going on for years. Highlighting that the Turkish Armed Forces on the island pose a threat, the Greek Cypriot Administration asked the island to be demilitarized. Even further, Greeks, demanding Turkish Cypriot settlers to return to the mainland. Turkish Cypriots expressed their opposition to the demilitarization perspective of Greek Cypriots. To have a contingent from Turkey was very important for Turkish Cypriots to feel secure. Hence, the issue of Guarantorship was always a hot debate (Sözen, 2008, pp. 92-93).

The issue of the EU membership was an issue of the Turkish Cypriots in reality. It was a verbal fight between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. While Greek Cypriots were highly supportive of the European Union membership as a united Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots would support the European Union membership only if a conclusion was reached on the Cyprus problem (Sözen, 2008, p. 93).

The elected new government and the arrangement of government in Ankara, and Denktaş' post-operative treatment process, made the response time of TRNC to be given to the Annan Plan was slightly delayed. Denktaş had serious apprehensions about the issues that were almost impossible to accept. The parties' feedbacks were received by De Soto when the Annan plan was not yet at the negotiation stage. The TRNC found the text is negotiable, but still, there were some arguments that would not be negotiated for the Turkish Cypriot community (Olgun, 2020, pp. 138-141). Denktaş also stated there are some arguments that would make the Turkish Cypriots a minority over time. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot Administration stated that some arguments should be clarified, and if these arguments are clarified, then negotiation could be possible.

When the first version of the Annan Plan received a negative response from the parties, the second version of the plan was redistributed to the parties one month later. Before the European Council Summit to be held in Copenhagen, the parties, which did not encounter a very different picture from the first version, also rejected the second version of the plan.

4.2. The essence of the Plan and the Referendum

Besides the different positions of the two sides, the Annan Plan tried to answer the leading problems which both sides did not compromise. Kofi Annan started the plan with a new state of affairs subject, viz an undefined 'federal government'.

One of the reasons which left a question mark on the essence of the solution plan was, the parties did not fully understand the thesis of the political system proposed in the plan. The question was; a new state of affairs, either perpetuation of the Republic of Cyprus, or a new state, the successor of the previous states.

About the political system, the proposition of the Annan Plan was the United Cyprus Republic consists of two constituent states together with a bi-zonal form. These are the Turkish Cypriot constituent state and the Greek Cypriot constituent state. The political system of this Republic was a composite system amid the federation and confederation, not defined. The unified Cypriot flag and the national anthem would be unique, unused. Swiss federal model and the Belgian model were utilized for the inner relation among the central government and its constituent states and the foreign relations of the United Cyprus Republic. This meant, the central government is the only body to deal with all matters related to foreign affairs in the international arena. The constituent states, on the other hand, would enjoy their power limited by their constitutions.

The representation of the legislative body of the State would be bicameral legislative and composed of a 48-seat Senate with the ratio of 50: 50 and a Chamber of Deputies together with its 48 members. The proportion of the population in Chamber of Deputies, with the requirement, the constituent states fill at least 1-fourth of the seats. Other minorities, such as Latin, Armenian and Maronite societies, would have the right to be represented by at least 1 representative within the seat quota of

the constituent state where the bulk of the members of the minorities dwell (Alexiou et al., 2003).

The representation of the executive body of the State would be composed of a six-member Presidential Council, based on the population ratio of the constituent states. The Council, round its term of five-year, would choose a President and a Vice-President out of the Council members, and the President and Vice-President would serve a period of ten months, then there would be a cycle again out of the Council members for the position of presidency. Within the Presidential Council, the division of duties of the units would be made. As an exception, the heads of EU Affairs and Foreign Affairs units could not be off the same constituent state. Unlike the 1960 Constitution, none of the Council members had the right to veto, and this change aimed to prevent any interruption in the state mechanism.

The representation of the judicial body of the State would be a Supreme Court, with the Turkish and Greek judges, numerically even, and three alien judges (Akgün et al., 2005, pp. 47-55).

The latest version, Annan V, had some minor changes about the Governance. These are; The President and the Vice President would be rotated every 20 months after the first 5 years of the adoption of the Annan Plan. So, the rotation of 10 months would transpose to 20 months. The latest version of the plan also offered a minimal change towards the form of a Presidential Council. There would be 9 members in the Council instead of 6, and 3 of them would have no right to vote. Furthermore, in the Presidential Council, from the beginning of the 6th year, there would be two terms of Greek and one term of Turkish President. At the same time, month changes regarding the transitional government were made, and also some regulations in the judiciary body (Akgün et al., 2005, pp. 47-60).

The proposal of the independent state of Cyprus regarding the issue of sovereignty was single shared sovereignty. Moreover, the thesis which both sides used against each other, known as Enosis and Taksim, would be prohibited. The aim was to prevent all possible scenarios such as partition, disintegration, union with another state.

Territorial issues were always a core element in the negotiations of the Cyprus problem. Although there were some regional changes in the adjustment, the demand never changed. Turkish Cypriots would renounce a land or lands to Greek Cypriots.

The Foundation Agreement has a part, explaining the territorial border of the constituent states, the map, elaborately. The territorial rates were (Hannay, 2005, pp. 208-212); a Turkish State with an area of 29.2% and a Greek State with an area of 70.8%. This rate would have minimally changed when the British bases on the island were also taken into account. Britain had stated, if a solution is reached, it can be also talk about some arrangements in the British Sovereign Base Regions. These arrangements mostly benefited the Greek side. The rate of the area of the Turkish side would fall vertically to 28% (28% with a fraction) (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, n.d.; Akgün et al., 2005, p. 50).

The United Nations, under the title of auditor, has been held responsible for the supervision of the parts of the existing TRNC territory, which will be gradually transferred to the Greeks in accordance with the plan. These lands would remain under the rule of the Turks in this transfer process, changing hands step by step, not exceeding three years in total. The loss of property to be incurred by Turks in the evacuation of the region was great when the calculations were made at the level of settlement and migration; the population of Turkish Cypriots to be affected by the territory issue was in the band of 45,000- 60,000. About the territorial issue faced by the settlers, which brings financial and moral difficulties, various regulations regarding the resettlement and accommodation of the evacuated citizens were proposed.

The three freedom was also an important argument when it comes to elaborate 'the restrictions' while to manage the bi-zonality. Some restrictions and quotas were imposed both by taking the international law into consideration and by not violating the rights to reside granted by the European Union to its member countries, except for some flexibilities. These restrictions were scheduled in the plan due to the status of Turkey, on being not a member of the European Union. Therefore, the phrase 'until Turkey becomes' was included in the plan.

