

T. C.
ISTANBUL KÜLTÜR UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

**PARADIPLOMACY IN POST-CONFLICT FEDERAL STATES: A CASE
STUDY OF SOMALIA**

MA Thesis by
ABDISHAKUR MOHAMED WARSAME
2100008108

Department: International Relations

Program: International Relations

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nazlı Çağın BİLGİLİ

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DEDICATION

To the cherished souvenir of my late father, whose longings and memories continue to guide me.

To my mother, the beacon of wisdom and strength that has conducted me through the voyage of life.

To my sister and her husband, who have provided unwavering support and love akin to that of a second set of parents.

To my family, the existing and the soon to be joined, for their endless encouragement and belief in my dreams.



ABDISHAKUR MOHAMED WARSAME

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ÖZET

ÇATIŞMA SONRASI FEDERAL DEVLETLERDE PARADİPLOMASİ: SOMALİ ÖRNEĞİ

Abdishakur Mohamed WARSAME

Bu tez, Somali'nin karmaşık çatışma sonrası ortamında paradiplomasi fenomeninin ortaya çıkışını, gelişimini ve güncel durumunu inceleme amacına ulaşmak için ülkenin çatışma sonrası federal yapısının iç dinamiklerini kapsamlı bir şekilde analiz etmektedir. Çalışma, çeşitli akademik ve politika odaklı materyallerin nitel bir bakış açısıyla kapsamlı bir inceleme yapmakta ve El-Dessouki'nin (2018) açıklayıcı teorik çerçevesini benimseyerek yapısal iç değişkenlerin—hukuki çerçeveler, otonomi düzeyleri, hükümetler arası dinamikler ve kurumsallaşma—paradiplomasinin nasıl şekillendirdiğini detaylı bir şekilde incelemektedir. Analizin sonucu, dış politikanın yapımı ve yürütülmesinin merkezileştirilmesinin anayasal olarak belirgin olması gerçeğine rağmen, anayasal belirsizliklerin, tarihsel mirasların ve çatışma sonrası yönetim zorluklarının etkileşiminin, Federal Üye Devletlerin otonomi arzuları ile Federal Hükümetin egemenliğini koruma güdüsü arasında bir çatışma yaratarak, ulusaltı unsurlarının dışişlerinde açılımı için verimli bir zemin oluşturduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Dolayısı ile, bu tezde verilen yapısal analiz, çatışma sonrası federal ayarlar bağlamında yapısal iç değişkenlerin paradiplomasiyi şekillendirme merkezi rolünü vurgulayarak, Somali'de paradiplomasinin iç içe geçmiş boyutlarını ve parametrelerini açığa çıkarmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Federal Yapı, Paradiplomasi, Çatışma Sonrası Federalizm, Somali.

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ABSTRACT

PARADIPLOMACY IN POST-CONFLICT FEDERAL STATES: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

Abdishakur Mohamed WARSAME

In this thesis, the domestic structure of Somalia's post-conflict federal structure is comprehensively analyzed in order to reach the aim of examining the emergence, development, and current status of paradiplomacy phenomenon within the country's intricate post-conflict settings. Employing a comprehensive review of diverse academic and policy-oriented materials through a qualitative lens, the thesis adopts El-Dessouki's (2018) explanatory framework to scrutinize how domestic structural variables—legal frameworks, autonomy levels, intergovernmental dynamics, and institutionalization—shape paradiplomatic engagements. It uncovers that, notwithstanding constitutional intents to centralize foreign policy, the interplay of constitutional ambiguities, historical legacies, and post-conflict governance challenges fosters a fertile ground for subnational foreign engagements, further intensified by the friction between the Federal Member States' autonomy aspirations and the Federal Government's sovereignty assertions. Thus, the structural analysis given in this thesis, through underlining the central role of domestic structural variables in molding paradiplomacy within the context of post-conflict federal settings, unveils interconnected the dimensions and parameters of paradiplomacy in Somalia.

Keyword: Federal Structure, Paradiplomacy, Post-Conflict Federalism, Somalia.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARS	: Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
CU	: Constituent Units
FGS	: Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	: Federal Member States
HDMS	: Hizbia Digil Mirifle Somali or Hizb al-Dastuur Mustaqil al-Somal (Independent Constitutional Party of Somalia)
ICU	: Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MoU	: Memorandum of Understanding
NCA	: National Constitutional Assembly
PFC	: Provisional Federal Constitution
SACB	: Somali Aid Co-ordination Body
SDM	: Somali Democratic Movement
SNL	: Somali National League
SNM	: Somali National Movement
SPM	: Somali Patriotic Movement
SRC	: The Supreme Revolutionary Council
SRRC	: Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Committee
SSDF	: Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SYL	: Somali Youth League
TFC	: Transitional Federal Charter
TFG	: Transitional Federal Government
TFIs	: Transitional Federal Institutions
TNA	: Transitional National Assembly
TNG	: Transitional National Government
USC	: United Somali Congress

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1. INTRODUCTION

Federalism, as a system of government, possesses distinct characteristics, the foremost being the division of sovereignty between a central government, which holds state sovereignty, and subnational governments, which enjoy a degree of autonomy. This bifurcation of governing authority within the federal framework, applicable to both policy formulation and implementation, instills the system with a delicate equilibrium. On one hand, this balance may facilitates smooth governance; on the other, it may predisposes the system to potential crises. Despite the relatively less structural issues encountered in established federations, the evolvement of federalism into a mechanism for conflict resolution in various nations, including Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia—the latter being the focus of this thesis—made the post-conflict federal arrangements confront with structural challenges. These structural challenges particularly manifests in practical implementation, policy making and in the clarity of roles between different governmental tiers. For instance, a critical area where these challenges manifest is in foreign policy formulation and execution, as the involvement of subnational governments in international forums—traditionally the purview of sovereign states—raises concerns about the potential for new crises in post-conflict nations. Consequently, given that the concept of paradiplomacy, denoting the international engagement of subnational actors, has garnered significant scholarly attention within the realm of international relations (El-Dessouki, 2018; Kuznetsov, 2015), its examination within the complex and intersecting context of federal frameworks in post-conflict settings is a significant and timely scholarly endeavor. Hence, this study, focusing on a structural level analysis rather than an examination based on isolated cases, attempts to evaluate the developments and impacts of paradiplomacy within a post-conflict federal settings in Somalia, through a detailed examination of its federal structure—encompassing operational, procedural, and legislative dimensions.

The case of Somalia—transitioning from a unitary to a federal state system after enduring prolonged periods of conflict, characterized by political divisions, internal wars, and elite discord, culminating in the adoption of a federal solution in 2004—offers a unique lens to explore the emergence and influence of paradiplomacy in a post-conflict federal setting. Consequently, this research, focusing on a timeframe spanning from the formalization of the system to the present day, i.e., 2012 to 2024,

aims to dissect the dynamics of subnational entities engaging in international affairs against the backdrop of Somalia's evolving federal structure. In alignment with this aim, the research is meticulously structured to encapsulate the subtleties of Somalia's paradiplomatic activities throughout this period of transformation, elucidating the approaches through which regional states articulate their international interactions within a post-conflict federal framework.

The noteworthiness of this study is underscored by a number of significant components, essentially typified within the examination of paradiplomacy's impacts on both the sovereignty and integrity of the federal states, alongside an in-depth investigation of the unique characteristics relating to the country in question, Somalia. On the one hand, paradiplomacy challenges the traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty by presenting subnational governments as active participants on the international stage. This expansion beyond the control of central governments reflects the evolving landscape of international relations, where non-state actors assume roles traditionally reserved for nation-states, thus complicating the dynamics of foreign policy formulation and implementation in federal systems (Lequesne & Paquin, 2017). On the other hand, the examination of paradiplomacy within Somalia presents a compelling case due to the nation's intricate federal structure which—stemming from it being characterized by its multifaceted structural and operational dynamics—furnishes an exceptional setting for probing the influence of post-conflict federalism on the birth and elaboration of paradiplomatic activities. This issue with federal structure of post-conflict Somalia gains tangible significance due to the emergence of multiple instances of paradiplomacy within the Somali federal experience, where the central government's response has involved to extent of severing relations with countries that engage directly with its regions in some cases. Hence, considering the significance of paradiplomacy—ranging from theoretical presence to practical implications—this research aims to bridge the existing gap in literature pertaining to paradiplomacy within the framework of post-conflict federalism through the case of Somalia.

The focus of this thesis is guided by the central research question, which inquires, how did post-conflict federal structure impact the emergence of paradiplomacy in the post-unitary federal state of Somalia? Therefore, it aims to analyze the emergence and development of paradiplomacy in the case of Somalia's federal structure, using an

explanatory framework proposed by El-Dessouki (2018). According to this framework, the level and form of paradiplomacy are influenced by four main variables of domestic structure: legal grounds, the level of autonomy, the type of intergovernmental relations, and institutionalization. These variables are operationalized by several indicators, such as constitutional and statutory competences, decision-making, cooperative or conflictual patterns of interaction, and the existence of strategies, institutions, and offices for foreign affairs at the sub-national level. Additionally, to fulfill the thesis's aim, a comprehensive review of academic, legal, and policy materials, including books, journal articles, reports, official publications, policy papers, and news outlets, will be conducted, adopting a qualitative research methodology.

In order to achieve the objective of providing a comprehensive analysis of paradiplomacy within the framework of the federal structure in post-conflict Somalia, this thesis is structured into six chapters. After this introduction, the research moves to the second chapter which attempts to present and define the basic concepts of the studies as well as theoretical perspectives on federalism, post-conflict federalism, and finally paradiplomacy and its place in this context. Subsequently, in the third chapter, the roots of the Somali conflict are traced through providing a historical overview to understand the everchanging dynamics of Somali politics from traditional society all the way to pre-federal settings. In order to complete the background of the research and move on to the analysis, the background of the restructuring of the country following the conflict will be examined in the fourth chapter, taking into account the roots and consequences of the adoption of the federal system as a solution to the political conflict in the country, and the analysis of the federal structure itself. The fifth chapter serves as the analytical core of the thesis, conducting an in-depth examination of paradiplomacy within Somalia's federal structure post-conflict as it begins with an overview of the phenomenon in the country and then applies the previously mentioned theoretical framework to analyze the phenomenon and draw findings. In order to address the outcome of the meeting of theory with practice within the scope of the study, the conclusion, the last chapter of this thesis, will include a summary of the major findings, an emphasis on the main implications, and recommendations for further research.

2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The primary focus of this research, as seen from the introduction above, fundamentally pertains to the outcomes resulting from the intersection and interaction among various concepts. This, therefore, necessitates an initial step involving the delineation of the positions of these concepts within the conceptual framework of the literature, alongside identifying the most appropriate methodological approaches to address the core problem of the research. Consequently, this chapter, and in order to lay down conceptual and theoretical basis for studying at hand, will provide a review of related literature on the main concepts of the study. Hence, the chapter is organized into three principal sections: the first section explicates the congruences and variances between traditional federalism and post-conflict federalism; following this, there is an in-depth exploration of paradiplomacy; and finally, the chapter concludes with a scrutinization of the theoretical underpinnings.

2.1. Federalism, Post-Conflict Federalism, and Federal Policymaking

The initial step in developing the conceptual framework involves elucidating the distinctions and commonalities between post-conflict federalism—as the focus of this research—and notion of traditional federalism. Therefore, the intersection and divergence between these two concepts will be thoroughly examined in this section and, as a complementation to that, the academic discussions about federalism, conflict management as well as federal policymaking in the relevant literature will be presented.

2.1.1. Federalism vs. Post-Conflict Federalism

The discourse on federalism, a concept characterized by its multifaceted nature—encompassing constitutional, political, social, economic, cultural, legal, philosophical, and ideological dimensions—has experienced a significant evolution over time. Notably, one of the most pivotal manifestations of these changes is evident in the emergence of post-conflict federalism, a development challenges traditional perspectives deeply entrenched in the principles of classical federalism (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011; Sayid, 2021). Historically, classical federalism, with notable examples including Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States, has

emphasized the importance of shared sovereignty, constitutional arrangements, and the coordination between independent governments (Choudhry & Hume, 2011). Conversely, post-conflict federalism, which emerges as a relatively novel field of study, has gained prominence chiefly in response to the unique challenges faced by states affected by conflict, aiming not only at the traditional objectives of federalism but also at the prevention of civil wars and secession (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011).

Classical federalism, rooted in the idea of political units coming together voluntarily, rests on a foundation of collective security and economic prosperity as catalysts for forming federations (Choudhry & Hume, 2011). It involves the creation of a constitutional pact among pre-existing political units, guaranteeing the autonomy of regions within a federation and allowing them to preserve self-government, thus offering the benefits of unity without imposing uniformity on diverse populations (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). The classical model, as expounded by prominent scholars in the field of federal studies, revolves around the distribution of powers, legislative and executive authority, revenue allocation, and constitutional amendment procedures to ensure regional consent (Choudhry & Hume, 2011). In contrast, the emergence of post-conflict federalism is marked by its distinct motivations, with the primary goal being the prevention of civil war or secession rather than pursuing public accountability or state efficiency (ibid). Unlike classical federalism, post-conflict federalism often arises in the aftermath of conflicts, with internal boundaries drawn to accommodate territorially concentrated national minorities, reflecting a shift from the voluntary coming together of political units to a more coercive state-building process (Chevreau, 2017). Consequently, the literature concerning post-conflict federalism, while underscoring its potential role in mitigating political fragmentation and conflicts within divided societies, it, on the other hand, underlines the field's immense significance and the uniquely inherent challenges associated with its implementation in the aftermath of conflict (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011).

Accordingly, although a comparative analysis of classical and post-conflict federalism reveals certain parallels in systemic foundations and operational frameworks, it also unveils significant divergences in their foundational assumptions and objectives. For

instance, while classical federalism assumes the permanence of a political community formed by pre-existing units, post-conflict federalism contends with the complexities of divided societies, where ethnic and cultural differences are politically salient and persistent markers of identity (ibid). Moreover, the motivations for federal state formation differ significantly, with classical federalism driven by shared interests and economic or security gains, whereas post-conflict federalism seeks to address the painful legacy of conflicts, aiming to prevent renewed hostilities and facilitate the emergence of shared identities (Chevreau, 2017).

Thus, to sum up, the traditional discourse on federalism, in its classical form, mainly examined examples from well-established federal states such as Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States, highlighting the constituent units' voluntary "coming together" and factors such as collective security and economic prosperity as incentives for creating federations. However, the application of the accumulated knowledge from these examples to post-conflict countries and the promotion of federalism as a tool for resolving conflicts has led to a different outcome, namely: post-conflict federalism. Unlike classical federalism, which emphasizes voluntary association and shared sovereignty, post-conflict federalism shifts the focus to the necessity of peacebuilding and the specific challenges of "holding together" a divided society. The new instances of post-conflict federalism have, therefore, sparked new discussions in the literature on federalism (as will be seen in the next section) on whether federalism can be an effective way of resolving conflicts or if it will make these countries more fragmented.

2.1.2. Federal Solution and Conflict Management

In reviewing the academic discourse on federalism as a conflict resolution mechanism in post-conflict federal states, a robust theoretical debate is clearly ignited within the scholarly community. Thus, a critical outcome of the review reveals that scholars grapple with the fundamental question of whether federalism serves as a viable peacebuilding strategy or exacerbates ethnic tensions, ultimately hindering the path to stability and national unity (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). Consequently, the dichotomy presented in the literature reflects opposing perspectives, with proponents emphasizing federalism's potential to contain internal conflicts and opponents cautioning against its role in solidifying ethnic cleavages, potentially

fostering conditions conducive to secessionist movements (Brown, 2008; Chevreau, 2017; Loizides et al., 2011).

Advocates of federalism as a conflict resolution mechanism assert that it offers a pathway to stability and unity in ethnically diverse post-conflict states. Hereof, Ted Gurr, among others, contends that federalism can prevent the breakup of countries into smaller, less viable entities by managing ethnic conflicts effectively (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). The argument extends to the transformation of ethnically heterogeneous regions into more homogeneous entities, as exemplified by the case of ethno-federalism in Ethiopia (Chevreau, 2017; Harun, 2020). Some of the proponents, including Michael Hechter and Yash Pal Ghai, posit that federalism can accommodate ethnic diversity by providing autonomy and addressing the demands of minority groups, thus averting calls for secession (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). In addition, federalism is viewed as a mechanism to protect and strengthen minority cultures and languages, as evidenced by India's experience. Cooperative federalism is lauded for creating linkages between the central government and the periphery, fostering effective bargaining, compromise, and the normalization of relationships between previously antagonistic groups (Chevreau, 2017). Furthermore, federalism is seen as an institutional device that contributes to regime consolidation, enhances democratic processes, and guarantees accountability, civil competencies, and social capital (Harun, 2020). Proponents further contend that federal structures may effectively contribute to the de-escalation of existing conflicts and crises by preventing the emergence of violent separatist movements, offering them shared rule and relative autonomy instead (Chevreau, 2017; Harun, 2020). Finally, notwithstanding the recognition of occasional breakdowns in power-sharing arrangements, the resilience of federal systems as a governing mechanism is highlighted through the stance of proponents, with the European Union and post-World War II industrial democracies serving as exemplars (Loizides et al., 2011).

Conversely, critics of federalism as a conflict resolution mechanism highlight potential dangers and drawbacks associated with its implementation. Ethno-federalist arguments caution that federalism may inflame local ethnic tensions, solidifying and perpetuating identities that were initially situational (Choudhry & Hume, 2011). The empowerment of ethnonationalist forces, according to Philip G. Roeder, sets the stage

for potentially violent secessionist movements, counteracting federalism's intended purpose (Chevreau, 2017). Concerns also extend to the tendency for short-term political compromises, fostering center-periphery relations that may ignore long-term needs and create a precedent for escalating demands in future negotiations (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). Will Kymlicka adds that federalism might not necessarily empower minority groups, raising challenges in drawing boundaries congruent with ethnic and administrative realities (Chevreau, 2017; Harun, 2020). Last but not least, concerns are voiced regarding the potential escalation of ethno-regional rebellion and secessionism as a consequence of federalism, suggesting that federalism might contribute to conflict exacerbation, providing impetus to demands for greater autonomy (Brown, 2009).

Moreover, in the realm of policymaking efficiency in post-conflict federal structures, the literature presents a complex picture with the proponents arguing that federalism, especially when intentionally cooperative, can create multiple layers of power, potentially fostering new alliances and transforming previously fractured relationships (Chevreau, 2017; Sayid, 2021). However, on the other hand, opponents contend that the constant struggle between centralization and secession in post-conflict federalism may lead to an unstable political environment, impacting policymaking by perpetuating conflicts over competing nation-state projects (Chevreau, 2017; Harun, 2020).

To synthesis, a review of the existing literature shows a paradoxical picture, where some scholars contend that federalism can reduce the desire for secession by acknowledging and empowering minority nations, while others argue that post-conflict federalism shapes political identities, granting regional governments with coercive tools that may result in political instability, and thus, the diverse viewpoints underscore the complex nature of federalism's effect on conflict resolution (Chevreau, 2017; Choudhry & Hume, 2011). Therefore, since the debate on federalism's role in conflict management in post-conflict federal structure is marked by differing opinions and no definitive verdict is seen, it becomes evident that understanding the efficiency determinants of policymaking in post-conflict federalism (to be explored in the next section) is crucial for a comprehensive assessment of the outcomes of federal structures in these delicate contexts.

2.1.3. Efficiency Determinants of Policymaking in Post-conflict Federalism

As seen above, a lot of academic debate has been generated by the question of how well federal systems can manage conflicts, as, while some scholars argue that it can prevent or solve disputes, others insist that it might encourage even more fragmentations. Consequently, with the potential threat of disintegration and secessionism faced by post-conflict federal states taken into account, this section delves into the literature on the determinants of an efficient federal structure with a specific focus on policymaking efficiency.

Efficiency in federal policymaking, as conceptualized by Braun (2008), is defined as the capacity of a federal system to produce policies effective in addressing collective issues and accepted as legitimate by citizens. Central to this efficiency are the following determinants, as identified in the literature. First, the supremacy and entrenchment of a written constitution play a crucial role (Sayid, 2021), as this ensures that constitutional amendments are not undertaken lightly, protecting the balance of power between the central and regional entities and guaranteeing recognition of subnational units' autonomy and powers (Harun, 2020). Subsequently, a constitutionally mandated separation of powers, including a supreme court, becomes imperative for maintaining this balance and ensuring the constitution's supremacy (Harun, 2020; Watts, 2002). The distribution of power is a linchpin in federal efficiency where a well-defined allocation of legislative and executive authority between the federal government and constituent units, as well as a clear demarcation of responsibilities, helps avoid conflicts and power imbalances (Watts, 2002; Sayid, 2021). This allocation should be flexible yet consistent, reflecting regional preferences and needs, allowing for policy innovation and adaptation to changing circumstances (Braun, 2008). However, the importance of exclusive federal powers, particularly in areas of national significance (e.g., foreign policy), is underscored to prevent overshadowing by more powerful regional entities (Harun, 2020). Third, the existence of an independent judicial body is crucial for upholding the federal balance and resolving disputes (Watts, 2002; Sayid, 2021; Harun, 2020). A constitutional court, acting as an arbiter, ensures the sovereignty of each level of government and safeguards against transgressions, playing a vital role in interpreting and upholding the constitution (Watts, 2002; Harun, 2020). Finally, efficient federal systems facilitate

collaboration through well-designed intergovernmental councils, which serve as safeguards against disruptive unilateralism (Braun, 2008; Schnabel, 2020; Watts, 2002). These councils, when properly institutionalized and producing binding outputs, ensure that policies are developed collaboratively, preventing imbalances in the distribution of power and reinforcing federal stability (Schnabel, 2020; Braun, 2008). They also promote information exchange, expertise sharing, and consensus-building among subnational and national entities (Braun, 2008).

Nevertheless, it is worth noting there are inconsistencies and context dependent evidence in relation to the impact of federalism on policymaking effectiveness. Some studies find that federal systems perform better than unitary systems in terms of policy outcomes, while others find the opposite or no significant difference (ibid). Moreover, some studies suggest that the effects of federalism on policymaking efficiency vary depending on the type and sector of policy, as well as on the institutional and political features of each federal system (Schnabel, 2020). Consequently, it is hard to make general conclusions or recommendations on optimal design and reform of state systems with a view to improving the efficiency of their policymaking in various contexts, so that all cases are examined within an historical and comparative context taking into consideration the specific challenges and opportunities which exist for policymaking at any given time. In order for a successful federal structure for post-conflict state-building to take root, the determinants of policy effectiveness must be carefully assessed. These determinants, all of which have contributed to the delicate equilibrium needed to maintain national unity and avoid a risk of fragmentation due to post conflict federal structure, include constitutional frameworks, division of powers as well as the establishment of effective intergovernmental mechanisms.

2.2. Federalism-Foreign Policy Interplay and Paradiplomacy

Having delineated the first two central concepts of this study—federalism and post-conflict federalism—the intricate interplay between federalism and foreign policy, along with the role of paradiplomacy within this dynamic, warrants further elucidation. Consequently, the section at hand is specified to an in-depth examination of the multilateral correlation among federalism, foreign policy, and, by extension, their impact on the concept of paradiplomacy. Hence, this section, through its four subsections, will review the conceptual foundations behind the emergence of

paradiplomacy and subsequently provide examples demonstrating its manifestation in several post-conflict federal states.

2.2.1. Making Sense of Paradiplomacy: A Short Prologue

Prior to engaging with the interplay between the federal system, as a governance mechanism, and the concept of foreign policy, along with the role this interaction assumes within paradiplomacy, it is first prudent to establish a theoretical foundation for the phenomenon itself. Thus, this necessitates endowing the phenomenon with a brief theoretical dimension by delineating its conceptual contours and retracing its historical line and place within the discourse of the extant scholarly literature. International relations, as an academic discipline that has surpassed its centennial, has overcome numerous ‘methodological and doctrinal’ obstacles to gain recognition as a legitimate field of study. Despite the diversification of approaches and the broadening of analytical perspectives resulting from various theoretical debates since its inception, “the consideration of the international actor as equivalent to the subject of international law has been a constant” (Alvarez, 2020). Thus, in international custom, as observed in Article 7.2(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the research effort to identify the authority responsible for international affairs of states concludes with the historical fact that this domain falls under the exclusive control of nation-states, as required by the principle of protecting sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. To uphold this principle, it has been customary for the highest representative authority of the state, such as the heads of state or government, to take charge of foreign policy making and implementation, along with a single bureaucratic entity, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), ensuring that states “need to have a unified position toward the exterior.” Nevertheless, despite the historical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the centrality of foreign policy, recent decades have revealed, due to various factors, the emergence of non-state actors challenging traditional authority in the international arena (Schiavon, 2018, pp. 1–2).

