

T.C.
İSTANBUL KÜLTÜR UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

**THE LANGUAGE POLICY AND THE LINGUISTIC RIGHTS IN SYRIA: THE
KURDISH LANGUAGE A PATTERN**

MA Thesis by
MOHAMMAD ISSA SULAIMAN
2000000472

Department: International Relations
Programme: International Relations

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nazlı Çağın Bilgili

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ÖZET

Dil politikası, Devletin inşasını düzenleyen ve kaynakları farklı dil grupları arasında tahsis eden bir araçtır. Ancak, etnik dil grupları olan bazı ülkelerde dil politikası, etnik gruplar için sembolik değeri nedeniyle dil gruplarıyla devlet arasında yaşanan çatışmaların bir kaynağı.

Dil gruplarının devletteki dil politikasına karşı tavrı, dil politikasının ve devletle olan ilişkilerinin anlaşılmasıyla şekillenir. Bu nedenle, bu dil grupları Dil'i farklı biçimlerde algılamaya başlarlar ve farklı taleplere ve farklı taleplere sahiptirler.

Bu çalışmada, Suriye'deki Kürt sorununun Dil merceği üzerinden incelenmesi amaçlanıyor. Suriye, 2011 yılından beri ihtilaf içinde. Bu ihtilaf kısmen iktidardaki etnik çoğunluk politikasında yer almakta ve bu politika, ülkeyi 2. Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra azınlığa karşı kurduğundan beri uygulanmaktadır. Bu politikanın en iyi göstergesi, devletin, aralarında Kürt toplumu olan etnik azınlık gruplarına karşı çeşitli asimilasyonist stratejiler uyguladığı dil alanında yer alıyor. Kürtler, vatandaşlıkları daha önce de sorguya çekmiş olan etnik dil gruplarından biri. Sonuç olarak, Suriye devletinin dil politikası Kürtlerin mayın ve baskılarının üç katına çıkmasına yol açtı. Bu yüzden, araştırmam devletin Suriye gibi çok ırklı bir poliste dil alanındaki asimilasyonist stratejilerini anlamak açısından hayati önem taşıyor.

Gazetem Suriye'deki Kürtler için ulusal kimlik oluşturma konusunda Suriye'deki Kürtçe statüsü üzerinde çalışacak. Ayrıca, hükümet tarafından yapılan sosmanistik ve Dil politikaları ve planlamaya da katılacak. Bu çalışma aracılığıyla, Suriye'deki Kürtler tarafından yayınlanan yayınlar ve Suriye'deki Kürtler temsilcileriyle yapılan görüşmeler gibi devlet belgelerini

(anayasalar, kararnameler, devlet kurumları ve örgütler için iç statü) inceleyeceğim. Ayrıca çalışma, dil bilimi adaletini insan hakları yaklaşımından ve azınlık dillerinin korunması ve Suriye'de demokratik bir sistem kurulmasında dil çeşitliliği sorunundan da araştıracaktır.

Genel olarak dil politikası, Kürt gruplarının dillerine Arapça dille eşit muamele edilmesini talep ettikleri Kürt grupları tarafından tanınma meselesi olarak algılanıyor. Bunun için, Suriye'deki tüm gelecek politika yapıcılar için, bu dil grubunun ihtiyaçlarını ve çıkarlarını karşılamak amacıyla dil politikaları bunları dikkate almalı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Suriye, Kürtler, Kürt Dili, Dil Hakları, Dil Öldürme, Liberalizm



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ABSTRACT

Language policy is a tool for regulating State-building and allocating resources among different language groups. However, in some countries with ethnic-language groups, the language policy is a source of conflicts between language groups and the state because of its symbolic value for the ethnic groups.

The attitude of language groups towards the language policy in the state is shaped by their comprehension of language policy and their relations with the state; therefore, those language groups head for perceive Language in different ways as well, and they have different demands, with different demands, with different paths.

This study investigates the Kurdish situation in Syria from a language perspective. Syria has been conflict-stricken since 2011. This conflict is partially in the policy of the ruling ethnic majority, being practised since the establish the country after WWI against the minority. This policy's best manifestation has been in the language domain, where the state has adopted various assimilatory strategies against ethnic minority groups, chief among which has been the Kurdish community. The Kurds are an ethno-language group whose citizenship has often been previously questionable. As a result, the Syrian state's language policy has led to tripled minoritization and oppression of the Kurds. Therefore, my study will prove vital to understanding the state's assimilatory strategies in the domain of language in a multiethnic polity such as Syria.

My paper will study the Kurdish language status in Syria in creating the national identity for Kurds in Syria. Also, it will attend to the government's sociolinguistic and Language policies and planning. Through this study, I will investigate the state documents (Constitutions, Decrees, internal status for government institutions, and organizations), the publications released by Kurds in Syria and interviews with the representatives of Kurds in Syria. Further, the study will investigate the linguistics justice from the human rights approach and the issue of protecting minority languages and linguistic diversity in establishing a democratic system in Syria.

Broadly, the Kurdish groups view the language policy as a question of recognition, and they demand that their language be given the same status as the Arabic language.

In order to satisfy the demands and interests of this linguistic group, any future policymakers in Syria should take these into account when creating language policies.

Keywords: Syria, Kurds, Kurdish Language, Language Rights, Linguicide, Liberalism

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CESCR	Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
DD	Damascus Declaration
HRW	Human Right Watch
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICERD Discrimination	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
ICRC	The Convention on the Rights of the Child
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KNC	Kurdish National Council
KRG	Kurdistan Region Government
LCP	Syria's Labor Communist Party
MoC	The Ministry of Culture
MoE	The Ministry of Education
MoHE	The Ministry of High Education
NCSROF	National Coalition of the Revolutionary Forces
NCCDC	National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change
OSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKKS	Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

PYD	Democratic Union Party
RYU	Revolutionary Youth Union
SCP	Syrian Communist Party
SHNC	Syrian High Negotiations Committee
SNC	Syrian National Council
SSSC	Supreme State Security Court
STJ	Syrians for Truth and Justice
UAR	United Arab Republic
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nation
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

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
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Map of Ethnicity in Syria



Introduction

Syria is a multiethnic ethnic country where the ethnic majority are Arabs with a significant ethnically mosaic area consisting of Armenians, Assyrians, Arameans, Circassians, Turkmens and Kurdish populations. In March 2011, the country witnessed a fierce civil war; some reason for this conflict went deep to the policy of majority against the minority since establishing the country; one of these policies was the State's language policy towered the different ethnic groups; one of these groups in Syria is Kurds, where this group is Ethno-language group.

My study will mainly focus on the Kurdish Language due to my linguistic background and mastery of Arabic and Kurdish. Also, among the minoritized communities, the Kurds have been the most saucerful community in offering alternative linguistic policies to that of the regime, which considers education in the Kurdish Language and the existing mother tongues as an authentic human right.

Since the formation of the Syrian State, the successive governments have engaged in deliberate efforts to influence the Languages of Syrian citizens by forcing the Arabic Language to be a Language of public space. That has mobilized its economic, educational, and institutional power to impose a single language at the expense of the rest. Moreover, it has removed all other languages from the public space and excluded them from official domains by sanctioning Arabic as the only permissible official Language to declare 'the nation as one and indivisible.

The State had practically forbidden non-Arabic languages such as Kurdish, while its speaker constituted the larger population group after Arabs. Such a determination would always occur by fiat as there was no room for debates or discussions. Any alternative narration of the nation or its Language would meet the wrath of the State and be harshly repressed. It was the most crucial factor in the weak state of Syria's minority languages and the central component of the Arabization agenda education. (Bednarowicz, 2014).

My research will investigate the status of the Kurdish Language in Syria and its role in the formation of Kurdish identity. Further, how the state policies of linguicide enacted in the Kurdish region affected the overall Kurdish question in Syria. I will explain those policies considering the United Nations' Genocide Convention's (1948) definition of assimilationist education of minorities as genocidal. Using the existing scholarship on sociolinguistic and Language policy and planning,

I will reflect on the Syrian states' language policies and planning. Also, intend to study the alternative language policies offered in the autonomous Kurdish region in the North. This will add a comparative dimension to my undertaking and allow me to discuss how recognizing the country's linguistic diversity could pave the ground for an open and democratic political system. In doing so, I will use the existing literature on the right to education in the mother tongue and the scholarship on human rights.

I aim to make sense of the relationship between Language and communal identities and how each community tries to formulate their community by using the discourse of language right. Since the Syrian is a very diverse one, the paper will use the ecological model as to how embracing plurilingualism and linguistic diversity can help to place various languages within their social, political, and economic ecosystems since the ecological metaphor focuses on the interplay between Language and the contexts in which language processes and policies take form and practice.

By revealing the policy of the Syrian government toward the Kurds, the study will show how they react to the centre and how they build their demands around the rights of Language. They build their identity around this tool to distinguish themselves from other groups in the region; the study will become important not for Syria but for other countries in the region, which has multiethnic, where the study examines the Kurdish issue effects on the regional. The study provides an analytic view of the policy of the Syrian government and the point of view of Kurdish themselves and brings other models in the region and the world to comprise the Syrian situation.

The study will discuss how the language issue elevated the Kurdish question in Syria as reaction against the language policy in Syria, also will look for how can a human-rights-based approach to language planning and policies protect linguistic diversity, minoritized communities' language rights, safeguard linguistic justice, and offer a practical framework for democracy in Syria?

To answer to these questions, the study will argue the aspect of nation-building, and how the Language substantially affects the creation of nations and the states, also how was effect to create the modern Syria as we know it also how the language established the Kurdish Political movement in general and between Kurds of Syria especially. the paper will argue how the State's language policies have paved the epistemological ground for the Arab majority hegemony and rendered any demand for recognizing the existing linguistic diversity illegitimate or treasonous. then the paper will argue the second hypothesis, how the namely, recognizing the country's multilanguage alone

could pave the ground for a more democratic system that respects human rights in linguistic rights that can give birth to a more participatory political system.

In my research, to argue these topics I studied and explained the most primary source like Syrian Constitutions from first constitution in 1918, via French mandate constitution 1928 to first constitution after independent 1950, to the United Arab state 1958, then I expand in the Ba'th's era constitutions since 1963, and the current Constitution which released in 2012, depend on that I explained most articles that mentioned to the official language of the state, and how the constitution identifies the state and the people of the state, or does it recognize the ethnics in the state or not. also, the paper review most of the presidential codes that issued to impose the Arabic language over all the people in Syria and banned other languages. also, I reviewed most internal codes that released from different institutions of Syrian government that banned Kurdish language in Syria. I used these material to analyze the language policy of the state against other minorities in Syria, in response to this, I did many meeting with some Kurdish Syrian politician, Academians, journalists who have experience about Syrian situations especially regarding the Kurdish issue there, also I did many meeting with activists who have contribution and working on Kurdish language in Syria, to discuss with them how the Kurdish community in Syria responded to Syrian language policy, and how the language be a core to mobilize the Kurdish community there, also to argue what the Kurdish community in Syria want in the future. The research will mainly use the qualitative method to examine my hypothesis, along with charts and graphs.

To review this discussion, the study divided to five chapters, as follows:

The chapter one will cover two topics: nation-building through language and the relationship between identity and nation, where language has been used to exert control and influence over societies torn apart by ethnic conflicts. Language has a significant role in discussions about nation-state transformation. The chapter also will cover the establishment of a nation-language state's policy and then discusses how liberal democracies around the world do recognize and accommodate cultural minorities, The chapter also provide an overview of the liberal theory through the Will Kymlicka works, and how the concept of accommodating national minorities through substate autonomy agreements regarding language and language rights.

In chapter Two, I will argue about the rise of Kurdish nationalism and its relationship with culture and language, then overview the Kurdish language and its varieties to give information about this

language. Furthermore, because the study focuses on the Kurds of Syria, the chapter will argue about the formation of Syria after WWI and how the Kurds are part of the new state because of Arabs elites there, then the chapter reviews the political situation for Kurds in Syria and review the tension between the Kurds and Arabs in Syria, also how the Syrian authorities used the other Kurds (Kurds from Iraq and Turkey) in the regional conflicts.

In Chapter Three will argue the Arabization policy, I will discuss the rise of Arab Nationalism in Syria, and how the Arab Pan, through the Ba'ath party ideology dominated over the Syria (State and the Community), then I will overview all Syrian constitutions, government institutions that control the language policy in the country, and how this institution banned another languages, especially Kurdish language, and how the state treat with this language, also the chapter review other actors in Syria (parties) and the whole community, how they look to language policy in Syria.

In Chapter Four, I will discuss the attempts of Kurds in Syria to demand their rights, where those attempts varied between the legal petition through Parliament, or as deal with the regime, or their attempt to keep the Kurdish identity at a low level by hidden and acting in a secret way to teach language, or direct confrontation and recently army conflict; however, on the other side, outside the authorities, the oppositions and even in general level, the Syrian Arabs how they are looking with doubt eyes to non-Syrian Arabic, especially to the Kurds, where in the future of Syria it will need considerable efforts to fill the political gap between different parties there.

In Chapter Five, I will argue the language rights and the Syrian Policy toward the Kurdish language as a linguicide policy. Then I will review the international declaration that supports language rights for Kurds, Finally, I will, briefly, recommend a solution model.

Chapter One: Theory, Rights, and Justice language

Language holds a significant place within debates regarding the transformation of the nation-state or from the perspective of political economy; whether from a political domination perspective when the linguistic ideology had played a central role in nationalist movements (Myhill 2006: 2); or because of the social stratification, or by downplaying and underusing local culture and linguistic sources (Ricento 2015). Depending on the recent literature regarding the language rights, the chapter will discuss the how establishing the language policy, although will concentrate on how language contributes to the formation of national identity, then will overview of language rights in liberal point of view.

Nationalism, Identity and Language

Nationalism has been a dominant political ideal for a long time until now. The received and still prevalent conceptualization of this idea is that the state and the nation should cohere within a single, sovereign territory. The nation-state thereby constituted should express and ensure the continued expression of a determinate national culture or identity. as Ephraim Nimmi wrote, the best described is the view that nationalism functions to sustain the formation of nation-states, whatever the vastly different empirical, normative, or conceptual arguments put forward to support this claim. (Nimmi in Breen and O'Neill, 2010: 22).

Where, Nationalism is an expression of the intense need to affirm national or communal identity as the anchor of individual identity, and it is one of the fundamental forces in political societies and one of the 'strong forces' in international relations (Heater and Berridge 1993: 103-115).

However, as Greenfeld argued, the national identity is reflected, apart from sovereignty, in possession of components of 'ethnicity', such as language, customs, and territorial affiliation; in other words, the 'nationality equivalent of 'ethnicity'. (Greenfeld 1992: 13).

Therefore, it should distinguish between "cultural nations" and "political nations." (Harrison and Boyd 2018), which is able seen in many regions in the world due to the presence of a common language and culture.

In this meaning, Nationalism is thought of as an extension of ethnicity, with adds the belief in shared characteristics, a desire for political autonomy, and the feeling that the 'only legitimate

pattern of government is national self-government' (Kedourie 1961: 9). In other words, politicization changes ethnicity to Nationalism.

There is a broad range of thoughts on a comprehensive definition of identity. As Tov Skutnabb-Kangas argued in (Multilingualism for All): Ethnic identity is allegiance to a group to which one has social links to ancestral, which is enough for the sense of a group boundary of the same community or cultural manners. It can be perpetuated by shared objective traits (language, religion), more subjective contributions to a sense of "groupness," or a combination of the two. In other words, symbolic or emotional relationships must be linked to an observably real past, no matter how far away. (Skutnabb-Kangas 1995:125-128).

McCrone argues that national identities are a form of collective identity, where he highlights their social nature; by emphasizing the everyday nature of national identity construction; further, he thought that some are consciously aware of making particular 'identity claims' and of their changing nature (McCrone 2002: 307). While Anthony D. Smith defined National Identity and distinguished it by basing it on the ethnic entity of the social human, he described nationalism as progressive and reactionary (Smith 1991:19–42). therefore, it found that nationalistic movements want something to change and return to language revival as a nostalgic romanticism of the past. This activity is part of the revitalization and reorientation of identity, which is crucial for the nationalist movement. (Skutnabb-Kangas 1995: 133).