The amount of Turkish and Greek citizens to be granted residence permits in the Turkish Cypriot State and the Greek Cypriot State was determined with a system

based on action plans to be, or not to be, taken in certain year intervals according to certain population ratios. The agenda was talking about a total moratorium for those who were not able to meet certain conditions (such as being over 65 years old, being the former settler of specific villages, and so on) for the first 6-year period. Since there was no restriction on the right of return and freedom of movement, there was no loss of this right. So the right to return was a natural right. After the abolition of the moratorium, the constituent states had the right to re-impose restrictions by introducing quotas if certain conditions occurred, such as the effect of other constituent state citizens residing in a constituent state in the population ratio of that state. These intervals were decided to control between 4 to 5 years after the first 6-year period, and the percentiles were decided on the basis of 6 to 7% increase rates. At the last stage, at the beginning of the 20th year, the decision was; the total Greek population in the north would be 1 in 3 compared to the Turks. Minor revisions were made in the final version of the plan (Akgün et al., 2005, pp. 51-52).

The Annan Plan qualifies exactly how the Guarantee and Alliance Treaties would continue with a scheme in which the territorial integrity, security, and constitutional order of the constituent states, as well as the United Cyprus Republic, are protected and guaranteed. In brief, the 1960 Treaties were revised positively in terms of the subjects.

In the Island, the number of troops calculated to be deployed by considering the gradual withdrawal and other similar factors (such as Turkey's EU membership) until 2011 was 6,000 in total. Later in the latest version, there was a revision on the number of troops on the Island. The latest version highlighted the number of troops would be as it was in the 1960 Alliance Treaty, only if Turkey becomes a member of the EU or after 2018. In Alliance Treaty, the numbers were 950 Greek, 650 Turkish troops in total (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, n.d.).

The property issue was perhaps the most difficult and complex issue within the Cyprus problem. Since the lead back of property issue is also related to other issues, the offer was quite complicated. The response of the plan to the property issue was examined over two options. The first option was, settling some of the displaced persons as reported by the territorial adjustment. The second option was divided into two within itself; the part which could not benefit from the first option would either

receive indemnification or restore to their former properties. Lastly, there would be a Property Board to decide how to act the property rights based on specific standards, including the conditions of the present occupants and the size of investing in the affected property.

On citizenship, the plan formed a structure of single Cypriot citizenship, with the fact that the constituent states in Cyprus also have separate internal citizenships. There was a fixed number with regards to the Cypriot citizenship valid for both constituent states, 45,000. Those who fulfilled the Cypriot citizenship requirement, namely those who had Cypriot citizenship in 1963 and their spouses, children, and grandchildren, would have Cypriot citizenship within the quota (list) of 45,000 people. The plan also re-emphasized the freedom of movement for all Cypriots regardless of their constituent state citizenship status (United Nations Security Council, 2004).

The EU membership would be a discussion after a concrete result would be achieved in which the negotiated revisions and positioning would be concluded and added into the *acquis communautaire*. However, the possibility of discussing this issue after the Greek Cypriot side's EU membership on 1 May 2004 has also disappeared. They were already determined to use the advantage of membership for their own goods, that is, a unitary state system and Greeks who would be the sole voice in the system (Hoffmeister, 2006).

This scheme, which was shaped by the third version of the plan after subjected to some regulations, did not follow a picture that is too distant from the positions of the parties but still left it confronted with a difficult picture to accept. Another important factor in the negativities in this picture was the presidential election of the Greek Cypriot Administration that took place in 16 February 2003. This choice ran back and forth between Tassos Papadopoulos, who was the former EOKAist and from the centre-right tradition, and Clerides, who was moderate to the plan and never completely refused. Describing his campaign as a change ticket, Papadopoulos won the sympathy of the people only with the Annan Plan statements and entered the election far ahead of other candidates. Due to the sacrifices confirmed by Clerides in the plan, Papadopoulos had conducted the election with a campaign that was far from compromising. He conducted his election campaign as 'NO to the Annan Plan'

entirely, and with earning 51% of the votes, he relied on the success of the campaign since it made a huge sound on Greek Cypriots (Anastasiou, 2008; Ihlas Haber Ajansı, 2008).

The Secretary-General submitted the revision, called Annan Plan III, to the parties on 26 February 2003 and awaited the leaders to The Hague for a quintet meeting with Guarantors on 10 March 2003. No progress was made, except for the promises of the leaders on the continuation of the negotiations. When The Hague negotiations, which lasted for about three weeks, came to a stalemate, the Secretary-General ended the negotiation process and touched on this issue in his report published as a UN document, as well as making statements against the Turkish Cypriots. In fact, separate and simultaneous referenda would produce the result of the people's will, but the ideas of both leaders had an undeniable impact on their people. As the biggest example; while there was a Greek leader who was very optimistic about the plan and a Turkish leader who was very concerned, there was now a Greek leader who was very pessimistic about the plan and a Turkish community who was inclined to look favourably on the plan. It is possible to say that the roles have changed. The statements of Papadopoulos to the press also confirmed his approach to the plan (Olgun, 2020).

Following the intervening time, unrealizable requests, and the fruit of the leaders' approach to the plan, the Secretary-General prepared the final version, the fifth version of the plan. The negotiations started on the island and moved to Bürgenstock, Switzerland, witnessed the final form of the Annan plan, and ended on 24-31 March 2004 (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, n.d.).

The Annan Plan referendum was held in the Republic of Cyprus and the non-recognized TRNC on 24 April 2004. Turkey and its future EU membership could have ended almost half of the main issues like demilitarization, property ownership, guarantorship, and residency restrictions. Separate and simultaneous referendums showed that only 24% of the votes came from the Greeks in favour of the plan. On the other side, for Turkish Cypriots, the rate of the plan supporters was 65%. In spite of the yes-vote, while Turkish Cypriots, not being included within the European Union membership, the Greek Cypriots, on 1 May 2004, became the member of the

European Union in qua of the Republic of Cyprus despite the no-vote (Sözen, 2008, p. 90).

4.3. Up-to-date Negotiation Process

After the referendum, negotiations were suspended for a while. One year after the referendum, as a result of the election held in TRNC, Mehmet Ali Talat came to the head of state, who was the supporter of the plan as Prime Minister. Even though there were cuts between 2004 and 2018, the negotiations continued intensely. The point made by the Secretary-General in his report was the necessity for peace on the Island is political equality and partnership, and ensuring this, is the permanent solution of Cyprus.