Given that one of the most important non-state actors lately are the sub-national/non-central governments or entities (or, as phrased by Kuznetsov (2015), ‘constituent units’), the phenomenon of “paradiplomacy is generally referred to in the academic literature as the involvement of the constituent units (regions) of national states in international affairs, such as the provinces in Canada, states in the US, autonomous

communities in Spain, the länder in Germany, the oblasts and the republics in Russia, and so on” (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 2). Despite the preceding definition having an encompassing capacity for most of the literature’s definitions of the phenomenon, there are other noteworthy definitions in various aspects, particularly the linguistic structure and semantic expression. For instance, Wolff (2007) offers a definition that emphasizes the phenomenon as a form of ‘capacity’ of non-central units, highlighting the necessity of bypassing the central authority for the maneuver to be considered parallel. He contends that “[paradiplomacy] refers to what one could describe as a foreign policy capacity of sub-state entities, their participation, independent of their metropolitan state, in the international arena in pursuit of their own specific international interests” (Wolff, 2007, p. 141). Furthermore, Cornago (1999) provides a more functional definition by stating that paradiplomacy primarily involves non-central entities foreign policy activities “[...] with the aim to promote socio-economic, cultural, or political issues, as well as any foreign dimension of their constitutional competences” (Castan Pinos & Sacramento, 2024; Cornago, 1999, p. 40). Therefore, when synthesizing all the definitions, the main conviction that emerges indicates that the phenomenon, although considered a newcomer in international relations studies, possesses an arguably sufficient amount of theoretical significance and practical implications to equip it with academic relevance.

Following the elucidation of the phenomenon’s definition, there arises the necessity to expand and elaborate on its theoretical underpinnings, which were alluded to succinctly. Specifically, if we conceptualize paradiplomacy as a force guiding subnational entities, or constituent units, toward the international arena, addressing the question, ‘what constitutes the origins of this force?’ is crucial to locate the relevance of the phenomenon within the discipline of International Relations Studies. Though some scholars, such as the case of Chatterji and Saha (2017), starts the tale of the phenomenon from the post-WW2 pluralist debates, Carr (2023) delineates three historical motives attributed to the emergence of the phenomenon in the realm of international relations studies. These three vertical motives that have engendered paradiplomacy are stemming from a fundamental factor, which is the role of globalization, and they are: (1) “the post-1960s rise of global interdependence”; (2) “changing ideas of government responsibility” with philosophies inspired by globalization such as New Liberalism and New Public Management, which

encouraged decentralization; and (3) the evolution of the security concept “from military-centric ideas—which remain the preserve of central governments—to a broad ‘non-traditional’ agenda including terrorism, organized crime, human security, health and the environment” (Carr, 2023, pp. 142–143). The conclusion reached by Carr (2023)—grounding paradiplomacy in globalization—is supported by Alexander S. Kuznetsov’s (2015) earlier findings. Kuznetsov, one of the foremost researchers in this field recently, concluded that globalization and regionalization have enhanced the role of non-state actors, making the ‘high politics’ “[...] become less dependent on national state regulations, but more influenced by powers that have flourished tremendously in the last few decades on supranational and subnational (regional) levels.” Therefore, although initial scholarly focus on the interaction between globalization and international relations centered on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) as non-state actors, this paradigm shift has broadened the discussion to include a wider array of non-state actors in international relations. Consequently, actors such as supranational bodies, transnational organized crime (TOC), and even individuals (as seen in the phenomenon of celebrity diplomacy) have gained recognition. Thus, Kuznetsov argues that the academic discourse on transnationalism, and the debate on the state’s future role, have led to a form of erosion in states’ assertion of sovereignty—or, as he puts it, a “partial extinction of sovereign states as major global players.” He accordingly concludes that “in these circumstances, it seems absolutely natural that states are increasingly losing their traditional authority and sovereignty” (Kuznetsov, 2015, pp. 1-2).

Even though the discourse of transnationalism questions the future of central government’s traditional control over sovereignty assertion, it may be misleading to proclaim that it has initially brought about a fundamental transformation in the traditional development and implementation practices of the foreign policies. The main reason here is that the fundamental schools of thought in international relations and their theories have not conceded, or more precisely, have not ceased to affirm, the traditional truth that states alone are the primary units of analysis, the principal actors in international law, and the direct subjects of the discipline’s analytical focus (Alvarez, 2020; Kuznetsov, 2015). Therefore, Schiavon’s (2018) assertion that “the number of internal actors participating in international issues has increased considerably, even though the national Executives maintain the constitutional power

to direct foreign policy and conclude international treaties,” appears to adequately explain the initial impact of the newcomer actors’ involvement in the practice of foreign policy. Similar to Kuznetsov’s (2015) proposition that these new actors—such as, supranational bodies, transnational organized crime, and even individuals—have initiated what can be considered a “partial extinction” of state’s traditional sovereign perception; Schiavon (2018) also argues that, although the impact on the state remains within arguably manageable limits, “the total control of the central Executive in foreign affairs has been increasingly challenged” by these actors in the international arena (Schiavon, 2018, p. 2). However, when sub-national entities, or constituent units (regions), entered the international arena as actors, it caused a significant disruption to the already eroded traditional foreign policy framework. The uniqueness of their impact lies in the fact that, unlike other emerging actors, “[...] subnational entities are the only actors who have a state-like nature [...]” Hence, the potential, or rather the risk, of subnational entities encroaching on and overlapping with the central government in its traditional spheres of influence—or, in other words, its domains of sovereignty practice and assertion—underscores the importance of examining their participation in the international arena from multiple perspectives. This examination is particularly significant given that these entities are actively engaged at the international level nowadays, to the extent that they “sometimes even challenge the official foreign policy of their central governments through their statements or actions” (Kuznetsov, 2015, pp. 2-4).

The inevitable significance of the phenomenon of paradiplomacy—i.e., the participation of sub-national entities in the international arena—imposes a multi-dimensional importance on both scholarly and practical circles. For example, Wolff (2007) asserts that “[paradiplomacy] is a conceptually and practically challenging development” for international relations as a field of study and for states as the traditional actors in the creation and implementation of foreign policies. Conceptually, the phenomenon challenges the entrenched belief within the discipline of international relations that sub-state actors are not within its purview; while, practically, it challenges the traditional notion of state sovereignty, which “in a sense, [is] hollowed out and perhaps fatally undermined if they have to share this essential prerogative of stateness” (Wolff, 2007, pp. 141-142). Moreover, while some scholars, such as Dubrovina and Salamov (2019), posit that paradiplomacy may emerge from a form

of consensus between the central authority—the national—and its constituent sub-national entities, others, such as Pinos and Sacramento (2024) present a contrasting viewpoint, contending that “paradiplomacy does not necessarily develop in harmony with the interests of the parent state.” They delve deeper into this argument by asserting that “any entity capable of delineating and advocating specific interests—and acting upon them—has the potential to antagonize the interests of another unit, irrespective of their inherent connection.” This potential, they argue, engenders “incongruent interests, and hence frictional dynamics,” wherein the foreign policies and interests of both parties—the national authority and sub-national jurisdictions—may exhibit disparities in both theoretical underpinnings and practical implementation (Castan Pinos & Sacramento, 2024, p. 195). Thus, particularly when considering that the foreign policies of subnational units may manifest as what Pinos and Sacramento (2024) describe as “subversive” policies, such as “pro-secession” paradiplomacy, it becomes evident that this phenomenon also assumes additional significance due to its inherent threat to the territorial integrity of the concerned state.

Furthermore, recognizing the ramifications of the phenomenon is not limited only to the theoretical circles but also appears in practice by extending to the level of state policies. For instance, Carr (2023) posits that Australian foreign policy has traversed a historical trajectory characterized by what may be termed a tumultuous period. During this time, the proliferation of influential entities and communication channels within foreign policy frameworks—attributable to the standardization of paradiplomacy—has engendered cacophony and distortion in policy outcomes. Carr elucidates, “to the degree there are problems of hearing one voice clearly, [...] primarily owing to the predominant (national) soloist’s uncertainty regarding “which anthem to perform.” This predicament necessitated legislative action by the Australian government at the close of 2020, bestowing upon it the authority to veto agreements forged between sub-national entities and external actors. This measure was implemented “to ensure that Australia, not merely at a federal echelon, but encompassing all tiers of governance, articulates a unified stance” (Carr, 2023, p. 141). However, despite its theoretical and practical importance, paradiplomacy seems to be facing an issue, and perhaps a dilemma, of incorporation within the discipline of international relations. Despite the fact that paradiplomacy, as previously mentioned, presents a novel and clear challenge to traditional thinking in international relations to the extent that this challenge is “[...]”

marking nearly a paradigmatic shift from the Westphalian concept of sovereign states as exclusively responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and war” (Chatterji and Saha, 2017, pp. 1-2), it cannot be said that the phenomenon has received the attention and prominence commensurate with its significance. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to state that Schiavon (2018) best expressed this dilemma of incorporation, noting that “paradiplomacy appears to be the elephant in the room in the discipline of international relations; it is there, it is growing, and very little attention has been given to explain its causes and consequences” (Schiavon, 2018, p. 1). When examining the underlying reasons for this situation, it is evident that “the rise of paradiplomatic activity, which has been recognized and normalized, [was not] seen as a displacement of the state but as its complement” due to the international relations discipline’s historical reluctance to recognize sub-national actors as legitimate. Additionally, the main focus regarding it in the international debates that took place in the aftermath of its theoretical emergence in the mid-1980s was discussing “the legality and relevance of “non-central governments” participation in international relations” instead of the questions of “how or why they did so.” Consequently, overlooking this phenomenon undoubtedly “hinders a more complex analysis of international reality” (Alvares, 2020, p. 1).

Recognizing the existence of neglect, or as we have termed it, the “dilemma of incorporation,” of paradiplomacy of the discipline of International relation does not imply a complete absence of research efforts by international relations scholars. Despite the theoretical frameworks of major schools of thought in the discipline ignoring non-central units as active agents and thus their participation in the international arena—paradiplomacy—as a subject of analysis, its research legacy is advancing in short but steady steps. For example, Kuznetsov (2015) traces the historical roots of studies on the phenomenon as a field of scholarly inquiry and concludes that it has developed over four historical phases: (1) the 1970s, marked by the “transnational revolution in world politics” as a significant factor influencing its inception; (2) the 1980s, where the foundational conceptual, theoretical, and research frameworks began to bud, although it was criticized for its North American centrism; (3) the 1990s, during which the phenomenon gained a global dimension due to the rising role of non-central units, driven by factors such as the flourishing of globalization, regionalism, and the move towards European integration; and finally (4)

the 2000s, described as “a period when the study of subnational authorities’ activities in the international arena is decisively crystallized into a sustainable subdiscipline in contemporary political science” (Kuznetsov, 2015, pp. 34-44).

An important conclusion drawn from decades of cumulative research on this phenomenon is the attempt to elucidate why and how sub-central units are involved in the international arena. For instance, Gürbey et al. (2023) cites a view on the driving roots of the phenomenon by echoing a conclusion saying that “paradiplomacy [is] being primarily driven by stateless nationalism or ethnonationalism, especially in the context of nations without states [and] thus, paradiplomatic activities are strongest in nationalist regions, such as the Basque Country, Wallonia, Catalonia, Flanders, or Québec” (Gürbey et al., 2023; p. 7). Schiavon (2018) further elaborates by compiling most of the arguments regarding the objectives, providing a comprehensive overview that suggests sub-national governments engage in international affairs for economic, political, or social (cultural) interests. Subsequently, he examines five specific objectives in greater detail: (1) “promoting local development” through “external economic promotion”; (2) “promot[ing] socio-cultural exchanges to project the sub-state unit’s distinct culture, values, or language” and forge links with their ethnic counterparts beyond borders; (3) pursuing political aims by “advancing local autonomy or even preparing for national secession or independence,” a notion also known as protodiplomacy; (4) “influencing regional or global policy debates in areas or issues in which they have a particular interest”; and (5) “addressing common-border or regional issues, such as infrastructure, trade, investment, migration, development, and the environment” (Schiavon, 2018, pp. 7–8).

On the other hand, in relation to the instruments employed by sub-national entities for paradiplomacy, Carr (2023) delineates the forms of paradiplomatic actions through identifying two distinct forms of paradiplomatic behavior by subnational units: (1) ‘Mediating strategies’, i.e., the pursuit of their interests through channels bypassing central authority such as “[...] lobbying federal leaders, cooperating with diplomatic networks such as embassies and national seats in multilateral forums, or encouraging national efforts aimed at an international audience”; and (2) ‘primary strategies’, i.e., non-national units’ resources mobilizing to engage in the international arena without passing through or coordinating with central authority—traditionally concerned with foreign policy (Carr, 2023, p. 143). Schiavon (2018) adds that subnational entities

utilize various tools, including: (1) concluding agreements, which range from “non-binding, sisterhood and inter-institutional agreements, to participating in local, regional and international networks and organizations”; (2) the diplomatic role of subnational leaders, through “receiving visitors from around the world and organizing international events” or “traveling to foreign countries on trade and investment missions to strengthen relations with their diaspora” and “concluding cooperation agreements or participating in regional or global meetings”; and finally, (3) providing an institutional framework for paradiplomacy by establishing “offices of representation of interests abroad” (Schiavon, 2018, p. 8).

In conclusion, the traditional means of foreign policy-making and implementation, which are intertwined with state sovereignty, are being challenged by the risk of interference—paradiplomacy—posed by sub-national entities. Thus, examining this phenomenon is of significant importance, as Kuznetsov (2015) underscores its significance by stating, “it seems fascinating to study paradiplomacy because this phenomenon is not only the major variable for examining contemporary international relations, but also because subnational diplomacy is a crucial factor for understanding those problems related to the interpretation of sovereignty and processes of centralization/decentralization that are taking place within modern states today” (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 4). Therefore, this research attempts to contribute, even modestly, to the expansion of the study of this phenomenon by examining it within the federal structure in the post-conflict phase in Somalia. Thus, as this section of the research aimed to outline the place of paradiplomacy in the literature and highlight its conceptual meaning in general, the subsequent section will proceed to study the emergence of the phenomenon in the context of the interaction between federalism as a system of governance and the concept of foreign policy.

2.2.2. The Federal Structure and the Emergence of Paradiplomacy

The literature on federalism and foreign policy reviewed in this regard unveils that the interaction between the two concepts brings forth intricate dynamics and tensions. Locating the source of this tension is not an arduous task, as the issue primarily revolves around the federal balance. This balance, as Schuetze (2009) described, involves maintaining the autonomy of each tier within the ‘duplex regimen’ of federal governance through the ‘architectural principle’ of striving to achieve ‘unity in

diversity'. Moreover, considering the point further emphasized by the Swiss statesman Alfred Escher (1819-1882) that "in federal systems, foreign policy should be characterized as external unity, internal diversity" (Schiavon, 2018, p. 3), it is evident that this situation—federal governance-foreign policy interaction—is fraught with significant challenges. Thus, this complex relationship is well-exemplified in Gambari's (1991) reference to Kenneth C. Wheare's remark on the inherent conflict between the federal governance tiers. Wheare, a seminal figure in federal studies, observed that "federalism and a spirited foreign policy go ill together," emphasizing the potential challenges stemming from constitutional divisions of power within federal tiers, which, as mentioned, are often fraught with disagreement (Gambari, 1991, 113). Therefore, the discourse surrounding the management of foreign policy within federations mainly revolves around the assumptions of whether external affairs should be the exclusive domain of the national government or whether the states within the federation should have a more direct role in the international sphere (Ababakr, 2023; Gambari, 1991). For instance, Schuetze (2009) delves into that matter, discussing the abovementioned federal principle's attempt to find "unity in diversity" and the resulting division of powers between the central and peripheral governments. Thus, he concludes that the tension between the doctrines of sovereign equality and dualism in the federal structures further complicates the international standing of federal states, leading to variations in how federations handle external affairs, such as "closed federations" acting like unitary states and "open federations" allowing member states to engage in treaty-making with third states (Schuetze, 2009).

Furthermore, another angle which has gathered significant attention within the academic discourse in this vein emphasizes the complexities of power distribution and its impact on the making effective foreign policy in the federal states. As outlined previously, the essence of the debate centers on the equilibrium between central authority and subnational autonomy within federal systems and the consequent implications of this balance. Drawing on the literature reviewed, which includes a variety of scholarly sources, the discourse reveals the complexities of the two concepts, providing a variety of perspectives (Ababakr, 2023; Schiavon, 2018; Schuetze, 2009; Tierney, 2022). For instance, Tierney (2022) contends that the constitutional commitment to a federal union necessitates the central government's possession of adequate powers to sustain an effective legal order and operate proficiently on both

domestic and international fronts. However, this inclination towards the centralization of power allocation, especially in matters of high politics, encounters resistance from the principle of constituent autonomy, which advocates for distributing powers to sub-state entities to enable meaningful self-governance. Consequently, the epicenter of this tension frequently converges on the sphere of international relations—a domain traditionally monopolized by the central authority within federal constitutions (Tierney, 2022).

This dynamic unequivocally illustrates that managing external relations within federal systems is fraught with challenges, as divisions between governmental levels often complicate the processes of treaty-making, conducting transactions, and implementing agreements (Gambari, 1991). Hence, the division of powers between the center and the peripheries may constitute a motivating factor for the participation of non-central entities in foreign policy, potentially leading to ambiguity, rivalry, and disagreement between different government levels in most cases. Considering the importance of this possibility of confrontation is important due to the debate over central control versus unit autonomy extends to the constitutional division of powers, creating a fundamental question in the federal structure: who governs in the realm of international politics? Consequently, this apparent paradox can be explained by understanding that federal structure entails a form of sovereignty that is shared or divided, rather than unitary or exclusive, thus challenging the Westphalian international order and principles of international law (Lequesne & Paquin, 2017).

Assembling the narrative, which examines the intersection of foreign policy-federal structure and their relationship to the emergence of paradiplomacy, comes to the conclusion that the emergence of a discursive space for exploring the contours of shared or divided sovereignty within the federal state has engendered a dynamic incentive for non-centralized actors to pursue their interests and agendas in the international sphere. Therefore, the traditional monopoly of central governments over foreign policy has faced challenges within federal structures, with federal units, such as states, cantons, and länder, have increasingly engaged in international relations, giving rise to paradiplomacy (Schiavon, 2018). Consequently, the phenomenon of ‘paradiplomacy’ has gained prominence in the federal studies literature, as it enables sub-state entities to shape the state’s international stance and, in some instances, assert their separatist intentions and distinct identity (Tierney, 2022). Even though the

phenomenon of paradiplomacy raises questions about the distribution of power in federal systems and prompts a reevaluation of who truly governs in the realm of international relations, a case of neglect of non-central governments as a significant actor is seen in the study of international relations; as the conventional focus on central governments marginalizes the significance of sub-state actors in shaping foreign policy (Lecours, 2002; Lequesne & Paquin, 2017).

The exploration of direct causal relationships between the interaction of federalism and foreign policy, and the potential emergence of paradiplomacy from this interplay, is seen to have received empirical validation from scholars within the pertinent research community. For instance, according to Kuznetsov (2015), the main perspective of most scholars of paradiplomacy is that the diplomatic activities of sub-national governments are mainly driven by the profound changes occurring within federalism and federal intergovernmental relations. He further stressed that many research on paradiplomacy in the 1970s and 1980s indicated that it could be regarded as a “by-product” of federalism. This argument was highlighted by Kuznetsov in his six-questioned explanatory framework for the study of subnational governments’ involvement in international relations, where he addressed the first question of “what are the causes of the flourishing of the paradiplomatic activities of an examined region?” by identifying federalization and decentralization as the first “internal”/ “domestic” causes of paradiplomacy. He, therefore, pointed out that the emergence of paradiplomacy can be understood as a consequence of the evolution of inter-governmental relations within federal states (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 102). However, El-Dessouki (2018) advocates for caution in directly associating federalism, or decentralization more broadly, with paradiplomacy, given the observation that federal units within federal countries may abstain from international participation, while sub-national entities—such as cities in unitary states—may actively engage in international affairs, thereby challenging the notion of a definitive causal link between federalism and paradiplomacy.

Finally, as seen, paradiplomacy creates even more tensions between central governments and sub-state governments, as the latter engage in foreign policy traditionally within the purview of the former (Schiavon, 2018). These tensions have fueled academic interest, prompting scholars to explore the consequences of paradiplomacy with some scholars arguing that paradiplomacy offers opportunities for

sub-state governments to establish bilateral and multilateral relations, represent their interests externally, and enhance their international status (Gürbey et al., 2023). However, examining specific case, Ababakr's (2023) study of the Iraqi Kurdistan region illustrates the inherent conflict between federal states and sub-state regions which can escalate to the point where sub-state governments pursue increasingly autonomous and separatist foreign policy objectives (Ababakr, 2023). Consequently, there is ongoing debate on whether these international activities strengthen or undermine the national conduct of foreign policy (Schiavon, 2018). Hence, in conclusion, the intricate relationship between federalism and foreign policy unveils a tension between the two forces, central control and unit autonomy, as highlighted by Tierney (2022), revolves around the constitutional commitment to federal union while addressing the demands for constituent autonomy and, thus, this tension introduces the emergence of 'paradiplomacy' which further complicates matters by providing non-centralized actors with opportunities to shape international stances. Therefore, aiming for a further examining the impact on federal states, the following sections will scrutinize this phenomenon through the discussion of the related debates in the literature.

2.2.3. Academic Discourse on Paradiplomacy

As demonstrated in the preceding sections, due to the fact that it is intricately linked to the sovereignty of the federal states, the phenomenon of paradiplomacy has sparked considerable academic debate that revealed four prominent discussions in the related literature. The first debate focuses on terminology and definition, whereas the subsequent one lays out the base motives the phenomenon. The third centers on the clash between the Multi-level Federal Governance School and the Centralized Federalism School, while the last scrutinizes the perspectives of the Proponents and Opponents of Paradiplomacy.

First, the debate on defining paradiplomacy is multifaceted as, even though Ivo Duchacek and Panayotis Soldatos, considered by some to be the founding fathers of studies in this field, initially termed it as the external activities of non-central governments with international actors, however, alternative terms like "multi-layered diplomacy," "constituent diplomacy," "regional diplomacy," "federative diplomacy," and "trans-federal diplomacy" have been proposed. Despite these alternatives,

“paradiplomacy” has emerged as the widely accepted term, capturing the essence of sub-state governments engaging in paradiplomatic activities (Gürbey et al., 2023; Kuznetsov, 2015; Schiavon, 2018). Another aspect of the discussion concerning terms relevant to paradiplomacy was the term ‘regions,’ representing the counterpart in the equation of the phenomenon or, more accurately, the actor. Researchers utilized various labels including ‘regional government,’ ‘regional authorities,’ ‘constituent governments/actors/units,’ ‘non-central governments,’ ‘subnational governments/actors/units,’ ‘federated units,’ ‘constituent governments,’ ‘subnational governments/actors,’ ‘federated units.’ Since paradiplomacy is a phenomenon shared by both federal and unitary states, one of the major deficiencies of the mentioned terminologies is the difficulty in using the term ‘subnational governments’ for cities and municipalities in the unitary states. Therefore, Kuznetsov (2015) argues that “the concepts ‘region,’ ‘regional governments,’ ‘constituent government/unit,’ and ‘subnational government/actor’ are recognized as synonymous and will be used interchangeably.” Regarding cities and municipalities in unitary states, he suggested to “place actors on the municipal and lower levels separately from ‘region,’ and consider them as an independent category from ‘local governments’” (Kuznetsov, 2015, pp. 21-25).

Subsequently, in the discourse between the multi-level federal governance school and the centralized federalism school, Lequesne and Paquin (2017) present a comprehensive exploration. Advocates of the multi-level governance approach, such as Brian Hocking, Ian Bache, Liesbet Hooghe, and Charlie Jeffery, argue that globalization and regional integration render centralized foreign policy obsolete, and thus they propose a model where both central and non-central governments cooperate, emphasizing the equitable distribution of powers. In contrast, proponents of the centralized approach, illustrated by Kenneth C. Wheare, Rufus Davis, and Fritz W. Scharpf, assert that centralization is essential for effective foreign policy, as according to them, paradiplomacy jeopardizes the state’s ability to make binding decisions, leading to internal conflicts and a compromised international image (Lequesne and Paquin, 2017).