As discussed above, the relationship between identity and nation, Identities are manifested in Language as, initially, in the categories and labels that people attach to themselves and others to signal their belonging; then as the indexed ways of speaking and behaving through which they perform their belonging; and finally, as the interpretations that others make of those indices. The ability to perceive and interpret the indices is part of shared culture. The ability to perceive and interpret the indices is part of the shared culture when the Cultural identities are textualized as national or racial/ethnic identities. The people willingly die for their fatherland or their people or other 'imagined communities' (Preece 2016: 19-20).

Furthermore, Fishman argued the link between language and ethnic identity thus: 'Although language has not often been equated with all the ethnicity, it has occasionally been given precedence within that totality in specific historical, geographical, and disciplinary contexts.' Therefore, due to the context-dependency of language and ethnic identity, examining how the

connection between language and ethnic identity develops, its importance and power, ebbs and flows, inevitableness, and potential for splintering, is essential.' (Fishman 1999: 4).

On another side, García employs 'linguaging' and 'ethnifying' for Language and ethnicity to refer to 'people individuals and groups, who use discursive and ethnic practices to indicate what they want to be', that is, how individuals and groups organize and carry out their identities through Language in social interaction. (Garcia 2010: 519).

The idea of basing national identity on Language began in the late 18th century, particularly with the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). where Language-based Nationalism had been in the air for more than a hundred years, the political borders of Europe were redrawn along linguistic lines, and many nationalist movements based upon minor languages achieved their goal of self-determination. (Myhill 2006: 119-122). With the ending of the First World War, the map of Europe and the Middle East had drawn on the lines of Language and came to be the political principle that territories are associated with languages and particular nationalities (Myhill 2006:2-3).

Consequently, ethnic Nationalism based on languages has been responsible, on the one hand, for transcending differences among different religious groups; or gaining the right to self-determination, or on the other hand: caused world wars and unprovoked attacks upon neighbours and conflict between different religious groups and establishing genocide and fascism systems (Myhill 2006:117).

Ethnicity and Nationalism are great understood for minority groups than other groups, where they perceive themselves as at risk of cultural, linguistic, or other forms of assimilation; so more significant matters of group identity have a special piquancy when that identity is being assailed. The clash here, between a threatened ethnolinguistic group and some overarching mainstream or neighbours, can often become one of the philosophies, too, where we see a dispute between purely individual rights and those of a beleaguered collectivity. Adherence to individual rights is a hallmark of most democratic societies. (Nimmi in Breen and O'Neill, 2010: 134).

Theory and language policy

Since the nineteenth century in Europe, which marked a historical turning point in the construction of modern Nationalism, the linguistic choices became political choices (Dorian 2014: 286), and

after the First World War (WWI), lots of new nation-states were established with a particular language, like that in the Middle East, the Turks and Arabs whose considered themselves as separate nationalities politically after centuries on the union, as well as the Kurds also, attempted to do the same, to develop their ideology and national identity around the language. (Myhill 2006:9).

However, as Vali argued, the Nation-state, to sustain its political and legal unity, is reducing the people to the dominant race within its diverse ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural structure and presenting it as a unified entity with a single identity (Vali 2020), where many countries have held campaign to gain these purposes, where they removed several rights for linguistic minorities. On the other hand, the minority groups, perceive themselves as at risk of cultural, linguistic, or other forms of assimilation; so more significant matters of group identity have a special piquancy when that identity is being assailed. (Nimmi in Breen and O'Neill, 2010: 134).

In this view, language policy is of enormous ethical, political, and legal significance worldwide; efforts to build common institutions and a shared identity have been significantly hampered by linguistic diversity and demands for recognition from various language groups. On the other hand, local linguistic majorities have attempted to mainstream their languages in the public realm (Kymlicka and Patten 2003).

The issue, however, is determining which languages should be recognized and in which sectors they will be employed. Should any language be spoken by a certain minimal number of people be publicly recognized, as Alan Patten said, when this Language obtains public recognition and when it is possible to receive public services in a linguistically plural society? (Patten 2001). While non-beneficial treatment ranged from denying the existence of a language and its speakers to labelling a language as inferior and its people as socially or intellectually limited, to the deliberate repression of speakers of some minority languages (Dorian 2014: 286).

The modern nation-state has an official language; However, as Nancy C. Dorian argued, it was unknown the specific Language how was treated; Such nations would generally have had some citizens who learned multiple languages or were bilingual to represent the group in interactions with other communities as general negotiators. Others in the community, who would have lived in more populous locations, might have maintained their monolingualism. However, the number of bilinguals and multilingual would rise at the borders of a large-group territory where members

came into more frequent contact with populations speaking other languages; population size typically influences which group has the more significant number of border area bilinguals. (Ibid: 285); the institutionalized bilingualism or multilingualism cases are durable, except in countries where linguistic minorities are associated with territory.

Ethnolinguistic viability studies have been conducted since the 1970s to explain observed maintenance cases and forecast whether a minority population would keep or abandon its language. Where they acknowledge that three sets of objective factors—status factors (economic, social, and sociohistorical factors, as well as status within and outside the group), demographic factors (proportion of the total population, concentration of the minority population, birthrate), and institutional support and control factors—have historically been the focus of evaluative efforts (use in mass media, education, government services, industry, religion, culture, politics) (Ibid: 302).

In his introduction to his book, *The Moral Foundations of Minority Rights*, Alan Pattan thoroughly defends his position on this matter: In the modern world, conflicting assertions about culture are a common theme in political discourse. On the one hand, majorities want to shape the state to look like them. They expect public institutions to reflect their beliefs, customs, norms, and identity meaningfully. From the majority's viewpoint, democracy or majority rule are the only mechanisms through which their culture is expressed in group decisions. States frequently take on the cultural preferences of the majority, and as long as some liberal guidelines are followed, this shaping is not problematic. Cultural minorities, on the other hand, frequently demand more state acknowledgement and accommodations. They demand that areas for expressing and preserving their own unique cultures be left open in public institutions. For minorities, these demands for acceptance and recognition of their diversity are consistent with liberalism's commitment to tolerating difference, its values of equal citizenship, and its concern against the tyranny of the majority. In this way, liberal democracies, for example, must consider issues relating to tradition, culture, and rights by their most fundamental principles. Liberal ideologies that prioritized individual rights in the past still struggle with the idea of "collective rights." Resentment in the social "mainstream" can nevertheless be caused by minority-group claims. (Pattan 2014: 1).

This can be summarized in **the following table (1) comparing between Minority and Majority Language rights** (Pattan 2014: 1-2):

	Majority	Minority
language policy	The majority frequently prefers to make its language the primary form of communication in public.	Minorities want that services be provided by the government in their native tongues and that they be able to participate in public institutions in their native tongues.
democratic institutions' structure	Within a unitary state, where the majority usually feels at ease, preferences can rule.	Typically, minorities aspire to carve out institutional and jurisdictional spaces where they can exercise some degree of autonomy or self-government.
the conspicuous markers of identity in the school curriculum, the use of public space	According to the majority, as long as legal liberal limits are met, there is no unfairness when governmental structures and policies are altered to reflect the values, stories, and identities of the majority.	It asserts minority rights; as a matter of justice, the state ought to acknowledge and respect the cultures of minorities by leaving areas in some institutions and policies that can represent minority values, traditions, narratives, and identity.

Many liberal democracies around the world recognize and accommodate cultural minorities to some extent. Will Kymlicka, the most significant intellectual for liberalism, will be the subject of the study.

Liberalism and Language

Since the 1990s, Will Kymlicka developed a liberal political theory of group rights with a critical role in Language and linguistic diversity. He noted the shortcoming in much of the liberal

tradition's focus on "universal categories," emphasizing that "Freedom of speech does not define what a useful language policy is" (Kymlicka 1995: 5). His attention to the importance of Language and linguistic diversity within his liberal multiculturalism approach to arguing for differentiated group rights has been used as a robust theoretical framework in addressing contemporary struggles favouring linguistic diversity and minority languages. Kymlicka's version of liberalism has been at the heart of one of the significant issues within politics and political theory since the 1990s, multiculturalism and identity politics. His theory was a response to questions of increased immigration, questioning the role, efficiency, and limits of the nation-state in the era of globalization, and other features that define the contexts that scholars of language and language politics are also facing (Ibid: 51).

Kymlicka's attention to the centrality of Language in his construction of a version of liberal multiculturalism that he sees "is the best hope for building just and inclusive societies worldwide". Kymlicka articulates his project as overcoming one of the dominant debates in political theory in the 1980s and 1990s, the liberal-communitarian debates. Rooted in a long-standing rift in Western political theory between the "moderns" and the "ancients," the liberal communitarian debates pitted liberal (or "modern") conceptions of society against those labelled "communitarian." The former approached government or political society as the result of an aggregation of some preexisting individuals who could be conceptualized concerning some pre-political state (i.e., a "state of nature"). Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and others articulated these ideas quite differently. Despite significant differences, this traditional ontological individualism is challenged by "communitarian" perspectives that insist that individuals cannot be reduced to some noncommunal essential core. Communitarians in the 1980s and 1990s drew on long and diverse traditions, including Aristotle's defining humans as political animals and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's development of a "General Will" not reducible to the sum of individuals' wills. Developing out of communitarian criticisms of John Rawls's procedural liberalism, communitarians championed the need for group rights and individual rights, including the rights of minorities and Language and cultural rights (Ives 2015: 48-72).

Kymlicka agrees with the communitarian critics of Rawls, who argue that the state cannot be neutral concerning questions of culture, identity, and especially Language, but he insists that group rights are fully compatible with liberalism. As he states, "the overwhelming majority of debates

about minority rights are not debates between a liberal majority and communitarian minorities, but debates among liberals about the meaning of liberalism". Also, Kymlicka creates a model of "internal restrictions" and "external protections." by taking seriously the notion that all liberal democracies, like other forms of government, inevitably partake in nation-building. That is, in promoting national identities, culture and Language (s), however, Kymlicka argues, "internal restrictions" are fully compatible with "external protections," which "involve the claim of a group against the larger society". In short, majority (or dominant) groups, even though the mechanisms of the democratic nation-state, should not have a monopoly on nation-building. Other minority groups should also be able to conduct nation-building activity, and a liberal state dedicated to equality must allow for and foster such activity by allowing for group rights. In Kymlicka's terms, the state can undoubtedly use collective rights to ensure "external protections" (protections of minority groups against majority groups) and remain thoroughly liberal— that is, committed to "internal protections" of individual rights. Kymlicka is adamantly critical of group rights if they would enable a specific cultural or ethnic group to demand individuals to "attend a particular church or follow traditional gender roles" (Kymlicka 1995: 36). Kymlicka concedes that there are risks associated with group rights but believes that the ethnic or national group may want to maintain its unique existence and character by limiting the impact of the actions of the greater society. (Ives 2015: 52).

Kymlicka's argued that "the state has to 'neutral' concerning ethnocultural identities of its citizens, and indifferent to the ability of ethnocultural groups to reproduce over time." however, he is against the notion that culture can be understood as "religion or as something which people should be free to pursue in their private life, where is not the concern of the state (they respect the rights of others)" (Kymlicka and Opalski 2002: 16). For that, Kymlicka draws on Language, noting, for example, that in the United States, the dominance of English is established, reinforced, and reproduced by the de facto requirement of immigrants to learn it and that the dominant group within all societies uses the state to promote integration, institutional cohesion, and "nation-building" as a deliberate project that is then not "neutral." (Kymlicka and Patten 2003; also in Recent 2015: 53) Kymlicka argues that group rights should not be understood as a deviation from the liberalism that emphasizes individual equality among citizens and how the state interacts with them. It means that members of minority groups should pursue the type of "nation-building" that

members of majorities do. To deny them this is tantamount to discrimination against these minority individuals (Ives 2015: 53).

Culture is difficult to define besides other elements such as a shared history, territory, practices, religion, food, dress, sense of identity, and Language. (Schiffman 1996: 56). Kymlicka is significant for language scholars precisely because he looks to Language to make "culture" a little less ambiguous and fluid (Ives 2015: 54). Central to his theory, Kymlicka defines "societal culture" as "a territorially fastened culture, settled on a common language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life, rather than merely common religious beliefs, family customs, or personal lifestyles" (Ibid 53-54; Kymlicka 2001: 39-49). As evident here, Language is central for Kymlicka's reconstruction of liberalism consonant with group rights (i.e., the "multicultural" attribution of "multicultural liberalism") (Ibid). further, Kymlicka admits the limitations of his theory and the critical characteristic of the important "grey areas" that are more difficult to address from his position; he discusses the cases of African Americans, "guest-workers" and illegal immigrants, all of whom are defined in terms of not having the linguistic component to a sufficient extent within his definition of "societal culture" (Ives 2015: 54).

Based on this argument that the majority often constitutes a "societal culture" engaged in the non-neutral state-building activity, Kymlicka differentiates among minorities by demarcating the various kinds of appropriate rights. Hence, they are not unjustly denied what individuals who belong to the majority have. He distinguishes three types of rights:

1. Self-government rights appropriate for "national groups" (which have "societal cultures") within multinational states
2. Polyethnic rights for those groups that have "voluntarily" immigrated (and left their "societal cultures")
3. Special representation rights for various groups, including women, the impoverished, and ethnic minorities

"National groups" share a common language and social institutions, and thus their rights include language rights for their languages to continue. Polyethnic rights also include the right to continue to use their "mother tongue" (a concept I return to later in Section 4) as well as resources to learn the majority's Language (Ibid 54)

The group rights to self-government are appropriate only to those groups that fully meet the criteria of societal culture and have a shared common language and public institutions. Thus, he takes the example of a large Chinese immigrant population to the United States or Canada and argues that it "is certainly possible in theory for Chinese to become a national minority, if they settled together and acquire self-governing powers". Nevertheless, he argues, this has not occurred in practice and would require public schools in Chinese and universities and Chinese to be used in the workplace, army units, and hospitals. He uses this example to emphasize those multicultural policies can include "self-government rights" for groups like the Quebecois or Aboriginal peoples in Canada, Catalonians in Spain, and other cases where colonialism and multiethnic states have forced groups with "societal cultures" into a state dominated by those of a different societal culture (Kymlicka 2015: 209-249).

As well as Ronald Schmidt points out that "Kymlicka's analysis is providing multiple opportunities for critical thinking about the meaning and significance of the claims made on behalf of various language-policy proposals in the name of 'equality.'" and it will support the policy language in a multilingual country." (Schmidt 2006: 106-107; Ives 2015: 55)

Kymlicka develops an understanding of the importance of cultural membership to such rights, but he pays almost no attention to the role of Language. His interest in Language is driven by his goal of reconstructing liberalism that can support multiculturalism but still be clearly distinguished from "communitarianism" (Ives 2015: 57)

As Appiah (2005) demonstrates when he criticizes Kymlicka's (1995) emphasis on recognizing and conserving identity groups and cultures, which contributes more to restricting the individual's rights than to freedom, the culturalist program has been linked to a variety of paradoxical results. Every "culture" represents not only difference but also the eradication of difference, according to multiculturalists like Kymlicka. The group represents a clump of relative homogeneity, and that homogeneity is sustained and enforced by regulatory mechanisms intended to marginalize and silence dissent from its fundamental norms and mores. (Appiah 2005: 152)

The Nationalism of the Majority is praised as an alternative to minority rights as long as core liberal principles are upheld, despite the fact that critics of the theory of liberalism reject the claims of freedom and equality and the concept of culture on which proponents of cultural minority rights rely. (Patten 2016: 4).

From this perspective, Patten came to the following conclusion: The main argument is that minorities should have the same opportunity as statewide majorities at the national level to become (local) majorities and use their majority power to reflect their culture. Therefore, minority cultural rights do not negate nationalism; rather, they constitute a desire to pluralize it by allowing other groups to have their own political communities and express their cultural identities through those communities' public institutions. (Pattan 2014: 5).

The finest justifications for upholding liberal culturalism, it can be determined by reexamining its tenets, are the rejection of nationalism. For this reason, the concept of granting national minorities substate sovereignty is crucial and worthwhile. Furthermore, other, pragmatic factors can suggest that nationalist claims should be respected. But we must reject the idea that justice ultimately consists of the majority and minority, each of which enjoys the chance to culturally dominate a particular region of the state. (Patten 2016: 6).