In 2006, that is, the process of July 8, a consensus was desired to be reached on the basis of concise issues, but a starting point could not be established. The agreement on the establishment of technical committees was the only positive news from this meeting. The technical committees gathered as a result of the appointments made by Talat and Papadopoulos and started approaching the issues to establish a basis for negotiations with full-fledged policies. When the technical committees served no benefit in 2006, the negotiations were delayed for a year until Demetris Christofias acceded to the head in 2008 with the slogans of reunification and negotiation and based his election campaign on his warm promises.

As soon as Christofias came to power, the first action taken in the first meeting was to form technical committees in March 2008. Following the agreement, inter-communal negotiations would be initiated upon the results of the technical committees. The issues were handled in separate departments formed under the name of technical committees. Thus, after a period of 4 months, the negotiation process started again in September 2008. Also, the negotiations revived four years later.

According to the agreed decision, the common ideal of both sides was to negotiate on a bi-communal and bi-zonal Federation. Political equality, states with equal status, and a single international identity were essential and non-negotiable. Single sovereignty and single citizenship were found appropriate in principle, and their applicability in practice remained open to discussion throughout the negotiations. The main issues of the negotiations carried out by Alexander Downer,

Special Adviser of the new Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was; Governance and Power Sharing, Security and Guarantees, European Union, Territorial issues, Property, and finally the Economy.

During the negotiations, which continued from 2008 to 2010 until TRNC Presidential elections, no progress was made on the Property, Territory, and Security and Guarantees issues. On other issues, the parties provided a joint text as a result of intense consultation. Ban Ki-moon, who visited the Island before TRNC entered the election process, expressed his views on intensifying the necessary efforts to make the process more beneficial for the parties and to reach a solution eventually. Derviş Eroğlu, who succeeded Talat in April 2010, agreed with Ban Ki-moon's opinion, and he wished to continue the negotiations from where the parties left off. Eroğlu also stated that TRNC would adhere to rapprochement arguments.

Eroğlu-Christofias negotiations started in November 2010 under the supervision of the Secretary-General and lasted until January 2012. Tripartite meetings, unorderly, were placed three times in New York and twice in Geneva. The negotiations were suspended due to the limited progress achieved and the Greek side's reluctance on a high-level meeting in which the Guarantor states would also participate. Greek Cypriots attitude was reasonable, on account of Turkey keeping the agenda busy on its relations with the EU, namely the accession negotiations, since 2005. The Republic of Cyprus was to hold the rotating presidency of the European Union in 2012. Another reason that will be among the explanations of their reluctance to high-level negotiations was that they use this occasion as a trump card for their benefit (KKTC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2014).

Since the length of time one leader negotiating with another leader corresponded to almost one Presidential term, each new leader took a different amount of duration to adapt the negotiations. Therefore, the reflection of opinions of leaders to the Cyprus Problem carried the negotiation process to different dimensions.

Negotiations started in February 2014; one year after Nicos Anastasiades took the office. The two leaders launched a joint text in the presence of the Secretary-General. Also, the official negotiators of the parties built cross-visits to the motherlands, Turkey and Greece. In the face of the Greek Cypriots' reluctance to negotiate and

their intention to move backwards, the Turkish Cypriots continued to be constructive and maintained their determined will for a settlement.

In September 2014, while a fundamental consensus was reached to enter the next stage of the negotiations, which had previously been brought to a certain point, the Greek Cypriots started off offshore drilling explorations in their so-called license zones. As a natural response, when the TRNC manifested and expressed that they would counterplot to safeguard their natural rights arising from the Law of the Sea, Greek Cypriot Administration tried to utilize this manifesto in their favour as the way out of the negotiations.

Natural gas has also been a critical aspect of the problem since the 2000s when the Greek Cypriot Administration tried to share the Eastern Mediterranean through agreements bravely. Natural Gas was not considered as a main issue of the problem at first, but it started to be operated frequently as a political element since the early 2000s.

In particular, the Greek Cypriot administration's plans to capture the Eastern Mediterranean began to be realized with the agreement put signature in 2003. The Greek administration, which made one-hand agreements on behalf of the whole island, made agreements with Egypt in 2003, with Lebanon in 2007, and with Israel in 2010. These agreements include the issue of Mediterranean sovereignty, Exclusive Economic Zone, oil exploration, and such as issues. This was a raw dash on sharing the Eastern Mediterranean with the other states. Increasing moves over the years have revealed that the issue of natural resources would be a ripe and irreversible problem. Physical mobility, which occurred with the increasing importance of the Eastern Mediterranean region, indicated that the Greek Cypriot Administration ignoring the existence and the rights of Turkey and TRNC on the Island (Olgun, 2020).

On the basis of the new representation in the Annan Plan, the issue of natural resources was left to the judgment of the joint parliament. For this reason, the unilateral activities carried out by the Greek side performed a disservice to the unfinished negotiation process. International law requires equal treatment for both sides. So, the parties should be weighted equally, the same wavelength.

4.3.1. Crans Montana

2015 was the first year when official negotiations resumed, which later would take the parties to the International Cyprus Conference in Switzerland. Mustafa Akıncı became the new President of TRNC in the 2015 presidential elections. The leaders were prepared themselves in full concentration for the negotiations. Towards the first half of 2016, while there have been substantial improvements in Economic issues and European Union issues, the differences of opinion on Governance and Power Sharing issues have continued. The Property issue was also still one of the biggest obstacles in front of the negotiations. Other issues, such as the Security and Guarantees, Territorial issues, were left for the homestretch of the negotiations.

The leaders who met with Ban Ki-moon in Mont Pelerin, Switzerland, could not meet on a common ground and 2016 continued on the same course without any progress. In Mont Pelerin, Greek Cypriots have adopted an attitude against political equality, rotating presidency, the concessions made on the property issue, flexible approach to the territory issue. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots was ready to progress but they highlighted the importance of political equality and rotating presidency since the soul of the Federation was to share the power (the prosperity and wealth, and governance).

The year 2017, which was a total product of two years of intensive effort and the convergence arguments before, was very important for the conclusion of the negotiations. In January 2017, the negotiations arrived at a critical verge. The first high-level meeting was held in Geneva with the participation of the Guarantor countries. Secretary-General Special Representative Espen Barth Eide stated that there is a positive atmosphere between the parties. Suddenly, in February, the Greek Cypriot Parliament approved to commemorate the Enosis Plebiscite in Greek Cypriot schools. The negotiations stopped until June 2017 due to the Greek Cypriot Parliament's tidings that would give some turbulence for the negotiations somewhat.