In the end, in their seminal work regarding the concept and the context of paradiplomacy, Chatterji and Saha (2017) underline the presence of various viewpoints within the literature concerning the debate between advocates and adversaries of the

phenomenon. While, on the one hand, proponents argue that paradiplomacy fosters cultural representation, decentralization, and democratization as it brings diplomatic practices closer to the people, enhances public engagement, and accelerates economic development through foreign relations, however, on the other hand, Opponents raise concerns about uneven institutional capacity, potential ethnic mobilization, and the need for central government coordination. The central state's role in ensuring congruence between its foreign policy and paradiplomatic practices emerges as a critical factor and thus the potential weakening of state unity due to cultural and ethnic identity issues is a notable concern (Chatterji and Saha, 2017).

Therefore, in short, paradiplomacy is advocated by some for its advantages in promoting cultural and ethnic communication, growth of the economy, and international partnerships, however, others criticize it for its dangers of internal turmoil, ethnic politicization, and the possible erosion of central power. The logical implications that arise from the discussions mentioned above are grounded on the fact that finding a balance between the autonomy of non-central actors and the consistency of the state's foreign policy emerges as a vital challenge in the changing context of federal states. Thus, the following section, by surveying the manifestations of the phenomenon in the post-conflict federal states, will look at how the tension between federal levels affects foreign policy and the role of paradiplomacy in these countries.

2.2.4. Paradiplomacy in Post-Conflict Federal Context

The discourse on paradiplomacy, as previously discussed, initially emerged in the 1970s, rooted in case studies examining the international activities of constituent units and the structural responses and organizational accommodations within established federal countries, including Canada, the United States, and Australia. Conversely, as the federal structure began to be viewed as a mechanism for addressing political conflicts in countries characterized by heterogeneity, novel perspectives and debates has rose regarding the extent to which the federal framework effectively addresses the underlying causes of conflicts, on one hand, and maintains state cohesion in the face of such conflicts, on the other. Given the significance of exploring these emerging challenges within the discourse on the operational aspects of the federal structure—particularly in the post-conflict phase and with a special emphasis on foreign policy—it is instructive to examine the responses of countries like Iraq and Bosnia and

Herzegovina. It is, therefore, hoped that these countries will give valuable projections to the problems of foreign policy making under the elucidated circumstances as they adopted a federal approach as a means to conflict de-escalation.

The constitutional and legal provisions governing the external activities of regions within a federal system are, as elucidated in the previous sections, identified as crucial factors influencing the growth of regional paradiplomacy. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the legal and constitutional frameworks established in Iraq after 2003 is seen to have played a pivotal role in shaping the region's paradiplomacy. The delicate federal structure, characterized by ambiguity and a lack of precise definition of external powers, has allowed the Kurdistan Region to engage in paradiplomacy, eventually evolving into protodiplomacy with a secessionist orientation—protodiplomacy (Ababakr, 2023). This transformation is driven by internal structural variables, nationalism, and a desire for independence illustrating how paradiplomacy can be a tool for subnational units to pursue secession, thus, shows the magnitude of maximum this phenomenon can reach in post-conflict conditions (Ababakr, 2023; Danilovich & Abdulrahman, 2017). Accordingly, this instance underlines the significant risk correlated with these diplomatic efforts in post-conflict contexts, manifesting in maximal situation of paradiplomacy's potential culmination in the ultimate disintegration of the state.

Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the foreign policy domain is constitutionally assigned to the state level, with the Presidency responsible for conducting foreign policy (Banović et al., 2021). However, the country's complicated multilevel polity, characterized by power fragmentation and relocation, is seen to have resulted in challenges in the execution of foreign affairs. The existence of sub-national paradiplomatic missions and offices, such as those established by the Government of Republika Srpska Entity, further complicates the situation, as these entities pursue actions abroad outside the official parameters set by state-level institutions. Thus, the imprecise constitutional provisions on foreign policy implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina make it susceptible to the influence of ethnonational policies and interests (Hasić & Karabegović, 2019).

The emergence of paradiplomacy as a critical factor influencing the trajectory of these federal structures makes the relevance of studying it in the post-conflict federal context

becomes even more. Paradiplomacy, as seen from the two cases above, introduces complexities and challenges that necessitate a nuanced understanding of the interplay between federalism, foreign policy, and the actions of subnational units as it might be driven by various factors such as regional ambitions, nationalism, and a desire for independence. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider paradiplomacy in the analysis of the logical results of the interplay between federalism and foreign policy in the context of post-conflict federal states, as it can have profound implications for the stability and integrity of these political entities.

Finally, the two cases presented in this section from Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina are considered to illustrate the challenges of post-conflict Federal States with respect to their management of Foreign Policy as well as drawing attention to the consequences of paradiplomacy on its coherence. In Iraq, the Kurdistan Region's paradiplomacy is seen as a preparation for secession, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, sub-national paradiplomatic missions complicate the execution of foreign policy at the state level. Given that the narrative in this section serves as a conclusion to both the presentation of the conceptual framework and the review of the general literature pertinent to this research, it effectively grounds the topic within an empirical reality, the forthcoming section will transition to introducing the theoretical framework selected for examining the problem at hand.

2.3. Rooting Paradiplomacy to Federal Structure: Theoretical Framework

In addressing the central question of this study, "how did post-conflict federal structure affect the emergence of paradiplomacy in post-unitary Federal State of Somalia," the approach adopted entailed an examination of the internal structure of the federal system as a mechanism for elucidation. The emphasis on structure within this analysis was not an arbitrary selection; rather, as elucidated by El-Dessouki (2018), the importance of comprehending the nexus between domestic configurations and foreign policy is paramount, given that the understanding of a nation's foreign policies is predicated upon national structures that establish regulatory frameworks, and the objectives of its foreign policy. Thus, this study will answer the research question by applying the methodology propounded by El-Dessouki (2018), which predicates its focus on the quintessence of paradiplomacy from a superior vantage point, namely, the structures operative within the examined system, by exploring the degree to which the

local structures either facilitates or impedes its development, through a dissection of the local structure into four distinct variables: “legal grounds, level of autonomy, type of intergovernmental relations, and [the degree of] institutionalization” (El-Dessouki, 2018, 102). The model hand too was not a matter of arbitrary choice, but rather based on its alignment of most of the variables with the discussion in Section (2.1.3.) above, which explained how the efficiency of policy-making in the federal system is influenced by various factors in the post-conflict phase, such as the supremacy and entrenchment of a written constitution, the distribution of power, the existence of an independent judicial body, and the facilitation of collaboration through well-designed intergovernmental councils.




Figure 1: The component of theoretical framework on the federal structure-paradiplomacy relation (El-Dessouki, 2018)

This explanatory framework, as seen in **Figure 1**, consists of studying four variables in the internal structures of the countries studied. The first variable, legal grounds, concentrates on the constitutional and juridical authorities bestowed upon subnational units concerning foreign affairs, as delineated in pertinent statutes and ordinances. This variable is predicated on the hypothesis that the manifestation of paradiplomatic instances within a sovereign state may be elucidated through the prism of whether regional jurisdictions are endowed with constitutional capacities for engagement in the global sphere. Thus, it scrutinizes three facets germane to the distribution of authority between the central government and the peripheral entities, to wit: (1) constitutional and legal authorities pertaining to international relations; (2) national and regional

statutes and regulations relevant to foreign affairs; and (3) the degree of juridical authorization for entering treaties with external entities accorded to regional governments. Regarding the second variable, level of autonomy, it transitions from the premise that the presence of paradiplomatic instances unequivocally suggests that subnational entities wield a considerable degree of autonomy. This autonomy, potentially, affords them the capacity to exert influence upon the central government's formulation of foreign policy, in the minimal scenario, or to enjoy a pivotal influence that empowers direct participation within the international sphere, in the maximal scenario. El-Dessouki (2018) points to an examination of the autonomy extent of subnational entities, utilizing indicators, of which the most significant, in the context of this research, is the authority to execute political decisions, for a more nuanced comprehension of paradiplomacy in the country being analyzed (ibid).

The third variable, the type of intergovernmental relations, endeavors to elucidate whether the character of the relationship, be it cooperative or conflictual, amongst the central government and the peripheral governments, underpins the genesis of paradiplomacy within subnational entities. El-Dessouki (2018) herein addresses the dynamic between the governmental strata, a dynamic that quintessentially shapes our comprehension of paradiplomacy; for, within the context of a cooperative relation, subnational entities engage under the aegis of the central authority, whereas, within the ambit of a conflictual relation, especially when the domestic structure hinder or undermine regions' international activities, subnational entities assert their presence on the international stage as a manifestation of defiance against the central authority, or as the author articulates, to "internationalize the domestic conflict." Finally, the fourth variable, institutionalization, posits that subnational actors engaged in paradiplomacy exhibit significant levels of institutionalization internationally within the realm of foreign affairs. This is manifested through the development of foreign policy strategies, the establishment of foreign policy institutions—i.e. regional departments/ministries concerned with foreign affairs—and the maintenance of permanent representations abroad, distinct from the diplomatic missions sanctioned by the central government. The significance of this variable, as elucidated by El-Dessouki (2018), resides in the premise that the degree of paradiplomatic institutionalization within a region offers insights into the predominant motivations underpinning subnational foreign policies. This, in turn, provides indications concerning the

orientations of these entities, which may pivot around political ambitions—i.e. secession—economic objectives, or cultural aspirations—i.e. cross-border interactions with a common ethnicity group (ibid).

Ultimately, the explanatory theoretical framework selected for this master's thesis is drawn from the synthesis of critical insights derived from the theoretical contributions of El-Dessouki (2018), it is anticipated that this framework will adequately address the central question of the study, which is to examine the impact of federalism adoption in Somalia on the emergence of paradiplomacy. This thesis will analyze the origins and the objectives paradiplomacy in post-conflict federal state of Somalia by exploring the domestic structure of the federal system of Somalia with the objective of addressing the central question of this thesis, which was, “how did post-conflict federal structure affect the emergence of paradiplomacy and the fragmentation of foreign policy in post-unitary federal state of Somalia.” Thus, in pursuit of this objective, the four domestic structure variables proposed by El-Dessouki (2018)—namely, the legal grounds, the level of federal member state's autonomy, the status of intergovernmental relations, and the degree of institutionalization—will be discussed to elucidate the structural underpinnings of the emergence of paradiplomacy.

2.4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter, which attempts to elucidate the key concepts and present the theoretical basis of the research, examined the interaction between federalism and post-conflict federalism and, thereby, that interplay's implications for the determinants of paradiplomacy. Initially, regarding the differences and similarities between federalism and post-conflict federalism, the analysis has reached a conviction that the evolution of federalism from classical to post-conflict federalism constitutes a considerable change in the motivations underlying national state formation. Classical federalism, with its emphasis on voluntary associations and shared sovereignty, differs from post-conflict federalism that responds to the problems of conflict afflicted states by focusing primarily on averting civil war and secession. In addition to that, the main distinction between classical federalism and post-conflict federalism is not based on their theoretical framework and conceptualization, but on their modes of creation and specific challenges. According to Alfred C. Stepan's typology of federalism (Choudhry & Hume, 2011), classical federalism can be categorized as “coming-together”

federalism while post-conflict federalism can be seen as “holding-together” federalism.

Subsequently, a discussion has emerged in the reviewed literature concerning the role of federalism in resolving conflicts in post-war federal states, with advocates arguing its potential for promoting stability, unity and accommodating divergent identities; and, critics, on the other hand, express concerns about worsening tensions which are fostering conditions conducive to secessionist movements. In this regard, a key aspect that attracted scholarship attention was the effectiveness of policy making within the structure of federalism. The determinants of efficient federal structures, as explored in the literature, encompass the supremacy and entrenchment of a written constitution, the clarity of power distribution, the existence of an independent judicial body, and the facilitation of collaboration through well-designed intergovernmental councils. However, the literature examined regarding the impact of federalism on policymaking effectiveness appears to be pointing out the need for all-encompassing and the context-based assessment and consideration of specific challenges and opportunities in each case.

Furthermore, a multifaceted interplay between central control and subnational autonomy in the federal structure is revealed in the study of federalism and foreign policy. The tension, as illuminated by scholars like Tierney (2022), emerges from the constitutional commitment to federal union while accommodating demands for constituent autonomy. The phenomenon of paradiplomacy, an emerging dynamic space in which noncentralized actors shape international policies, is created by this complex relationship. The academic discourse surrounding paradiplomacy presents two significant discussions: (1) The clash between the multi-level federal governance school and the centralized federalism school, which highlights the debate over the relevance of centralized foreign policy in an era of globalization; and (2) the perspectives of proponents and opponents of paradiplomacy, which delve into the advantages and challenges posed by subnational actors engaging in diplomatic activities. The importance of striking a delicate equilibrium between the autonomy of non-central actors and the consistency of national foreign policy is underlined in both discussions.

Finally, examining paradiplomacy in the context of post-conflict federal states, as illustrated by cases in Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina, adds another layer of complexity. The obstacles revealed by field experiments to the effects of paradiplomacy to the federal structures in these countries, ranging from the fragmentation of the cohesion of foreign policy decision-making to separatist tendencies, point out and emphasize the fragility of the federal equilibrium in the post-conflict phase with the importance of examining the effects of paradiplomacy in other cases of post-conflict federations. As evident, in the context of an evolving environment for international relations in federal systems, which remains subject to constant review and debate, it is more relevant than ever that a thoughtful study be carried out on how paradiplomacy affects sovereignty, state unity and the effectiveness of foreign policy implementation. Thus, this thesis will, using the theoretical contribution of El-Dessouki (2018) presented in the proceeding section, analyze the impact of the federal structure in Somalia on the emergence of paradiplomatic activities by the constituent units by analyzing the domestic legislative and operational structure of the Somali federal system, considering the specific challenges of post-conflict federalism and the factors that affect the effectiveness of political decision-making within it.

3. TRACING THE ROOTS OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT

In this chapter, an in-depth examination of the multifaceted socio-political and historical factors shaping the conflict landscape in Somalia is conducted, grounded in Samatar's (1992) hypothesis that understanding Somalia's collapse requires scrutinizing the transformations in its social structure. Accordingly, for the aforementioned purpose, this chapter scrutinizes the social architecture of traditional Somali society, elucidates the manner in which this structure concurrently functioned as a political system, and subsequently delineates the influence of Islam in augmenting this traditional socio-political order. After this general picture of the traditional system, the chapter will discuss the factors that led to the political conflict under study by considering the impact of subsequent transformations of this traditional system as a result of the inputs of the early state-making period, colonial legacies, and post-colonial state formation. In short, this chapter attempts to establish an explanatory framework for the analysis of the genesis and evolution of the conflict in Somalia, and thus, ultimately, pursuing to furnish a comprehensive insights into its foundational causes and the dynamics elicit its persistency.

3.1. The Socio-Political Structure of the Traditional Somali Society

This section attempts locate a framework for comprehending the fundamental traditions and dynamics of Somali society by exploring its historical roots, traditional social organization, and political order. Consequently, in pursuit of this objective, this section initially delineates the historical trajectory of the conventional societal framework of the Somali populace, subsequently scrutinizes the political ramifications inherent in the societal structuring within the traditional milieu, and, ultimately, assesses the repercussions stemming from the advent of Islam on this archetypal socio-political order.

3.1.1. The Social Organization of the Traditional Somali Society

The Somali Peninsula (seeing in **Figure 2**), also referred to as the Horn of Africa, emerges historically as a critical juncture in the global trade nexus, pivotal in the early interactions between Africa, Asia, and Europe. As the homeland of the ancestors of the Somali people, its significance stretches back 7000 years, marking it as a cradle of

human civilization (Abdullahi, 2017). Furthermore, a pivotal indicator of this region's geographical salience was its paramountcy in ancient transmarine economic systems, a significance underscored by its integral function in the exchange of highly sought-after commodities, including frankincense, myrrh, and spices, ardently desired by ancient civilizations such as the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Mycenaeans, and Babylonians. The Land of Punt, located in the northeastern Somali Peninsula, epitomizes this era of economic vibrancy as, notably, the fleet dispatched by the fifth Pharaoh of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt Queen Hatshepsut (c. 1507–1458 BC) in 1478 BC, memorialized in the temple of Deir el-Bahri, and the fact that the region was called “God's Land” by the queen underscores the Somali Peninsula's early international significance (Abdullahi, 2017; Cassanelli, 1982). However, a palpable historical void exists in the Somalis' historical records between the first and seventh CE centuries, where a dearth of historical documentation leaves a gap in understanding the fate of these once-flourishing cities and civilizations (Abdullahi, 2017).




Figure 2: The map of the Somali Peninsula and Somali ethnic limit in Horn of Africa (Lewis, 2004).

The Somalis have a lineage tracing back thousands of years, forming a distinct ethnic unity in the Horn of Africa, the Somali Peninsula, extending from the Awash valley in Ethiopia to beyond Northern Kenya's Tana River (Fox, 2015; Lewis, 1993; Webersik, 2004). However, the aforementioned historical gap was, in one way or another, a prime contributor to the scarcity of quantitative sources concerned with studying the historical course of the social and political development of Somali society. Therefore, the first known record of the term "Somali" was in an Ethiopian hymn celebrating King Negus Yeshaaq's (1414-1429) victory over the Adal Sultanate—a multiethnic medieval (15th-16th CE) Muslim Sultanate based in the city of Zeila, northern of modern-day Somalia, in which Somalis played a major role (Abdullahi, 2017; Cassanelli, 1982). Some Somali clan-families, however, finds its roots in some record from earlier centuries, with Muslim travelers and geographers such as Muhammad al-Idrisi (1100-1166) and Ibn Sa'id al-Maghribi (1214-1287) identifying the Hawiye clan-family's—one of the largest clan-families in the Somali Peninsula—presence in the central and southern parts of the peninsula in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, suggesting that the presence of the Somali ethnicity within this geographical context has historical roots extending back to a significant temporal duration (Abdullahi, 2017; Cassanelli, 1982; Ingiriis, 2018).

As for the cultural and economic structure, Somali society is predominantly rooted in nomadic pastoralism, a lifestyle adapted to the challenging environmental conditions of scarce and unpredictable rainfall (Cassanelli, 1982; Lewis, 1993). This dominant pastoralist culture, mainly revolving around the herding of camels, sheep, goats, and cattle, concurrently coexisted with agricultural pockets in the south, particularly along the Jubba and Shabeelle Rivers (Cassanelli, 1982). Interestingly, despite demonstrating proficiency in livestock breeding, it is significant to observe that the Somali pastoral culture did not progress towards the development of large-scale livestock trading—arguably attributed to the cultural perception of livestock as a symbol of wealth and status, rather than as a means of economic subsistence (Cassanelli, 1982; Lewis, 1999; Samatar, 1992). Furthermore, the presence of urban centers, particularly those situated along coastal areas engaged in commercial enterprises including the trade of jewelry, weapons, cloth, incense, and ivory, appears to exert minimal influence on the prevailing dominance of the pastoral lifestyle, due to their relatively diminutive population sizes (Cassanelli, 1982). Therefore, pastoral

ethos, characterized by a strong sense of individualism and autonomy, profoundly influenced Somali societal structure (Lewis, 1999).

Regarding the social organization, the Somali society is traditionally organized around a clan-based system, which consists of a multilevel patrilineal lineage-based “segmentary” affiliation scheme. Thus, as for the significance and causal roots behind this structure, Lewis (1999) articulates that a Somali’s genealogy transcends a mere familial lineage, instead defining his relational and societal positioning, symbolically akin to a home address in European context, marking that this genealogical identity affords each individual a precise societal placement and relational connectivity within a broad spectrum of agnatic kinship. Furthermore, despite his reservations about considering lineage, or kinship, as the sole and absolute factor in explaining the social structure of traditional Somali society, Samatar (1992) emphasizes the central role of genealogy in Somali culture by highlighting its significance in both fostering unity at the clan level and causing divisions at the sub-clan level due to the impact of the state of “segmentary clanism” organization and the constant movement necessitated by a pastoral lifestyle. This notion is further supported by many scholars—for instance, Ingiriis (2018) observes the spatial division of Somali lands into clan territories, reflecting a unique organizational structure where each clan has its own designated pastoral areas and water sources. Hence, Somali clan identity can be distinguished from other societal forms by emphasizing its basis in lineage and blood relations, which are crucial for self and mutual identification among Somalis (N. Ahmed, 2019; Samatar, 1997). Consequently, this identity is broken down into a paternal lineage-based hierarchical affinity structure: from the larger Clan-Families and eventually, to individual family units—the household (Abbink, 2009; Gundel, 2009; Lewis, 1999; Luling, 1997; Samatar, 1992).

In this ‘segmentary’ social structure (shown in **Figure 3**), the fundamental unit of this structure was the household, a pivotal political entity in the pastoral lifestyle, wielding considerable autonomy over vital resources such as grazing land and water, indispensable for sustaining the symbol of wealth (livestock) in the challenging milieu of the Somali peninsula (Samatar, 1992, 1997). Beyond the household, the structure expanded into primary, secondary—or even tertiary—lineage groups generally termed as clans and sub-clans, which are numbering in the hundreds to thousands tracing their descent to a common ancestor. These groups were an organic evolution of

households' reaction to the cooperation demanding hard tasks such as herding livestock, developing and maintaining water wells, managing and exploring the range lands, and circulating livestock to reduce the deleterious impact of ecological perturbations. In lineage groups, the clan level represents the larger category and serves as the socio-political hub of traditional Somali society. Although it is subject to fragmentation due to the living conditions of the segmentary and constantly moving pastoral society, it is within the kin group that the most evident unity and solidarity are experienced—particularly in basic politico-legal circumstances, such as legal processes, responses to catastrophes, and especially in the face of external threats. (Luling, 1997; Samatar, 1997; Lewis, 1999). Lastly, the clan-family level represented a larger, more complex grouping, spreading over extensive territories and encompassing major clan-families such as Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn), and Isaaq—with many scholars such as Abdullahi (2018) considering the later, Isaaq, a sub-clan of Dir (Fox, 2015; Lewis, 1999; Luling, 1997; Abbink, 2009; Gundel, 2009). This convoluted scheme of affiliation, thus, reveals the degree of complication of the social organization of Somali society, which will become more evident in the following section when the political and legal dimensions are examined.




Figure 3: Segmentary affiliations in the traditional Somali society's social structuration. Created by the author, drawing on the work of Samatar (1992), Samatar (1997), Luling (1997), Lewis (1999), Fox (2015), Abdullahi, (2017, 2018), Abbink (2009) and Gundel (2009).

3.1.2. The Political Organization of the Traditional Somali Society

In traditional Somali society, political affiliation and structure were closely linked to the aforementioned kinship-based social organization. Based on the scarce anthropological and historical studies on traditional Somali society in the reviewed

literature, a speculative assessment on the politization of kinship-based social structure can be accumulated. This assessment suggests that the segmentation of the traditional Somali society's social structure into major clan-families, and further into smaller units, created a complex political allegiance system rooted in kinship, cascading from immediate family—household—to broader clan-families (Samatar, 1992; Lewis, 1999; Fox, 2015). Lewis (1999) adds to this understanding by emphasizing that the lineage-based organization in Somali society is not simply a record of familial descent but a foundation for corporate political groupings.

The political significance of lineage in Somali culture, thus, lies in its vital role in defining political affiliations and understanding political relationships among various groups in Somali society. In other words, the roots of the interchangeability between social and political structures in traditional Somali society can be summarized by Lewis's conclusion regarding the Somali character, which he described as possessing an inherent political dimension. This characterization of the traditional Somali individual's character can be attributed to the social structure's foundation on a segmentary lineage system, primarily based on the household (Lewis, 1999). This structure facilitates the delegation of political decision-making to the household level due to the primacy of individual interests during peacetime, a necessity of the pastoral lifestyle that emphasizes individualism. Moreover, the sociocratic (non-hierarchical), ad hoc, participatory, and egalitarian nature of the traditional socio-political system has, according to Lewis's (1999, 1993) observation, further supported the traditional Somali's capacity to engage in administration and politics, thereby politicizing their character.