Language rights

Languages are sometimes compared to different plant or animal species. They can survive if they will have commode conditions. surprisingly, every community in the world exhibits linguistic variation to some extent. in this sense, each language has a legitimate claim for continued use. The work of Alan Pattan, which is outstanding, is used to explore the rights of language. In it, he defines the rights and compares two groups of them, which he calls toleration rights and accommodation rights, Patten Table (2) (Pattan 2014: 188-92):

Toleration Rights	accommodation rights	
	“Norm-and-accommodation” model	“Promotion rights proper” model/ “promotion rights.”
Individuals are protected by tolerance rights from governmental meddling with their choice of language. Without intervention from the government, people have the right to speak any language they	typically, the language that is spoken by the majority in the relevant jurisdiction; this language is used in courts and legislatures, to provide public services, as a medium for public education, and in other	The purpose of these rights is to advance the language with which they are related. Their enjoyment is not dependent on a lack of proficiency in a "regular" public language, unlike the

like in their homes and in organizations and institutions of civil society.	settings. People who don't speak this language receive special accommodations	particular accommodations provided under the norm-and-accommodation strategy. Even if he is proficient in the dominant language, a person can use his promotion rights in that language.
Only minority language speakers who are required to use their language in private communication circumstances are protected by the toleration rights. They make no mention of the usage or recognition of minority languages by state institutions in any context.	Although accommodations rights do require the state to take meaningful action, they are also significantly constrained. The fact that they cannot be claimed by those who speak the mainstream, or standard, the language of ordinary communication is crucial. Additionally, the state is not always required to provide activities in the minority language by virtue of accommodation rights.	

From another view of liberal theorizing of language rights, as Bale cited in the "negation, not right", Jeff Bale borrows the work of Lionel Wee on language rights; Wee acknowledges that linguistic discrimination exists. There is a specific role for language rights to alleviate such discrimination. However, language rights cannot resolve discrimination because too many discrepant stakeholders exploit language rights to satisfy too many competing interests. Consequently, "the appeal to language rights exacerbates rather than reduces social tensions" as a corrective. While Wee advocates for rights which allow individuals to negotiate their cultural practices and add their voices to public discourse, which he describes as deliberative democracy (Bale 2015: 74).

Wee notes that Kymlicka operationalizes language rights in ways that ultimately create a new hierarchy of language minority groups, with some (indigenous and national minorities) seemingly more deserving of formal protections than others (immigrant groups). Moreover, he argues that a

liberal approach to language rights "merely attempts to replace a set of historical processes that have worked to the advantage of one language (the current dominant language) with a structurally similar set of processes that are now intended to work to the advantage of another language (the current minority language)" (Bale 2015: 75-76)

The concept of language rights assumes that every human being has an "inborn "right to communicate in his/her Language with his/her fellow; like other human rights, the linguistic right is not something granted by the state or any social institution, or under any statute, law constitution. However, the linguistic rights of groups do exist in primary and essential relationship to the laws that can admit, restrict, or even forbid its use in different contexts by different groups and regions (Skutnabb-Kangas, Phillipson 2010).

Language rights were separated into "natural" and "conventional/legal" categories. The ability to use any language, both in public and privately, is one of the "inalienable and innate" rights. Conventional rights are those that are acknowledged by the prevailing group. However, as captive communicators have at least natural language rights, no state or nation is normally able to control all language functions. (Ibid).

Summary of the Chapter

This chapter covered two topics: nation-building through language and the relationship between identity and nation, where language has been used to exert control and influence over societies torn apart by ethnic conflicts. Language has a significant role in discussions about nation-state transformation.

The chapter also covers the establishment of a nation-language state's policy and then discusses how liberal democracies around the world do recognize and accommodate cultural minorities, according to Will Kymlicka, the most important critic of liberalism. The chapter also provides an overview of the liberal theory and the concept of accommodating national minorities through substate autonomy agreements regarding language and language rights.

Chapter Two: The Kurds, Kurdishness, and the Kurds of Syria

As discussed in the previous chapter, the relation between nationalism and language, this chapter will investigate the "Kurdish issue" through the lens of language in Syria because of its inextricable relationship between a nation's identity and public representation. Language is one of the most critical aspects of national identity, Sheyholislami claimed, even though an essentialist view of the relationship between language and national identity may not always be preferable. The role of language in defining and creating national identity should be emphasized for at least three reasons. First, language is one of the most apparent indicators of group identity for most people, especially minorities. It is especially true of the Kurdish language. The fact that democratic politics are political in common parlance is a second argument related to the instrumentality of language. The ordinary person feels most at ease discussing political matters in their language. In other words, the level of access that regular citizens have to their language determines how much they participate in their community's cultural, social, and political life. Finally, language plays a significant role in constructing other aspects of national identity. (Sheyholislami 2010: 4).

This chapter will also shed light on the political and cultural issues the Kurds face, as these work with language in informing the Kurdish identity and the Kurdish identity within the new formation state of Syria, since the 1920, when the country was under French Mandate, then the chapter will overview the political environment for the Kurds people there.

The Kurds, Nationalism

According to Bozarsalan, the earliest map that mentioned Kurdistan was prepared in the 11th century by Mahmud al-Kashgari and was titled "States of the East." This map featured all the "races" recognized in the East and was necessary to comprehend the Kurdish situation. Later, in the year 1150, the Seljuk sultan Sanjar created the province of Kurdistan, its center was the town of Bahar, and it included territory in the Kurdish regions of modern-day Iraq and Iran. (Bozarsalan 2021: 1). But after that, the term "Kurdistan" started to be used frequently to refer to a system of Kurdish fiefs in general. The Kurds were caught up in inter-imperial warfare as early as the medieval era, and this condition persisted until after the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, when the

Kurdish chiefdoms and emirates were partitioned between the Safavid and the Ottoman empires. Their inter-imperial status has, however, also ensured their survival as a unique tribe. (Ibid:2).

The nineteenth century was a critical era change in the Kurdish Sphere. The nineteenth-century massive change in the Kurdish Sphere had happened. First, the centralization and Westernization strategies unleashed led to the abolition of the Kurdish administrative institutions put in place at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Then, as a result of the centralist reforms carried out by Ottoman authorities, local notables were suppressed throughout the empire, leading to the abolition of the Kurdish emirates. Due to this unique circumstance, the tribal confederations, and tribes (asirets) rose to prominence as the political and social foundation of the Kurdish Sphere. (Bozarsalan 2021: 1-4).

The Kurdish identity was not in danger before to the twentieth century because they lived under the Ottoman Empire's sovereignty in semi-autonomous emirates. However, as the area became more Turkified in the late Ottoman era, the Kurdish principalities revolted under the leadership of their own shaykhs. However, the reformist era saw the beginning of change, especially with the consolidation of Turkish ideology to the detriment of other nationalist ideologies; this sparked a desire to put an end to nebulous, irredentist desires or concerns related to the emergence of a rival authority that posed a threat to centralized power. Nevertheless, most intellectuals, notables, and tribal and religious leaders from the prewar period continued attached to the idea of Ottoman unity. Kurdish political nationalism, which developed around Kurdish history and literature in the 20th century formed alongside ethnic groups (Turks, Armenians, Arabs) active in the clubs of Istanbul (Tejel 2009: 16-17).

With the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, the Kurds came to live within the new boundaries of the Sykes-Picot agreement, thereby separated into four nation-states, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. This situation guided the politics and identity of Kurds to demand their own social, political, and economic life in Kurdish society. However, those states that Kurds, included have those nationalists,

attempted to create 'imaginary communities' based on monist–ethnic cultures, so they forced policy on assimilative regimes (Tekdemir 2021: 157; Tezcür 2009).

The new states showed a strong sense of territorial ownership and a desire to maintain control over their areas and their inhabitants.

The political border threatened to dissolve existing group ties for the Kurds, dividing tribes, religious brotherhoods, villages, and even families. As a result, the Kurds chose to resist the state by maintaining networks of cross-border solidarity, such as brotherhoods and tribal confederations. On a variety of levels, for example, the government's drive for cultural uniformity clashed with the Kurdish desire to maintain links with linguistically related populations outside the state border. (Tejel 2009: 68-70)

The Rise of nationalism of Kurds (Kurdishness)

For centuries the intellectual elite among the Kurds expressed themselves in the language of their conquerors and rulers. The use of the dominant language by those to whom it is not the mother tongue is not unusual behaviour by historians and other non-creative writers. The creative intellectuals, especially the poets, usually take the first step towards using the mother tongue in their work, thus endowing it with the power of becoming a collective identity symbol and perhaps a medium of written communication outside the poetic domain. (Hassanpour 1992:154)

As mentioned above, the Kurds were trapped by inter-imperial conflicts in the medieval age. Where it can feel through Ahmed Khani's (Ehmedê Xanî)¹ epic *Mem û Zîn*, wrote in 1695, When Kurdish regions were divided between the Persian and Ottoman empires, the poet Ahmad Khani was conscious of the ethnic and nationalist essence of this plan. (Ibid: 2; Fandi 2008; Allsopp 2016: 46)

Khani declares that no matter what deficiencies the new Kurdish language may have, it is still superior to other tongues simply because it is the Kurds' mother tongue and not an imported medium of expression. Unlike other languages, a Kurd can call the Kurdish language his own. It is the language of his mountains and is most natural to him. By expressing these ideas, Khani acts like pre-nationalists in other cultures, which makes it their task to extol their languages' beauty and

¹ Ahmad Khani, sometimes spelt Ahmad-i Khani, was a Kurdish author, poet, astronomer, and philosopher who lived from 1650 in Hakkari to 1707 in Dûbayazt. His Kurdish name was Ehmedê Xanî. He was born in the Khani clan in the Turkish region of Hakkari. He relocated and established himself in Ritkan province's Bayezid. Later, he began instructing students in the fundamentals of Kurdish (Kurmanji). Khani spoke Kurdish, Arabic, and Persian with ease. In order to aid youngsters in their learning, he created the Arabic-Kurdish dictionary "Nûbihara Bîçûkan" (The Spring of Children) in 1683 (source: Wikipedia).

'naturalness' as markers of their ethnic identity. Khani is a pioneer in that regard among Kurdish intellectuals who intuitively understood that language and literature are tied by cultures and, if only implicitly, by "nation" (Hassanpour 1992: 156), and in an effort to help his students' Kurdish language proficiency, he wrote a description of how to teach Islam in Kurdish. (Hassanpour 1992). Therefore, it can say that the idea of nation and nationalism in Kurdish Land in the seventeenth century was voiced by both individuals and the masses of the people. (Hassanpour 1992: 55)

This interest in Kurdish continued right through the 19th century into the 20th century. Although the second half of the 19th century in the East was also the age of rising nationalism in the Levant, Turkey and the Balkans, which considered language as a prime factor in collective identity formation, the ideological approach to language was the concern of Ottoman officials, the state's linguistic Turkification policies had rapidly evolved (Solaimani 2016: 113-124). Another intellectual Kurd founded (Haji Qadir Koyi)², may, therefore, regard Koyi's interest in the Kurdish language to reflect this general trend in the Ottoman Empire, where the national feeling transition to a middle class and koyi called for the formation of a Kurdish state, propagated the use of Kurdish language and literature, and encouraged the adoption of modern secular education (Hassanpour 1992: 57; Fandi 2008).

To show the interdependence between language and identity, the poet points out that people enter history through their language and that even the most learned among them cannot attain their position as part of the cultural elite in ethnic terms if they continue to use other languages for self-expression. The poet is also aware that genuine learning cannot spread among the Kurds except through the Kurdish language and that the attainment of this objective is a prerequisite for a robust literary revival. (Suleiman 2013: 157)

Before World War I, apart from limited journalistic activity, Kurdish literature had been restricted to poetry and some prose, little of which had been published. The language propelled into centre stage in Kurdish life, giving rise to persistent calls to institute government-sponsored programmes to teach the written language to Kurdish speaking people and use, where many organizations and

² poet and a proponent of contemporary Kurdish nationalism. Koyi maintained that the Kurds could only establish a state if they employed both the pen and the sword—that is, if they acquired both a written language and state authority—in response to the old Kurdish tribal and religious leaders, despite the fact that he himself was a Mulla. He urged Kurds to start newspapers and journals, record their legendary oral ballads, and do so in response. Many young people are still inspired by his patriotic poems (Gunter 2011: 104).

clubs that were established in Istanbul focused on Kurdish history and literature and opened several schools for Kurdish children in Istanbul in which the Kurdish language was taught (Allsopp 2016: 51).

In this respect, the end of World War I marked the beginning of the activist movement; after the Turkish government crushed the Sheikh Said uprising in 1925, several Kurdish groups in Istanbul sought asylum in the Levant, where the most Kurdish political and cultural activities during the 1920s and 1930s in Syria and Lebanon which organized and established the Kurdish nationalist organization Khoybun/ Xoybûn (Being Oneself)³ in 1927, which sparked a revolution in the development and standardization of the Kurdish language during the 1930s and 1940s (Bozarsalan 2021: 7); The Khoybun was the first Kurdish nationalist organization in Syria and a turning point in the development of contemporary Kurdish nationalism in both Turkey and Syria using the Kurmanji language.(Tejel 2021: 438).

After World War II, The Kurdish intelligentsia of the 1920s had a different sociological character than the new generation of Kurds that rose to prominence in Kurdish politics. The new Kurdish struggle incorporated left-wing ideologies and applied Marxism-Leninism to conceive Kurdish self-determination and explain the circumstances in which Kurds found themselves. (Bozarsalan 2021: 7).

Considering this, in August 1944, in Dalanpur village, located where Turkey, Iraq and Iran converge, held a famous meeting of Kurdish delegates from Turkey, Iraq, Iran as well as from Syria. The participants signed a treaty known as *Peyamiani sei Sanowar* (The Treaty of the Three Boundaries), In which they vowed to help one another, share resources, and revive the Kurdish language and culture. Even though this gathering did not lead to any actual Kurdish unification, it did highlight the presence of transnational Kurdish aspirations and, consequently, the challenges

³ KHOYBUN, also known as Independence, was a pan-Kurdish party founded in October 1927 in Bhamdoun, Lebanon, by exiled Kurdish intellectuals with aristocratic backgrounds. Khoybun got some initial assistance from France and Great Britain in addition to the close collaboration of the Armenian Dashnak Party. The first leader in that position was Jaladat Badr Khan. The permanent headquarters of Khoybun were built in Aleppo, Syria, which was then governed by France. With a well-trained fighting army independent of the traditional tribal elders, Khoybun aimed to build a powerful Kurdish national liberation organization. It sparked the unsuccessful Kurdish revolt in Turkey's Ararat region in 1927–1930. In 1928, France outlawed Khoybun's activities in Aleppo in response to Turkish pressure. The party has had a dreadful time trying to spread its name among the Kurds in northern Iraq. Nevertheless, Khoybun survived for a long time and is today regarded as one of the most significant pan-Kurdish organizations of the 20th century (Gunter 2011: 99).

they posed to the governments where Kurds were residing at the time. For example, the failed Mahabad Republic of Iran in 1946 still resonates in the development of transnational Kurdish nationalism, including among the Kurds in Syria (Gunter 2014: 36; Gunter 2010: 78; O'balance 1995: 243).

The modern nationalist movements had solidified into a coherent philosophical system by the 1960s, known as *kurdayetî*⁴ (it means the idea of and struggle for relieving the Kurds from national oppression by uniting all parts of the Kurdish Sphere under the rule of an independent Kurdish state) (Gunter 2014: 62), Kurdish nationalist ideology has undergone considerable differentiation, by 1980s, the ideological/ political trends that may be identified as "populism", "socialism", "national democracy", and "national socialism" had appeared in the literature and programs of the political parties (Tekdemir 2021).