In the first week of June, Secretary-General Guterres hosted the leaders in New York, and from this meeting, a decision came out to hold a summit on 28 June 2017. At the summit held in Crans Montana between 28 June and 7 July 2017, the parties

prepared their positions by taking the 'package solution' approach of Secretary-General Guterres as a guide. Issues sorted out under 5 headings, and these were; Political Equality, Territory, Property, Equivalent Treatment, and lastly Security and Guarantees (KKTC Dışışleri Bakanlığı, 2017; Akıncı, 2017, 3:58-4:22).

The system envisioned by the United Nations was, bi-zonal and bi-communal Federal system to be established on equality, freedom, and security, which parties familiar before.

In the issue of political equality, the intention was to break Greeks' disbelief in the rotating presidency. The United Nations expressed rotational presidency should no longer be a problem in the issue of Political Equality (Akıncı, 2017, 5:10-5:22).

On the subject of Territorial Adjustments, a map arrangement would be made, in the form that the Greek Cypriots desired but the Turkish Cypriots predicted. Thus, the territorial expectations of Greek Cypriots would meet, and the issue of Territorial Adjustments would eliminate (Akıncı, 2017, 4:45-5:10).

The United Nations has reaffirmed its belief that Equivalent Treatment is an issue included in the package and that it will reach a solution with this package, as discussed in 1960, 1992 and 2010 (Most Favoured Nation)(Akıncı, 2017, 5:59-6:35).

The United Nations envisaged that the ideal would be possible with two different regimes in the Property issue. The United Nations envisaged that the user right should be protected in properties that will remain in the North, Turkish Constituent State of Cyprus. In areas to be subject to territorial adjustments and left to the Greek Cypriot Constituent State, it envisaged a regime in which the rights of the former owners should be protected (Akıncı, 2017, 5:22-5:57).

The Security and Guarantees issue has been one of the most discussed issues for years, and parties almost never came close to each other in this issue. For this reason, it took up too much space in the summit. The United Nations tried to bring the parties closer to each other with their propositions. One of the propositions by the United Nations was to activate fresh mechanisms. Since mutual convergence could not be achieved in the present Security and Guarantees system, the United Nations envisaged that parties could resolve the Security and Guarantees issue with an alternative and new system. It was envisaged that a numerical reduction in the

presence of soldiers would be a reasonable step towards a solution. Except this, whether the remaining soldiers would return the motherland altogether or some of them would continue to stay on the Island would be discussed in a separate meeting with the participation of the Prime Ministers of the Motherlands (Akıncı, 2017, 6:37-8:02).

The prepared proposals, on the basis of a total package solution, made the course of the summit difficult due to mutual differences of opinion. The Turkish Cypriots prepared their proposals, guided by the total package, made arrangements so that compromise could be achieved, and acted in accordance with the requirement of the solution. While the Greek Cypriots insisted on the rejection of the rotational presidency, after a certain extent, they stipulated to link this issue with the issue of Territorial Adjustments and the issue of Security and Guarantees. The underlying cause for this effort was to impose the map that they offered, to make the Turkish Cypriots accept the territory which they wished to take, and to make the Turkish Cypriots accept the idea of 'zero.' The idea of zero has been a living request almost since the negotiations started. The idea of zero proposes demilitarization of the island and no Guarantee, which numerically means zero soldiers and zero Guarantees (Akıncı, 2017, 0:17-35:56).

Turkish Cypriots approach to the property issue was to focus economic dimension and the peace of the people. The focus was on the people of the Island not being victims. Therefore, according to the Turkish Cypriots, a solution had to be brought in which the people would not be irritated, but the Greeks would also be satisfied. At places to stay in the South, the rights of the people who lost their property in the South were looked after, while the peace of the people in the North was discussed in places to stay in the North. An uncertain approach would affect the entire area and create an uneasiness both economically and spiritually. However, Greek Cypriots wished to leave the issue to European Union case law (Akıncı, 2017).

Consequently, all the steps taken have remained unsolved as of the point reached. The Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, closed the negotiations without an agreement. Due to the Greek Cypriot side's remain firm from both the issue of Security and Guarantees and the total approach of the package, International Cyprus Conference in Crans Montana was closed (Guterres, 2017).

CHAPTER FIVE

5. THE ALTERNATIVE: RISING TWO-STATE SOLUTION

The substance, method, and UN mediation of the negotiations began to be a question mark as no result could be achieved in the talks that have been going on between the two peoples since 1968 (Akgün, 2018, p. 97). Upon the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey positioning the argument for a Two-State solution to Cyprus negotiations, alternatives written for resolving the Cyprus problem increased in the academic community. The Cyprus problem, which has caused great debate in international relations studies, also preoccupied the question of whether the problem is structural or not. At this point, it would be worthwhile to look at some of the explanations and speeches made by the politicians, political analysts, scholars, negotiators and journalists.

There is, of course, no single reason why the Cyprus negotiations are inadequate/failed to resolve the issue in the light of historical assessment. However, the tendency toward the Two-State solution model and analysing the underlying causes of this tendency with the discourses created by the parties would be an essential approach to making a healthy inference.

Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs (FM) of the Republic of Turkey, who issued statements after the Crans Montana summit (Hürriyet, 2017);

"Turkey and the TRNC put utmost efforts to seek a lasting and sustainable solution to the Cyprus issue through the last ten-day negotiation process, yet the process remained fruitless due to the uncompromising behaviour of the Greek Cypriot side."

Following his statement, Çavuşoğlu added that;

"This negotiation process, sponsored by the UN, has lost its validity, and the process that has ended with the same result for years can no longer contribute/benefit the settlement."

Çavuşoğlu finalized his speech by pointing out that;

"It was the final conference both for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots retain their 'zero soldiers, zero guarantees' position on guarantees and Turkish troops on the island. As a result, withdrawing Turkish troops from the Island and terminating Turkey's guarantee is not an acceptable approach for either the Turkish Cypriots or us. From the outset to the final day, they kept the same approach."

Issuing such a statement on the collapsed Cyprus conference meant blaming the Greek Cypriot side entirely. This discourse, laying the groundwork for alternatives, marked the beginning of a new era in the Cyprus negotiations, at least for some of the parties.