Complementing these views, Afrah (1995) observes that the clan family system in Somali culture predicates social judgments and interactions on blood ties, fostering a dichotomy between kin and outsiders. Finally, Cassanelli (1982) provides a historical lens, indicating that Somali political identity has long been anchored in discrete kinship groups based on descent. Therefore, collectively, these sources depict a society where blood-ties are not merely a marker of familial lineage but also a determinant of political alliance and social identity, reflecting a multiplex interaction of kinship, culture, and politics in traditional Somali society. Consequently, although the lineage-based organization of Somali society promotes a strong sense of political affinity, it also raises legitimate questions about its preference in traditional Somali society over

other forms of political structure and therefore leads to an examination of the underlying reasons for this unique political organization.

The political structures in traditional Somali society, shaped by geography, culture, and history, were deeply rooted in genealogy. As Lewis (1999) points out, the barren terrain and nomadic pastoralism prevalent in the Somali Peninsula discouraged the formation of stable territorial groups, favoring lineage-based political units instead. Samatar (1992) adds that the egalitarian nature of Somali society, founded on kinship-based “segmentary clanism,” inherently fosters internal conflicts and a cohesive stance against outsiders. Segmentary clanism, with small, self-governing units forming larger groups based on shared ancestry (Samatar, 1995), established a political and social organization anchored in clan and lineage. Hashi and Hock (2022) further emphasize the cultural inclination of the Somali people towards informal governance and negotiation, eschewing formal legal structures (Hashi & Hock, 2022). Taken together, these factors illustrate in one way or another why traditional Somali society favored a kinship-based organization for its political structure, shaped by environmental challenges, cultural practices, and historical developments. However, the fact that the traditional Somali society was organized along kinship lines and lacked a centralized authority—or, to use Samatar’s (1995) term, an “umbrella state governance”—makes it crucial to examine whether this structure resulted in a state of anarchy across all Somali lands in the Somali peninsula.

Contrary to the perception of absolute anarchy, traditional Somali society, despite its lack of centralized authority and its reliance on lineage-based organization, exhibited structured political and social governance. Lewis (1999), among others, clarifies that despite the absence of centralized government machinery, political institutions were indeed present. The political structure, deeply embedded in lineage and kinship, was underpinned by an unwritten social contract system known as “Xeer,”—pronounced as Heer (Lewis, 1999; Samatar, 1992; Samatar, 1995). The customary law (Xeer) served as a regulatory framework for clans and sub-clans, setting the terms for unity within the clan system (Samatar, 1992; Samatar, 1995; Lewis, 1999). Samatar (1992) further clarifies that the Xeer, a socially constructed set of rules and norms, maintained security and social justice within and among Somali communities, functioning as an ethical restraint against divisive tendencies within the lineage system. Therefore, this law played a crucial role in governing the behavior of kin groups within and among

themselves, as the Xeer customary laws and social norms were effective in aspects such as the preservation of the community’s traditions and customs, definition of mutual rights and obligations, and implementation of criminal justice—by identifying/describing lawful and unlawful actions and managing conflicts and retributions (Samatar, 1995). Therefore, the Xeer, founded on egalitarian principles, provided a framework for governance and conflict resolution, emphasizing mutual obligations and collective decision-making (Lewis, 1999; Samatar, 1992; Ahmed, 2019).




Figure 4: The main elements of the socio-political moral order in the traditional Somali society (Samatar, 1995).

Furthermore, Xeer customary law reflects traditional Somali society, in which the culture of “acute segmentation” along patrilineal bloodlines prevails and consequently interacts with close kinship ties in both the creation and implementation of the customary law rules (Samatar, 1995). This interaction, in a way or another, posits that the political order of traditional Somali society is based on communal governance—a unique system in which each kinship unit has its own customary laws—based on kinship association. This communal governance system is further elucidated by Samatar (1995) who identifies its “two principal elements” that give the system functionality: (1) a shared identity marker “blood ties”—which comprise the determinant of one’s position in the male lineage and thus the concrete signifier of one’s allegiance to a kin group, “common male lineage (tol),” and the signifier of the duty of deference towards the relatives of the spouse or more precisely the mother from a different tribe, “marriage ties (hidid)” —and (2) a normative regulator “general code (heer).” Thus, this kinship-based system (summarized in the **Figure 4**), supported by these customary laws, enabled the society to navigate the complexities of political relationships and maintain a balance between autonomy and communal obligations by promoting interdependence in the “quintessentially stateless” traditional Somali society (Afraah, 1995; Lewis, 1999; Samatar, 1992, 1995; Ullán de la Rosa & Arrey,

2021). Therefore, to summarize, the traditional Somali society was not anarchic, but rather regulated by intricate, decentralized systems of social contracts (heer) and kinship-based norms, exhibiting a refined comprehension of communal governance and conflict management. Therefore, to comprehend the governance structure in traditional Somali society, we need to examine more closely how this political order operated on a daily basis.

The traditional Somali communal governance, known as “Pastoral Democracy” (Lewis, 1999) or “Go’aankii Geedka (the decision under the tree)” (Afrah, 1995), was based on an egalitarian and participatory decision-making process. This system of governance, devoid of centralized governance, was mostly limited to a specific kinship group (clan or sub-clan) and it deliberated decisions by gathering all mature males in a certain lineage group to a clan assembly (shir) performed under a tree with the leadership of the clan elders (guurti) and the legal counsellors (xeerbeegti). Therefore, these event-based—ad hoc—egalitarian clan assemblies played critical roles in legal and societal matters, such as declaring war or peace, imposing sanctions, or resolving disputes (Samatar, 1992; Samatar, 1995; Afrah, 1995; Lewis, 1999; Fox, 2015). The system comprises several vital components, such as legal counsellors (xeerbeegti), which are clan elders who regulate the Xeer judicial framework ensuring its adaptability to changing circumstances. Another component is clan elders (guurti), who declare the final verdict after hearing the input of the clan assembly (shir) and also consulted for issues related to clan related affairs such as conflict and its resolution (Fox, 2015; Ahmed, 2019; Lewis, 1999). Thus, this system, characterized by clan matters’ related mediation and arbitration, ensured a balance of power and fostered a sense of equality and reciprocity among clan members (Afrah, 1995; N. Ahmed, 2019; Gaas, 2018; Lewis, 1999). Thus, in short, the traditional political order in Somalia was recognized for its flexibility, dependence on family ties and agreements, and a strong framework of customary law and communal decision-making.

The political structure of traditional Somali society was distinguished by several unique features, rooted in its segmentary clannism and kinship-based affiliations. The political structure of traditional Somali society, marked by its unique segmentary clannism and kinship-based affiliations, lacked a clear, politically active superordinate nationalist identity due to these same affiliations, emphasizing the household’s pivotal role in a pastoral lifestyle and the importance of clans and sub-clans as basic politico-

legal units without extending to clan-family levels, let alone the Somali identity level, highlighting a cultural rather than political unity in the traditional society (Samatar, 1997; Luling, 1997; Lewis, 1999; Fox, 2015). Furthermore, this societal framework also featured an absence of centralized authority and formal government, underscoring an egalitarian social structure fostered by centuries of nomadic life and lineage politics, where community elders upheld communal governance principles and social sanctions without the need for coercive authority. Although clans, or at least some of them, possessed clan leaders—individuals with titles resembling ‘king’ and ‘sultan,’ such as Ugaas or Malaakh—these leaders did not have a tangible political roles or socio-political influence and their contributions were confined to offering advice, mediation, and other symbolic functions as political arena was egalitarian and participatory (Lewis, 1999; Samatar, 1992, 1997). Finally, the Somali societal fabric was strengthened by adherence to customary law (xeer) and the role of traditional intelligentsia, illustrating a community that cherished equality, reciprocity, and accountability through decentralized and culturally embedded systems (Gaas, 2018; Afrah, 1995; Fox, 2015), thus, seamlessly blending these elements into a cohesive narrative that underscores the complexities and nuances of Somali social and political life.

In conclusion, this section examined the origins of the traditional Somali political structure by highlighting the development of the traditional social organization, whose structures based on kinship affinity extended beyond merely family ties to encompass the founding factor of political identities—in line with geopolitical necessities such as the harsh environment, pastoral lifestyle, and absence of a dominant central authority. This elaborate system termed as “pastoral democracy,” marked by the prominent role of communal traditional governance systems grounded on customary law (heer) and lineages (blood ties), exhibits a refined comprehension of social order and conflict resolution in a traditional atmosphere devoid of the “umbrella state” and unified national political identity. Accordingly, the analysis illustrates how ecological, cultural, and legal aspects of that system have molded a distinctive political landscape characterized by clan or sub-clan based narrow and decentralized governance system and a classless society that embrace lineage affinities and collective decision-making.

3.1.3. The Advent of Islam and the Formation of the ‘Moral Commonwealth’

Traditional Somali society, with its characteristics such as blood kinship and segmentary clanism based social and political affiliation, and the predominance of nomadic life, was on the verge of a restructuring process with the spread of the Islamic religion in the 7th century CE. The Somalis were among the earliest societies to converted to Islam, and therefore, the introduction of Islam to the Somali Peninsula in the seventh century marked a pivotal moment in the region’s socio-political landscape as this period witnessed a transformation of the traditional Somali society—historically segmented by clan loyalties. The impact of Islam on the traditional Somali society has manifested as unifying diverse political affinity, enhancing communal governance, and catalyzing state-building efforts (Abdullahi, 2017; Cassanelli, 1982; Y. S. Omar, 2022).

First and foremost, Islam served as a ‘unifying force’ in the traditionally segmented Somali society, effectively consolidating socio-political affinities and cooperation that extended beyond primary, secondary, and tertiary lineages, such as clans and sub-clans, by fostering a superordinate identity—the Somali identity or, at the very least, clan families, which represent the broadest extent of clanship, encompassing multiple clans (see **Figure 3**). This unification emerged from an increased self-awareness of their cultural distinctiveness, which was encouraged by active participation in entrepot trade with other ethnic groups, religious travel to Islamic centers of knowledge and worship, and particularly, the significant roles that Somalis played in the early East African Islamic sultanates such as Ifat (13th–14th centuries CE) and Adal (15th–16th centuries CE)—multi-ethnic Islamic sultanates that resisted the Abyssinian Empire’s (13th–20th centuries CE) efforts at Christianization and expansion (Abdullahi, 2017; Cassanelli, 1982; Fox, 2015; Lewis, 2004; Y. S. Omar, 2022). Therefore, and particularly due to the latter reason, Islam primarily functioned as ‘a rallying point’ for Somalis, leading members of various clans to set aside their loyalties and unite against external threats (Abdullahi, 2017; Cassanelli, 1982; Mukhtar, 2016). In other words, this unifying feature associated with the introduction of Islam into Somali territories contributed to the creation of a social and political identity at the level of Somali identity (see **Figure 5**). Thus, although this cohesion tends to emerge in times of adversity, it has, in turn, revitalized and strengthened the spirit of a shared destiny

among community members who previously lived in a state dominated by individualism and a centeredness around the narrow kinship ties.




Figure 5: Affiliations scheme in the traditional Somali society's social structuration after the advent of Islam. Created by the author, derived from Abdullahi (2018) and drawing on the work of Samatar (1992), Samatar (1997), Luling (1997), Lewis (1999), Fox (2015), Abdullahi, (2017, 2018), Abbink (2009) and Gundel (2009).

Subsequently, the socio-political influence of Islam's adherence extends beyond the thinly populated urban areas to the pastoral regions where the majority of Somalis reside, and thus, this influence has reconfigured the traditional socio-political framework of Somali society, which was previously depicted in **Figure 4**. This transformation was facilitated through the introduction of 'Qanoon,' rooted in Quranic and Hadith teachings, thereby broadening the customary law (Xeer) and blood-ties based communal socio-political order (kinship) to evolve into a 'moral commonwealth,' a wider and more inclusive moral order. Therefore, Islamic law (the Qanoon) established another foundation for decision-making processes, simultaneously acting as the aforementioned 'unifying force' against the segmentary tendencies of kinship-based identities. Consequently, the Qanoon not only echoed the customary law's (heer) focus on values such as the sanctity of life, dignity, and communal responsibility but also integrated and emphasized social virtues like the fellowship of believers and the precedence of reconciliation over conflict, as derived from Islamic teachings. Hence, the amalgamation of Xeer customary law and Islamic principles furnished stateless Somalis with a formidable 'political center of gravity,'

pivotal in maintaining societal ‘order and continuity’ (F. A. Omar, 2021; Samatar, 1995). Thus, while the advent of Islam did not establish a Somali nationalism concept that equate to the sense of the concept of the modern nation-state, it fostered what Samatar (1995) has described as a ‘moral commonwealth’ or ‘ummah’ (seen in **Figure 6**), which is a concept implying practical collective identity transcending clan loyalties.




Figure 6: Basic elements of traditional Somali moral order (Samatar, 1995).

Thus, in short, Islam has exerted a profound and positive influence on Somali society, to the extent that it has become, in various forms, an inseparable adjunct to the pre-existing Somali identity. Kinship, while continuing as a primary identifier, is complemented by Islam, which emerged as a critical unifying element, fostering a collective sense of identity and destiny among the Somali people. Consequently, this amalgamation of Islamic and Somali identities has been pivotal in shaping the socio-political landscape and collective mindset within Somali society (Omar, 2022; Lewis, 1999). Accordingly, taking the ‘moral commonwealth’ as a frame of reference, the roots of the crisis will be deliberated by examining the factors that transformed the traditional society, which was characterized by an egalitarian ethos based on customary laws and Islamic teachings, underwent a transformation into a conflict-ridden society plagued by lawlessness, civil wars, and state failure.

3.2. Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial Transformations and Turmoils

The ensuing sections will delineate the impact of historical events, such as the evolution of state-building culture, colonialism, culminating in the rise and decline of the contemporary Somali state, on the traditional Somali moral order. Thus, the

following sections will highlight how altering the traditional ‘moral commonwealth,’ epitomized by the dualistic nature of the kinship intertwined with the Islam, serves as a pivotal frame of reference.

3.2.1. The Early ‘State-Building Culture’ and the Emergence of Clan-States

As discussed in the previous section, Somalis actively participated in some of the Islamic Sultanates that emerged in East Africa between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, such as the Sultanate of Ifat and, more importantly, the Sultanate of Adal. In these contexts, numerous Somali clans moved beyond their traditional segmentary clannism, collaborating to counter the external threat posed by the Abyssinian Empire’s efforts at Christianization and territorial expansion. Consequently, this historical involvement of Somalis in these Islamic sultanates is regarded as the precursor for the development of indigenous Somali Sultanates such as the Ajuran Imamate (mid-13th – early-18th century), which was a regional sultanate based in south-central parts of the Somali peninsula and was regarded as the largest pre-colonial state established by the Somalis. The imamate, which lasted from the mid-thirteenth century to the seventeenth century, formed a confederacy of clans that mainly comprised some clans of the Hawiye and Digil-Mirifle clan-families (Abdullahi, 2017; Cassanelli, 1982; Mukhtar, 2016).

The sultanate secured trading routes and promoted foreign trade with Arabia, India, Venetia, Persia, Egypt, and as far away as China, which flourished in the coastal cities. Additionally, the Ajuran Imamate instituted strong standing army, which had successfully resisted the Oromo (an ethnicity that lives in Abyssinia) invasion/migration from the west, as well as the Portuguese incursion from the Indian Ocean (Abdullahi, 2017; Cassanelli, 1982; Mukhtar, 2016; Omar, 2021). Therefore, the state-building culture of the traditional Somali society, whose foundation was laid with the experiences gained from contact with other East African Islamic sultanates, was further developed with the institutions and practices of the Ajuran Sultanate and thus increased the accumulation of the society.

Nevertheless, although the Ajuran Imamate did well in resisting devastating aggressions by Abyssinian (Oromo) attempts of invasions from the west and Portuguese incursions from the east, Ajuran authority was challenged in the late 16th century by rebels within the confederacy due to disturbance by some pastoral clans,

who suffered from authoritarian practices unfamiliar to pastoral traditional Somali clans such as harsh taxations, forced labor, and, most importantly, from discriminatory decrees on water rights—which is vital for the pastorals. Ultimately, Ajuran Imamate was weakened in the seventeenth century and was replaced by fragmented, clan-centric states such as Sultanate of Geledi (18th – 20th century) and Hiraab Imamate (18th – 19th century) (Abdullahi, 2017; Cassanelli, 1982; Mukhtar, 2016; Omar, 2021).

In addition to that, many other clan-centric sultanates later emerged in the northern and central parts of the Somali peninsula such as Majeerteen Sultanate (17th – 20th century), Warsangeli Sultanate (12th – 17th century), and Hobyo Sultanate (19th – 20th century) during the pre-colonial period. Interestingly, a clear manifestation of the status of ‘mosaic’ of clan-states that characterized this era was the bifurcation of the coastal city of Mogadishu, which currently serves as the capital, into two distinct entities, Shingaani and Hamarweyne, each ruled by a different sultan throughout this period. Therefore, apart from the Ajuran Imamate, which initially emerged from a confederation of clan-families, all other clan-states were merely urban entities that bore the names of clans, while the pastoral areas remained under the customary moral order and the states could only mobilize the clans in times of crisis. Consequently, the state-building culture of the traditional Somali society failed to establish a centralized state that could institutionalize the traditional Somali ‘moral commonwealth’ and extend its authority over the entire Somali peninsula. Rather, it deviated from the egalitarian, collective decision-making based on non-hierarchical communal governance and empowered the traditional clan leaders, who were apolitical in traditional society. This shift produced a form of ‘monarchical leaders’ with titles such as Malaaq, Geraad, Islaw, Suldaan, or Ugaas for each clan—i.e., this historical event paved the way for the emergence of elite culture in the Somali lands (Abdullahi, 2017, 2018; Cassanelli, 1982; Ingiriis, 2018; Mukhtar, 2003).

Thus, the colonial pioneer explorers who came to the Somali peninsula were drawn to this fragmentation, as it facilitated their attempts to establish a colony in these clan-states in their region. Subsequent to the increase in the strategic significance of the region with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the colonial powers signed separate economical, ‘friendship,’ and protectorate treaties with the elites of these fragmented clan-states between 1884 and 1885 (Mukhtar, 2003; Abdullahi, 2017; Ingiriis, 2018). Hence, these elites, although did not radically alter the ‘moral commonwealth’,

assumed the prerogative of the clans to make collective decisions and prioritized their own interests when they signed treaties that facilitated the colonizer's entry into Somali lands. More gravely, this deviation undermined, or at least delayed, the cohesive force of clans against the external threat, as the role of elites made it hard to perceive colonialism as a hostile intrusion. Consequently, there was no effective resistance to colonialism at the onset, since it came through treaties with the elites that concealed the reality from the clans, most of whom resided in pastoral areas. Therefore, the Somali peninsula paid the price of neglecting the 'moral commonwealth' with their own independence.

3.2.2. Colonialism and the Disruption of the Somali Socio-Political Order

The preceding sections have shown that, with the exception of a few economic and political elites who emerged from the pre-colonial 'mosaic' of clan-states in urban areas, Somali society traditionally adhered to a form of 'communitarian pastoralism'. In this non-hierarchical system, pastoral and peasant products, especially livestock, were regarded as symbols of wealth rather than commodities. However, the colonial era ushered in a 'peripheral capitalist pastoralism' that integrated the Somali economy into global capitalism and transformed the traditional socio-political order. This change gave rise to new social groups—merchants and state elites—who exercised power through the commodification of livestock and the accumulation of wealth (Samatar, 1992; Webersik, 2004). As a result, the commercialization of the pastoral and peasant economy undermined the traditional social order, based on a fusion of Islam and kinship, and led to the emergence of a competitive, elite-oriented, and consumption-driven urban society (Samatar, 1992). Consequently, this abrasion in the traditional egalitarian social order presented an opportunity for the colonial powers to manipulate these new elites and restructure the socio-political landscape by amplifying their socio-political role, which had previously been marginal.

Furthermore, colonial powers profoundly reconfigured Somali society by introducing a bureaucratic administration structure. Somali society traditionally followed a clan-based system without a central authority, known as 'segmentary clannism' (Samatar, 1992). In this system, each clan had its own territory of influence and socio-political order. However, the colonial powers seized vast territories inhabited by segmentary clans and imposed a new bureaucratic administration model, incorporating clan leaders

into a bureaucratic system to maintain control over the clans. This resulted in the politicization of clans, creating a new form of clan elite competition and reconfiguring the traditional moral order (Webersik, 2004; Samatar, 1997; Abdullahi, 2017). The colonial state's appointment of clan leaders (chiefs) as intermediaries between the administration and the tribesmen, a role alien to the indigenous Somali structure, eroded the traditional Islam-kinship based moral order and fostered a shift towards a more authoritarian, clan-identity-based social power structure (Samatar, 1997). Thus, this 'bureaucratic integration' of the clan leaders and their use as bureaucratic agents to strategically maintain control over Somali communities distorted the pre-existing social structures by politicizing the clans, fostering a hierarchical system alien to the egalitarian nature of Somali society and provoking intra-clan resentments and rivalries (Ahmed, 2019; Samatar, 1997; Abdullahi, 2017, 2018).

The colonial education system, which established selective schools as a colonial transformation strategy, was another element that severely disrupted the established socio-political order. This education system, which functioned as a key instrument of colonial configuration of the traditional order, produced a new class of westernized political elites who deviated from the traditional norms and values and aligned more closely with colonial interests and ideologies. The colonial policy of educating the children of the clan elders and other traditional elites in culturally oriented selective schools aimed to maintain their elite status while integrating them into the colonial structure and its state institutions. Consequently, the growing gap between the traditional roots of the society and the modern elites triggered a significant transformation of Somali society, indicating a clear departure from traditional patterns and values (Abdullahi, 2017).

Finally, the traditional order has been significantly influenced by the partition of Somalia into five distinct territories occupied by colonial powers with different administrative traditions and languages. This artificial division into distinct zones, governed by three Western colonial powers—British, Italian, and French—and one region under the control of an African colonial 'bedfellow,' Ethiopia, fractured the previously unified cultural landscape and led to the emergence of regional identities and the establishment of diverse administrative and legal frameworks. Such fragmentation of the Somali identity sowed the seeds for subsequent conflicts (Abdullahi, 2017; Balthasar, 2014; Ingiriis, 2018; Lewis, 2004; Samatar, 1995).

Taken together, during the colonial era, the Somali traditional socio-political order was deeply altered by colonial interventions, drastically shifting the society's non-hierarchical, egalitarian, and collective decision-making-based nature. This was done using actions included empowering certain clan leaders and elites, thus destabilizing pre-existing social balances, and establishing educational systems to cultivate a new class of colonial elites, embedding cultural imperialism. This redirection of clan allegiance from collective decision-making to the interests of manipulated elites, backed by Western powers, significantly influenced the clans' political dynamics setting the stage for the undue influence of individual elites on traditional collective decision-based clan politics. However, although the negative impact of the colonial had lasting, regrettable impacts on Somali society.

Nevertheless, despite the colonial legacy engendering a plethora of persistent social and political challenges that continue to reverberate within the Somali society to this day, it is imperative to acknowledge that the decolonization process did, to a notable extent, rejuvenate the essence of the Somali 'ummah' and its intrinsic traditional moral order. As previously elucidated, this Somali traditional moral system, aptly described by Samatar (1995) as the "moral commonwealth," is characterized by a confluence of clan identity and Islamic identity. Hence, with the colonial powers exerting control over the tribal identities with the elites, the genesis of the path towards liberation and anti-colonial mobilization predominantly emanated from the religious identity, spearheaded by eminent religious scholars such as Sayyid Mohamad Abdullahi Hassan, Sheikh Ahmed Haji Mahdi, Sheikh Abdi Abiikar, and Sheikh Hasan Barsane (Abdullah, 2017; Omar, 2022).

Therefore, the catalyzation of this liberation movement by these scholars precipitated a sort of awakening within the collective Somali consciousness, to the extent that certain members of the educated colonial elite transformed into fervent anti-colonialists. This awakening, in conjunction with historical dynamics in the colonial nations, eventually culminated in the termination of the colonial trajectory, heralding the independence of the territories colonized by Britain in the north and Italy in the south. This pivotal moment marked the inception of the first central government to administer a major part of the Somali lands—with the exception of three Somali regions, two that subsequently became part of Ethiopia and Kenya, and Djibouti which become an independent county—in the year 1960 (Abdullahi, 2017; Ingiriis, 2018).

Consequently, following the cessation of the colonial epoch, the Somali populace was presented with an unprecedented opportunity to reconstruct and reform their traditional social and political systems, which, although altered, were not entirely effaced by the colonial experience.