Moreover, as McKeever argued in his thesis: the concept of a nation has been inculcated within Kurds across the Kurdish Sphere through subjection to processes of 'nation-formation' by the states whose sovereignty they reside under. The main driving force behind these processes has been a nationalist ideology of exclusion that labels Kurds as a national other outside the national concept of the state. Efforts by nationalist policymakers to eradicate Kurdish identity or incorporate it into the state's official national identity are examples of self-conscious nation-formation, as are more banal and routine dynamics like the ways that centralized bureaucracy, education, and military service can emphasize and reinforce political and geographic identity. Such experiences underscore the 'otherness' of Kurdish identity while also normalizing and accentuating the nation and nation-ness frameworks by endowing them with natural, self-evident qualities. As "outsider identities can be understood at the dialectics of national identity constructed through outsiders and an outside identity constructed through a historical consciousness of state violence" (McKeever 2021: 18)

⁴ The phrase first appears in Sulaymaniya's Kurdish nationalist discourse in the 1930s, especially among the city's educated, secular elites. It then reappears frequently during the post-World War II era, especially among the founders of the Komalay Jîyanaway Kurd (Committee for the Revival of the Kurds) movement. Finally, after the Mahabat Republic was overthrown in December 1946, it reappears among Kurdish leaders and nationalist elites. With the Kurdistan Democratic Party's (KDP) formal definition of the term as the party's political ideology, *94Kurdayetî* was institutionalized with a strongly political undertone in the early 1960s (Tunc 2018: 54).

the assertion made by Kurdish nationalists that Kurdistan is their historical and ethnic homeland is strengthened and given credence by the ethnicist and primordial understandings of nations found in academic and non-academic literature, which view geography as a given characteristic of communities. and Kurdish claims to a historical and ethnic homeland mesh well with the idea of territoriality that permeates the modern international system, which is based on territorial nation-states, as well as the political influence that maps have when used as propaganda tools to advance the notion (Kaya 2012: 40). On another side, the “nationalist” feelings among Kurds, are produced by Kurdish movements and intellectuals and feed the Kurdish people in the region (Keskin 2017: 60). Consequently, as Tejel argued, the doctrine of Kurdish nationalism, which asserts that there is the Kurdish nation is unfairly divided into four states, is not accepting of restrictive border laws, and in order to develop and even survive, Kurdish nationalism must be opposed to the establishment of political borders. (Tejel 2009: 70), on another words, The attempts to push the Kurds to assimilate, a part of the majority's plan to create new nations in states that were artificially founded after World War I, can be considered a cause of the strengthening of the Kurdish ethnic identity. In addition, it needs to be seen as a response to the Pan-nationalist movements that have emerged in these states. The sheer number of Kurds, their geographic concentration, accessibility issues, cultural and linguistic differences, and their alienation from the majority societies due to inequality and racial discrimination have all contributed to the failure of assimilation or "forced integration" policies (Sheikhmous 1992: 134).

The linguistic characteristics of Kurdish

Kurdish is one of the Iranian groups of the Indo-European family of languages (Blau 2010: 1). along with Arabic, Persian and Turkish, Kurdish is one of the major languages of West Asia. It has linguistically and culturally diverse communities across the area that Kurds inhabit; the Kurdish dialects, which are significantly dispersed, have differences in proportion to the geographical distance separating them. The dialects called Kurmanji are spoken by the most significant number, including the Kurds of Turkey, Syria, and Armenia, and by some Iraqi and Iranian Kurds, the dialects of northeast Iraq called Sorani and the neighbouring dialects of Iranian Kurdistan called Mokri, Kordi or Sene'i (Hassanpour 1992; Opengin 2021: 640; Sheyholislami 2021: 670), it characterized as below:

-KURMANCI (Kurmanji, North Kurdish), spoken between the Kurds in Turkey and Syria and northern parts of Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish areas and Armenia.

-SORANI (South Kurdish, also called middle Kurdish) is spoken between Kurds in Iran and Iraq. (Opengin 2021: 640; sheyholislami 2021: 670; malmısanij: 2021: 700; Hassanpour 1989; Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray: 2006; Arslan 2015).

For the Kurdish people in Syria (the study area), the dialect used by all Kurds in Syria is Kurmanji as the spoken language, and when the Jaladat Badrkhan⁵ with Rocite Lesco founded Latin alphabet, that called The Badrakhan variety or HAWAR-variety), which introduced in 1932 in Damascus and Beirut by Jeladet Ali Badrakhan in the magazine Hawar, based on Kurmanci with latin code (sheyholislami 2015: 30; Izady 2015:178), In the Hawar the tried to inspire the idea of Kani, where they mention to Ehmedê Xanî and other intellectual Kurds, for granting the language its 'soul', (Bozarsalan 2021: 623)

In Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut, as well as in Kurdish area in the northeast, the Khoybun helped establish a number of Kurdish committees and organizations that may be regarded as Khoybun "schools" of Kurdish nationalism in Syria. Additionally, the Khoybun leaders, particularly the brothers Jaladat and Kamuran Badirkhan, were pivotal in the push toward a cultural revival of the Kurmanji dialect; their presence in Syria had a significant impact on the function of the Kurdish language in Kurdish culture. (Tejel 2009: 17).

Syria, The New State

The state is known as the Syrian Arab Republic, historically known as "greater Syria" or, as Arabs commonly refer to it, Bilad al-Sham/ Levent, Greater Syria, and more specifically, the modern truncated nation-state of Syria at the heart of the Fertile Crescent (Clay 1924).

Geographic Syria had been part of the Ottoman Empire ever since 1516. All her religious, political, and cultural ties were linked to the central government in Istanbul; the entire social system was

⁵ Badr Khānī Jālada :One of the most important advocates for Kurdish independence during the 20th century was BadrKhan, a Kurdish nationalist leader and journalist (born 1893 in Maktala, Syria; died 1951 in Damascus). Jaladat committed his entire life to bringing about the creation of a single Kurdish state in the Middle East. He was educated in Istanbul before leaving for America in 1912 and strongly backed the British throughout World War I. Jaladat settled in Syria (1919), where he joined the Kurdish émigrés, after being disappointed that the British did not assist the creation of a single Kurdish state. He was chosen to serve as the Khoybun's first president in 1927. Three years later, he took part in the unsuccessful Kurdish uprising in Turkey. The bilingual Kurdish-French review *Hawar* ("Summons"), which he founded and served as the first editor of (May 1932), along with his later illustrated publication *Runahi* ("Light"), helped to foster understanding among the various and frequently at odds elements of the Kurdish nationalist movement and aided in the development of a Kurdish popular literature (Britanica).

based on Ottoman laws, Ottoman culture, and Ottoman traditions, under Ottoman rules (Masters 2013).

When the Arab armies entered Damascus on October 1, 1918, a new era began in the region. Damascenes declared the final stage of the Arab Revolt. September 26 marked the evacuation of the last Ottoman authorities from Damascus and the transition into an era of independence. The Arab Government was proclaimed with Prince Faisal at its head and Damascus as its capital (Moubayed 1999, p. 12; Hinneboucsh 2001: 18).

Long before the war had ended, Great Britain and France had already planned out the future of the Arab world in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and The Middle East became the spoil of war that the victorious nations of Europe divided among themselves to secure their positions along the Mediterranean in case another deadly war ever broke out in Europe (Moubayed 1999: 13).

in July 1920, the French High Commissioner to Syria, General Henri Gouraud, issued an ultimatum to King Faisal, demanding that he dismantle his government, arrest all anti-French activists, and dissolve the newborn Syrian Army. (Moubayed 2018: 15)

In 1920, France received the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon in recognition of the "Special Position" it had established for itself in these territories before World War I. (KHOURY 1987: 27). Syria was home to numerous religious and ethnic communities, which were bound by little more than language and geography. Consequently, Frenchmen chose to emphasize social and cultural distinctions among Syrians and to interpret these as the product of endemic sectarian conflict (KHOURY 1987: 28).

The Levant was divided into small states: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine in the initial 1920s, with the League of Nations Mandate, where Syria was awarded to the French administration. Through common cause and hostility to the foreign power, the populations of the territorially reduced modern Syria rebelled against the Mandate. They continued to fight against the French policy of "dividing and ruling the truncated state even further as six separate statelets (Chatty 2017: 42-43). Those small states were under separately administered Mandates under French and British supervision, isolated a truncated Syria and surrounded it with artificial boundaries and customs barriers that obstructed the free passage of goods and people. The people of Aleppo were cut off from their natural hinterland in Turkey and Iraq. (KHOURY 1987: 57).

Minorities became a constant source of friction between the local Sunni elites and the Mandatory French administration. Moreover, the concept of specific social and cultural groups as "minorities" "was new construction, having been recently inherited from the Ottoman millet system and having emerged from creating new, naturally homogenizing nation-states. Among the "minorities", "the Kurds represented the largest non-Arab Muslim group in Syria from the 1920s onward (Tejel 2009: 9).

Significant ambiguity characterized the political climate in Syria in the 1920s. The end of the Ottoman Empire, the spread of pan-Islamic propaganda, the creation of the French Mandate, and international initiatives to protect "minorities," among other things, all contributed to the chaotic and shifting environment that various communities and their leaders were attempting to adapt to or take advantage of. (Tejel 2009: 12).

France divided the country along regional and ethnic lines as part of its "divide and rule" strategy. The French asserted that by highlighting communal divisions and aspirations, they were submitting to political reality and popular desire. However, by appealing to possibly Francophile minority, they were able to diminish Arab nationalism and pan-Syrian sentiment while also strengthening French power. (KHOURY 1987: 58). The French government played a crucial role in defining local ethnic and religious groups like minorities and in the creation of contemporary nation-states in Syria and Lebanon. French interests in (Syria and Lebanon) since the 19th century were based on a "secular tradition" and to protect Christian communities, which were strengthened by religious missions and educational institutions. By exploiting the antagonism between urban and rural elites, as well as between Sunni Arabs and other ethnic and religious minorities, the French government implemented a divide and rule strategy. The French administration portrayed itself as a mediator between the ethnic and religious minorities and the Sunni Muslim majority; for France, Syrian unity was nothing more than an Arab nationalist invention perceived as an artificial creation of the British to harm French interests in the Middle East. At the same time, France relied on support from certain urban elites to isolate the Arab nationalist. (Tejel 2009: p 15- 16). The French were successful in keeping the nationalist movement from spreading to the areas inhabited by minorities throughout a significant portion of the Mandate era, which helped to define the scope of the movement. At the same time, the periphery areas lacked many of the factors that had united Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, and Homs into a nationalist front in resistance to French authority in

Syria. As a result, it was extremely difficult for the Syrian nationalist movement to base its operations outside of the four nationalist centers. (KHOURY 1987: 59). The next chapter will wide study the Syrian state and its policy.

The Kurds in Syria, the new state

The Kurds are found all across the Syrian Arab Republic, but they are most numerous around the northern borders with Turkey and Iraq, which used to be part of the Kurd's Sphere before they were given to the French Mandated Syrian state in 1920.

In Syria (Bilad Alsham) certain Kurdish tribes preserved their close endogenous structures or connections with Kurdish areas, while others were integrated into towns, Turkish and Arab confederations, and villages. (Tejel 2009: 99; Winter 2009; Jaziri 2017:335-350 and 368).


Kurdish regiments constituted up the military colony of the Kurds in Damascus. The Ottoman Empire confirmed the Kurdish community's military presence in Damascus; many Kurds from rural Syria's hinterland joined the neighborhood Janissary corps (yerliyye). Others who had received training in Istanbul had landed in Damascus as Imperial Jannissaries (qapi-qul). Identification with their task contributed to a strong sense of ethnic belonging for many Kurds in Damascus. Later, migrants from various Kurdish origins (Diyarbakir, Mosul, Kirkuk) joined these military units, leading to the expansion of the Kurdish neighborhood. Since the nineteenth century, there has been a Kurdish neighborhood in the city, with residents from Kurd Dagħ (Efrin) and Jazira. During the French Mandate, the Kurdish sector in Aleppo was absorbed into Damascene life in the 1930s. (Tejel 2009: 10-11).

Many Kurds have lived in Syria for many years. For instance, the Millis tribal confederation was settled in the eyalet of Raqqa as part of the empire's tribal settlement policy. (Winter 2006; Winter 2009); On the left bank of the Euphrates, near Jarablus and Seruj, as well as in Jazira, seminomadic and sedentary tribes were also present. The territory on the right bank had been established by Kurds by the beginning of the seventeenth century. (Tejel 2009: 10).

Additionally, during the 1920s and for the entirety of the 20th century, Syrian Kurdish settlements have been home to displaced Kurds from Turkey who invaded the country to seek refuge.

The Kurdish aghawat class, who ruled Syria in the early 20th century, had strong ties to the previous Ottoman order. While some Kurdish tribes from Jarablus and Upper Jazira opposed the

French, the majority of Kurdish leaders worked with them to establish French rule in Syria. Because of this, the Damascene Kurds usually did not support the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans led by the Sharif of Mecca, and with the fall of Faysal's government in July 1920, they demonstrated their loyalty to the French. (Tejel 2021. 438), Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf, the leader of the Damascus Kurds, improved his ties with the French, for example, and France enlisted the aid of Kurds, Armenians, and Circassians during the Great Arab Revolt of 1925 in order to put an end to this insurrection. (Chatty 2017). Additionally, according to Philip S. Khoury, "relations between Arab nationalists and the Kurds of Damascus were strained for the rest of the mandate" due to the Kurdish auxiliary troops' assistance in putting down The Great Revolt. (Tejel 2021: 438).



Map by
M. Izady,
Gulf
2000
Project
[http://
gulf2000.columbia.edu/
maps.shtml](http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml)

Map of Ethnicity in Syria based on gulf project in Columbia University (Link)

The East of Syria (Hassaka province) was not integrated into the Syrian political system till 1930; with the annexation of this area, the new state (Syria) as we know it was completed (White 2017: 141-178)

The Kurdish populations placed under the French Mandate occupy three narrow zones, isolated from one another, all along the Turkish frontier: Jazira, Jarablus, and Kurd Dagh. These three

Kurdish enclaves constitute the natural extension of Kurdish territory into Turkey and Iraq. According to Tejel, many tribes cooperated with the French; however, the Syrian Kurds, because of their geographic origins, history, lifestyle, and settlement of diverse environments, did not constitute a homogenous group at the beginning of the twentieth century. In this sense, Kurdish identity was redefined locally "in the face of universalist representations of Kurdish ethnicity suggested both by nationalist historians and state-centered historical interpretations" as a result of the progressive and fragmented integration of Kurdish populations in mandatory Syria; in other words, the Kurdish "group" was going through a transition in its own right during the French Mandate. (Tejel 2009: 12-13), This situation changed gradually, and as Tejel noted, Jamil Mardam, a Leader of the National Bloc who later became President of Syria, was dissatisfied with the rising suspicion of an independent Kurdish identity among the Arab political elites, who saw the Kurdish population as a barrier to Syrian national development, where the statue read: "Since the arrival of the Badirkhan brothers, the Kurds of Damascus have gone back fifty years," was becoming more and more associated with Arabism. (Tejel 2009)

Consequently, with the formation of the new state called Syria, the Kurds there have three groups, the first one, which historically integrated with the Arab community (Homes, Hama), and the other who settled in the north of Syria (Afrin, Jarabuls and Jazira), and the new coming immigration Kurdish, that those who carry the national feeling and struggle for that (Ibid). there is no correct number regard the Kurdish population in Syria, because of there is no official statistics in Syria refer to ethnicity, but approximate statistics by different sides, where each of them tries to show its desire to reduce or maximize this number for example: the Minority Rights Group international estimated them number around 2.5 million Kurds in Syria (Minorities and indigenous peoples in Syria, Kurds), also the Human Rights Watch in reports mentioned that the Kurds in Syria comprising about 8.5 to 10 percent of the Syrian population (The Silenced Kurds 1996; Chatty 2010 :232), however the Kurdish Institute in Parise estimated population of Kurds in Syria around 3 to 3.5 million, nearly the 15% of the population of Syria (The Kurdish population in Institut kurde de Paris). In front of these numbers there is some sides especially Arab side said that the number of Kurds in Syria not more than one million, nearly 6% of the population of Syria (A team of Researcher 2013: 66-69), if we take the average between those estimations, it will be around 2 million Kurds in Syria.

The Political Conditions for Kurds in Syria

Before studying this issue, it must mention that both Arab and Kurds started in dominion that has transborder movements, which means the Kurdish Sphere in other states will affect others in some way, for example, the national movement in Iraq or Turkey or even in Iran will affect to others.