On 2017, the President of the TRNC at the time, Mustafa Akıncı, also touched upon essential arguments in his speeches after the collapsed Cyprus Conference in Crans Montana (Olgun, 2020, p. 235);

"The map issue was discussed when we were in Geneva. Greek Cypriot side thought we wouldn't be able to take firm action, but the map was there, in response Greece asked for a break and left. Turkey has proven that they tolerate demonstrating flexibility in a way that does not jeopardize the security of Turkish Cypriots while also adopting a strategy fit for the current situation.

Regrettably, no decision was reached. They need to be determined about their desire. Either we shall meet politically under one roof, or if their desire does not match this, if they could not internalize 'being equal' as we experienced in the Annan Plan, as we experienced in Crans-Montana, we will then have no other choice. Therefore, two independent states will take root side by side and continue on their path. I see no other option."

On the other side, President Anastasiades denied the narratives targeting the Greek Cypriot side for the collapsed Cyprus Conference in Crans Montana, construed as 'not reflecting the reality'. At first, he denied the narratives but later when his former advisor Makarios Drousiotis also blamed his own President for the failure of Crans Montana, Anastasiades admits the Two-State solution discussion between him and Turkish FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu (Bilge, 2021). This is also backed by Anastasiades' comments being issued in 2018 following the Crans Montana negotiations: He at first favoured a two-state solution, later a confederation, and eventually a flexible and decentralised federation for Cyprus (Boyras, 2022).

Jack Straw, who served as the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary during the Annan Plan years, thinks that the Federation model will not be suitable for the existing status quo. He also emphasizes that TRNC fulfils all the characteristics for existence as a state however is not even recognized as a state by the international community (BRT, 2021).

The member of the European Parliament, Niyazi Kızılyürek, also stated in one of his interviews; the more I believe the historical necessity of the Federation, the more I believe its sociological foundations are diminishing every day (Akansoy & Kızılyürek, 2016).

It is particularly significant to consider whether these discourses, which occurred during the era when the two-state solution model mushroomed as a proposal, have gained popular traction in public, given that the Two-State solution is not endorsed by either the Greek Cypriot Administration or Greece. The people's will toward the Two-State solution model is at least as crucial as the solution model itself. According to Professor I. William Zartman, other determinants are as weighty as the substance in the resolution processes. Two of these are the terms and timing of the resolution process (Zartman, 2001). The outcomes of the simultaneous referendum in 2004 illustrate that whatever the negotiated solution model is, it must first be espoused by the people. In other words, are Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots ready for an alternative model to the Federation? Do they think reunification is possible? Do they believe the terms of the federation exist? Or, in other words, do they think it is the right time for a Two-State solution?

Some of the questions in the public survey conducted by Gezici Research Company in January 2020 reveal concrete results in measuring the pulse of the Turkish Cypriots. The first of the survey questions was "What kind of solution proposal should be negotiated for the Cyprus Problem?". Accordingly, 81.3% of the respondents, that is, the majority of them, are in favour of the two-state solution model in the Cyprus Problem. The Two-State solution, which leaves behind the options such as Federation and Confederation in the percentile, shows that the public now believes that a new path should be tried in the negotiations. "Do you believe there will be an agreement between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus?" 84.2% of those who answered the question answered: "I don't believe". It

appears that the participants believe a solution that would bring peace to the island will not be achieved with their neighbours (Gezici Araştırma, 2020).

Another poll conducted by Interpeace has more or less the same reaction. According to opinion poll data collected by Interpeace in 2010; the framework of a settlement for Cyprus should be a unitary state for Greek Cypriots, with a substantial vote of 92%, Two-States for Turkish Cypriots, with a substantial vote of 90% (Olgun, 2020, p. 304).

The findings of the polls illustrate that a considerable amount of the peoples of Cyprus are exhausted. Yet, there is a Turkish Cypriot newly elected President, Ersin Tatar, who determined to break the traditional position of the UN. He himself winning the election was a concrete example of Gezici Research Company's poll that the belief in the Federation is decreasing. But why did the UN parameters fail so many times?

On 29 August 2004, a Greek Cypriot political analyst Nicos A. Pittas stated that (Olgun, 2004);

"Even more Catholic than the Pope, our rulers is ostensibly trying to establish a federal government. Still, in reality, they want to achieve a structure that is a unitary state that accepts the majority of the Greek Cypriot community in case of any disagreement.

It's easy to label the Annan Plan defective. If the Cyprus problem still exists today, we could hold the leadership of our government coalition responsible for this. Federation would be achieved by the commitment of our leaders to a federal solution. In such a case, after the birth of the United Cyprus Republic, all the practical problems would have been overcome by negotiation, if any."

Professor Birol Yeşilada and Professor Ahmet Sözen analyse the outcomes of the post Annan Plan period as (Sözen, 2007, p. 163);

"Seeking a non-cooperative strategy was the absolute outcome of Greek and Turkish Cypriots' aimed at unilateral gaining instead of a consensus and internal and international factors creating a root for the aim. The EU's assurance of Greek Cypriots' membership, independent of how the Cyprus conflict is settled, acts as a bonus that drives a non-cooperative approach. The Turkish side's strict approach, on the other hand, is shaped by both Turkey's overwhelming military supremacy in the area and its consistent backing for itself."

The parties, who could not reach a consensus even on the root causes and beginnings of the Cyprus problem, have led to a dilemma about how the Federation would be, as many of the issues envisaged by the agreement have not been fulfilled yet. According to Tamçelik, a Turkish Cypriot Professor and political advisor, the most important issue here is the necessity of distinguishing what is meant by the Federation. Is this Federation a 'community' consisting of two peoples (Greek and Turkish Cypriots) or a 'formation' constituted by two political unions (Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) and TRNC)? In the first case, the Greek Cypriot interpretation is federal centralism. In the second case, there is an ethnically segregated dual entity that Turkish Cypriots consider (Tamçelik, 2008, p. 101). At this point, when the theses developed from the perspective of both parties examined in depth, it is understood how contradictory they are to each other, from the deep gaps created by the explanations made for the same concept and the meanings they understood. One of the main elements to reconsider while analysing the Cyprus negotiations, therefore, has to be more realistic about whether the two communities are genuinely willing, faithful, and determined to live together under one roof.

Scholars are divided, with some seeing the Two-State solution as a requirement of the status quo, while others still hold out hope for reunification.

Nathalie Tocci, a senior researcher and advisor to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, emphasizes that the parties in Cyprus benefit from the status quo and claims that reaching an agreement would necessitate painful concessions for both sides, which neither is willing to make. At the same time, Tocci maintains that an agreement in Cyprus is not plausible under existing conditions and that the hunt for a federal solution has come to an end (Olgun, 2020, p. 313). As TRNC President Ersin Tatar stated that, the conjuncture has changed (Kıbrıs Postası, 2021).