3.2.3. The First Republic and the Rise of Elite Rivalry

The inception of the Somali Republic in 1960 heralded a unique moment in the annals of African state formation, characterized by an unprecedented alignment of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious uniformity, which set it apart from the prevalent societal fragmentation observed in other post-colonial African states (Balthasar, 2017)(Balthasar, 2017)(Balthasar, 2017). This homogeneity, coupled with the egalitarian nature of the pre-colonial Somali society, was seen as a harbinger of a new paradigm in state-building, leading observers to regard Somalia as a potential role model for nationalism in Africa (Webersik, 2004). The emergence of the first Somali Republic was greeted with a fervent nationalist euphoria and social unity that expressed the shared aspiration for a prosperous post-colonial state, and thus, nobody anticipated the potential of this venture to become a failed state-building experiment (Ingiriis, 2018; Samatar, 1997). However, this initial optimism concealed the underlying vulnerabilities and sectarian tendencies ingrained in Somali society from its colonial past, casting a shadow on the longevity and stability of this nascent national identity (Samatar, 1997).

One of the main factors that contributed to the weakening and degradation of the high spirit of independence was the failure of the political elites to establish an original political system that reflects the specificities of Somali society and its traditional systems that were disrupted by colonial interventions. Instead of fulfilling the popular expectations, the dominant elites of the first republic opted for replicating colonial models of administration and this change in the direction of state building required a conscious departure from indigenous governance practices, especially undermining or sidelining the role of Islam and the egalitarian principles of the Xeer (social contract) and kinship-based collective governance systems, which were the foundation of the pre-colonial Somali social and political structure (Abdullahi, 2017; Samatar, 1992). Therefore, by adopting a top-down state structure that resembled the colonial model, the ruling elites significantly deviated from the pre-colonial socio-political ethos

deeply embedded in the society and thus created a fracture in the post-independence moral unity of society.

Another key factor in the decline and deterioration of the post-independence euphoria was the structure of the elites themselves, as their lack of unity hindered the development of a cohesive and lasting national project in Somalia. These westernized Somali elites, consisting of merchants, bureaucrats, and politicians from the colonial era, were among the leaders of the anti-colonial movement, but they also sought to replace the European administrators and enjoy the benefits associated with these roles. Therefore, their instability stemmed from their limited collective social experience and material basis, which increased their individual vulnerability and intensified their intra-group rivalry. Consequently, their emphasis on exploiting the privileges of their position, along with their empty rhetoric of promoting nationalism and modernity while alienating and disparaging the traditional pillars of society such as clans' egalitarian governance tradition and Islam's unifying role, had a significant role in disrupting the previously harmonious Somali society (Abdullahi, 2017; Ismail, 2016; Samatar, 1997). Hence, these factors collectively resulted in the absence of a united front among the elite, aggravating the political fragmentation and hindering the establishment of a unified national vision and the emergence of stable, legitimate leadership.

Furthermore, a dramatic shift in political dynamics, which further weakened the post-independence optimism and fragmented the political landscape, has been caused by the growing rivalry between elites over the scarce resources of the young state. The competition among the elite for powerful positions within the state apparatus was intense and intensified in the late 1960s, to the point where it overshadowed the necessity of fortifying state institutions. Contrary to their initial opposition to the pre-colonial roots, the elites ironically embraced clan affiliation as a strategical instrument in their political rivalry, resulting in the institutionalization of clan-politics, which refers to the exploitation of clan identity as a political card. As a result, political parties that identified with clans increased from 24 to 62 between 1964 and 1969, and the traditional kinship ties and moral principles were replaced by elites' rivalry that manipulated these ties for a relentless pursuit of state resources and power. Hence, the rampant bureaucratic corruption, overt election rigging, and the politicization of clan identities, further driven by a survivalist instinct among the elite struggling to maintain

their socio-economic status, led to a disintegration of the nation-building aspirations and a descent into clan-based factionalism (Abdullahi, 2017; Ismail, 2016; Samatar, 1992,1997). Therefore, these events not only undermined the government's credibility but also set the stage for the eventual collapse of the state as the elite's obsession with individual survival based on clan manipulation outweighed the collective national interest.

To sum up, the postcolonial Somali state, which had high hopes at first, quickly collapsed due to growing social discontent caused by perceived elite interests, rampant corruption, destructive interference on the social fabric, and incompetence in the civilian political domain, especially in the allocation of national resources and the execution of electoral politics (Samatar, 1995; Ahmed, 2019). At first, to secure political influence and access to resources, the elites manipulated clan affiliations as a strategy, which caused social and political divisions. Later, when these elites converged on their interest in state resources, they transformed Somalia into a one-party state, paving the way for what Samatar (1992) termed as 'petit-bourgeois dictatorship'.

Nevertheless, the assassination of the newly elected second President, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, laid bare the underlying political instability of the state, subsequently precipitating a bloodless coup d'état by the armed forces on 21 October 1969, merely six days after his demise (Samatar, 1992; Ahmed, 2019; Abdullahi, 2017). This military intervention, which marked the end of parliamentary governance, was ironically met with substantial public support, as the central government had hitherto failed to deliver tangible benefits to the Somali society at large, instead being perceived as an instrument for a few to exploit the many (Abdullahi, 2017; Coyne, 2006). Hence, although the first republic's legacy eroded the post-independence morale, its overthrow by the military intervention revived it significantly, creating a historic opportunity for the army that took power and had public support to learn from the past and construct a bottom-up Somali state, one that not only acknowledges but also reinforces the unique historical particularities of the society. Therefore, it is clearly evident here that despite the coup d'état representing a collapse of the people's will, the morale and hopes remained high among the populace. This sentiment was eloquently expressed by Ali Sugule Egal (1936-2016), a prominent Somali poet and songwriter

of that era, in his poem where he described the event as: “a splendid dawn has broken, a cordial morning, a day crowned with glory.”

3.2.4. Intensification of Clan-Affiliation Manipulation and State Disintegration in the Second Republic

The 1969 military coup d'état in Somalia, orchestrated by General Mohamed Siad Barre, resulted from a myriad of socio-political and economic factors, profoundly shaped by the preceding civilian government's failures. General Barre's takeover of power, which was bloodless, received widespread public approval and enthusiasm driven by hopes for a government free of corruption, a resurgence of pre-colonial traditional egalitarian spirit, and a shift from the divisive politics based on clan affinity manipulation that had fractured the nation. However, despite the Barre regime's initial efforts to promote nation-building and institutional change, the initial optimism turned into disappointment as the regime's oppressive nature became evident. Therefore, the regime's repressive strategies ultimately provoked armed resistance movements, which played a significant role in the collapse of the state and the descent into decades of anarchy and civil war (Abdullahi, 2017; Balthasar, 2017; M. O. Omar, 1996; Samatar, 1992, 1997).

The initial years of the military regime in Somalia, led by General Barre, were marked by a blend of hopeful nationalism and efforts towards nation-building. Central to this period was the introduction and institutionalization of a writing-script for the Somali language, which did not have a unified writing script and was transmitted orally until that time. Thus, the decision to adopt characters for the Somali language, as announced on October 21, 1972, by Barre, was more than a mere linguistic reform; it represented a conscious attempt to forge a unified national identity, tying together the notion of modernization with a sense of shared community (Balthasar, 2017). In addition, this initiative was part of a broader strategy, which included extensive literacy campaigns and healthcare improvements, with a view to integrating nation building into all aspects of life in Somalia (Ahmed, 2019). Consequently, the military regime initially represented a diverse national spectrum and gained public approval for its policies, which promoted self-reliance and education, such as creating higher education institutions and handling the 1974-75 drought effectively, which reinforced public

support for the junta's articulation of nationalist and communitarian ideals (Samatar, 1997).

Nonetheless, yet again, the initial nationalistic euphoria was gradually overshadowed by an increasing centralization of power and a growing authoritarian bent. The Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), established immediately after the coup as the country's sole governing body, began restricting constitutional rights and suppressing opposition voices, signaling a departure from its previous participatory and inclusive approach. Thus, the regime's shift towards a more oppressive governance style became starkly evident with the public execution of dissenting figures and the suppression of political freedoms, eroding the public's initial enthusiasm (Samatar, 1995). By the mid-1970s, Barre's leadership had become synonymous with a governance style marked by concentrated power, fear, and intimidation, a far cry from the hopeful beginnings that had once seemed to signal a break from past sectarianism (Samatar, 1995; Samatar, 1992; Abdullahi, 2017). Consequently, as the decade progressed, the initial public enthusiasm gave way to disillusionment, as the regime's self-glorification and disregard for law and due process became more pronounced, undermining the development of a rational and politically mature society (Samatar, 1995).

The downfall of the Second Republic, and subsequently, the disintegration of the Somali state, can be ascribed to a convergence of multiple factors. Among these factors, the most salient was the Barre regime's aggressive campaign against kinship and Islam—integral elements that constructed what Samatar (1995) termed as 'moral commonwealth' of traditional Somali society—as part of the regime's broader strategy to advocate scientific socialism as the country's dominant ideology. The regime's endeavors in constructing homogenized national consciousness were started by the territorial reorganization in 1974, which reconfigured regions and districts to transcend clan boundaries and expunge tribal names. Nevertheless, this restructuring aimed at eradicating entrenched clan loyalties and fostering a unified political identity, yet it only partially succeeded, as clan institutions continued to hold sway, particularly among nomadic populations. More provocatively, the regime's introduction of laws that contravened Islamic principles sparked widespread opposition from Islamic scholars and the general populace. Furthermore, the execution of leading Islamic scholars and the suppression of peaceful protests against these secular laws led to a profound change in the social fabric and laid the foundation for opposition to the

regime and, ultimately, the collapse of the Somali state (Balthasar, 2017; Ahmed, 2019; Abdullahi, 2017). Consequently, the regime's direct attack on the clan identity, the fundamental social structure, rather than the elites who exploit clan loyalty for their political ambitions, and its policies that contradict the Islamic identity, which is integral to the clan identity, have caused severe shocks in the society, raised clanship sensitivities, and reinforced the desire to overthrow this regime.

The aftermath of the Ogaden War (1977-1978) marked a critical point in the decline of the Somali military regime, precipitating to a profound change in the country's already eroding political dynamics and signaling the beginning of state collapse. The Ogaden region, historically inhabited by ethnic Somalis, was annexed by the Ethiopian Kingdom during the colonial partition of the Somali Peninsula in the nineteenth century and, as a result, became a symbol of irredentist ambitions and national pride for post-colonial Somalia, which sought to unite all Somali-inhabited territories in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti under the concept of 'Greater Somalia'. Aware of these aspirations, the military regime launched an invasion of the Ogaden region in July 1977, triggering an approximately eight-month-long war between Ethiopia and Somalia, with some implications from the cold war. Despite the initial success of the Somali army against Ethiopia, which regained most of the Somali lands in the region and even advanced into the Ethiopian interior within days, the situation changed when the Soviets and their allies intervened, resulting in a military defeat that eroded the regime's legitimacy and sparked a national debate on governance. It is crucial to highlight that the Soviet Union's shift from supporting Barre's socialist regime to siding with Ethiopia during the war marks a peak in Cold War dynamics influencing the Somali crisis. Initially, the Barre regime's embrace of scientific socialism in the mid-1970s, amid growing ties with the Soviets, clashed with societal religious sentiments, eroding popular support. However, the significant influence of these dynamics became evident when the regime's prior rapprochement with the United States, followed by the expulsion of Soviet advisers, precipitated a pivotal turn in the war and, thus, culminating in a defeat that undermined the stability of Barre's military government. Consequently, factors such as the severe blow in the regime's legitimacy, the post-war faltering economy, the lack of democratic mechanisms for government change, alongside the regime's clings to power led to initiatives within the regime itself that resulted in an attempted coup in April 1978. In reaction, Barre resorted to brutal

measures, including the purging of the military and the repression of entire regions, notably punishing some clan in the northeast for its perceived role in the coup attempt (Samatar, 1992, 1997; Samatar, 1995; Balthasar, 2017; Abdullahi, 2017). Hence, the post-war power consolidation tactics, such as clan-based collective punishment, nepotism towards Barre's own kin, and clan affinity manipulation, coupled with the ongoing oppression (Abdullahi, 2017; N. Ahmed, 2019; Wam, 2005), further eroded the national solidarity and amplified the kinship-ties and clan-based allegiance.

The formation of armed opposition movements against the Somali state, crucial in its collapse, stemmed from escalating clan grievances and political disenchantment, peaking in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The genesis of these movements, pivotal in the state's disintegration, occurred mainly outside Somalia, led by ex-affiliates of Siad Barre's regime. The first, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), emerged in the late 1970s from senior Majerteen clan officers, part of the Darood clan-family, including Barre's sub-clan. These officers, post a failed 1978 coup against Barre, fled to Ethiopia, a recent adversary in the Ogaden war. In the early 1980s, the Somali National Movement (SNM) arose, primarily involving Isaaq clan members, formed by a coalition of businessmen, intellectuals, and ex-army officers, many in the British diaspora. Moreover, a new wave of opposition groups emerged in the late 1980s, such as the United Somali Congress (USC), backed by the Hawiye clan-family and founded in Italy, and notably the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), which stemmed from internal rifts within the regime's inner circle and was linked to the Ogaden clan, a subgroup of the Darood clan-family, indicating its eroding support, even among its erstwhile allies, let alone his distant ones. These movements, although under political or ideological fronts, were fundamentally clan-based, resulting from the regime's divisive post-1977-war policies. Therefore, these resistance movements, driven by both domestic discontent and foreign backing, particularly from Ethiopia, gradually converged under the increasing conviction that any alternative was preferable to Barre's regime, and thus further exacerbating clan-based divisions in the country. However, the regime's cruel and vengeful response, particularly against the Isaaq clan-family in the Northwest, alienated the populace and legitimized opposition claims of its predatory nature, leading to armed resistance. Furthermore, despite reform attempts, including a proposed new constitution, institutional reforms, and elections, these were seen as insincere and late, bolstering opposition. Eventually, the

culmination of the regime's inflexibility and intensification of the armed clan-centric oppositions led to Barre's overthrow in 1991 (Abdullahi, 2017; I. I. Ahmed & Green, 1999; N. Ahmed, 2019; Coyne, 2006; Luling, 1997; M. O. Omar, 1996; Samatar, 1995).

The collapse of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia in 1991, which was opposed by various factions that had little in common except their anti-regime stance, ushered in a period of civil war and anarchy, resulting in the disintegration of the state. As discussed earlier, General Barre's manipulation of clan loyalties, which enabled him to maintain his rule by favoring some clans and marginalizing or antagonizing others, deepened the divisions within Somali society and contributed to the regime's demise. However, the armed factions that toppled the regime were no better than their predecessor, as they soon engaged in a violent struggle for power over the remnants of the state. Therefore, the power vacuum in the post-Barre era triggered a series of inter-clan conflicts fueled by the ambitions of the faction leaders who exploited and exacerbated the tribal grievances and social cleavages in the Somali community that had been aggravated by the successive regimes from the First Republic to the military dictatorship (Ahmed, 2019; Coyne, 2006; Ingiriis, 2018; Samatar, 1995; Omar, 1996; Samatar, 1992; Wam, 2005; Webersik, 2004).

3.2.5. The Mayhem Status of Post-Collapse Era

The collapse of Siyaad Barre's regime in January 1991 marked both an end and a beginning for Somalia—a conclusion to years of authoritarian rule, but the onset of a devastating civil conflict fueled by clan divisions and the quest for power. The aforementioned armed opposition movements, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), were informally united by a singular objective: the overthrow of Barre's military regime. These groups, in order to achieve this aim, rooted themselves in their respective clan identities—such as the Issaq-dominated SNM in the northwest, the Majerteen-centric SSDF in the northeast, the Hawiye-led USC in the central regions, the Ogadeni-centric SPM and the Digil-Mirifle-oriented SDM in the southwest regions—reflecting not merely nominal affiliations, but also the bedrock of the groups' support bases and operational strategies. Thus, these groups had mobilized

clan loyalties to challenge Barre's regime, leveraging the clan as a unit of political mobilization (Abdullahi, 2017; Mukhtar, 2003; Coyne, 2006); a factor that would later exacerbate the fragmentation of the state.

In the months leading up to the collapse of the General Barre regime, the main opposition forces were the SNM and the USC, with some support from the SPM. The SNM had secured most of the northern regions, while the USC was advancing in the south, where Mogadishu, the capital city and the stronghold of Barre's regime, was located. In October 1990, only three months before Barre's downfall, the leaders of these rebel groups convened in Mustahil, a town in the Somali region of Ethiopia, and reportedly reached 'the Mustahil accord,' stipulating the formation of an interim government upon Barre's removal and, thus, demonstrating their common goal of overthrowing the regime. This goal was achieved on 26 January 1991, when the USC captured Mogadishu and forced Barre to flee from his presidential palace, Villa Somalia (Abdullahi, 2017; Bryden & Farah, 1996). Nevertheless, although the overthrow of Barre briefly gave the Somali people a glimpse of hope for a better political system, based on the pre-colonial egalitarian and religious traditions of Somali society, this hope soon turned into despair as the opposition leaders, now competing for power, failed to establish a coherent government, leading to a devastating civil war (Webersik, 2004; Ahmed, 2019; Abdulahi, 2017).

The precipitating event of the civil conflict occurred just two days after Barre's ousting, on 28 January 1991, when a faction of the USC unilaterally announced Ali Mahdi Mohamed, a Hawiye businessman and politician, as the interim president. This declaration was made without the consent of General Mohamed Farah Aidid, the official leader of the USC, who was pursuing Barre in the southwestern regions. Thus, Aidid's opposition to Ali Mahdi's appointment split the USC into rival camps, igniting a power struggle that would decimate the capital city, Mogadishu, and plunge the country into chaos (Abdullahi, 2017; Biddle, 2021). This act of political brinkmanship not only disregarded the agreed-upon frameworks for a post-Barre transition but also inflamed existing clan rivalries, particularly within the Hawiye clan, setting the stage for the violent power struggles that would follow. The rivalry between these factions devolved into a protracted conflict, fundamentally altering the social and political fabric of Mogadishu and setting a precedent for the fragmentation of Somalia into clan-based fiefdoms (Catena, 2020; Coyne, 2006).

Moreover, in contrast to the anarchy in the south, where fighting between the rival factions of the USC resulted in widespread death, destruction, and a humanitarian crisis that prompted international intervention, the north pursued a path of autonomy, or rather separatism. The SNM, representing the Isaaq clan in the north, proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Somaliland on May 18, 1991, rejecting the interim government formed by the self-proclaimed Ali Mahdi government in Mogadishu, and thus creating division between the north and south of Somalia (Omar, 1996; Abdullahi, 2018; Bryden & Farah, 1996). Consequently, the failure to establish a unified government led to a prolonged period of civil strife, characterized by the manipulation of clan loyalties and the emergence of warlordism. Additionally, external interventions also contributed to the conflict, with regional and international actors sometimes supporting specific factions for their strategic interests, complicating the internal dynamics further. The militias that had fought against Barre's regime fragmented further into sub-clan and sub sub-clan-based militias, intensifying the violence and chaos across Somalia (Ahmed, 2019; Coyne, 2006; Webersik, 2004). Therefore, the legacy of the post-colonial elites, who had exploited clan identities for political gain, continued to shape the dynamics of conflict, with clan affiliation becoming a political legitimacy and manpower source for the conflicting factions, and a vital form of protection against violence for the society (Webersik, 2004; Wam, 2005).

The prolonged civil conflict in Somalia was exacerbated by the disappointment of early reconciliation efforts, which were hindered by the ingrained mistrust and the self-serving agendas of warlords, who often acted as clan representatives in peace talks. The Djibouti I and II conferences, which epitomized these efforts, had ambitious objectives but could not prevent the escalation of violence. The first conference, convened by President Hassan Gulaid Abtidon of Djibouti in June 1991, aimed to unify the Somali factions by denouncing Mohamed Siad Barre as a menace to peace and calling for national unity (Omar, 1996). However, the conference lacked the participation of key actors such as the Somali National Movement (SNM), which had declared Somaliland's independence, and faced the opposition of General Mohamed Farah Aidid, who refused to recognize the interim government headed by Ali Mahdi Mohamed, describing it as an illegitimate extension of Siad Barre's regime. These factors revealed the difficulties of reaching a consensus among the splintered entities (Ahmed, 2019; Abdullahi, 2018). The second conference, held two months later,

increased its international involvement, and tried to establish a ceasefire and a provisional constitutional framework (Omar, 1996). Yet, the conference could not overcome the clan-based cleavages and Aidid's outright rejection of the Djibouti process, which he considered a continuation of Barre's regime. This discord not only demonstrated the ineffectiveness of external mediation efforts but also triggered an eight-year civil war, highlighting the challenges of reconciling entrenched clan animosities and the constraints of international diplomacy in restoring national cohesion (Abdullahi, 2018; N. Ahmed, 2019; Fessha & Dessalegn, 2022).

Thus, to conclude, the collapse of the state resulted in an anarchic situation that was worsened by the splintering of clan-based militias into smaller factions along sub-clan and sub-sub-clan lines. Consequently, Mogadishu, the capital, descended into a state of complete chaos and persistent violence, due to the fragmentation of one of the largest armed factions, the USC, into rival wings, and the seizure of power by some remnants of the former regime, which led to the division of the capital into zones controlled by different armed factions. In the north, separatist movements emerged, as the SNM and SSDF, the oldest clan militias in terms of establishment, declared self-rule and announced the republic of Somaliland in 1991 and the state of Puntland in 1998, respectively, driven by their clans' interests in autonomy from the turmoil that engulfed the rest of the country. These declarations, while providing some degree of order within their respective territories, further complicated the national picture by challenging, to varying extents, the notion of a unified Somali state. Furthermore, the situation was worsened by external interventions and the lack of successful reconciliation efforts, which deepened the existing social segmentations (Ahmed, 2019; Coyne, 2006; Ingiriis, 2018; Omar, 1996; Samatar, 1995; Webersik, 2004). Thus, these historical events marked the collapse of the second state-building effort by the Somalis and triggered decades-long crisis of politics and humanity, foreign intervention, and a series of peace talks that laid the foundation for the federal system under analysis.

3.3. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, the interrelated socio-political and external factors that formed the roots of the Somali conflict were examined. The sociological organization of traditional Somali society was initially scrutinized, observing that a kinship-based structure

rooted in paternal lineage and to a lesser extent in-law affinity—both as an adaption mechanism to the absence of central authority and harsh pastoral and agro-pastoral environments—played a crucial role in shaping the identity and politics of traditional Somali society. The political organization of this traditional society was based on an ad hoc communal governance system based on kinship relationships, which Lewis (1999) called “pastoral democracy,” demonstrating a refined understanding of social order and conflict resolution in a traditional society’s atmosphere that lacks a central authority. The use of this traditional system of government, which was based on customary laws (heer) and lineages, created a unique political landscape characterized by a decentralized stateless order and a classless society that embraces collective decision-making and egalitarianism. Additionally, the advent of Islam has reformed the traditional governance system by introducing of ‘Qanoon,’ informed by Quranic and Hadith teachings, which expanded the customary law (heer) and blood-ties-based communal governance system, kinship, into a ‘moral commonwealth,’ as described by Samatar (1995). Islam’s profound influence on Somali society made it an integral part of the kinship identity and, thus, this fusion of Islamic and Somali identities has significantly influenced the socio-political scenery, molding a society that is far from anarchy—despite lacking a central state and being based on segmentary clannism—and structured around a classless, egalitarian, majoritarian, and participatory decision-making socio-political order.

Commencing in the 13th century, a state formation wave emerged in traditional Somali society; however, no sultanate succeeded in unifying all Somali territories. By the 17th century, a plethora of clan-states had developed, with many clan-families or sub-clans establishing their own states. Nevertheless, these, using Ingiriis’s (2018) description, ‘mosaic’ of clan-states, were unable to centralize or institutionalize the traditional Somali ‘moral commonwealth’ across the entire peninsula. This deviation from the customary majoritarian, collective, and non-hierarchical communal governance led to the rise of monarchical leaders and urban elites within each clan and, subsequently, colonial powers exploited this fragmentation and entered region by signing treaties with the elites of these clan-states. Colonial era further disrupted the traditional ‘moral commonwealth’ of the Somali society by imposing a bureaucratic administration model, politicizing clan identities, and creating a new class of westernized elites. These interventions undermined the classless, egalitarian, and participatory decision-making

of the clans and enabled elite manipulation of clan identity for political control purposes.