As mentioned above, in Syria, the new state formation, the urban elites had been labouring to "fashion" the "identity of that historically unique subject"—the citizen—since the late-Ottoman Tanzimat (1839–1876), a period of modernizing reforms that included numerous liberalizing edicts; a new land code; extensive revisions of the empire's commercial, civil, criminal, and penal codes; a constitution; and the establishment of a parliament. The Tanzimat initiated a process of defensive developmental reforms that persisted in the empire's successor states long after its dissolution (Silverstein 2011: 31). It was noteworthy that the Ottoman Empire was based on the superiority of Islam rather than conceptions of one community's ethnic superiority to another. (Chatty 2017: 19). Ottoman population statistics were all recorded according to religion rather than ethnicity or language. Muslims, for instance, may be of several languages and racial groups, including Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Albanians, Bosnians, Circassians, and others. (Ibid: 20).

The battle for independence after the First World War by numerous Governments and groups with an interest in changing the political status of Syria gave rise to the idea of national unity in the modern "nation-state" understanding; they were divided into their political ideas and preferences, but they all gathered around there is a Syrian State loosely linked with the other Arabic-speaking regions (Hourani 1946: 41).

Many important urban notables and ex-Ottoman officials discovered little prospects to reclaim their positions of authority under the Arab nationalist dictatorship of Amir Faysal. They were loathed and mistrusted by the nationalist elite ruling the Arab state, thus every effort was taken to prevent them from holding political office. While they waited for the defeat of the young militant nationalists, some notables who had been pushed to the political margins sought the assistance of French political officials. Faysal did not appoint a cabinet of non-nationalist notables, however, until the French arrived at Damascus' doorstep in late July 1920. Additionally, this ministry was given the humiliating task of handing up Syria to France. (KHOURY 1987: 68). On another side King Faysal and his supporters, who established a short-lived Arab government in Syria between 1918-1920, regarded the Kurds with great suspicion because of their close links with the previous

Ottoman administration and their consequent pro-Ottoman stance during the war, understandably the Kurds of Damascus greeted the change of regime with relief, where the local Kurdish communities in Damascus generally welcomed French rule (Foccaru 2003: 197)

The French Policy in Syria

The relationship between the Kurds and new authorities was affected by the policy of Mandate in Syria and Lebanon; The French authorities were an essential role in defining local ethnic and religious groups like minorities having been inherited from the Ottoman millet system and depend on them to creating new nation-states. The Kurds were the largest non-Arab Muslim community in Syria starting in the 1920s among this mosaic.

Moreover, as mentioned above, the Kurdish tribal troops were part of the French Army, negatively reflecting Syria's political elites (National Collation), which appeared evident in the 1930s, especially in 1936-37. Adding to this the rule of Khoybun Kurdish committees, which was acted as political arms of revolution in Turkey, and it was a card in the hand of the Mandate to negotiate with Turkey and political elites in Syria, and this was evident during Franco-Turkish talks on defining the border between Turkey and Syria. (Tejel 2009; Fuccaro 2003).

The Khoybun League established diplomatic ties with representatives from several nations in an effort to garner political backing for the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish state in the area. (Ibid: 19-21),

The autonomous movement in Jazira in 1936, also known as the Kurdish-Christian bloc, was another event that contributed to tensions between the Kurdish notables and Arab nationalism elites. This movement sought administrative autonomy, with the following being its main demands:

- A specific law with protections similar to those accorded to the Alawites, the Druze, or those in Alexandretta
- The presence of French forces ensured the safety of minorities.
- the selection of a French governor under League of Nations supervision (Tejel 2009; White 2011: 69-91).

Conflict between Damascus and the French government coexisted with conflict with minorities in Damascus. Furthermore, when Syria had complete independence from France in 1946, Damascus had a negative idea toward Kurds leaders even though some were close to the Arab National bloc (Tejel 2014).

During the 1940s, after France fell in the war, the Free French offered Syria and Lebanon independence once the war was won; with the Mandate ended and Syria gained its independence, The rights of the Kurdish minority in Syria were not secured by France. As a result, the Kurds faced numerous restrictions that made the teaching and learning of Kurdish illegal after the French withdrawal. (Yildiz 2005: 24). Also, the Kurds lost their alliance, the Christian Bloc, which went far more than Kurdish leaders after 1937, when some Kurdish leaders raised the Kurdishness of the Jazera (Tejel 2014).

The French mandate had no great impact on the Kurdish areas, where the Kurds had little sense of belonging to a larger Syria state and identity. the relations between French and Turkey had affected on the Kurds in the Syrian Northern Borders, where the Kurds relation with French colonial were mixed between supported to reject the French rule to aligned with Turkey (Allsopp 2014: 48-49), moreover, French representatives did not encourage territorial autonomy. Instead, they asked Kurdish leaders to focus their activities on the cultural field (Tejel 2016: 268), when a petition was submitted to the Constituent Assembly of Syria seeking official permission to use the Kurdish language alongside other languages in Syria and to permit it to be taught in the three Kurdish regions of Syria, in response to this in the constitution, Where the constitution tried to strike a balance between the rights of religious and ethnic minorities to education in their own language and the establishment of their associations and that was clear in article 6: Syrians are equal before the law. They all enjoy the same civil and political rights; they are bound by the same duties and subject to the same charges. No inequality of treatment shall be established between them on account of religion, denomination, race or language. And (Art 19: *Education is free provided it is not contrary to public order and good morals, and does not affect the dignity of the country or of religions*; art 20: *The aim of education is to raise the moral and intellectual level of the population, within the framework of the national spirit, and to achieve harmony and fraternity among all citizens*), also to open way for other languages, in the article 24 the constitution said: *The Arabic language is the official language in all the services of the State, except in cases where*

other languages are added to it in this capacity by law or by an international agreement. Also in the article 109, to open door for region to have special statue regarding its needs, where said: The areas of administration and their competences shall be determined by a special law in which the special situation of some of these areas shall be considered (Syrian constitution 1930). Through these laws issued, we note that the French authorities in Syria opened the door for religious and ethnic minorities, even in their areas of presence, to exercise their linguistic and religious rights, as they allowed them to open schools and associations.

Syrian Policy Toward the Minorities/ Kurds

In response, the new authorities started to shut down Kurdish organizations, clubs, and publications published by the Mandate authority. They also seized Kurdish publications from stores and houses. The first step was publishing code 1061 on October 2, 1947, pointing the candidates to the Syrian parliament, when the code excluded the Kurds from other groups (Hassaf 2017: 22). This situation continued the new era of coup d'état in Syria (started in 1949), especially during the Adib Shishkly how executed an Arabization policy, and because many Kurds were in the communist party of Syria, which was led by a Kurdish communist Khaled Bagdash, this party because related to Soviet policy, and when Israel declared in 1948 the soviet union was one of the states that recognize the new state in Palestine, and that reflected to view to (Syrian Communist Part) SCP in Syria and its members (Alssop 2016), and Shishkly has doubted for Kurdish and Christian minorities (Hassaf 2017: 103)

The official discrimination against Kurds by the Syrian government did not start until the late 1950s, in part as a reaction to the unrest and uncertainty that Kurdish communities were causing for its neighboring governments in Turkey and Iraq. The national character of the Kurdish regions has changed in preparation for announcing the solution to the Kurdish problem in Syria through its abolition (Chatty 2017: 135).

By Syrian independents, the Arab Pan controls Syria and the country's constitution. The Ba'ath Party dismissed the Kurds' perfectly legal existence, and the government has stepped up its repressive measures. it had the same policy attitude toward Israel and Kurds, it was assumed that "there is no difference between them and Israelis, for Judistan and Kurdistan, so to speak, are of the same species" and it is danger on the Arab nation, after the Ba'ath Party control Syria in 1963, The government began: (1) displacing Kurds from their homelands to the interior; (2) denying

them access to education; (3) engaging in anti-Kurdish propaganda; (4) enforcing a "divide-and-rule" strategy against the Kurds; (5) Arab colonization of Kurdish lands; (6) militarizing the "northern Arab belt" and expelling Kurds from this region; (7) denying them the right to vote; and The Arabization process started in 1973 after the establishment of an "Arab belt." In Kurdish areas, about 4,000 Arab families have settled. Kurdish language instruction was not permitted. As'ad ended forcible transfers from Jazira in the 1980s as the opposition movement (Islamic renaissance movement) increased among Syrian Arabs, and Kurds were given critical military positions and put down Muslim Brotherhood uprisings in the 1980s. However, as Kurdish oppression increased, numerous resolutions banning the Kurdish language were enacted, and this process is still ongoing. (Radpey 2016: 472-473).

Between 1958 and 1961, when Syria and Egypt had founded the United Arab Republic, tensions in the region increased due to the expanding Kurdish separatist movement in Iraq and the discoveries of oil in the Kurdish areas in 1956 and 1959. A few leaders of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party (PDKS) were detained when the Kurds in Syria were accused of undermining Nasserite pan-Arabism. Syria went domestic after the collapse of the United Arab Republic and chose to take control of the province in the north, which was home to numerous Kurds. (Chatty 2017).

Its worries centred on the expanding Kurdish community in the area and prompted the commissioning of a population study. Official statistics from 1954 and 1961 showed a seven-year rise in Hasake's population of 25–30%. Concerns regarding the country's quick population expansion and territorial control were raised by the Syrian government. (Chatty 2011: 271; Chatty 2017: 136).

In August 1962, the government announced a special decree (no. 93) authorizing a special population census in the governorate of Hasak. All non-Arab residents were required to provide documents proving their residency in Syria before to 1945 since the declared goal was to identify those who had entered the country unlawfully from Turkey over the preceding several years. As a result of that census, some Kurds (about 40% of the Kurds in Hassaka Province) had their citizenship inventoried; the justification for this action was that these individuals were "infiltrators" from Turkey who entered Syria "illegally" and as such had no claim to citizenship. as well, these people lost all rights in Syria as Syrian citizens; in return, they were granted a red

identity card called ajanib (non-citizen foreigners) just used to prove their names. (Vanly 1968; Chatty 2017: 136; HRW 1996; McKeever 2021).

According to Salah Badaraldeen, a political leader in the Kurdish movement in Syria, A kind of Arab clergy was brought from the province of Aleppo and distributed among the island villages to guide the Kurds in the Arabic language. Several Arab poets and narrators from Deir Ez-Zor and Raqqa, On the other hand, Kurdish songs and music are banned, as there are rumours that the security services have assassinated one of the most famous Kurdish musicians (Badaraldeen 2018: 43).

Since such ideology spread throughout Syria fifty years ago, In the Kurdish political movement, there has been limited organization to address this inequitable and discriminatory policy (Allsopp 2015). As Chatty argued, part of the reason may be the schism among Kurdish parties in Syria (Chatty 2017: 138).

To manage the Kurdish problem and prevent losing control of the entire Kurdish group, which could result in a revolutionary situation, the Syrian authorities adopted a more pragmatic approach regarding the Kurds in Syria after the Ba'th Party came into power, most likely with the coup of Hafiz al-As'ad. (Tejel 2009: 70).

In this new regional game, Syria has mastered the use of the Kurds for political gain. Hafiz al-As'ad implemented a strategy of coopting particular Kurdish group subgroups both inside and outside of Syrian territory. This strategy was combined with a selective and equally potent repression strategy in Syria. This cooptation strategy helped him advance his regional goals abroad and remove the Kurdish "threat" from the city. Between 1970 and 1990, Hafiz al-regime As'ad's was successful in shifting "its" Kurdish issue toward Iraq and Turkey, which fueled the division of Syrian Kurds between supporters of the Kurdish movements in Iraq and Turkey. (Tejel 2009: 71).

The Ba'ath Party's eleventh national Congress in 1971, where the Kurdish issue was discussed in part and a resolution calling for autonomy for the Iraqi Kurds was ultimately adopted, was the first indication of As'ad's "Kurdish policy." The Syrian regime ignored the enlistment of hundreds of Syrian Kurds, primarily in Barzani KDP, as peshmerga (combatants) (Kurdistan Democratic Party). Both the KDP and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) were able to maintain offices in

Qamishli and the Syrian capital, which allowed them to preserve their second port of entry into Kurdistan in the far northeast of Upper Jazira and secure outside contacts, due to this, the Kurdish parties in Iraq did not any attempts to organize Syrian Kurds against Hafez al-regime Assad's or even support them, in exchange for Damascus' backing (Tejel 2009: 72).

The Progressive Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria and the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria jointly controlled the political scene in Syrian Kurdistan until the 1990s. However, both parties held contrasting political ideologies. Where the latter one, its main goal was to have the Syrian Kurds recognized as an ethnic minority, whereas the former called for political and social-economic rights for Kurds in Syria. Even though, due to their connections to the Syrian regime through the former's alliance with the PUK and the former's link with the KDP of Iraq, the Syrian Kurdish parties avoided any open confrontation with the regime in the future. The Kurdish Union Party in Syria ("Yekity"), a new party that was founded in 1993, took the lead from the two preceding ones by emphasizing more audacious methods of opposing the Syrian regime, such as public demonstrations and letters to international human rights organizations concerning Kurdish rights (Allesop 2016, Tejel 2009).

Hafiz al-As'ad became interested in the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey in the 1980s as a result of outside pressure. Thus, Hafiz al-regime As'ad's had to accept the growing of cross-border ties between the Syrian Kurds and Kurds in neighboring countries as a result of Syria's explicit support for the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) (Tejel 2009: 70-80).

This situation had some change, the PKK leader was deported from Syria as a result of increased tension between Turkey and Syria in 1998. Later, in 2003, following the Second Gulf War and the declaration of the KRG (Kurdistan Region Government) within the Federal System of Iraq, the Syrian Regime felt that Syria would be the next stop for Alliance Forces, and as a result, it increased its restrictions against Kurds. (Ibid: 82)

The Syrian Kurdish people began to experience a political re-reveille after the Syrian government, pressured by Turkey, ended its support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), where the Kurdish activists in Syria began to be more critical of the regime's policy regarding Kurdish assimilationist, particularly After the death of the Syrian president, Hafez al- Asad, in June 2000, Kurdish activists, as many other civil rights advocates did. A liberal atmosphere fueled by the western push for "democracy and human rights" pervaded the country. Public political parties protested, and stores

started selling Kurdish music and books, private Kurdish language lessons were widely available. Private Kurdish language classes proliferated. In 2002, a younger generation of Kurds started to stage sit-in demonstrations in Damascus. They called on Syrian authorities to remove the restrictions imposed on the Kurdish language and culture (Gorgas 2007).

In Syrian Kurdish areas, two fresh movements began to take shape at the turn of the century. One was "The Democratic Union Party-PYD," which was established in 2003 by PKK-affiliated individuals in Syria following Abdulla Ocalan's deportation from that country in 1998. This came about because of many years of tense relations with the Assad regime. The second was the 2005-founded "Kurdish Future Movement in Syria." (Allessop 2014)

With the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Kurds in Syria also hastened to take advantage of political advances made by Iraqi Kurds in the region next to Syrian Jazireh. As a result, nationwide Kurdish riots broke out in 2004. The level of ethnic violence during this uprising was the highest in many years. Although there was a lot of anger in the Kurdish community, some sources acknowledged that the unrest "was not an entirely spontaneous eruption but a politically timed move to pressure the Assad regime to obtain some Kurdish political objectives." (Gambill 2004; Lowe 2006; Montgomery 2005). A riot broke out in Qamishli on March 12, 2004, when supporters of a visiting Arab soccer club entered a stadium and started yelling racial epithets and chanting in favor of Saddam Hussein. The two sides got into a fight as the Kurdish team's supporters responded with shouts glorifying Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdish citizens of the city rioted because of this. The turmoil swiftly extended to neighboring towns when demonstrators set ablaze Ba'ath Party buildings and destroyed images of the Syrian president. In the days that followed, the violence moved to the Kurdish-Dagh region's Ain al-Arab, Aleppo, and Afrin. The Damascus Kurdish neighborhoods also saw protests. Over 2,000 Kurds were detained, and numerous individuals were killed. (HRW 2009; Savelsberg 2014: 85- 107; Tejel 2021: 440-445).