In return, Professor James Ker-Lindsay believes that the two communities being separated is unhealthy. Militarized boundary leaves a false impression about the Cyprus negotiations, and Security Council Resolutions address a federal structure. Moreover, considering that Turkish Cypriots are isolated, it is dangerous to speak about the status quo benefits for both sides (Ker-Lindsay, 2022, 25:10-32:05).

As Kudret Özersay, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2018-2020, stated, it won't be beneficial for the parties to re-negotiate the Federation, which is a sharing model, without a change in the existing perception (Özersay, 2020, 3:44-4:23).

The Cyprus negotiations were conducted under six headings, these are, respectively, future political system (Governance-Power Sharing), Territory, Property, Security and Guarantees, Economy, and the EU. An image was drawn as the parties reached a consensus on the heading of the future political system. Nevertheless, political equality, the international identity of the state, and single citizenship, which can be categorized as the sub-arguments of the future political system, are the red-lines that overshadowed reaching a consensus. This friction derives from the position of the state to be created in the international arena, the ambiguity about the place of different communities under the roof of this state, and the difference in the approaches and perspectives of the parties. Therefore, in Cyprus negotiations that have been going on since 1968, while a consensus has been reached, relatively, on three of the six topics mentioned above, chronic disagreements are observed on the topics of the future political system (Governance-Power sharing), Territory, and Property. The main reasons underlying chronic disputes on these issues are identity differences and the emergence of security concerns arising from them. This illustrates that the parties disagree on the form of government. It also reveals deep prepossession about reuniting the two communities under the roof of one state will ensure, to what extent, sustainable peace (Akgün, 2018, p. 97).

The parties also hold an absolute disagreement on Security and Guarantees. The main reason is the Turkish military forces that came to the Island to eliminate the coup in 1974 against the Republic of Cyprus and to ensure the security of life and territorial integrity of the Cypriot people pose a security threat to the Greek Cypriots. In other words, while Turkish Cypriots were unsure of their safety in 1974, this state of affairs gained validity for Greek Cypriots as well with the presence of the Turkish army after 1974.

It is near impossible to provide an example in which conflicts originating from national differences have been resolved in a sustainable fashion in the Federal

system. It is also very unlikely that multinational federations will last forever. When examined on this ground, federations that emerged with demands from federated states could be relatively long-lasting, while federations established with pressure or incentives from foreign powers or international organizations cannot continue for a long time and could be resulted in secession. Canada and Belgium are rare examples that unite communities under the umbrella of a multinational federation, although they differ dramatically in terms of ancestry, language, and culture. Moreover, even in such positive examples, as in the Canada-Quebec issue, demands for independence can occur. It is also present in countries such as Australia, the US, and Switzerland that have established/adopted the federation culture for a long time. Some federations, on the other hand, are countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Mali, and Malaysia, whose conditions for obtaining independence were attached to having a federal structure by the colonial powers. Since gaining independence in these countries would be achieved when a federal state is established, the federal structure has been adopted without considering the people's will (Işıksal & Gökçekuş, 2021, p. 203; Olgun, 2020, p. 294).

The common feature here is; Multinational federations enable their constituent peoples to maintain their identity and collective political equality while ensuring that their citizens have multiple allegiances, both national commitment to the federation and nationalist loyalty to their regional homeland. Therefore, today, multinational federations are a management pattern that offers the opportunity to reconcile identity conflicts with power sharing and regional self-government regulations (Burgess & Pinder, 2011).

The most phenomenon examples to be given of unsuccessful federal structures are undoubtedly Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia became two independent states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Czechoslovakia was also founded by neither Czechs nor Slovaks. It was the victorious states in World War I who drew the borders of Czechoslovakia. Czechs were highly educated, more populous, and economically more stable than Slovaks. Moreover, Czechs also had representatives in the parliament. The political consciousness of Slovaks was lower than that of Czechs. Therefore, when political movements began to develop among the Slovaks, one group wanted unity with the Czechs, while another favoured a

separate Slovak nation. As a result, they went to part. The territory of the country was shared by law. The goods were remunerated at a two to one ratio. The reason was Czechs comprised 10 million of the country and Slovaks of 5 million. Both countries were not heirs to Czechoslovakia, so Czechoslovakia dissolved without heirs. Political analysts see the current situation as the most constructive period in Czech-Slovak relations. Currently, there is no organ in favour of reunification in both countries. Furthermore, economic relations between both countries are advanced (Subaşı, 2010).

The aim of the establishment of the state of Yugoslavia was a Yugoslav identity consisting of Montenegrins, Croats, and Bosnians. The disintegration process of Yugoslavia is primarily related to the beginning of the economic-political change. Due to the destabilization of the Federal structure of Yugoslavia and the rising ethnic nationalism movement, declarations of independence began to occur in succession. One of the main factors in the failure of these two federation examples is that they are forcibly kept together with the elements of anxiety, ideology, and military power against possible external factors. For this reason, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were unique examples of how different ethnic and religious groups could survive together within the Federal structure with sustainable peace and harmony during the resolution processes until the 1990s. However, after the 1990s, with the global and regional power balances as the changing international conjuncture realities, it has been among the rooted examples of unsuccessful federal structures and conflicts resolved by disintegration (İşıksal & Gökçekuş, 2021, p. 204).

It is possible to observe similar shades in the Cyprus problem. The decolonization, the Cold War, and the emerging nation-states after the Second World War have resulted in an outcome beyond unification with homelands that could be 'attractive' for both communities in Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus negotiations led to the discussion of an alternative, which was not the first choice of the two communities. The first choice of both communities was a state structure they desired. Federation aimed at a structure in which Greek Cypriots were close to a unitary state and or dominated by Greek Cypriot dominance in the existing Republic, while Turkish Cypriots aimed at a structure established by two partner states based on political equality. Despite this, both communities have drawn an image that does

not reject the federal model, focuses on the theses they developed while negotiating the Federation, and tries to maximize their interests. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a common perspective and desire between the parties regarding the federation. In addition, the lack of a guarantee that one community would not dominate the other and the lack of mutual understanding, tolerance, and sympathy would bring failure in the Federation model. At this point, there has been intense insecurity in inter-communal relations in Cyprus. This situation gave rise to a crisis before and after the negotiations. Due to the events that took place after the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus, the two communities could not develop close ties, instead, they distanced themselves further. This, in turn, has led to negative discourses that are far from “sharing.” The most concrete example of this is the failure of a common identity and the absence of stable relations even after all this time together (Akgün et al., 2013, pp. 109-118; Olgun, 2020, pp. 308-311).