The first republic of Somalia (1960-1969) emerged with great optimism and aspirations, owing to the post-independence surge of nationalism, cultural homogeneity, and egalitarian ethos of the pre-colonial traditional society. However, these strengths were overshadowed by the weaknesses inherited from the colonial legacy, as the ruling elites of the first republic, who were predominantly products of the colonial era, failed to revive and reform the traditional social and political systems and instead emulated the colonial models of administration. Worse still, these elites sowed the seeds of discord in the Somali society by exploiting clan-affiliation as a means to pursue their own interests in the scarce resources of the nascent state, thereby exacerbating the clan-politics initiated in the colonial era and undermining the post-independence national spirit.

The Second Republic (1969-1991) emerged with aspirations for a corruption-free government that would restore pre-colonial values and eschew clan-based politics. However, these aspirations were soon dashed as the regime turned authoritarian, elitist and divisive, privileging some clans and marginalizing others. This exacerbated the social cleavages and provoked clan-based armed resistance that toppled the regime. Nonetheless, the power vacuum left by the military regime triggered violent competition for control over the state's remnants among the resistance factions, resulting in inter-clan conflicts. These conflicts, largely fueled by faction leaders' exploitation of clanship grievances as a political instrument, resulted in the disintegration of the state, and consequently a prolonged state of anarchy and civil war.

Therefore, in summarizing the literature reviewed for this section, which seeks to identify the origins of political conflict in Somalia, it has been discerned that factors such as colonial legacy, competition for power, Cold War dynamics, lack of patriotic leadership, and foreign interventions are frequently emphasized. However, this chapter, employing Samatar's (1995) traditional 'moral commonwealth' as a frame of reference and aligning with the conclusions of Samatar (1997), Abdullahi (2017, 2018) and Menkhaus (2003), argues that the elite competition is the key driver of the recurrent conflicts across the state-building phases and thus this competition among the opportunistic, or what Samatar (1992, 1997) calls 'survivalist', elites can be

regarded as the core and the catalyst of all root causes of the conflict. These elites, characterized by Abdullahi (2018) as having a culture of ‘clan-affinity imperativeness,’ ‘nepotistic behavior,’ ‘politics commoditization,’ ‘foreign patronage dependency,’ and ‘endless greed,’ have been the majority in the post-colonial period, with rare exceptions. Therefore, recognizing that the Somali conflict is primarily rooted in elites who repeatedly exploit and emotionally manipulate clans for their own political gains will enable us to comprehend the federalization process in the following chapter and the emergence of paradiplomacy in the post-conflict federal state of Somalia which is the main focus of this study.



4. THE FEDERAL PRESCRIPTION TO THE SOMALI CONFLICT: ROOTS AND RAMIFICATIONS

In the aftermath of the Somali state's dissolution, the fabric of the nation was unraveled, revealing a landscape marked by the fragmentation and resurgence of pre-colonial clan loyalties, supplanting the nascent national identity that had struggled to take root in the post-colonial era. The state collapse was less about the pre-existing internal divisions (Webersik, 2004), and more a consequence of the elite's clash over the distribution of newfound political and economic remnants from the ash's military regime, which exacerbated the societal fissures. Ingiriis (2018) further explains the consequences of this transformation, observing the re-appearance of a complicated 'mosaic of clan-states' that resembled pre-colonial arrangements in the form of federal structures, thus reinforcing Somalia's image in the global perception as the ultimate example of a failed state, marked by chronic conflicts, piracy, and secessionism. The irony of these years of extreme chaos was that Somali elites, who had rejected the organizational principles and egalitarian spirit of pre-colonial Somali society in the state-building efforts that followed the end of colonialism, repurposed a dysfunctionalized form of the pre-colonial system of segmentary clannism to cope with the complex situation of post-state-collapse rivalries.

Therefore, this chapter will trace the historical events that led the conflicting elites, who usurped the collective will of a vulnerable society that had experienced successive socio-political shocks, to settle on the federal solution after a long trajectory of reconciliation—or perhaps inter-elites power bargain. Hence, after comprehending the dynamics and frameworks of the federal system in Somalia, which, as the chapter will demonstrate, caused the development of paradiplomacy in Somalia, the chapter concludes by showcasing cases of paradiplomacy in the country, thereby augmenting the analysis of post-conflict federalism consequences in Somalia.

4.1. Pre-Federal National Reconciliation Trajectory

Following the disintegration of Somalia's central government in 1991, the international community witnessed a relentless pursuit of peace through a series of conferences held across various nations—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, and Yemen—aimed at addressing the escalating crisis within the Somali borders. These

gatherings, particularly those between 1991 and 1997, were characterized by the participation of warlords, who were deemed the principal Somali stakeholders (Ahmed, 2019), representing the intricate mosaic of clan-affiliation-manipulating factions that define the nation's political atmosphere in these years. Thus, this period marked an era where external interventions, through numerous reconciliation initiatives (seen in **Figure 7**), sought to navigate the deep-rooted complexities and divisions of Somali political arena, in an effort to restore some semblance of order (Omar, 1996). The persistent state of conflict among ever increasing factions and anarchy, essentially a byproduct of the prolonged civil conflicts based on the manipulation of clan affiliations and the failure of the reconciliation process, ultimately necessitated a shift towards a externally-driven federal solution (Fessha & Dessalegn, 2022)—a strategy which, while aimed at defusing the crisis, underscored the international community's gravitation towards a federal solution that navigated along the precarious lines of clan affiliations.




Figure 7: Notable post-collapse national reconciliation initiatives.

The first attempt at reconciliation, the Djibouti I Conference in 1991, however, this initiative was met with opposition from many parts, highlighting the intricate web of elite rivalries that plagued the peace process from its inception. Despite the inclusion of multiple factions and the presence of international observers and regional countries of interest at continuation of Djibouti I, Djibouti II, these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, culminating in a continued state of division and conflict within the country (Ahmed, 2019; Omar, 1996; Abdullahi, 2018). Thus, the failure of the conference in Djibouti in 1991, which saw the assembly of 6 clan-based faction, paved the way for further divisions and the emergence of multiple factions, each claiming to represent the interests of a certain clan, sub-clan, or even sub sub-clan. The intractability of the Somali conflict, underscored by the proliferation of clan-based factions at successive peace conferences, illustrates the complexities of achieving a sustainable peace in post-collapse fragmented political atmosphere. As a matter of fact, the burgeoning of faction number to 15 at the next gathering, the UN-sponsored Addis Ababa Peace Conference in January 1993, and to 28 factions in the subsequent Cairo conference in 1997 further exemplified the dilution of representational legitimacy, as the increasing number of factions did not correlate with a more inclusive representation of Somali society's genuine stakeholders, such as elders, merchants, and women's groups. Consequently, this oversight highlights a critical flaw in the peace process: the exclusion of authentic community voices in favor of warlord-led factions, which, despite multiple agreements, consistently failed to usher in peace (Ahmed, 2019; Abdullahi, 2018). Therefore, these fruitless conferences, exacerbated by external interventions and internal divisions, underscores a complex tableau of failed resolutions and the exacerbation of conflict dynamics, thus impeding, if not outright diminishing, the prospects for a peaceful settlement in the early years of the conflict.

In the labyrinthine saga of Somalia's quest for peace and governance post-collapse, the Arta conference, orchestrated under the aegis of Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh in May-August 2000, emerged as a seminal juncture. This ambitious peace initiative, diverging from previous efforts by virtue of its inclusive assembly of over 1,500 delegates spanning the gamut of Somali civil society, marked the first substantive deviation from the warlord-dominated discourse that had beleaguered Somalia. The delegates, in a pioneering move, constituted a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), delineating seats via an innovative 4.5 formula that not only

acknowledged the major clans—Darood, Dir, Rahanweyn (Digil-Mirifle), and Hawiye—but also extended representation to minority clans and women, thereby embedding a semblance of equity in Somali politics. This extensive assembly, the largest Somalia-owned peace conference ever held, elected a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) comprising 225 members, distributed according to the 4.5 formula: equal representation for the four major clan-families—Darood, Dir, Hawiye, and Rahanweyn (Digil-Mirifle)—and proportional representation for minority clans and women, totaling 245 seats.

Nevertheless, the nascent Transitional National Government's (TNG) aspirations, albeit representing a momentous stride towards re-establishing national governance, were stymied by a confluence of internal dissent and external machinations. First, the inclusion of the Isaaq clan/clan-family, the main component of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland in the north, under the Dir clan-family in the power-sharing arrangement was perceived as an act of aggression by Somaliland, exacerbating pre-existing grievances and prompting their insistence on remaining an independent entity in the north. Concurrently, the Ethiopian government's surreptitious empowerment of warlords, notably through the formation of the Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Committee (SRRC), underscored a strategic intent to forestall the emergence of a cohesive Somali state that could ostensibly threaten Ethiopian interests. This external intervention, coupled with the TNG's inherent frailties—namely, a leadership of low capacity and the lack of broad international support—culminated in its eventual incapacitation. Ethiopia's role as a 'spoiler' in Somalia's fragile peace process, driven by a desire to maintain Somali fragmentation, was emblematic of the broader geopolitical dynamics that have perennially complicated the Horn of Africa's quest for stability and governance (Abdullahi, 2018; N. Ahmed, 2019; Kasaija, 2010; Mukhtar, 2003).

To conclude, this section has shown that the quest for national reconciliation prior to the federal solution was constrained by the dominance of post-collapse elites, namely warlords, and the interference of regional actors, especially Ethiopia. After several unsuccessful conferences controlled by warlords, the first reconciliation attempt with a relatively inclusive and warlord-free base, the Arta Conference, produced the TNG, which failed to establish its authority and legitimacy, revealing the internal and

external challenges that hindered Somalia's stability. Thus, the historical analysis of the national reconciliation process has illustrated how this intricate interplay of clan dynamics, post-collapse elites (warlords), and regional geopolitical interests shaped the precarious nature of peace initiatives in Somalia, paving the way for a federal solution to the crisis, which will be examined in terms of its evolution and implications in the subsequent sections.

4.2. The Evolution of the Federalism Solution

The discourse on federalism within Somalia, a nation with continuous striving for political and social unity amidst periods of tumultuous change, presents a multifaceted chronicle that predates its official contemplation in 2004, tracing its genesis to the dawn of independence and evolving through various ideological, diplomatic, and scholarly engagements. This historical journey of federalism, within the rugged Somali political dialogue, is marked by several pivotal moments and proposals that have shaped the trajectory towards a federated state structure. Initially, the federalist aspirations were articulated by the Hizbia Digil Mirifle Somali (HDMS) party—a party later renamed as Hizb al-Dastuur Mustaqil al-Somal (Independent Constitutional Party of Somalia), mainly oriented to the Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle), an agro-pastoral clan-family based in the southern inter-river areas—in the late 1950s, advocating for a federal constitution to unify Somalis through full regional autonomy, a vision that stood in contrast to the centralist preferences of major anti-colonial nationalist parties such as the Somali National League (SNL) and Somali Youth League (SYL), which wanted to establish a strong central state to liberate the rest of the Somali lands under French, Ethiopian and British colonialism (Abdullahi, 2017; Dahir & Sheikh Ali, 2021; Mukhtar, 1989).

Subsequently, as this early federalist rhetoric came to nothing, the federal solution was brought back to the fore after quite a while. The pre-collapse external interventions, notably by James Keough Bishop, the last U.S. ambassador to pre-conflict Somalia, who in December 1990, nearly a month before the ousting of Barre's regime, proposed federalism as a means to avert state collapse, only to encounter resistance from Somali elites and clan elders who equated federalism with partition (Dahir & Sheikh Ali, 2021). The collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 ushered in a period of state disintegration, during which the decentralized governance model resurfaced as a viable

solution to the ensuing civil unrest by many faction leaders and even international community representatives, as evidenced by the United Nations Special Representative for Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun's advocacy for a federal solution in October 1992, aligning with global trends towards federation as a means to accommodate strong clan-oriented factions' division (Omar, 1996; Luling, 1997). Nonetheless, the first concrete study of federalism as a possible option as conflict resolution mechanism in Somalia was produced by report prepared in August 1995 by consultants, led by I. M. Lewis and James Mayall, from the London School of Economics and Political Science and commissioned by the European Union, European Commission's Somalia Unit, with the assistance of the United Nations Development Office for Somalia. This 'menu of options,' as the authors described, delineated federalism among other decentralization options, thereby providing an academic scaffold to the debate (Abdullahi, 2018).

Furthermore, concrete root of today's federal arrangement in Somalia can, arguably, be traced to the position paper issued by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1998, proposing an "Building Block Approach" methodology to the conflict resolution process (Abdullahi, 2018; Dahir & Sheikh Ali, 2021). This approach, at a minimum, within the publicly disclosed segment, emphasized a phased, bottom-up, and regional-to-national state-building process, where each faction/warlord establish regional authority over the territories which it claimed tribal custodianship, with the hope that, eventually, these territories would be brought together within a federal fence. However, although the implications of this strategy appear to address the core of the Somali crisis at first glance, and played a role in the formation of the Puntland region in 1998, along with international endorsement from the EU and the Somali Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB)—an Ethiopia-based UNDP project comprising non-governmental organizations, UN agencies, and donor governments—the strategy did not have a significant impact in its early days. The primary reason for this was that the Somali society, including intellectuals, civil society leaders, and religious scholars, considering the politically divided atmosphere and the general apprehension of Ethiopia's covert strategies—or ambitions, perceived this strategy as a conspiracy to divide and extend external influence over Somalia, which is engulfed in the abyss of non-statehood (Hussein, 2017; Abdullahi, 2018).

This initiative, “Building Block Approach,” conflicted with the rejection of the Arta reconciliation conference in 2000, the only conference not predominantly controlled by Ethiopian-backed warlords, as the governments emerging from this conference focused on a strategy that prioritized national unity and reconciliation before decentralization (Abdullahi, 2018). Nevertheless, despite Ethiopia’s unsuccessful initial project, it escalated its operations to undermine the transitional unionist government that emerged from the 2000 Arta conference, using faction leaders and warlords as proxies. It employed various tactics, such as accusing elements of the technocratic government of terrorism—in order to secure US and international communities’ support in the post-9/11 context—and arming the warlords, which resulted in the collapse of the civilian government and the initiation of a new reconciliation process, but with the same “building block” strategy in Eldoret, Kenya in 2002 which led to the 2004 conference in Magahi, Kenya, where the federal solution was officially adopted (Abdullahi, 2018; Dahir & Sheikh Ali, 2021; Hussein, 2017). Thus, it is evident from the historical narration of the backgrounds of the federal solution in the Somali political arena that it was incompatible with the collective political thought of Somalis and that it was the choice of the conflicting elites and behind them external actors with strategic interests in Somalia, which will provide an interpretive introduction to a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the federal system in Somalia.

The Eldoret conference, launched in 2002, with the warlords—or, in other words, post-collapse elites—coming to the forefront of politics, laid the groundwork for the document that not only anticipated the creation of Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs); the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC). This process, backed notably by Ethiopia and the U.S., led to the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) at the Mbagathi conference hosted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 2004. As a clearer indication of Ethiopia’s pivotal role in this path, a political figure that some have argued its proximity to Ethiopia, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed—a former army colonel, one of the leaders of the armed resistance against Siad Barre, and the first president of Puntland state, which was established according to the aforementioned “building blocks” initiative—was chosen as president. Although the conference abandoned the content of the outcomes of the Arta Conference, it continued to adopt the tribal power-sharing system 4.5, which sought to

distribute parliamentary seats among the tribes, so that the tribal quota system became at the center of the new system, the federal system (Abdullahi, 2018; N. Ahmed, 2019; Hussein, 2017; Spodaryk, 2013; Yimenu, 2023).

The TFG, despite receiving regional and international backing, remained in Nairobi until mid-2005 as it faced difficulties in establishing its authority over the country, especially in the capital city of Mogadishu, where a fierce conflict erupted between the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)—a coalition of Islamic scholars led armed courts, initially legal, and then political, organizations formed in the early-nineteenth to address the lawlessness that had gripped during the Somali Civil War—and warlord militias. The outcome of these clashes was determined in 2006 when the ICU emerged victorious, which enabled them to extend their control not only over the capital but also over most of the southern and central regions, gaining popular support, and thus posing a de facto challenge to the TFG's legitimacy.

The transitional government, and its allies, resorted to a military solution, which resulted in them entering the capital, Mogadishu, backed by a US-supported Ethiopian military intervention, which, although bolstered the TFG's military position, also damaged its public image due to popular resentment over the unprecedented event of Ethiopian troops setting foot on Somalia. Consequently, this maneuver backfired, due to historical animosity towards Ethiopia, which led to the emergence of a popular movement composed of former members of the ICU, defectors from the TFG, intellectuals of the Somali diaspora, and prominent figures in Somali civil society under the banner of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). This movement, which combined military resistance on the ground with diplomatic efforts, led to the actual collapse of the TFG with the resignation of President Abdullahi Yusuf, the election of Sheikh Sharif Ahmed—chairman of ICU and later ARS—in 2009, and the extension of the TFG's mandate until 2012 (Abdullahi, 2018; Spodaryk, 2013; Hussein, 2017).

Finally, in the process of the Somali's federal evolution, the year 2012 stands as a watershed moment, marking the official transition from a transitional governmental structure to a formally established federal system. This year saw the adoption of a new constitution that unequivocally proclaimed Somalia a federal state, thereby instituting a governmental framework that encompasses the federal government, member states,

and local governments (Fessha & Dessalegn, 2022). This constitutional foundation laid the groundwork for a restructured political order, significantly moving beyond the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) through the election of a new president and the adoption of a Provisional Constitution by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), which notably included 825 clans-based members. This assembly's efforts culminated in a bicameral parliament structure, introducing the House of the People and the Upper House, thus signifying the end of a protracted transitional phase (Spodaryk, 2013). On the other hand, despite the formal omission of the 4.5 power-sharing system from the 2012 Constitution, its influence persisted, reflecting the enduring dominance of major clans within the governmental framework and, thus, highlighting a continuity in governance practices, where clan-based representation continued to play a pivotal role in the government's formation, including the election process marred by allegations of vote-purchasing and undue influence (Ahmed, 2019). Hence, the period between 2012 and 2016 was particularly significant for establishing the federal system in its current form, marked by the creation of four Federal Member States (FMS)—Jubaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and the South-West—illustrating tangible progress in the operationalization of the federal system within the Southern and Central regions of Somalia (Yimenu, 2023; Dahir & Sheikh Ali, 2021).

Thus, in conclusion, this section has endeavored to demonstrate that the development path of the federal prescription for the Somali crisis followed what could be termed, if we adopt Menkhaus's (2018) characterization, a successive process of "elite bargaining" from its initial emergence to its current outcome. This trajectory, marked by external interventions and the absence of grassroots intellectual and civil participation, has resulted in a fragile federal system—what Muhumed (2020) aptly labeled as "dysfunctional federalism." The struggle between elites with divergent agendas and orientations, coupled with the geopolitical ambitions of regional and global actors, has cast the nascent federal system into an environment fraught with multifaceted challenges. On the other hand, it is essential to recognize that the adoption of the Federal Charter in 2004 and the subsequent establishment of the Federal Government with the Provisional Federal Constitution in 2012 represent critical milestones in post-conflict Somalia as these developments fostered an opportunity for a conducive environment that might lay a foundation for political rebuilding after decades of civil conflict. Therefore, the subsequent section will overview the

structural, legal, and operational frameworks to explore how this opportunity interacts with the aforementioned root challenges.

4.3. General Overview of the Federal System in Somalia

Somalia's federal system stands as a fascinating, if unorthodox, experiment in state-building as, unlike traditional "coming-together" or "holding-together" federation models, Somalia's federation arose from the ashes of a collapsed state, driven by a unique approach involving both internal and external actors. This federation approach, termed as "building together" by Yimenu (2023) indicates a federation model where the "center" and "constituent units" (CUs) are simultaneously constructed, pointing to the role of factors such as the Somalia's lack of historical tendency to federalism and the absence of strong central and subnational institutions in the constituent status of Somalia's federation. The rationale for these two factors is quite simple, as the first factor is due to the lack of cultural, linguistic, or religious diversity in the Somali society, and the second factor is due to the political vacuum and division in post-collapse Somalia resulting from the conflicting mosaic of elites. Thus, these twofold factors, combined with the external ambitions, paved the way to an unorthodox federation approach, where regional and international actors like the US, Ethiopia, Kenya, the UN, EU, and IGAD played a pivotal role in shaping the new political landscape of the post-conflict Somalia.

Furthermore, at variance with the ethnic federation notion of some federal settings, a unique aspect of Somalia's federal system lies in its approach to managing the ever-present reality of clan-based tensions. As discussed earlier, despite sharing common linguistic, religious, and ethnic identities, the Somali people are divided along clan lines and, thus, post-collapse elites' exploitation of these divisions to their interests fueled protracted civil conflicts and had an effective role in post-war settings. The federal system, therefore, seemed to be trying to accommodate these divisions through the establishment of Federal Member States (FMS) that ostensibly reflect the clan composition of their respective regions (Fessha and Dessalegn, 2022). This approach, while not explicitly outlined in the 2012 Provisional Federal Constitution, finds justification in the clanship quota based '4.5 power-sharing formula' and its use in the electoral process for various positions at the local and federal levels (Ahmed, 2019), implicitly acknowledging the role of clan affiliations in the political and administrative

organization of the state. Thus, while formally intended to address the root causes of conflict and division, this clan-based federalism has generated its own set of challenges, including debates over the national and regional affiliations of individual leaders, and the equitable distribution of power and resources.

Moreover, the evolution of the federal solution itself arguably reflects the convergence of the conflicting power ambitions of post-collapse elites and the geopolitical interests of external actors, rather than being a grassroots-driven initiative. Commencing with the “Building-Blocks” Initiative in 1998, proceeding through the formal adoption of federalism in 2004, and culminating in the establishment of the Federal Republic in 2012, Somalia’s path to federalization has been predominantly shaped by external actors, such as Ethiopia and the United States, alongside internal elites, often to the detriment of genuine national reconciliation. The essence of the discussion lies in the observation that the federal system materialized as a consequence of dynamics Menkhaus (2018) characterizes as an “elite bargain,” in which post-collapse elites (warlords), bolstered by their international and regional allies, apportioned power—or, more precisely, land—following their inability to assert hegemony over the state—remains via either arm-twisting confrontations or successive, externally-facilitated negotiations (Menkhaus, 2018).

Remarkably, the waning influence of warlords in the political sphere, supplanted by civil and religious movements culminating in 2012 with the formal adoption of the transitional constitution and the establishment of the federal system, did not mark a significant departure from previous power structures; instead, it heralded the rise of what might be termed post-conflict elites. Minkhaus (2018) delineates the genesis and nature of these elites as rooted in “elite bargaining,” giving rise to what is referred to as an “elite compact,” an informal accord among them to navigate the political landscape in a manner that secures individual interests while simultaneously preventing a total disintegration of this elite-succession paradigm within the federal structure (HIPS, 2020). Therefore, this illustrates an aspect of the complexity inherent in Somalia’s federal structure, wherein the political hegemony remains under the elite’s control, achieving a peculiar equilibrium amidst competitive dynamics, with groups alternately anticipating their electoral ascendancy, and the incumbents cautiously avoiding the encroachment upon the interests of others, thereby perpetuating a state of balance that, paradoxically, fosters ambiguity and heightens the potential for tension.

The legal framework for Somalia's federal system, established in the 2012 Federal Provisional Constitution, lays the foundation for a multi-layered system comprised of the federal government, member states, and local governments and endeavors the clarification of fundamental and power-sharing principles of the federal system in the convoluted dynamics of the country's post-conflict federal setting. This document, crafted by a body of 825 members—the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA)—representing virtually all Somali clans, officially declares Somalia as a federal, sovereign, and democratic republic, built upon the principles of inclusive representation, a multiparty system, and social justice, as articulated in first article (Fessha and Dessalegn, 2022). The legal foundation for Somalia's federalism is further elaborated through a bicameral federal parliament structure, as outlined in Article 58, comprising the House of the People and an Upper House (Fessha and Dessalegn, 2022; Ahmed, 2019; Spodaryk, 2013). The bicameral structure of the 329-member parliament, as delineated in the constitution, with the Upper House wielding considerable influence, including participation in judiciary appointments, and an immutable term, alongside the House of the People's representation of 275 members, embodies the constitutional intent for a balanced representation across Somalia's diverse communities (Spodaryk, 2013).