Many Kurds and the regime were shaken by the outbursts of violence in Kurdish communities in 2004 and the harsh response from the Syrian security forces. For nearly fifty years, due to the Syrian government's support for their rivals in the three separatist movements—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and lastly, the PKK—which were given a home base and a refuge—the Kurds in Syria had accepted the government's resistance to their community's aspirations. (Pinto 2007: 261).

With PKK's expulsion from Syria and the creation of a Kurdish Regional Authority in Iraqi Kurdistan, many Syrian Kurds, especially the younger generation, started an aggressive and occasionally violent agitation for the recognition of all Kurds in Syria as citizens, and the Syrian government started to suspect its own Kurds of working with the enemy should there be an American-led attack on Syria (Gunter 2014). Given such political positioning, many Kurdish youths in Syria have taken a militant and uncharacteristically violent stance in the Syrian armed conflict. Moreover, many have set their minds on creating a semi-autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria (Pinto 2007: 262).

With an uprising for democratic change in Syria, in March 2011, Deraa, introduced a new and very dynamic actor onto the political scene in Syria, followed by a significant increase in the formation of civil society organizations and grassroots movements. Later the Kurdish National Council of Syria (KNC) was established in October 2011 between thirteen political parties and independents. During the talks for the establishment of the Kurdish National Council in 2011, PYD participated in them until its announcement and then decided to join the loyal opposition of the “National Coordination Committee for the Forces of Democratic Change” and gained a vice chairman position in that body. In contrast, in late 2013, KNC joined the National Coalition of Syrian Opposition Forces and gained representation in its prominent leading institutions.

The PYD later founded the People's Council of West Kurdistan, and in January 2014, the cantons of Cezre (Jazirah), Kobanî (Ain Al-Arab), and Efrîn (Afrin) formally declared democratic autonomy under a provisional constitution. With the help of multi-ethnic and multi-religious alliances like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the Rojava cantons gained international recognition and praise for their fight against ISIS; in 2016, this eventually led to the establishment of the Federal System of Rojava/Northern Syria (Dinc, 2020).

Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter, I argued about the rise of Kurdish nationalism and its relationship with culture and language, then overview the Kurdish language and its varieties to give information about this language. Furthermore, because the study focuses on the Kurds of Syria, the chapter argued about the formation of Syria after WWI and how the Kurds are part of the new state because of Arabs

elites there, then the chapter reviews the political situation for Kurds in Syria and review the tension between the Kurds and Arabs in Syria, also how the Syrian authorities used the other Kurds (Kurds from Iraq and Turkey) in the regional conflicts. The next chapter will argue the Arabization policy and how the Kurds reacted against it.



Chapter Three: Syrian language Policy

The chapter will overview the rise of Arab nationalism in Syria, then look over the intellectuals who affected the Arab pan, then how they dominated the constitutions in Syria till the Ba'th party era, which continues till now. Then will argue that most state institutions control through their rules of procedure and documents on the language policy. It will also review some Syrian laws restricting the Kurdish Language in Syria.

The chapter will review articles of the constitutions, laws, and resolutions released to regulate the Language in the State.

The contemporary Arabs pan

Since the rise up of Arab nationalism with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–97) or Syria experienced an extreme form of Arab nationalism that was encouraged by western intellectuals involved in a movement of Arab cultural renaissance, and it provided the ideal environment for the rise of the far more radical and aggressive nationalism that was rumoured to be developing in the area. (Tejel 2009: 54, 55 and 56; Khoury 1981).

As Hinneboucsh argued: the Syrian State was imagined from the beginning; most Syrians looked at it as an artificial creation and did not undeserving of affective loyalty. In this space, many attempts were made to foster a "Pan-Syrian" territorial identity; in return, some other political actors called for sub-state identities or a more universalistic ideology, such as Islam or communism or Arabism, which the last became the dominant identity which organized Syrian identity as Arab and Syria as part of a wider Arab nation (Hinneboucsh 2001: 18)

In other words, the national unity in the modern 'nation-state' understanding was created through the struggle for independence following the First World War by found several Governments and groups with an interest in changing the political status of Syria; they gathered around there is a Syrian State loosely linked with the other Arabic-speaking regions. in other meant, people were able to view themselves as members of a broad national community because of the illusion of contemporaneous common experience that the intellectuals and numerous historical forces created. (Anderson 1983). In this context, Satei Alusari said: that all people who speak Arabic are Arabs. as many Arabs intellectuals argued, the Language and Culture are the main characteristics of the

Arab Nation, Perhaps the most prominent of them are Sate' al-Husari, Zaki al-Arsuzi, Nadim Bitar and Michel Aflaq, and others.

Sati' al-Husri (1880 – 1968)

Al-Husri, Syria's first education minister (1918–1920), sought to create a new secondary school curriculum in 1943 that was founded on Arab nationalist principles. (Cleveland 1971: 47-78).

Al-Husri believed that a nation's most important components were its shared language and its history. He saw the nation as a living thing with a lengthy history, even if its members were denied the designation of Arab: "even if he does not want to be an Arab, or he is scornful of his Arabness, he is an Arab regardless of his wishes, whether ignorant, indifferent, undutiful, or disloyal, he is an Arab, but an Arab without consciousness or feeling" (Ibid: 82).

One of his most quotes is: " Every member of the Arabic-speaking world is an Arab. (Dawisha 2003: 72).

Zaki al-Arsuzi (1899 – 1968)

Al-Husri's ideas influenced other intellectuals, like Zaki al-Arsuzi, a Syrian patriot, philosopher, philologist, historian, sociologist, and historian. His thoughts had a big influence on how Ba'athism and its political movement evolved. He wrote various books throughout his lifetime, but *The Genius of Arabic in its Tongue* stands out (1943) (Khatib 2012: 22-24).

As a part of Ba'athist ideology, Al-beliefs Arsuzi's on society, language, and nationalism argue that the Arab Nation would come together after the Arab people recover the Arab identity, they have lost over the past 1000 years. According to al-Arsuzi, language is the means through which the Arabs can unite. Al-Arsuzi asserted that Arabic was significantly less arbitrary and more intuitive than Latin. Al-Arsuzi, however, receives very little attention in either Western or Arab study despite his contributions to Ba'athist ideology. This absence might be connected to Sati' al-Husri, a modern Arab nationalist who shared many of al-ideals Arsuzi's but was more adept at putting them into words. (Watenpaugh 2009).

Michel Aflaq (1910 – 1989)

Michel Aflaq was a sociologist, Syrian philosopher, and Arab nationalist who served as Syria's minister of education in 1949. His theories about society, economics, and politics, known as

Ba'athism, hold that the Arab world must be united into one Arab Nation in order to reach an advanced stage of development. Ba'athists believed that it placed an emphasis on liberty and Arab socialism. (Sievers 1980).

In Aflaq's writings, he asserted that Language is the most important title for the continuation of the standard Arabic characteristic and that the Arab Nation is distinguished by the unity of origin and elements that were polished and nourished by languages. and the unity of the Language is the essential link.

In recent years, another Arab Syrian intellectual came out, Mahmoud Alsayid, former education minister 2000-2003, former culture minister 2003-2006, Director of Education Sector, Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, 1992-1996, and the director of Academy of the Arabic Language in Damascus, in one of his book (Promotion and empowerment of the Arabic Language): The far-reaching goals of the calls for teaching in non-Arabic languages are the fragmentation of the Arab Nation and the consolidation of fragmentation and separation. The American example in Iraq in creating a non-Arab Iraq is a clear example (Alsayid 2013: 26).

The Ba'th Ideology

As discussed above, Arabism became the compelling integrating bond, this ideology dominated the Syrian identity and claimed Syria part of a wider Arab nation. Where the Ba'th Party had the most influence over Syrian politics for over fifty years since it ruled in 1963 (Galvani 1974).

Those Arabs intellectuals and other ideas inspired the Arab pan, and they founded the roots of the Ba'th party, which ruled Syria since 1963 by its Ba'ath ideology is a type of pan-Arab nationalism, where the "Arab nation" is an unquestionable historical fact. (Bozarslan 2005: 323).

in the Constitution of the party (Ba'th Constitution: website) considered all political and social groups established in the Arab fatherland which did not share the Arab national ideal were illegal, and some rules of procedure for the policy regarding Language:

Art. 8: The Official Language of the State and the Language of citizens recognized in writing and education is Arabic.

Art. 10: An Arab is someone whose Language is Arabic, who lived in the Arab land or aspired to a life in it and believed in his affiliation with the Arab Nation.

Art. 11: Everyone who calls for or joins a racist bloc against the Arabs and everyone who immigrated to the Arab world for a colonial purpose will be evacuated from the Arab world.

Art. 15: The National League is the only existing association in the Arab State that guarantees harmony between citizens and their fusion in the crucible of one Nation and combats all sectarian, sectarian, tribal, ethnic, and regional fanaticism.

Art. 20: Full rights of citizens are granted to every citizen who has lived in the Arab land and is loyal to the Arab Nation and has separated from every racial bloc.

Art 41, paragraph 4: Allow space, within the limits of the Arab nationalist idea, to establish clubs, form associations, parties, youth organizations, and tourism establishments, and benefit from cinema, radio, television, and all the means of modern civilization in the Dissemination of national culture and the people's entertainment.

Art 43, the second paragraph: The party's educational policy aims to create a new Arab generation that believes in the unity of its Nation and the immortality of its message

Art 44: Imprinting all aspects of intellectual, economic, political, urban, and artistic life with an Arab national character that restores the Nation's connection with its glorious history and motivates it to aspire to a more glorious and optimal future

Art 45: Education is a function of the State alone, and therefore all foreign and private educational institutions are abolished.

Art 48: Restricting the teaching profession and everything that affects education to Arab citizens, except for higher education (Ba'th Constitution: website).

Michel Aflaq acknowledged the presence of ethnic diversity within the "Arab nation," despite the Ba'athist attitude that all "schismatic" inclinations on the side of any ethnic or religious minority were unacceptable. Aflaq's views on minorities, where he advocated Arabism as a national perspective for the Kurds, were contradictory. according to Aflaq, if the Kurds were viewed in terms of their culture and history rather than their race they would be a simple group to incorporate into the Arab Nation. Furthermore, he claimed that the Kurds and other non-Arab ethnic groups

only desired to live dignified lives, and that their recognition of Kurdishness was contingent upon the Kurds accepting the Arab nationalist ideal. According to this theory, any resistance has been attributed to the self-serving interests of certain conservative sectors of Kurdish society, such as the tribal chiefs or enemy plots from the outside. (Tejel 2009: 57- 60).

According to Hinnebusch work (Syria: Revolution from Above), when The Ba'th came to power by a military coup and the army was a central pillar of the Regime (in March 1963), As Hinnebusch put it, it had a complicated, multifaceted nature, and the usual descriptions of the Regime—army, secret, class—failed to effectively convey its complexity. (Hinnebusch 2001: 1). Given that nationalist elites are simultaneously confronted with external threats and internal instability, this form of regime is perhaps best described as "populist authoritarianism." (Ibid: 4-5).

The Syrian Constitutions

The constitutions and institutions 'are not mere pieces of machinery. If they work, it is because of the ideas and beliefs of those who try to work them. The Syrian Constitution since 1918 reflects the Arab's pan; World War One gave rise to the Syrian State. Damascus was captured by the Arab anti-Ottoman uprising, which briefly installed an Arab government there. This movement, led by Amir Faisal, was a Pan-Arab alliance supported by al-Fatat that included Iraqis, Syrians, Palestinians, and Hijazis. As a component of a larger Arab federation, this pan-Arab middle-class movement sought to create an autonomous Arab state in historic Syria (bilad ashsham). Identity fluctuated between linguistic Arabism and an overlapping territorial Arab-Islamic identity in Syria. (Hinnebusch 2001: 18), where the first Constitution in Syria (1918-1920), Among other things, determined Syria's character as Arab, and the official Language for the State is Arabic (article 3). since that time, the Government proved its vision of Arabism on a linguistic and cultural basis early in that it relies on the inclusive of Dhad/ ض as a civil inclusive for all (Barout 2020).

Then, after the French occupied the Syrian in 1920, the founding Constitution of the First Syrian Republic under the French Mandate in 1930, did not mention the identity of the State; where came in article 6: "...no distinction shall be made between Syrian People regarding religion, faith, race, or Language (Constitution of Syria (1930)); however, it came back to set out in article 26: Arabic language shall be the official language in all the General Services, unless other languages may be used in addition, in accordance with a law or an international agreement (Ibid); however, it did not mention which Language could be used

By independence of Syria in 1946, the Mandate constitution (1930) was replaced by the Constitution of September 5, 1950, by the preamble: We, the representatives of the Syrian Arab people. We declare that our people, who are part of the Arab Nation, with their history, present and future, are looking forward to when our Arab Nation will meet in one State.

It is clear to concentrate on one component without mentioning other elements of the new State.

Then came back to assure that in article 1: the Syrian Arab Democratic Republic and its part of the Arab Nation, and in the article 4: the official language is Arabic (Constitution of Syria 1950), after the military coup in 1951, the Constitution was restored on July 10 1953, which was the same as the previous one, to ensure the official Language of the State is Arabic; moreover, in the article 21, paragraph 2: Education should aim at creating a generation that is strong in its body, thinking and personality, believing in God, imbued with virtuous morals, proud of the Arab heritage, equipped with the knowledge, aware of its duties, keen on its rights and freedom, a worker for the national interest and the general Arab interest, imbued with the spirit of solidarity and brotherhood among all citizens, and any education contrary to the objectives set out in this paragraph is prohibited (Constitution of Syria 1953).

This Constitution, which was followed by The Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Republic or the Constitution of 1958, served as the legal framework for the United Arab Republic (UAR), a brief political union between Egypt and Syria that existed from September 28, 1961, until the Syrian coup d'état. The United Arab Republic is a member of the Arab nation, as stated in article 1 of this constitution, and citizens are equal before the law and are not subject to discrimination based on their sex, origin, language, religion, or creed, as stated in article 12. (Constitution of Syria 1958).

When a military coup ended UAR in 1961, the 1950 Constitution was again restored; however, it was replaced in 1962, and the word (Arabic) was added to the name of the new republic, which adopted the title 'Syrian Arab Republic' instead of 'Syrian republic', as the country's name, which was the first official step to Arabized the country. (Constitution of Syria 1961).

Following a military takeover in 1963, the Ba'ath Party came into power. They mandated a state of emergency that lasted until 2011, which will be discussed later, and they established the National Council of the Revolutionary Committee to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial

authority in the nation. However, they kept the name Syrian Arab Republic and proclaimed the State to be a sovereign socialist democratic republic with a pan-Arab orientation. In addition, they released many codes to strengthen the power in the hand of the party (Constitution of Syria 1964).

Under the name of protecting national security, The Legislative Decree 51 of December 22, 1962, which forbids defying any orders from the martial law governor, is one example of how the Emergency law adopts arbitrary measures to silence critics. In addition, the Syrian authorities established the Supreme State Security Court (Mahkama Amn al-Dawla al-'Uliyya), an exceptional court exempt from the rules of procedure followed by regular Syrian courts. (Constitution of Syria 1964).

After the radical Ba'th party staged a bloody coup in 1966, the new leadership suspended the 1964 charter and created a new provisional one. The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party is the dominant party in the State and society, and its Constitution once again guarantees that Arabic will be the official language and that Arabic will be the title of the State (Article 4). Moreover, in the article 17, in aim to control the education system, and it was text: The education and culture system aims to create a nationalist, socialist Arab generation with scientific thinking linked to its history, and struggling in order to achieve the goals of its Nation (Arab) in unity, freedom, socialism, and in the service and progress of humanity (1964 Constitution).

In another coup in 1970, the members of the Ba'th party under General Hafiz al-Assad seized power; in 1973, he promulgated a new constitution as frames Syria's governance structure. However, besides many articles to assure the hegemony of Arab pan in Syria, and the control of the Ba'th party over the life of the Syrian people, in the (preamble, Art 1, Art 23, Art 83, Art 134), and the Article 4, the official language is Arabic (Constitution of Syria 1973).

The current Constitution 2012, after the uprising the conflict in Syria, this Constitution dropped the article 8 which said (The Ba'ath Party is the leading party in the society and the State) and abolished the Emergency law but replaced it with another article 114.