Professor Will Kymlicka, a political philosopher, underlines that it would not be a rational approach to adapt the federal solution model to every inter-communal conflict just because it has been tried before and has been successful (Lehning et al., 1998, pp. 109-139).

Small states can make a defence partnership to reduce or eliminate the external threat pressure they experience, or they are capable of doing this by coming together under the roof of a federation. For this to happen, communities that come together need to see a common external threat. However, from the point of view of Cyprus, aside from the common external threat, both communities see each other's existence as a threat and an enemy to them. As stated above in the paragraph on Security and Guarantees, Turkish Cypriots are concerned about the realization of the Enosis thesis, whereas Greek Cypriots see the presence of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus as a threat to them. While the focal problems experienced by the parties are discussed above, the 1974 example on Security and Guarantees is only one of the deepened problems existing regarding the threat.

To realize Federations, communities must also need each other, apart from being united against external threats. In this way, the fact that they need each other in terms of economic, trade, security, and similar aspects and that they will meet this with mutual relations and commitment can bring communities together under the

roof of the federation. However, being recognized in the international community as the Republic of Cyprus and representing the whole island as *de jure*, the Greek Cypriot side can establish diplomatic relations and carry out commercial activities with any country she wishes. Owing to its EU membership, it has rights far ahead of Turkish Cypriots, and in this respect, there is a lack of equal need to establish a partnership. On the other end, the *de facto* TRNC is not recognized by any country except Turkey and has an international legitimacy problem (Olgun, 2020, pp. 294-320).

The number, size, and equal distribution of the communities in Federations are also of great importance. In the federative structure, in which at least three communities are involved, there should be no absolute losers or winners in any dispute, and no community should have and or gain the entire State structure. The excess number of members in the system would ensure an effective common mind in the Federation, and by having 'multiplicity,' the absolute gain of any member would be prevented, thus, the grouping may happen against the member - who achieved an absolute gain - would disappear since the formed system would not allow such a circumstance. Thus, since one of the federated states would not overpower the others, an additional security environment is generated organically. Due to the bi-communal nature of the Federation model being negotiated in Cyprus, the fact that one party has a larger population than the other may result in a potential dominance of one party over the other in a potential agreement, which may produce problems concerning the agreement's applicability in Cyprus. Professor Tözün Bahçeli and Professor Sid Noel argue the difficulty of referring to a dual-identity federal partnership in communities with power asymmetry (in status, economic power, population). According to them, power asymmetry draws attention to the fact that the strong party may try to gain superiority over time while the weaker may seek to leave the partnership. Both communities' multidimensional disparity is the answer to many leading causes of why so many previous initiatives aimed at achieving a federal approach have failed. From a unique standpoint, Greek Cypriots are deeply concerned about demography in Cyprus. Since they have historically been acclimated to majority rule in the functioning of their system of government, any central government of the federation that does not respect the majority's right to govern is intrinsically undemocratic - rendering dual-majority minority veto decrees in theory untenable. Practically

speaking, a federation is understood differently between majorities and minorities, and they naturally possess individual objectives and primacies (Ker-Lindsay et al., 2015, pp. 41-46). Bahçeli and Noel also attribute the endless negotiations to the lack of a motivating factor (driving force) and incentive for the parties to abandon the opportunities offered by the status quo and move on to a new rearrangement with an ambiguous outcome (Olgun, 2020, p. 308).

According to Professor Clement H. Dodd, a federation may start as a union of states, but given that the federal government often performs substantial and vital duties, such as military, health care, and economic growth, it quickly generates extensive and sustained attention, publicly, across the federation. Another element that contributes to the federal centre's prominence is since it has an extensive variety of crucial operations; it must also have the financial funds necessary to carry them successfully. Taxation and funds in the federations become more of an issue. Federal states with a severe tendency to affect and even erode the state and provincial autonomy areas are federal states whose central institutions are exponentially indexed to support from the public. Even in a comparatively homogeneous country, such as the US, this could ground for alarm. Professor Clement H. Dodd makes a solid point on this subject (Dodd, 1999);

“Though a federal state's propensity to lessen state or provincial autonomy could exacerbate inter-communal tensivity, as soon as the federal authorities have gained a majority backing across the federation, it is challenging to embrace a substantial amount of local independence. This challenge could indeed be exceptionally severe in a bi-communal federal structure.”

Discourses such as "equal sovereignty" and "single sovereignty", which have become more frequent among the parties recently, also enrich the difficulties of a possible settlement in the Cyprus problem. Although it is accepted that the source of sovereignty is two communities in Cyprus, namely Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, it is another factor that strengthens the possibility of the dominance of one over the other due to the power asymmetry between the two communities. However, it is worth remembering that there is no single sovereignty concept in the founding logic of multinational federal partnerships and contemporary democratic governance approaches (Dodd, 1999).

Another crucial element in the sustainability of a federation is geopolitics. Within this element, the geography where Cyprus is located and the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, both throughout history and today, are the issues that a possible Federation would give a real test. The relations between Turkey and Greece in the region, extending to Russia and the US, and Turkey-France relations and other regional relations within the scope of exploration activities for hydrocarbon resources in the region cause the mobility in the Eastern Mediterranean even tenser (Işıksal & Gökçekuş, 2021, p. 207-208).

Looking at the pre and post-Crans Montana periods, it is possible to witness the sensitivity of regional and international actors to Cyprus negotiations due to the energy reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. Such "side payments" after the failed Annan Plan and Crans Montana point to the importance of perpetual peace and stability in the region.

As in the case of Czechoslovakia, even if the two states solved their problems by secession, their economic relations were quite intertwined. Ultimately, the reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean serve the interests of both states, and foreign investors do not want to find themselves in a conflict in this region and risk their investments in an unstable area. At this point, both communities will need each other equally. For this reason, as Özersay expressed, the parties should find pragmatic ways that would not harm each other's status. However, determining the legal status of the Turkish Cypriots in the international arena could be a solution to the stalemate in the Eastern Mediterranean so that these resources, which attract the attention of every country in the region, do not destabilize the region (Özersay, 2021).