Nonetheless, the absence of explicit guidance on the distribution of parliamentary seats, coupled with the historical 4.5 formula, reflects a continued effort to maintain clan balance within the legislative framework (Ahmed, 2019). Moreover, the constitutional directive under Article 49(5), which mandates that federal member state boundaries revert to the pre-1991 administrative regions, introduces a framework for the territorial delineation of the member states, albeit entangled in debates over clan-based federalism (Fessha and Dessalegn, 2022), which emphasizes the intricate balance between historical administrative boundaries and the contemporary socio-political realities dictated by clan dynamics. Thus, the Provisional Constitution, not only reaffirmed the federal state structure but also set the stage for future devolution processes without concrete guidance, hence opening avenues for interpretation and potential inter-clan disputes (Spodaryk, 2013). The intakes to the provisional constitution extend beyond initial observations, with numerous critics highlighting its prolonged 'provisional' status, exceeding a decade, attributable to successive

governments' fixation on power struggles rather than the development of a comprehensive constitution encapsulating society's collective needs.




Figure 8: The Map of the Federal Member States (Chevreau, 2017)

In the federal system of Somalia, as seen in the figure above, there are currently five federal member states (FMS), namely Puntland, Galmudug, Hirshabele, South-West, and Jubaland (Abdullahi, 2018; Ingiriis, 2018; Dahir & Sheikh Ali, 2021; Fessha and Dessalegn, 2022; Ahmed, 2019; Menkhaus, 2018). Since 2012, the post-transitional institutions and political order necessary for a functioning federal state gradually began to take shape, with progress seen particularly in the Southern and Central regions, resulting in the formation of four interim regional administrations between 2012 and 2016, which eventually became the aforementioned FMS (Dahir & Sheikh Ali, 2021). On the other hand, Somaliland claims separate state status while Banadir Regional Administration (Mogadishu) still awaits its special status as the capital city (Abdullahi,

2018). Intriguingly, ongoing active endeavors are observed, which are exemplified by, but not limited to, the aspirations within Somaliland for the establishment—occasionally through violent means—of five clan-based states: the Khaatumo State, the Awdal State, the Zeila/Lughaya State, the Maakhir State, and the Beesha Dhexe (Central Clan) State (Ingiriis, 2018). Notably, the Khaatumo State—or, officially, the SSC-Khaatumo Administration—has initiated its establishment process following an armed confrontation with Somaliland in February 2023, which led to the central government’s acknowledgment of the unionist and pro-federal stances of the region’s traditional authority, the elder’s council, in December 2023, thereby suggesting that the trajectory towards federalization may persist and that the delineations of the constituent units remain somewhat nebulous.

Hence, in conclusion, an examination of Somalia’s federal system—considering its structure, legal framework, and constituent units—reveals an under-development trajectory marked by certain imperfections, even after more than a decade. The federal system, inherently structured around clan affiliations, remains in a provisional constitutional phase since 2012, and the lack of clarity in both the legal and procedural frameworks governing the constituent units renders the system unpredictable, thereby predisposing it to crises and potential exploitation. This situation inevitably leads to undesirable political tensions between the federal and constituent units and is fraught with structural defects such as the paradiplomacy problem under discussion—an evident outcome of this complexity, which aligns with the conclusion drawn by Kuznetsov (2015) in the conceptual framework Section (2.3.). Therefore, considering the complex federal structure of Somalia, this fragmented and multi-actor system is inherently prone to the rise of non-state actors engaging in diplomatic activities. Consequently, the study of paradiplomacy within the context of Somali’s post-conflict federal structure becomes a particularly relevant and insightful lens through which to understand the intricacies of Somali politics, especially in the foreign policy sphere.

4.4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter, upon scrutinizing the arduous journey toward the resolution of conflict in Somalia—which culminated in the adoption of a federal structure as a remedial strategy—unveils and elucidates the dynamics that guided this evolution toward the endorsement of a federal governance model in a nation formerly characterized by a

centralized, unitary regime and the predominance of ethnic homogeneity. The span from 1991, characterized by the disintegration of the central government, to 2004, marking the adoption of a federal system, witnessed Somalia grappling with internal divisions, external interventions, and the intricacies of elite politics entrenched in clan rivalries. Efforts at reconciliation in the pre-federal era, marked by an array of conferences and initiatives, were predominantly orchestrated by external forces and impeded by the vested interests of post-collapse elites (warlords), thereby perpetuating a cycle of conflict and instability. The Arta conference in 2000, notable as the inaugural reconciliation endeavor to diminish the influence the warlords, despite being under substantial leadership from civil and intellectual circles, did not achieve lasting peace as the outcomes were spurned by the warlords and certain regional actors supporting them. Hence, the interval from collapse to the federal prescription to the Somali conflict illustrates how the intense confluence of elite power struggles, the dynamics of clan politicization, and international-regional geopolitical interplays have significantly influenced Somalia's political landscape, obstructing a centralized resolution and facilitating the transition to federalism.

Furthermore, despite the adoption of the federal structure marks a pivotal moment in Somalia's journey of post-conflict state-building, a closer examination of the country's over a decade-long federal experience reveals the profound implications of the externally-oriented and hastily pursued approach to federalization. For instance, the provisional constitution of 2012 itself, despite laying the groundwork for the official establishment of the federal state of Somalia, has, due to its decade-exceeding provisional status, reliance on clan-based power-sharing mechanisms and the ambiguous status of constituent units, contributed to the perpetuation of ongoing challenges and tensions. Additionally, tensions between the federal government and its constituent units, arising from ambiguities in legal and procedural frameworks, constitute another dimension of the structural underpinnings of crises within the federal experience, extending over a decade. Moreover, the likelihood of crises escalates due to the operational dynamics within the system characterized by "elite bargaining" and "elite compact" scenarios, signifying a form of collusion among post-conflict elites who remain in anticipation of a subsequent election and are engaged in the mutual balancing of political interests.

Consequently, when tensions between the federal government and constituent units, coupled with ambiguities in the legal and procedural frameworks, remain unresolved by inclusive, structural, bottom-up resolutions, the structure tends to incline towards fragility, thereby engendering structural flaws. These flaws, hence, yield the structure susceptible to procedural complexities, leading to center-periphery desynchronization, which may manifest as organizational phenomena, such as paradiplomacy—the subject of this study. Thus, the contextual analysis presented in this chapter compellingly indicates that a comprehensive examination of the core subject of this study—the logical foundations and structural dynamics underpinning paradiplomacy in post-conflict federalism in Somalia—is both undeniable and grounded in reason. Therefore, the conviction articulated in this chapter regarding the objectivity of this research’s aim significantly paves the way for the subsequent analytical chapter.

5. PARADIPLOMACY IN SOMALIA'S POST-CONFLICT FEDERAL STRUCTURE: AN ANALYSIS

Considering the structural inadequacies discussed in this study, the emergence of instances of paradiplomacy within the Somali federal experience does not present as an unforeseen phenomenon. Since the formal institution of the federal system in 2016, marked by the promulgation of the provisional constitution, Somalia has entered a period characterized by significant fragmentation and volatility within its post-collapse political structure, with respect to the federal structure, leadership, actors involved and policy formulation procedures. Furthermore, as elucidated in Chapter 2, the theoretical exploration of this phenomenon has recognized the inherent theoretical nexus between paradiplomacy and the shift towards decentralized governance structures, as evidenced by the scholarship of Kuznetsov (2015), among others. Consequently, this chapter, aiming to examine the state of paradiplomacy within the post-conflict federal structure of Somalia, will initially providing an overview the state of the paradiplomacy thereof, subsequently analyzing the phenomenon in Somalia through the theoretical lens established in the second chapter of this study and presenting findings.

5.1. An Overview of Paradiplomacy in Somalia

In the examination of Somalia's federal experience, it must be acknowledged that the participation of Federal Member States (FMS) in the international domain is hardly a revelation shrouded in secrecy. The federal system, a dozen years subsequent to its formal enactment, continues to serve as an arena for post-conflict elite contestation, significantly impairing the system's developmental capacities and engendering a highly charged milieu of rivalry both within the central authority and between the central and peripheral entities. Despite a considerable corpus of literature that delineates and critiques the inherent structural deficiencies within the Somali federal paradigm, the phenomenon of paradiplomacy remains a relatively obscured subject, scantily addressed by academic inquiry. Salim (2022), in a somewhat tentative engagement with this subject, highlights the existent discord between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the FMS regarding the latter's role in the formulation of foreign policy, as well as the delineation of distinct modes and spheres of foreign affairs and foreign policy. Moreover, analyses by think tanks, including

those by SDP and SPA (2022), and HIPS (2020), have observed that, although the federal resolution to the Somali conflict was conceptualized to mitigate conflict by redistributing power and resources away from the capital, Mogadishu, in the anticipation that such a redistribution would diminish the incentive for factions to vie for dominion over the capital, numerous elements of Somalia's federal model remain, to a considerable extent, either undefined or, more accurately, ambiguous—a situation that, in some instances, exacerbated conflict. Consequently, with the objective of examining this phenomenon within the context of Somalia, the subsequent paragraphs will scope the instances of paradiplomacy, following a methodology that was relatively uncomplicated—chiefly attributed to the nature of the research being desk-based. Thus, the procedure concentrates on cases identified within the reviewed scholarly literature, as well as newspaper articles scrutinized from both local and international news agencies (HIPS, 2020; Salim, 2022; SDP & SPA, 2022).

The first two occurrences of paradiplomacy, characterized by significant public and official consternation, manifested through the agreements concerning ports and military bases between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the regions of Somaliland and Puntland in the years 2016 and 2017, respectively. The genesis of this controversy was marked in September 2016, when DP World, a port operator of global renown headquartered in Dubai, divulged a concession agreement spanning 30 years, with an automatic extension of a decade, for the stewardship and expansion of a multipurpose port project in Berbera, Somaliland, articulating that the corporation would retain a 65% stake in the joint venture. Subsequently, in April 2017, amidst a climate fraught with discussions on sovereignty in Somalia—provoked by the initial accord, which had been ratified without the endorsement of the central administration—the same enterprise disclosed the ratification of an additional 30-year concession accord for the stewardship of a multi-purpose initiative in Bosaso with Puntland. Notwithstanding the widespread and official tumult elicited by these two accords, particularly subsequent to DP World's integration of the Berbera deal into a collective venture by incorporating Ethiopia into the agreement, thereby allocating the shares amongst Somaliland (30%), DP World (51%), and Ethiopia (19%), in addition to the introduction of an Emirati military base project into the compact, Somaliland, Puntland, and the UAE persevered in the execution of the agreements. Regarding the genesis of the two deals, detractors have ascribed the situation to elements such as the

geostrategic ambitions of the UAE, which harbors apprehensions over the development of ports along the Red Sea and the western segment of the Indian Ocean, perceiving these as threats to its own ports, and the UAE's discontent with the neutral stance of Somalia's central government concerning the Gulf crisis of 2017. Ultimately, despite the UAE's refusal from the military base initiative, DP World consummated the initial phase of the Berbera agreement in 2021, whilst the Bosaso port accord encountered obstacles, and the project did not culminate as envisaged (Garowe Online, 2020; Harun, 2020; ICG, 2018; Labrut, 2021; Osman, 2021; Telci, 2018).

Another instance was the "red carpet treatment crisis" that unfolded between Somalia, and the Republic of Guinea, specifically Guinea-Conakry, in July 2019. The incipient event was the visitation of the President of Somaliland to the Republic of Guinea, pursuant to an official summons by its president, culminating in his reception as a fellow head of state, complete with an official protocol ceremony and a red carpet—a tradition reserved for sovereign state leaders within the ambit of diplomatic custom—thereby precipitating a political crisis between the central government of Somalia and the Republic of Guinea. While the discourses of Guinean and Somaliland officials predominantly concentrated on the economic dimensions of the visit, Somalia expressed consternation over the diplomatic courtesies extended to the President of Somaliland as a sovereign leader, characterizing the act as an egregious affront to its sovereignty and territorial sanctity (Allison, 2019; Guled, 2019; Wasike, 2019). Despite the visit occurring amidst a period characterized by a significant surge in momentum towards Somaliland's secessionist endeavors, there are no trace of subsequent reports that elucidate the extent to which this bilateral relationship evolved, suggesting, perhaps, that this interaction was merely ephemeral.

The fourth occurrence of paradiplomacy within the confines of Federal Somalia was manifested in April 2019, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya proclaimed its intentions to explore diplomatic relations with Somaliland, and disclosed that an envoy had been dispatched to inaugurate a mission in Hargeisa, thereby positioning Kenya as the third African nation to establish diplomatic missions in Somaliland, subsequent to Ethiopia and Djibouti, and notably, the inaugural in the federal epoch. Exacerbating the situation was the Ministry's depiction of the dialogue between the two parties as a convening in which the interests of "the two countries" were

deliberated, tacitly acknowledging Somaliland as a sovereign state, an action that precipitated a diplomatic altercation between Kenya and the State of Somalia, to which Somaliland is annexed pursuant to international law. Scholars ascribe this tactical maneuver by Kenya as a retaliatory measure to the souring relations with the Somali government during that timeline, attributed chiefly to the contention over maritime boundaries and the central government of Somalia's repudiation of Kenya's attempts to exert influence in the federal region of Jubaland, situated on the common frontier of the two nations. Notwithstanding, this diplomatic venture attained its zenith in 2020 with the visitation of the President of Somaliland to Kenya and subsequent reports that the Kenyan Council of Ministers was deliberating the recognition of Somaliland, followed by the designation of a representative to Somaliland with the stature of ambassador in the ensuing years. Nevertheless, subsequent to the revitalization of Somali-Kenyan relations, facilitated by Qatari intermediation in the median of 2021, the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, via a dispatch dated October 26, 2023, proclaimed a reduction in the diplomatic status of the designated envoy from ambassador to Consul General. Interestingly, the decree also stressed the Ministry's staunch reiteration of the Government of the Republic of Kenya's unequivocal recognition of the United Federal Republic of Somalia and Kenya's acknowledgment of Somaliland solely as a regional administration within the Federal Republic of Somalia, a development that engendered considerable speculation regarding the future of Kenya-Somaliland relations (Africa News, 2019; Al Jazeera, 2020; Daily Nation, 2019; Makori, 2020; Mwagiru, 2023; The Horn Diplomat, 2021).

The fifth instance occurred in June 2020, when it was announced that Taiwan and Somaliland intended to establish representative offices within their respective territories. Subsequently, these bilateral relations materialized through the inauguration of the Taiwan Representative Office in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, on August 17, and the Somaliland Representative Office in Taipei on September 9. Although formal diplomatic relations have not been declared by the two states, they have articulated that, should they eventually proclaim official relations, Taiwan will be recognized as the inaugural nation to diplomatically acknowledge Somaliland, which is perceived as an autonomous entity within Somalia. This development was regarded as a reciprocal enhancement of the separatist ambitions of the two entities, perceived as a catalyst for the diplomatic impasse of Taiwan—which

has not secured an international ally for its secessionist cause since 2007—and Somaliland’s aspiration to secure Western, particularly American, endorsement for its secession dossier from Somalia (Joy, 2021; Shattuck, 2020).

The abrupt proclamation, made by the Jubaland region—a FMS situated upon the border between Kenya and Somalia, in the southwestern quadrant of Somalia—of dispatching an envoy to Kenya in September 2023, is the sixth quintessential instance of paradiplomacy within federal Somalia. This declaration, deemed by the president of the region as lawful and in alignment with the prerogatives inherent to the regional presidency, concerning the enactment of political appointments and the delegation of diplomats to novel posts, precipitated a pronounced escalation in the magnitude of controversy and bewilderment pervading public discourse and scholarly circles, regarding the ramifications of the tenuous equilibrium subsisting between regional and federal jurisdictions within the Somali federal structure. Despite this study has yet to procure an official communique from the central administration of Somalia or the formal media outlets of Kenya pertaining to this episode, a multitude of critics have characterized this announcement through various lenses. Foremost among these interpretations is the delineation of an attempt by the Jubaland administration to assert its autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government, and drawing attention to the existence of a clear infraction by the said region against the constitutional prerogatives of the federal authority, which operates an embassy in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi (Horn Observer, 2023; Nyamasyo, 2023; Radio Dalsan, 2023).

The context of the seventh, and final, occurrence within this examination, which manifested concomitantly with the procedural execution of the present research, emerges as a particularly salient development, eliciting widespread debate across local, regional, and international spheres. On the inaugural day of the year 2024, the populace was taken aback, unexpectedly, by the declaration from the secessionist region in Somalia, known as Somaliland, and Ethiopia, concerning the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) about the latter’s entitlement to utilize one of the separatist region’s maritime ports, albeit without delving into the specifics of said agreement. The manifestation of popular disquietude and the expressions of discontent from the central administration in Mogadishu were rapid, the paramount reasons for which included the revelation from Somaliland that Ethiopia, a country devoid of

maritime access, would reciprocate the region's gesture with its inaugural international recognition in exchange for granting it a maritime port and a military base—for its navy, which it had surreptitiously reestablished in 2019—in the strategically located region at the confluence of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. The aspiration of Ethiopia to secure maritime access is far from a novel endeavor. Since its severance of maritime ties subsequent to Eritrea's secession following the Eritrean War of Independence in 1993, Ethiopia has been engaged in a persistent quest for a dependable maritime outlet. This Ethiopian pursuit has intersected with Somalia on several occasions, most notably Ethiopia's involvement in the Berbera port deal, elucidated in the initial case aforementioned, in conjunction with successive rebuffs by Somalia despite possessing the longest African coastline relative to its modest population size, whereas Ethiopia, with a populace of 120 million, remains landlocked. Hence, cognizant of the publicly declared Ethiopian ambitions towards accessing the Red Sea, numerous Somali critics were taken aback primarily by the Somaliland region's decision to even negotiate the option of granting territory in exchange in return for secession, further accusing it of sabotaging the path to reconciliation with the central government, which had announced the resumption of discussions with it mere days prior to the signing of this MoU with Ethiopia (Akin & Farhat, 2024; Ali, 2024; AP, 2024; Chemam, 2024; Faruk, 2024; Pinto, 2024; Yibeltal, 2024).

Regarding the objectives of the Somali regions in engaging in paradiplomacy, it can be summarized, despite the current research not focusing on specific isolated cases, that these objectives stem either from the consequences of the collapse of the state structure in 1991 or from the outcomes of the conflict itself, particularly the conditions surrounding the adoption of the federal system in the country. For instance, the Somaliland region declared its independence on May 18, 1991, merely four months after the collapse of the central government, and since then, it has not engaged in any formal conflict resolution processes and, therefore, the region's pursuit of secession remains the primary driver of its paradiplomatic activities. On the other hand, the Puntland region emerged before the establishment of the federal system, with its elites being pivotal proponents and defenders of federalism to the extent that they achieved an unofficial status as custodians of the federal system, enjoying a degree of autonomy and special treatment. Consequently, it can be argued that Puntland employs paradiplomacy as a deterrent to safeguard its political gains in the post-conflict

settings, participating in paradiplomatic activities particularly when in disagreement with the central authority. In relation to the other federal regions, although paradiplomatic activities are less frequently observed, the emergence of the federal system in Somalia—specifically the historical fact that its adoption stemmed from elite compromises, which involved sharing territories (political influence) by elites exhausted by decades-long stalemate-wars for central control—also positioned these regions, and their influential elites, in places of power relative to the central government. Therefore, given that the federal arrangements are based on clan foundations, it is evident that all federal member states have the capacity to pursue their interests in the external domain, if necessary, particularly when their relationship with the central authority is conflictive.

In conclusion, for reasons attributable to numerous inherent structural deficiencies of federalism in Somalia, as elucidated in preceding chapters, the manifestation of paradiplomacy within the nation emerges as scarcely astonishing. Hence, by way of illustration, this section has delineated seven instances of paradiplomacy in Somalia, through their identification within the ambit of scholarly discourse reviewed, in conjunction with the examination of articles disseminated by both local and international news agencies. Therefore, upon providing a comprehensive context for paradiplomacy within this section, the study will do a detailed analysis of the phenomenon in subsequent section, aiming to thoroughly explore its dynamics within the post-conflict federal structure of Somalia by leveraging the theoretical framework—established in the second chapter of this study. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that although the cases discussed in this section introduce a variety of dimensions and dynamics to paradiplomacy, the analysis herein will primarily focus on the structural level in its entirety rather than examining each case in isolation, aligning with the study's focus and theoretical framework.

5.2. Examining the Emergence of Paradiplomacy in Somalia: Theory Application and Results

In this section, the research question posited, “how did post-conflict federal structure affect the emergence of paradiplomacy and the fragmentation of foreign policy in post-unitary federal state of Somalia,” shall be addressed through a meticulous analysis of the origin, objective, and structure of paradiplomacy within Somalia, employing the

theoretical construct delineated in **Section (2.3.)** of this study. As previously articulated, the theoretical construct scrutinizes the local infrastructures of federalism within Somalia, with the objective of elucidating a more profound comprehension of the dimensions characterizing this phenomenon within the stipulated context. The research delineated herein will deliberately eschew engagement with the seventh instances previously identified, owing to this segment's alignment with the methodology propounded by El-Dessouki (2018), which predicates its focus on the quintessence of paradiplomacy from a superior vantage point, namely, the structures operative within the examined—federal—system. The ambition here is to discern the structural antecedents underpinning the emergence of this phenomenon, by exploring the degree to which the local configuration either facilitates or impedes its development, through a dissection of the local structure into four distinct variables: “legal grounds, level of autonomy, type of intergovernmental relations, and [the degree of paradiplomacy] institutionalization” (El-Dessouki, 2018, p. 102). In the subsequent sections, the concept of paradiplomacy will be scrutinized through an examination of the Somali federal structure, employing the previously outlined variables. These sections will be organized as follows: an initial detailed exposition of El-Dessouki's (2018) theoretical framework pertaining to the variable under investigation, succeeded by the application of this framework to the Somali federal structure, and culminating in the presentation of findings for each respective section.

5.2.1. Legal Grounds

In the analysis of the first variable, legal grounds of paradiplomacy, El-Dessouki (2018) posits that “the constitutional and legal framework could have a distinct bearing on region's capacity to pursue its interests internationally” (ibid., p. 105). This implies that, when analyzing from legal perspective, the existence of paradiplomatic activities within a country can be attributed to several factors, including: (1) the existence of constitutional provisions, though rare, that empower subnational governments to engage in international affairs; (2) ambiguity—whether deliberate or inadvertent—in the constitutional directives concerning engagement in the international arena, prompting subnational governments to improvise; or (3) violations by sub-national governments of peremptory constitutional provisions that vest exclusive authority in foreign policy matters with the central government, thus engaging in “extra-constitutional foreign activities” (ibid., p. 108).

In the case of Somalia, federal member states (FMSs) do not possess any constitutional empowerment to directly engage in the domain of foreign policy, as the Provisional Federal Constitution (PFC) of the Federal Republic of Somalia—delineating the allocation of powers—states that all power are open to negotiations between Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and FMSs with the exception “in matters concerning: (a) foreign affairs (b) national defense (c) citizenship and immigration (d) monetary policy, which shall be within the powers and responsibilities of the federal government” (PFC Som., 2012, Art. 54). Nevertheless, the Constitution does not completely preclude the Federal Member States (FMSs) from participating in foreign policy decision-making processes. Contrastingly, it articulates, within the context of outlining the principles of international negotiations and reflecting the “spirit of cooperation” between government tiers, that “the Federal Government shall consult the Federal Member States on negotiations relating to foreign aid, trade, treaties, or other major issues related to international agreements” (*ibid.*, Art. 53, § 1). In the same vein, the Constitution stipulates that if “negotiations particularly affect Federal Member State interests, the negotiating delegation of the Federal Government shall be supplemented by representatives of the Federal Member States governments” (*ibid.*, Art. 53, § 2). Moreover, the Constitution explicitly mandates the FGS to adopt the role of protector of the FMSs’ interests during international negotiations, stating that “the Federal Government shall regard itself as the guardian of the interests of the Federal Member States, and must act accordingly” (*ibid.*, Art. 53, § 3). On the other hand, the Constitution delineates the guiding principles to the general allocation of powers among the various tiers of government, asserting that “all levels of government must comply with the national Constitution, without any government assuming more powers than the Constitution allocates” (*ibid.*, Art. 51, § 4).