The Constitution (2012) describes the Syrian Arab Republic as a democratic, popular, socialist, and sovereign state, where the right to freedom is a cherished one and guarantees the right to education, including free, required elementary schooling, Minority language rights in education may be guaranteed by some lax protections. For example, According to article 22, the Syrian

educational system must ensure that the people continue to advance and must meet their requirements for ongoing social, economic, and cultural development. The use of minority languages in schools is not mandated by legislation, however, and minority language rights remain unaffected. According to Article 21, the goal of the educational and cultural system is to produce a socialist, nationalist, and Arab generation that is interested in science, devoted to its heritage, and socialist.

According to Article 25, the State must uphold the idea of equal opportunity for all citizens and that all citizens are equal before the law in terms of their rights and obligations. The full and effective participation of women in political, social, cultural, and economic life is likewise guaranteed under Article 45. (Constitution of Syria 2012)

Syrian constitution Table, Articles Related to Language, Table (3)

The Constitution	Articles
1918-1920	Art. 1: The Government of the Syrian Arab Kingdom is a representative civilian monarchy, with Damascus as its capital. Art. 3: Arabic is the official language in Syria Kingdom.
1930-1946	Art. 6: Syrians are treated equally by the law. They are all subject to the same obligations and charges, and they all have the same civil and political rights. There shall be no discrimination between them on the basis of religion, denomination, race, or language. Art. 19: Education is free with respect for public order. Art. 24: The official language of the State's general services is Arabic, unless in cases where other languages are added to it in this capacity by law or by an international agreement. Art. 28: The rights of the religious communities are guaranteed, and these communities can find schools to teach children in their language by law.
1950-1953	In the Preamble was the text: We are representatives of the Syrian Arab people. Art 1: Syrian Arab Democratic Republic Art 4: The official language is Arabic

1953	The Constitution of 10 July 1953, which was the same as the previous one, only in the article 21, paragraph 2: Education should aim at creating a generation that is strong in its body, thinking and personality, believing in God, imbued with virtuous morals, proud of the Arab heritage, equipped with the knowledge, aware of its duties, keen on its rights and freedom, a worker for the national interest and the general Arab interest, imbued with the spirit of solidarity and brotherhood among all citizens. Any education contrary to the objectives set out in this paragraph is prohibited.
1958-1961	Art. 1: The United Arab Republic is part of the whole Arab nation Art. 7: Citizens are not subject to discrimination on the basis of their gender, ethnicity, language, religion, or creed before the law.
1962-1964	The title 'Syrian Arab Republic' as the country's name replaced the 'Syrian republic', the first step in officially Arabizing the country.
1964-1969	Art. 1: "The Syrian Arab country is a sovereign socialist people's democratic State that is part of the Arab world. The Arab people of the Syrian country are part of the Arab nation. " Art. 4: The official language is the official language Art. 7: "The leading party in the State and society is the Arab Baath Socialist Party. Art. 17: The education and culture system aim to create an Arab, patriotic, socialist and scientific generation.
1969-1971	No data
1971-2012	The preamble: Separate the Ba'ath politics Art. 1: The Syrian Arab Republic is a sovereign people's democratic and participatory State whose territory, which is part of the Union of Arab Republics, cannot be ceded. 1. The Syrian Arab country is part of the Arab world. 3. The people in the Syrian Arab country are part of the Arab nation working and struggling to achieve its comprehensive unity. Art. 4: The official language is Arabic

	Art. 8: The Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party is the dominant force in both society and government. It is the head of a progressive national front that aims to mobilize the potential of the vast majority of the populace and use it to further the goals of the Arab people. Art. 21: The education and culture system aims to create an Arab, national, socialist, and scientific generation linked to its history and land, dear to its heritage and imbued with a spirit of struggle to achieve its nation's goals of unity, freedom and socialism and to contribute to the service and progress of humanity. Art. 23/1: Building a unified socialist Arab society is based on socialist national culture. Its objectives are to uphold moral principles, realize Arab national aspirations, advance society, and address global concerns. the State has to support and safeguards this culture. Art. 83: A candidate for the Presidency of the Republic must be a Syrian Arab with civil and political rights who is 35 years old. Art. 134: Judgements shall be handed down on behalf of the Arab people of Syria
2012- currently	Preamble: The Arab people and the Syrian Arab Republic are essential components of the Arab world. The Syrian Arab Republic seeks to accomplish this belonging as part of its national and pan-Arab ambition and encourages Arab collaboration to do so. Art. 1: The Syrian Arab Republic is part of the Arab homeland; The people of Syria are part of the Arab nation Art. 4: the official language of the state is Arabic. Art.8/ 4: it does not any political activities or forming of any political parties or groupings on the ground of religious, sectarian, tribal, regional, class-based, professional, or discrimination based on gender, origin, race or colour may not be undertaken; Art: 9: the Constitution shall guarantee the protection of the cultural variety of the Syrian society with all its strains as a national heritage that promotes national unity.

	Art. 29/ 4: The law shall regulate the state's supervision of private educational institutions Art. 32: The state has to protect antiquities, archaeological sites, and artistic, historical, and cultural value objects. Art. 33/3: The state shall guarantee the principle of equal opportunities for all citizens
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The Constitution in Syria was a political tool of the Ba'th Party (since 1963, by declaring the emergency law).

However, after 2011, with evoked the conflict in Syria, the new Constitution did not respond to the Syrian people; the preamble of the Constitution on the entire Syrian people with an Arab character. Therefore, in order to avoid violating the Constitution, every Syrian citizen must work to bring about the total unity of the Arab Nation.

In the introduction Syrian Constitution 2012, which is supposed to be inclusive of all Syrians, the Constitution glorifies only one Arab Nation and neglects the Syrian people's diversity (Constitution of Syria 2012). These ideas are also in line with those stated in Article 1.

Moreover, article 154 of the current Constitution said: "Legislation in force and issued prior to the adoption of this Constitution shall remain in force until it is amended following its provisions, provided that the amendment is made within a period not exceeding three Gregorian years", where this Article opens the way for the application of all previous laws of the current Constitution, where the goal is mainly to maintain the security of the authority and the continuation of the previous policy (Constitution of Syria 2012).

Examples of previous policy: The Revolution Protection Law, which was promulgated by Legislative Decree No. 6 on 7/1/1965, which includes penalties of up to life imprisonment for hard labour for violating the orders of the customary ruler and for carrying out demonstrations, gatherings, or riots

In 2011, President signed a decree ending 48 years of emergency rule depending on law 116; on April 21 2011, the Syrian, nevertheless replaced by Art 114 in the Constitution, which includes: If there is a grave and condition threat to national unity or the integrity and independence of the

country's territory or the State institutions are impeded from carrying out their constitutional functions, the President may take the prompt action required by these circumstances to address the threat (constitution 2011). In Syria, besides the Constitution, some institutions do the policymaker for the country also many presidential codes; those institution are:

The Ministry of Education (MoE)

After the Ba'th took power in the early seventies, the educational institution in Syria played an essential ideological role in legitimizing the new ruling authority over the following decades. As a result, the educational curricula adopted by the Assad regime produce a submissive generation that lacks the priorities of critical thinking.

Over the past decades, Syrian society has been subjected to an exact organization. Since the Syrian individual enters the first circle of life, leaving the family circle, he finds himself in the arms of the Ba'th vanguards, and it is the first organization created by the ruling Ba'th Party for young people. Here, the ideas of the party are implanted in the young minds. The issue begins with the recitation of the morning slogan, which becomes synonymous with the name of any child: "One Arab nation with a message..."; This stage is followed by the "Ba'th Youth" stage, which coincides with the second and third stages of primary education, where the educational system begins by imposing two new educational subjects: military training and national education. Here the indisputable militarisation of society begins. The dress imposed on the students is the oil colour - we call it the military colour in Syria - and here begins to mould the minds of young people and implant the Ba'th ideology in their surroundings. That applies to the university level, where all students must undergo university training, military training in the strict sense of the word.

At the secondary and high schools, military education was taught to all pupils (boys and girls) until 2003. Following Ba'ath party ideologies, the curriculum combined military instruction and political education. All students were compelled to wear military attire, which included military headgear, socks, and shoes in black. Additionally, military education teachers had extra responsibilities within the educational system, such as upholding student discipline and order. (AL HESSAN and others, 2016)

The ruling Ba'th Party had tripled its membership between 1971-and 1974, after President Hafez al-Assad seized power, doubled twice between 1974-and 1981, and tripled again between 1981-and 1992. However, this phenomenon did not reflect individuals' ideological desire to join the

organization, as it usually happens. Instead, affiliation with the Ba'th Party has been imposed on Syrian students at all educational levels; on the one hand, affiliation with the Ba'th was a gateway to graduating on the social ladder, where pragmatism and careerism became desirable social features; on the other hand.

Where the Bath party overhand the education system in different ways; through the chosen the education ministry, one member of the leadership committee of part, to enforces the party condition on the Ministry and the system (Language, history, ideas and values) (Hinnebusch 2009), with the other tools, they are:

The National Organization for Syrian Childhood, often known as the Ba'ath Vanguard, is a Ba'ath scout group for Syrian children in the primary school years. Students in the first through sixth grades who are from the Syrian Arab community are a part of this political and educational group. Additionally, it strives to educate children in accordance with the socialist and nationalist ideals of the Ba'ath party and its leader Hafez al-Assad. It had been established under the direction of Hafez al-Assad and the decision of the regional leadership of the Ba'th Party No. /493/ dated 24/3/1974. To achieve a society of unity, freedom, and socialism, it seeks to educate the youth in a nationalist, socialist manner. (The Ba'ath Vanguard organization website).

Aims of the organization:

- Love for the Arab homeland and the Arab Syrian sector [of the Arab homeland].
- Implanting the understanding of the ethnic heritage of our Arab homeland. Affirming sincerity and proficiency in work, cooperation, and control.
- Emphasizing the justice of our national issues and the inevitability of their victory
- Conscious commitment to the thought of the Arab Socialist Party and its goals of unity, freedom, and socialism
- Contribute to achieving the fundamental objectives of primary and basic education.

The other organization is Revolutionary Youth Union (officially abbreviated R.Y.U.; Ittihad Shabibat al-Thawra) is the youth organization related Ba'ath Party in Syria, and defined itself as a political organization (RYU website).

The Syrian student completes the stage of primary education and is entirely ready to move to the stage of maturity and guidance, carrying with him an extensive repertoire of ideological "ideas" that make him an essential element in the marches of support.

Political attitudes appear in a child in the early stages of education, so the educational system in Syria is embodied as a system that gradually distances children from everything related to the culture of democracy and the free-thinking that it presupposes. As a result, society becomes an excellent incubator for all forms of superstitious awareness and myths, moving away from scientific thinking and the ability to analyze (Hinnebusch 2009).

Bylaws of primary education schools issued by Resolution No. 21231/443 dated July 21, 2002, from the Ministry of Education, we will find many articles that asserted for control of the bath party on the education system and the Arabic Language like (MoE website):

The chapter one, Art 2, paragraph 1: (Confirmation of national and national identity, belonging to the homeland and the Nation, pride in the culture and civilization of the Arab Nation), and paragraph 5: (Upbringing to love the Arabic Language), and in paragraph 9 we find it is mentioned to other Language but did not mention to the mother tongue or any local language (MoE website).

Article 7: The activity of the Ba'th Vanguard is organized in the study plan for the first cycle in coordination with the leadership of the Vanguard of the Ba'th Organization, and the youth activity is organized in the study plan for the second cycle in coordination with the leadership of the Revolutionary Youth Union (MoE website).

In articles 22 and 23, which is for the fourth first level, it is asserted to teach in the Arabic Language.

For the director in any school, the law in article 53 said him/her to have followed the course of a vanguard unit supervisor for the managers of the first cycle (which means should be a member in the bath part). Furthermore, he/ she tasks in the article 57/4: Carrying out the task of the unit supervisor as stated in the bylaws of the Vanguard of the Ba'th Organization in the first episode. Also mentioned his/ her task in article 63, second paragraph no.11. also, the director deputy has bath party tasks, like article 72 no10 (Vanguard unit record) (MoE website)

In addition, there is an article for the Ba'th party that prepares the student on the army moral (Extracurricular Activities Supervisor) like article 82 second paragraph (MoE website).

Chapter 14, with articles 105, 106, 108, 109 and 110 related to the school activists, related the Vanguarding school activity and Revolutionary Youth Union school activity (MoE website).

In another rule for the education, the Ministry controls the other school, the law for Organizing private educational institutions for pre-university education Number: 887/843 (4/8) on April 1, 2013, we find in the chapter one article 1 that: State Curricula: The curricula that the Ministry sets for official government schools, with all their stages and branches. Informal curricula: curricula recognized by their countries and taught by these countries, or internationally recognized curricula and taught by recognized international organizations (MoE website).

Also, the Article (23): Licensing procedures for a private educational institution that teaches non-formal curricula, in its paragraph: First, the content:

a- It should not conflict with the educational policy in the Syrian Arab Republic.

B - The content should not conflict with Arab values, norms, and traditions in society.

C- The content should not offend the monotheistic religions.

d- The content should not offend Arab history.

E- It should not include racial, religious, sectarian, or sectarian discrimination (MoE website).

Article (46): Private educational institutions are obligated to teach the official curricula (books or vocabulary).

Article (47): the paragraph: 1. Private educational institutions are obligated to implement the official curricula and study plans approved in the corresponding official schools, and their teaching, studies and exams shall be in Arabic, except for a foreign language subject (MoE website).

Article (51): Private educational institutions that teach non-official curricula (the joint sector - embassies or international bodies) are obligated to teach the Arabic Language and social sciences (history, geography, and civic education) approved in the official curricula (books or vocabulary)

in the Arabic Language for Syrian students or from in their judgment, and teaching the Arabic Language to its non-Syrian students, with no less than two study sessions per week (MoE website)

In Chapter Twelve: Violations and Measures Taken in their Responsibility, we will find the role of this Article in the education system of the de facto system in the northwest Syria and northeast Syria; the article 101, third paragraph:

- 1- Violation of the approved lesson plan or curricula.
- 2- Circulating or teaching books without prior approval from the Ministry.

Also, in the fourth paragraph:

2. Changing the educational stage in the institution without obtaining prior approval from the Ministry.
3. Moving the institution's headquarters without obtaining prior approval from the Ministry.
4. Imbalance of the private educational institution's financial situation, which was proven by investigation.
5. The low level of education in the private educational institution, as evidenced by the investigation.
6. Proving the spread of moral corruption or the promotion of national discord in the private educational institution.
7. Proving the Dissemination of religious, sectarian, or sectarian discord in the private educational institution (MoE website).

Article (111): A private educational institution may not be called a name that denotes any religious, sectarian, sectarian, or ethnic affiliation. It is required that the name of the educational institution be registered with the Directorate of Industrial and Commercial Property Protection of the Ministry of Economy and Trade (MoE website).

Article (112): Private educational institutions may not be part of or affiliated with a political or religious institution or association (MoE website).

Article (119): The private educational institution is obligated to keep the following approved administrative records in Arabic, whether they are paper or computer records.

Also, Legislative Decree No. 15 of 2008 established the "Public Printing Corporation":

This legislative decree has become effective since 1/7/2008. The most worrying thing about this decree is that it places the process of printing government newspapers under the management and control of the Ministry of Education, where Article 2 of it states: "It occurs in the Syrian Arab Republic as a public institution with An economic character called the "Public Establishment for Printing" enjoys legal personality and financial and administrative independence and is linked to the Minister of Education and its centre is in the governorate of Damascus. Article 3 states, "The Foundation aims to: A- Print the textbook and distributes it to it branches in the governorates and print all publications of the Ministries of Education and Information. "(MoE website)

Moreover, through the experience, the party organizations grant the high school graduates a total of up to 25 to be added to their available total to apply to higher branches in universities, and they also have a special status in obtaining government jobs (the researcher).

The Ministry of High Education (MoHE)

It starts with its Vision: A comprehensive national educational and research system that achieves excellence, proficiency and quality through building and investing human resources and knowledge as a strategic wealth and provides the infrastructure for knowledge transfer, settlement, generation, and Dissemination to ensure the achievement of the State's goals and the development of the Syrian Arab person.