On the other hand, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis' hard-hitting speeches and the escalation of tensions between the two NATO Allies are missing the opportunity for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean (Mitsotakis, 2021);

“We rely on our allies and strategic partners, namely the United States and EU member states, to maintain our mutual beliefs and goals. We are proud of the vast Greek Cypriot and Greek community abroad for the continuation to transmit this noble cause and the principles and ideals that Cyprus and Greece have always championed.

Greece has started and is actively involved in the further deepening and expanding of our multilateral, multisectoral partnerships with Egypt, Israel, and other countries of the wider neighborhood in the Eastern Mediterranean, in tight collaboration and cooperation with Cyprus as well as with the bona fide and productive assistance from the US.

It is already well known how crucial these ties are to both regional and international security and stability. Advancing our shared vision of the Eastern Mediterranean as a region of peace, security, and growth necessitates both the US-Greek strategic ties and the US-Cyprus stronger relationship.”



CHAPTER SIX

6. CONCLUSION

Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who have a bad reputation in managing their political dissimilarities, are the founding partners of the Republic of Cyprus, born in 1960. Due to the aforementioned political dissimilarities, it has only lived three years as a bi-communal Republic. Turkish Cypriots, who were politically isolated from the administration and Power sharing three-four years after the establishment of the Republic, completed the physical division in 1974. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots sat at the negotiating table to maintain relations on the basis of the Federation in late 1970s, despite all the tensions and not being able to go beyond their positions.

The federal State system, which is a product of the negotiations carried out with the parameters of the UN in Cyprus, has the characteristics of transforming social difference into a reunion under the federal roof, and this has led to the acceptance of federalism as a promising system for the permanent solution of the Cyprus problem. However, accepting the Federation as the ideal formula in terms of applicability in theory and practice has not been successful in solving the Cyprus problem that has been on the agenda for many years. The differences in opinion in practice and the parties not accomplishing generous concessions in the name of a solution caused the federal State system to be no longer seen as a solution to the Cyprus Problem for Turkish Cypriots after the Crans Montana summit. This brings to mind how long the forced Federation can live.

A negotiated bi-communal and bi-zonal federation form for Cyprus is not an ineffectual model, and it has a directly proportional relationship with ensuring an equitable and lasting peace if it is adopted properly. However, considering the course of the negotiations and today's Cyprus, it is doubtless apparent that the road to a settlement is blocked. The solid evidence of this rhetoric is that the federation-based Annan Plan, which is the most advanced and comprehensive plan ever put forward for a solution, was rejected by the Greek Cypriots with a substantial vote of 76%.

While simultaneously flipping the blame to the opposing party, political elites are the ones who seek to emphasize how cooperative and open-minded they are. Interestingly, political elites frequently underline their desire for settlement, and the refusal of their compatriots across the divide, in their everyday discourses. This is highly required to illustrate to the locals that they are fully devoted to the 'national cause.' Yet, it also softens outsiders as it demonstrates the parties' devotion to a settlement. This attitude is encouraged by the public's contingent desires for a resolution as far as it is both fair and workable, frequently without taking into account how significantly each community sees what constitutes justice and what constitutes a workable settlement.

Considering the history of the Cyprus problem and Cyprus Negotiations, handling in its simplest form, it is necessary to focus on two major headings.

All differences (ancestry, religion, language, culture) aside, the finest detail that should precisely be mentioned in the Cyprus Problem is that the belief in the roots of the problem is different. The history of the Cyprus Problem illustrates that the perspective they brought to the Federation model is shaped accordingly, as the parties position the starting point of the problem differently while negotiating a possible reconciliation. In other words, the Turkish Cypriot side accepts 1963 as the root of the problem. Turkish Cypriots, with the support of Turkey, articulate that if a Federation model is to be negotiated, it should be in a structure where there are two sovereign equal and politically equal constituent states share the administration, wealth, and prosperity. Turkish Cypriots also say that; if such a structure would not emerge, then alternative models should be discussed for the Federation. The most prominent element that distinguishes the current state of affairs from the Taksim thesis is that the negotiations, which have been held for almost 55 years, could not achieve perpetual peace, and there has been a change in the conjuncture. While on the other hand, the Greek Cypriot side accepts 1974 as the root of the problem. Greek Cypriots, with the support of Greece, say that if a Federation model is to be negotiated, it should be an independent, disconnected, bi-communal, bi-zonal Federation with the principle of single sovereignty and territorial integrity, and it should be based on the arguments drawn by the UN and accepted by the international community. While saying this, the Greek Cypriot side points to the continuation of

the current Republic of Cyprus by demanding the termination of foreign military forces in Cyprus.

The 1960 treaties emerged with the adoption of a system that would not allow any of the parties to gain primacy in the bi-communal partnership to be established. The importance of the UN as an international organization in reconciliation processes is undeniable. Nevertheless, it seems that the year 1964 and Resolution 186 left a hard-hitting impact on the history of the Cyprus problem by disrupting the political balances that made the 1960 political partnership agreement possible in Cyprus. As mentioned in the thesis, this situation can be considered as the turning point of power asymmetry because it was an important decision that resulted in favor of one side and against the other. As long as the status imbalance created by this decision continues, it would naturally be demanding to achieve peace in Cyprus that would include equal status and legitimate rights for both sides. At this point, global and regional powers should not be ignored. Since the problem has become international, global and regional power factors have acted to protect their interests rather than how the two ethnic communities can achieve sustainable peace. It should not be forgotten that international relations trends such as the era of decolonization and the Cold War were important trends that marked that century and whose effects are still felt. It would be a crucial success to reconsider resolution 186 and the environment created by this decision to establish that the relations between the two parties are not superior-subordinate and to establish the necessary balances for reconciliation in Cyprus.

When these two major headings are resolved, it will be easier to solve the subheadings related to these headings. That is, when the root perception of the problem is resolved, one of the spirals will be resolved, and the approach of the parties to any negotiated model would be different from their current attitudes. Likewise, when the political imbalance created by Resolution 186 is resolved, the approach to problems such as economic problems, the European Union, the demilitarization of the island, and natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean would completely shift. It may not be easy to progress, yet it would certainly add a new breath to the solution process.

If a new state system is to be formed in Cyprus that could glue Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in a common ground, the necessary legal and political terms must be achieved. Once these terms are met, parties would be able to reach a compromise through joint efforts. For the settlement of the Cyprus problem, devotion is the result of mutual sincerity, so real solution effort is genuinely the result of common ideals to be determined by both sides. At this point, the parties should first identify the problem rather than chasing a solution without agreeing on the problem gently. Otherwise, the Cyprus problem would remain unresolved for another half century.



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