Conversely, despite the clarity of the federal constitution, the Constitution of Puntland, a federal member state, delineates areas concerning international politics by embedding provisions in the Puntland Constitution suggesting a foreign policy framework. This is evident in provisions such as the one stating, “Puntland promotes the principle of resolving existing and future disputes at the international level through dialogue and peaceful means” (Punt. Con., 2012, Art. 3, § 5), when addressing the founding principles. Similarly, in matters related to natural resources, the Constitution specifies, “Puntland State may enter into agreements with national or foreign

companies, granting them the rights to exploit natural resources” (ibid., Art. 54, § 3). Intriguingly, when defining the powers and responsibilities of the President of Puntland, the Constitution articulates, “The President shall direct and develop the international relations of the Puntland State and negotiate and sign international agreements” (ibid., Art. 80, § 8). On the other hand, Somaliland, by virtue of its unilateral declaration of independence more than a decade prior to the adoption of federalism, possesses de facto legislative and executive authority and thus does not align itself with the federal constitution. While other federal states lack constitutional provisions that explicitly overlap with the federal constitution in terms of foreign policy, this does not negate the significance of the aforementioned examples nor the potential for other states to adopt similar stances.

Therefore, despite the constitution’s efforts to maintain a delicate balance in the process of conducting foreign policy and foreign relations—by vesting the FGS with absolute authority over the executive power to formulate policies, procedures, and treaties in a “spirit of cooperation” with the FMSs—that balance appears to be difficult to achieve in practice as numerous FMSs display conflicts and contradictions with the FGS to maximize their interests in the international sphere. These contradictions can extend to such a degree that certain FMSs openly establish their own foreign policy agendas and engage in treaty-making, particularly, according to Spodaryk (2013), in matters related to foreign aid and trade. On the other hand, beyond the criticism directed at the Constitution for its ‘provisional’ status—stemming from the absence of formalization through a popular referendum/ for over a decade—these constitutional provisions regarding foreign policy exhibit notable practical inconsistencies and a degree of ambiguity (Abdul Rahim & Abukar, 2021; SDP & SPA, 2022). Consequently, upon applying the legal grounds analysis by El-Dessouki (2018) to the Somali case, it is revealed that the violations of peremptory constitutional provisions by sub-national governments are indeed critical; however, the practical ambiguity of these constitutional provisions also plays a minor yet significant role in the emergence of paradiplomacy within Somalia.

5.2.2. Level Of Sub-National Autonomy

In examining the second variable of paradiplomacy analysis, namely the level of autonomy, El-Dessouki (2018) theorizes that the existence of paradiplomacy may be

“reflecting the degree of autonomy given to sub-national governments” (El-Dessouki, 2018, p. 105). Thus, he concludes that when analyzing paradiplomacy in terms of autonomy level, if it is not enshrined as a constitutional right, it emerges from one of two scenarios: (1) pressure exerted by sub-national governments on the central authority “to acquire more autonomy and privilege”; or (2) a particular form of semi-autonomy, not constitutionally sanctioned, bestowed upon a sub-national government as a strategy to discourage secession, referring it to as “stateless nation-building” and exemplifying it by the cases of Quebec and Iraqi Kurdistan (ibid., 110).

In the case of Somalia, the issue of autonomy necessitates no examination of indicators, as it has firmly occupied the forefront of discussions concerning the federal system since its inception. Within the broader discourse, critiques of the Somali federal system have highlighted its propensity for engendering “states within [the] state” that perceive themselves “not just [federal] states but also nations” (Ingiriis, 2018). Moreover, it is a plausible consideration that these “mini-state(s),” when viewed in the context of the nation’s wartime and post-war political landscape, may present “a rare window of political opportunity for power-hungry politicians and businessmen” (Africa Research Bulletin, 2012), thereby cultivating an environment conducive to multi-autonomism. Consequently, considering that the federal system, as elaborated in **Chapter 4**, is predicated on the apportionment of territories among contending elites, oriented around the clan structure in exchange for peace, it becomes evident that the Somali federal system confronts an autonomy dilemma across its federal tiers.

In addition, discussions of autonomy prominently feature the regions of Puntland and Somaliland in northern Somalia. Established prior to the inception of the federal system in 1991 and 1998, respectively, these entities are often characterized as “a child born out of wedlock” (Dahir & Sheikh Ali, 2021) within the context of federalism’s evolution. Somaliland, for instance, emerged under the auspices of the Somali National Movement (SNM), a militant faction predominantly comprised of the Isaaq clan-family. This group, as detailed in **Chapter 3**, launched a rebellion against Siad Barre’s regime, gaining control over significant portions of northwestern Somalia during the regime’s collapse in the early 1990s. Amidst the initial stages of the civil war in southern Somalia, SNM’s political leaders orchestrated a sequence of conferences with the region’s traditional leaders, culminating in Somaliland’s declaration of independence from Somalia, accompanied by a pursuit of international recognition.

On the other hand, Puntland was founded through a series of gatherings convened by political and traditional leaders predominantly from the Majeerteen tribe, a segment of the Darood clan-family. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland was declared autonomous amidst the ongoing civil war in Somalia, eschewing separatist objectives (Harun, 2020; Ingiriis, 2018; Balthasar, 2017; Spodaryk, 2013). Therefore, although both regions, particularly Puntland, are widely acknowledged to have endorsed the federal option upon its establishment in 2004—to the extent that Puntland regards itself as the “mother of Somali federalism” (Dahir & Sheikh Ali, 2021)—and despite their representation in both chambers of the Federal Parliament and the Ministerial Council in the Centre, Puntland persists in oscillating among demands for a privileged status within the federal configuration, maintaining its autonomy, or intermittently threatening secession. Similarly, Somaliland steadfastly adheres to its quest for secession, notwithstanding its failure to secure any international recognition for this stance over the span of more than three decades.

In summary, despite the establishment of a post-conflict federal structure in Somalia that, in general, resulted in the creation of clan-based federal units, which may occasionally perceive themselves as a “nation,” this characteristic has been explicitly utilized only by Puntland and Somaliland—the latter having proclaimed itself an independent state. In other words, it could be posited that the emergence of federal units, other than those previously identified, asserting autonomy would not be unexpected if circumstances necessitated such actions. This is because the legitimacy of the political elites governing these federal units is derived from clan affiliations, which are blood-linked, rather than from a legal bond with the citizenry. Consequently, upon applying El-Dessouki’s (2018) analysis of the level of autonomy to the Somali context, it becomes evident that the development of paradiplomacy in this instance can be linked to both outlined scenarios in the case of Puntland, and exclusively to the second scenario for Somaliland, particularly when regarded within the framework of the federal structure, despite its unilateral declaration of independence. In the case of Puntland, there is an evident endeavor to exert pressure on the central government for enhanced power and privileges, alongside aspirations towards “stateless nation-building.” Conversely, the central government perceives Somaliland primarily through the lens of “stateless nation-building” pending the outcome of the precarious Somaliland-FGS discussions, which aim to integrate it into the federal framework.

Meanwhile, Somaliland views itself as an autonomous state and conducts itself accordingly.

5.2.3. Intergovernmental Relations

In the third variable of paradiplomacy analysis, which concerns the intergovernmental relations across federal tiers, El-Dessouki (2018) asserts that “the type of intergovernmental relations affects the prospects of success for the international activities of regions” (El-Dessouki, 2018, p. 105). This assertion implies that the existence of paradiplomatic activities within a certain country may be influenced by both the positive and negative dynamics of center-periphery relations. Specifically, on one hand, (1) cooperative relations between tiers of governance may enhance the engagement of sub-national entities in the international arena through consensual regulatory frameworks among tiers, such as “[...] constitutional or ad hoc arrangements, procedural agreements, regular meetings, and institutional linkage mechanisms between levels of government”; on the other hand, (2) conflictive relations can also catalyze paradiplomatic activities, wherein paradiplomacy serves as “[...] the reflection, not the cause of domestic conflicts” (ibid., p. 111-112). In essence, sub-national governments engage in the international sphere, or at least possess a stake in matters pertaining to foreign policy that concern them, facilitated and informed by the central government’s knowledge in the first scenario. Conversely, in the second scenario, sub-national entities navigate the international domain driven by their own interests, independent of—and often in strained relations with—the central authority.

In the context of Somalia, the intergovernmental relations between the central and state levels of its federal system are marked by conflict (Hashi & Barasa, 2023) in certain instances, or exhibit a predisposition towards conflict in others. Despite the theoretical clarity of the Constitution regarding the distribution of powers and intergovernmental relations—wherein, as explicated in the aforementioned legal grounds variable, it assigns foreign policy authority exclusively to the central government while concurrently affording federal units the right to participate, express opinions, and mandates the central authority to consider their interests—the practical implementation of these provisions proved to be complex. For instance, Hashi and Barasa (2023), in their seminal and groundbreaking work on intergovernmental relations in Somalia, argue that the constitutional provisions designed to govern these

relations are not being effectively implemented by either level of government and, thus, significantly affecting the functionality of the federal government by hindering cooperation in solving problems and achieving common goals at various governmental levels. In addition, they argue that structural obstacles, notably the undermining role of post-conflict elites—who identify as “government owners” and engage in continuous competition—alongside the lack of consensus on the mechanisms of intergovernmental relations, significantly hinder the development of intergovernmental relations and, thus, the advancement of the federal structure in the Somali context (Hashi and Barasa, 2023).

The findings drawn by Hashi and Barasa (2023) regarding the influence of elites within Somalia’s political sphere resonates with the insights detailed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study, which examined the origins of successive political crises and the initiation and implementation phases of a federal solution. Esteemed scholars, including Samatar (1997), Menkhaus (2018), and Abdullahi (2018), have identified that conflicts among elites have been the primary catalysts for the majority of crises throughout Somali history. Moreover, Menkhaus (2018) further asserts that the federal structure itself emerges from an “elite bargaining” and presently operates under an “elite compact” scenario, typified by a mutual balancing of political interests. Therefore, revisiting the initial discussion, Harun (2020) elaborates on the theme of intergovernmental relations, underscoring the state of indeterminacy in the relationship between the two tiers. Despite the prevailing challenges and competition, the parties at both levels often, somewhat paradoxically, manage to establish unpredictable cooperation, maintaining an unseen equilibrium that benefits both, albeit not necessarily the nation or the federal structure, thereby not diminishing the level of indeterminacy.

In conclusion, given the complexities inherent in the autonomy dilemma referenced previously, along with numerous instances of disruption or cessation of relations by federal entities—exemplified by their comprehensive suspension of ties with the central authority in September 2018 (Hassan, 2018), Somaliland’s persistent pursuit of secession, and Puntland’s repeated declarations to sever ties with the central government, the latest occurring at the outset of 2023—it becomes evident that the dynamics of the relationships between the federal tiers are marked by conflict and unpredictability. Thus, the application of intergovernmental relations analysis by El-

Dessouki (2018) to the Somali context elucidates that the involvement of federal units in the international arena serves as a reflection of the inherent uncertainties within the federal structure and the interrelations among different levels of the federal system. Moreover, this analysis further indicates that the option of cooperation, should it materialize, proves more advantageous for all parties involved, contingent upon the presence of constitutional arrangements that maintain a delicate theoretical equilibrium concerning foreign policy as delineated in the provisional constitution. These arrangements (see PFCS, 2012, Art. 53, §§ 1-3) assigns significant authority to the central government by affirming its sovereignty in foreign policy domain while concurrently mandating consideration of the federal units' interests and their inclusion in relevant affairs.

5.2.4. Institutionalization

In the last variable of the analysis, level of paradiplomacy institutionalization, El-Dessouki (2018) advances a theory for analyzing the extent of sub-national governments' engagement in paradiplomacy by positing that the "regions that show a high degree of involvement in international relations have a high level of institutionalization" (El-Dessouki, 2018, p. 105). This suggests that when sub-national governments embark on paradiplomatic activities, they extend beyond isolated incidents to systematically institutionalize these efforts, including "(1) designing strategies/policies to direct regional foreign affairs, (2) involving the management of Regional Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other regional organizations in pertinent foreign activities, and (3) establishing permanent regional offices abroad" (ibid., 2018, p. 112).

In the case of Somalia, concerning the realm of formulating strategies and policies pertinent to foreign affairs, aside from the case of Somaliland—which unilaterally declared independence in 1991 and assumes the role of a sovereign state—there is an evident lack of tangible evidence demonstrating the engagement of federal units in crafting distinct foreign strategies or policies. Nonetheless, a notable instance is articulated in the constitution of the federal member state of Puntland, which, under the article related to the specification of the powers and responsibilities of the President of Puntland, states: "the President shall direct and develop the international relations of the Puntland State and negotiate and sign international agreements" (Punt. Con.,

2012, Art. 80, § 8). Furthermore, the Constitution of this federal state proceeds to address issues pertaining to international politics, traditionally the purview of the central government. For instance, it outlines founding principles by stating, “Puntland advocates for resolving current and future conflicts at the international level through dialogue and peaceful means” (ibid., Art. 3, § 5), and in relation to natural resources, it declares, “The Puntland State is empowered to enter agreements with national or foreign entities, granting them rights to exploit natural resources” (ibid., Art. 54, § 3). Despite the presence of provisions in the Puntland Constitution suggesting a foreign policy framework, research has yet to identify specific foreign policy documents or strategies officially adopted by the state. In contrast, Somaliland pursues its own independent foreign policies and strategies, focusing on attaining international recognition and seceding from the rest of Somalia—a process initiated in 1991, significantly predating the adoption of the federal system in 2004.

Moreover, regarding the factors of establishing foreign policy institutions or departments and creating permanent regional offices abroad, the case of Somalia tends to illustrate varied outcomes. While all federal units initially included ministries designated as “Ministry of Planning and International Relations/Cooperation,” federal member states such as Southwest, Galmudug, and Puntland deviated from this norm in their most recent ministerial regulations, announced in 2019, 2020, and 2024, respectively. Conversely, this practice remains in place in the states of Jubaland and Hirshabelle. In a distinct vein, owing to the aforementioned historical context, Somaliland operates a *de facto* Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Additionally, with the exception of Jubaland’s appointment of an envoy to Kenya in 2023, this study found no evidence of formal permanent regional offices established abroad by the federal units. Somaliland, however, maintains a diplomatic presence through liaison or representative offices in approximately 27 countries worldwide (Makori, 2020), including Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, which share borders with Somalia. Also in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, three Consulates General—representing Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Turkey—operate alongside five liaison or representative offices from the United Kingdom, Denmark, Kenya, the UAE, and Taiwan.

In conclusion, the institutionalization of paradiplomacy in the Somali context exemplifies the prevailing confusion within its federal structure, thus indicating its occasional coherence and, at times, deviation from the aforementioned theoretical

framework. The application of the theory, as proposed by El-Dessouki (2018), which encompasses three critical factors—namely, the formulation of strategies/policies to guide foreign affairs at a secondary level, the establishment of regional departments dedicated to foreign policy, and the creation of permanent international offices for regions—produces diverse outcomes across these entities. Specifically, in Somaliland, the framework is comprehensively applied; in Puntland, only the initial factor is partially recognized through constitutional articles, with the subsequent two factors lacking. Jubaland represents a contrasting scenario, where, despite the presence of the second and third factors, there is no evidence supporting the implementation of the first. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that Hirshabelle State, which has not significantly engaged in paradiplomacy, exhibits the second factor, as evidenced by the appointment of a Minister for Planning and International Cooperation in the latest state ministry roster. Considering the presence of the second factor in all federal units at certain points historically, the conclusion drawn by El-Dessouki (2018)—that regions exhibiting a high level of paradiplomacy demonstrate greater institutionalization—holds relative validity in the Somali context.

5.3. Concluding Remarks

In the process of synthesizing the examination of paradiplomacy within the context of Somalia's post-conflict federal framework, as delineated in this chapter, it is essential to present a comprehensive reflection that captures the intricate and complex aspects of this phenomenon. The initial conclusion drawn here posits that paradiplomacy emerges solely as a manifestation of the intricate dynamics inherent in the Somali conflict, thereby shaping the federal arrangement in Somalia. Consequently, given that this federal arrangement materialized as a political compromise among the conflicting elites following decades of stalemate struggles, it becomes evident that the federal structure was conceived amidst a tangible tension between the pursuit of decentralized governance and the necessity of upholding a unified nation. Hence, this tension, inherent in the specificity of a post-unitary state endeavoring to reconstruct its social and political fabric following decades of conflict, presents a distinctive case study within the broader discourse on paradiplomacy. Recognizing the significance of this context, the analytical chapter has endeavored to delineate the intricate interactions between the Federal Member States (FMS) and the central government, by offering a

thorough exposition of the current state of paradiplomacy in Somalia and then scrutinizing its dimensions in the post-conflict federal.

The general overview of paradiplomacy in Somalia, as presented in this section, leads to an unequivocal conclusion: the prevailing dynamics of the phenomenon in Somalia can be encapsulated by considering the essential roles of the structural inefficiencies inherent in the structure of the Somalia's federal arrangements, alongside the interest-maximizing strategies employed by subnational entities, notably the FMSs, in the context of foreign policy. Thus, by methodically focusing on the influence of four key variables—namely, the legal grounds, the extent of subnational autonomy, intergovernmental relations, and the degree of institutionalization—this study's structural level analysis explored paradiplomacy and its dimensions within the Somali federal structure. The most salient finding of the analysis is that Somalia's post-conflict federal arrangement, along with the flaws in its formation conditions, has spawned significant structural constraints that potentially hinder the country's policymaking and policy implementation—particularly in foreign policy. These constraints, which trigger paradiplomacy, include; (1) the susceptibility of legal provisions to disputes, (2) the presence of provinces asserting independence from the central state or demanding a privileged status, (3) the confrontational nature of the federal intergovernmental relationship, which lacks formal dispute resolution mechanisms, and (4) the propensity of federal states to institutionalize their paradiplomacy in pursuit of their interests.

6. CONCLUSION

With the main research question, “How did post-conflict federal structure impact the emergence of paradiplomacy in the post-unitary federal state of Somalia?” this study sought to analyze the emergence and development of paradiplomacy in the context of Somalia’s federal structure. In order to achieve this objective, the research first focused on defining the general outlines of the three central research concepts—federalism, post-conflict federalism, and the emergence of paradiplomacy. Initially, regarding the differences and similarities between federalism and post-conflict federalism, the analysis has reached a conviction that the main distinction is not based on their theoretical framework and conceptualization, but on their modes of creation and specific challenges. While classical federalism emphasizes voluntary unions of constituent units and shared sovereignty, post-conflict federalism, on the other hand, responds to conflicts and focuses primarily on averting civil war and secession. The complicated relationship between the federal structure, as a system of government, and foreign policy formulation was also observed to be serving as a hotbed for potential tensions owing to the unpredictable outcomes of the principle of shared sovereignty between the two tiers of federal governance. It is within the context of that tension, particularly exacerbated in post-conflict scenarios, that the phenomenon of paradiplomacy within federal frameworks is observed. The frequency of conflicts of interest between the two governmental levels escalates in the absence of several critical elements—including the supremacy of the constitution, a clearly delineated distribution of powers, the existence of an independent judiciary, and the establishment of well-conceived intergovernmental councils.

The research, then, navigated the peculiarities of the country under study through an analysis of the roots and dynamics related to the origins of the Somali conflict, the background to the federal solution to the conflict and the overarching atmosphere of the current federal structure. Regarding the roots of the conflict, the analysis found that the traditional socio-political structure of Somali society—marked by the predominance of kinship-based affiliations, and an ad hoc egalitarian approach to governance, devoid of hierarchical systems—was radically affected by the advent of elite culture into its political sphere. This influence manifested across several epochs of Somali political history, commencing with the advent of colonialism, which

penetrated Somali territories through traditional elites to consolidate control, traversing through the demise of the First Republic (1960-1969) owing to intra-elite conflicts, and culminating in the downfall of the Second Republic (1969-1991). Hence, notwithstanding other contributory elements, the interplay of conflicts among the elites emerged as the principal catalyst in both igniting and perpetuating the Somali conflict. This commenced with the overthrow of the oppressive military regime—a ruling elite—by armed, clan-based resistance movements spearheaded by various elite factions. Subsequently, the conflict escalated as these elites clashed over the distribution of power in the post-military regime settings. Therefore, since the intra-elite conflict was the main dynamic in the emergence and fueling of the conflict, they were a key player in the reconciliation process, which ended with the sharing of the land in the federal structure in 2004, within what was described as “elite bargaining,” subsequent to the failure of all parties to the crisis to fully extend control over the central authority. Consequently, the prevailing state of the federal structure exhibits significant continuity with its antecedents, primarily due to the competition among post-conflict elites. This competition, distinguished by its civilian backdrop, pragmatism, and a pronounced preference for interests over armaments, impedes the overall advancement of the federal framework as it shifts the emphasis towards the transfer of power rather than the developmental enhancement of the structure itself.

Following the clarifying the concepts and historical backgrounds related to the key parameters, the study’s final part overviewed the general situation of paradiplomacy and then analyzed its roots in the federal structure of Somalia using the theoretical framework. A brief overview of the general state of paradiplomacy in Somalia has showed a tangible alignment with the theoretical discourse of the notion. The existence of multiple paradiplomatic cases, the most recent being the charged atmosphere in the Horn of Africa following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia in January 2024, suggests a prevailing belief that the dynamics of federalism’s emergence in the country, and their impact on the overall federal structure, have fostered an environment conducive to the development of paradiplomacy. Hence, this theoretical stance posits that the federal arrangement, emerging as a political compromise among conflicting elites following decades of Conflict, evidently originated within a pronounced tension between the objectives of decentralizing governance and the imperative of upholding a cohesive national foreign

policy. Therefore, this engagement in the international arena by Federal Member States (FMSs)—ranging from the signing of international agreements to the establishment of diplomatic missions—has furnished this research endeavor with three key outcomes: (1) empirical validation of the theoretical frameworks introduced in the initial chapters of this study; (2) an illumination of the practical ramifications of Somalia's federal configuration on foreign affairs management; and (3) an accentuation of the significance of the analysis proffered by this study.

In the end, after painting a general picture of paradiplomacy in Somalia, the research sought to answer its central question, which was how Somalia's federal structure affected the emergence of paradiplomacy, by examining four structural variables in the federal system—the legal basis, the extent of subnational autonomy, intergovernmental relations and the degree of institutionalization—determined by the theoretical framework. In the legal ground, it is revealed that the violations of peremptory constitutional provision—which gives the central government exclusivity over the foreign affairs—by sub-national governments are indeed critical; however, the practical ambiguity of these constitutional provisions also plays a significant role in the emergence of paradiplomacy within Somalia. As for the analysis of the level of autonomy, it became evident that the development of paradiplomacy in the case of Somalia can be linked to evident endeavor to exert pressure on the central government for enhanced power and privileges by Puntland State, and Somaliland's self-inauguration as an autonomous separatist state. In the analysis of the third variable, the state of intergovernmental relations, it was elucidated that the involvement of federal units of Somalia in the international arena serves as a reflection of the inherent uncertainties within the federal structure and the interrelations among different levels of the federal system. Finally, in analyzing the degree of paradiplomacy institutionalization, it was found that although Somaliland exhibits a concrete degree of institutionalization by formulating foreign policies and strategies, establishing permanent offices abroad, and establishing regional ministries of foreign affairs; other states had a comparatively lower degree of institutionalization.

Thus, despite the constitutional prerogatives intended to centralize foreign policy formulation and implementation within the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the central government, the main takeaway from the analysis of this study illustrates that a combination of factors have collectively created a conducive environment for

the development of paradiplomatic activities by the Federal Member States (FMSs). These factors includes the ambiguities in the constitutional text, the dynamics established by the historical accumulations in regions like Somaliland and Puntland, and the practical realities of governance in a post-conflict settings. This situation has been exacerbated by the noticeable tension between the FMSs' quest for autonomy and the central government's endeavors to assert its sovereignty, thus forging a complex mosaic of intergovernmental relations that vacillates between cooperation and conflict. Consequently, it is posited that the future direction of paradiplomacy in Somalia will be determined by the changing dynamics within its federal system, the interaction between legal frameworks and political exigencies, and the overarching geopolitical context in which it operates.

In considering future research directions, this study asserts the imperative need for a more comprehensive examination into the phenomenon of paradiplomacy, due to the noticeable gap in its analysis within the broader scope of post-conflict federal states and specific case of Somalia. Given the limited number of country-specific case studies—with Iraq being a notable exception extensively explored by scholars—this research advocates for a more concentrated effort to investigate and delineate the nuances of paradiplomacy in post-conflict federal states, acknowledging the intricate challenges these nations face. Furthermore, this study recommends an in-depth exploration of paradiplomacy in Somalia by employing theoretical methodologies that is able to analyze the phenomenon on a case-by-case basis such as Kuznetsov's (2015) explanatory framework on comprehensively examining cases of paradiplomacy.

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