Furthermore, in the Executive Regulations of the Universities Organizing Law promulgated by Decree 250 of 2006, in section 2 (Personnel), chapter 2(Working hours of scientific workers), in the article 41, it mentioned that the member of bath party (- Members of the national and regional leadership of the party, members of the central leadership of the National Progressive Front, and the secretary of the party branch, have work hour there.) ((MoHE website)

In section 3 (Study plans and student affairs) the, chapter 6 (discipline), the article 123: Any violation of university laws and regulations and the various student activities carried out by the National Union of Syrian Students is considered a violation that requires disciplinary measures to

be taken in the Distributing flyers, issuing wall newspapers, placing advertisements in any form, or collecting signatures inside the university or its attached places without prior permission from the university president or the National Union of Syrian Students (MoHE website).

Moreover, The National Union of Syrian Students is a well-known organization that includes students from Syrian public and private universities as well as higher education institutions. It has branches both inside and outside of Syria and is a weapon of the Ba'th party in higher education. The union was officially established on April 23, 1963, based on the excellent student struggle heritage founded by Hafez al-Assad. At the forefront of the union's goals is consolidating the spirit of the student masses' affiliation to the homeland and loyalty to its leader. Depending on the report, Maher al-Assad's security arm suppresses university students (National Union of Syrian Students website)

In the Legislative Decree 36 of 2001 regulating private educational institutions for the post-secondary stage, we find in the article 8: The institution enjoys academic freedom provided that it is consistent with the laws and educational policy objectives in the Syrian Arab Republic, also in article 10 paragraph C: The objectives of the institution that must be consistent with the objectives and policy of higher education in the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Higher Institute of Languages was established in 1995 as a centre for language education and then turned into the Higher Institute of Languages under Decree No. (384) dated 10/15/2006 as one of the educational institutions in the higher education sector in the field of language education.

The institute offers different Languages (most is international Language), but there is no local language, especially Kurdish Language as Internal Regulation in article 9 ((MoHE website).)

However, the professional practice office at the Higher Institute of Languages, which is part of the institute, offers paid Teacher training courses for all languages at the institute, including the Kurdish Language. Currently, two centres at Damascus university and Aleppo university offer classes for teaching the Kurdish Language (Higher Institute of Languages website)

The Ministry of Culture (MoC)

The Syrian Arab Republic's Ministry of Culture is the government department in charge of handling cultural matters in Syria.

Under Jamal Abdulnassar's leadership, the Ministry of Culture and National Guidance was founded in 1958 after Egypt's unification. It exercised the General Directorate of Advertising and News powers related to the supervision of cinematic films (screening and directing) and the control of publications in partnership with the relevant ministries and public administrations. (Ministry of culture)

However, it has continued under this name till 2014; as we see in its task and efforts, it is working on the Arabic Language and culture with denied other cultures in the country. Furthermore, it covered other minorities with Arabic cover. (Book, history, theatre, songs traditions.)

The concept of culture and the orientation of official cultural institutions in Syria since the 1970s have been directly linked to the official political discourse and national conflicts in the region. Moreover, the Syrian cultural field politicians deny the existence of Syrian culture and consider it part of a more comprehensive Arab culture that constitutes the incubating vessel for history and the present. (Ministry of culture)

There are many primary legal texts in the cultural field: Art 21, Art 23/1; also, there are legislative texts contained in the Constitution of the Ba'th party that had controlled the cultural life in Syria as mentioned above: Art 41, Art 44. (Ministry of culture)

The essential document of cultural legislation in Syria is the internal regulations of the Ministry of Culture, and the internal regulations of the directorates, general directorates, and their affiliated and subsidiary bodies.

In the preamble of the fundamental law for the Ministry, recognizing the official Language is Arabic, The Ministry's primary goal is to spread knowledge and culture among the populace and to spread the message of Arab civilization, after which it must point people in this direction. (here is mean Arabic pan), as once the current minister mentioned: "I do not see that there is a thing called Syrian culture, I see something called Arab culture, that is why you see me haunted by the obsessions of our Arab writers from Tangiers to Salalah. I am not only interested in what the Syrian creators produce; I read daily what the Egyptians, Yemenis, Moroccans and Gulf people write because we are all in one ocean, and we draw from one source, which is the authentic Arab culture. Moreover, because we are concerned with national thought and spreading the culture of resistance, the limits of our cultural aspirations are far beyond the geopolitical space". (Ministry of culture)

the Ministry has relations with different institutions and ministries; for example, it has relations with the Ba'ath Vanguard organization and Revolutionary Youth Union

In the 4s section, 3rd paragraph, the internal system refers to the Kurds, Circassians, and Armenians' cultural diversity and minorities in Syria. However, it goes back to confirm that the official institutions in the State seek to promote this diversity, neither externally nor internally.

In the Art 4/3/1: Arabic is the official Language in the Syrian, and it is, in fact, the dominant Language in artistic work, based on clear political orientations to support the Arabic Language and even directives to adopt Standard Arabic, not the local Language, in all official media and other arts.

In Art 4/3/2: The issue of minorities' access to cultural activities is not one of the themes and questions cultural policymakers pose in Syria.

The other instituted related to the culture ministry is the Syrian General Organization of Books, which does not mention other languages to print in Syria. (Ministry of culture)

Moreover, when someone searches in The Asad National Library, he will find a few books related to Kurds in general and no book about Syrian Kurds or only a few dictionaries in the Kurdish Language.

another task for the Ministry related to the Constitution of the Ba'th party:

Article 2/B-2: Guiding the people in a national (Arabism) direction.

Also, in article 2/b- 7: Reviving the historic Arabic scientific, literary, and research traditions while protecting them and incorporating contemporary technologies, arts, and sciences. (Ministry of culture)

The Ministry of Information (Media)

The intellectual, legal, and administrative structure of the Syrian State is based on the foundations of a strong state that controls and controls all societal sectors through government agencies in light of a state of identification between the concept of the State and the ruling party created by Article 8 of the Constitution, despite some changes that have appeared on the This structure in the recent period, but it is still the view of the media - even with the presence of private media - as belonging to the State and the party and its function is limited to explaining the policies of the State and the

party and their positions and mobilizing the masses to support them, as the Syrian Ministry of Information system stipulates In Article 3, "The mission of the Ministry of Information is to use all media to enlighten public opinion, consolidate Arab nationalist trends in the country and support relations with Arab countries and friendly countries in order with the principles of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and state policy." Through its governmental institutions and executive bodies, the Syrian state controls all aspects of the media process and all stages. The only development that occurred during the period covered by the report was the increase in this control, as it prevented the presidency of The Council of Ministers, all public authorities, popular bodies and organizations, and natural and legal persons may carry out statistical research or issue any bulletin containing statistical information or figures, except after the approval of the Central Bureau of Statistics, starting from the date of 17/11/2008:

The State's monopoly on the distribution of publications through the Public Corporation for the Distribution of Publications established Legislative Decree No. 42 of 1975.

– The State's monopoly on advertising through the Arab Advertising Agency "Declaration", a problem since 1963

The State's monopoly on news through the Syrian news agency, SANA

Monopolizing the granting and withdrawal of licenses by giving the absolute right to that to the Prime Minister upon the proposal of the Minister of Information.

They control administrative procedures and executive regulations through Resolution No. (297 of 2001) issued by the Minister of Information.

Lack of law for the right to access information.

The Ministry is responsible for many other institutions (general organization of radio and Tv-Syria, Syrian Arab News Agency, Arab advertising organization, G.E. for television and radio production, Syrian Publications Distribution Company, and Al- WAHDA Foundation for Press, Printing and Publication) where the minister must be a member in the Ba'th Party. (Ministry of Information)

In The Media Law and the Internal Regulations of the Ministry of Information, the article 3/1 (Freedom of expression and essential freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution of the Syrian Arab

Republic, as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and relevant international conventions and article 12: "The media are not allowed to publish:

- 1- Any content that would prejudice national unity and national security, offend the monotheistic religions and religious beliefs, or incite sectarian or sectarian strife.
- 2- Any content that incites the commission of crimes, acts of violence and terrorism or incites hatred and racism.
- 4- Everything prohibited from publishing in the General Penal Code and the legislation in force, and everything the courts prevent from publishing.
- 5- Everything that affects the symbols of the State.

Furthermore, Code 50 for 2001, the first section the articles 6,7,8,9 and 10 said: The Minister may prevent the entry or circulation of foreign publications if they affect national sovereignty, disturb security, or contradict public morals.

Also, the article 12 grants legal the paragraph A, the seven conditions (the Language or languages which the platforms will edit) (Ministry of Information)

There were some exceptions depending on the situation in Syria; for example, an interviewer that he asked did not mention to him, or his publisher house said, during his work as founder of the publisher house, he published different titles related to Kurdish issues, even he published some books in the Kurdish Language, but when he sent those books to Kurdish areas, they were confiscated by security agents, he continued, sometime in the International Book Fair his books confiscated again, even he got the accreditation. He assured that the security intelligence was the main prevention of publishing Kurdish books in Syria, even though there are no legal laws to permit that, but by his talent in convention and admissible of the title, it could be passed some title and get the approval of oversight committee (Ministry of Information)

The Ministry of Local Administration

It is the central administration that supervises the work of the governorates and municipal councils. The Ministry of Local Administration was established after the issuance of the Local Administration Law in 1971 to concentrate Responsibility in the hands of segments of the people and involve local authorities in working with the central authorities as to the main vessel that

regulates popular participation in various fields, including the field of culture, where administrative units are responsible for multiple sectors Include culture. The organizational structure of each governorate includes an executive office concerned with cultural affairs, celebrations and festivals and administratively supervising the cultural centres in the governorate, knowing that they are technically affiliated with the Ministry of Culture, which creates duplication in the work of these centres. (Ministry of Local Administration)

We find that the Ministry of Local Administration during the governorate office changed the historical and cultural identity by changing the names of the original villages and towns with Arabic names.

Additional Tools to control the Language

Aside from the government institution, President Bashar al-Assad adopted Republican Decree No. 4 of 2007, which includes the formation of the Arabic Language Empowerment Committee, whose mission is to develop a national action plan for the empowerment of the Arabic Language. Through the formation of follow-up committees on ministries, state institutions, government organizations, and non-governmental organizations (Alsyid 2013: 230). Other tasks for this committee were renewal the of Law 139 in 1952, which added new instructions to it: the law includes twenty articles stating that the Arabic Language is the Official Language of the State in all institutions of the public, private and public sectors, popular organizations, associations, and non-governmental organizations, and that teaching and education in all educational stages is in Arabic (Alsyid 2018: 21).

The law stipulated that no national educational institution could hold a teaching certificate or a license to instruct in a foreign language, and foreign schools were required to teach Arabic as a language of instruction in each year of study as well as to teach about Syria and the history of the Arab world. It is not permissible to name shops, companies, and national institutions other than Arabic. Ancient as Aramaic, Syriac, and Assyrian rule of Arabic.

The law included proof of the trademark in Arabic names.

The law indicated imposing penalties on violators of the law after warning them.

In July 2012, President signed Law No. 19, (the Counterterrorism Law), then followed by Law No. 22, to establish the Counterterrorism Court, The court is responsible with prosecuting non-combatants and combatants for "terrorism"-related offenses. (Counterterrorism Law)

The new law to fight terrorism defines terrorism as follows:

Every act that attempts to frighten the public contributes to "funding terrorism" by either directly or indirectly giving money, weapons, ammunition, explosives, communication tools, and information, or "other things" intending to use them to carry out a terrorist act.(Counterterrorism Law)

In Syria, there are a few different security organizations: the Political Security Directorate, the General Intelligence Directorate, sometimes known as State Security (Amn al-Dawla), and the Military Intelligence. Typically, these organizations—instead of the ordinary police—deal with people engaged in what the authorities view as political activity, such as those who support political and cultural rights.

According to Human Rights Watch, the following are the criminal laws that are most frequently utilized against Kurdish language rights advocates in Syria since they are so broadly drafted and available to the prosecuting authorities there:

Article 267: any "acts, speech, writings, or other means to cut off part of Syrian land to join it to another country".

Article 285 ("issuing statements that weaken national sentiment or awaken racial or sectarian tensions").

Article 307: any "acts, writings, or speech that incite sectarian, racial or religious strife").

also, the articles: 288, 307, 335 and 336 from Syria Penal Code (HRW 2009)

The Arabization policy towards the Kurds in Syria

The Kurds have seen a certain level of "linguistic Arabization," whereby Syrian authorities' prohibitions on the use of the Kurdish language prevent Kurds in Syria from speaking it (Tejel 2009: 82)

The features of the Syrian Government's desire to Arabize Kurdish names, and to write down the names of newborns with Arab names and surnames, began at the end of 1939 when the General Directorate of Souls in Damascus took strict legal measures regarding Syrians who did not have papers proving their identities in the personal status department (Mirani 2009: 14). At that time, the Syrian Government decided to refer the violators of this decision to the Magistrate's Courts. They were forced to register their names so that the newborn's names would be written in Arabic, not in Kurdish. However, it can be pointed since the independence of Syria, On December 22, 1952, Legislative Decree 179 was issued, changing the names of the Syrian governorates, as the name of the governors of Al-Jazirah was changed to Al-Hasakah Governorate, and the name of Jabal Al-Akrad District in Aleppo Governorate was changed to Afrin District (Mirani 2008: 21). When Adib Shishakli came to power, however, minorities had to deal with escalating pan-Arab animosity. He made a decree in the early 1950s (code 139 on November 16, 1952) that included encouraging the use of Arabic in the environment by banning the use of foreign names in public and private settings; but, once the Pan-Arab Ba'ath Party rose to power, the situation altered to worse. The Arabization of all communities under the framework of a single nation was the primary tenet of its ideology. The Pan-Arab language policy has negative effects on Syria's linguistic minority as well. (Bednarowicz 2014: 7).

Since the 1950s, Syria's successive administrations have called for Arab nationalism and, as a result, have actively suppressed other minorities, particularly Kurdish identity, which they saw as a threat to the country's unity as an Arab one. For example, the government conducted a special census in al-Hasakeh province in northeast Syria in 1962 (as indicated in chapter 2) on the guise that numerous Kurds had crossed illegally from Turkey (code 93 on Aug 1962). The Kurds were forced to provide evidence of their residency in Syria before 1945 or risk losing their citizenship. The census was performed by the government in a single day without providing adequate notice or information to the populace; as a result, some people had their citizenship revoked (it was believed that there were 120,000 Kurds and dubbed Turk's foreigners; However, in 1969, code 276 altered the name to "Syrian Foreigners" or "Hasaka Foreigners," rendering them stateless and subject to a variety of challenges, including difficulty finding employment and accessing government services.

The number of stateless Kurds in Syria has increased since then (later in 2011, with another code, they were awarded citizenship); the order was wholly in violation of the laws and constitutions in effect in Syria at the time because children of stateless men are also considered stateless. (HRW 2009).

Talab Hilal, a former head of the Hasaka Secret Services, issued a study on Jazira on November 12, 1963 as a security report to the authorities, who regarded it as a manual for action or source of inspiration in handling the Kurdish problem. Al-Hilal denied the existence of the Kurdish people, The report's author said that the Kurdish people didn't exist due to their lack of "history of civilization; language or ethnic heritage." he urged for a rise in repressive tactics in all areas in order to eradicate any traces of Kurdish identity from Jazira, because the Kurds were "our enemies," as he said, He saw the Kurdish issue as a cancerous disease that had spread throughout the Arab nation, and The only solution that "we can effectively apply is cut". The report proposed a dozen measures to eliminate the "Kurdish danger," including: (1) relocating Kurds from their homelands to the interior; (2) denying them access to education; (3) turning over "wanted" Kurds to Turkey; (4) denying them employment opportunities; (5) anti-Kurdish propaganda; and (6) expelling Kurdish religious clerics who would be replaced by Arabs; (7) the implementation of a "divide-and-rule" strategy against the Kurds; (8) Arab colonization of Kurdish lands; (9) militarization of the "northern Arab belt" and deportation of Kurds from this region; (10) the establishment of "collective farms" for the new Arab settlers; (11) the denial of the right to vote or hold office to anyone lacking Arabic proficiency; and (12) the denial of citizenship to any non-Arab (Vanli 1968; Tejel 2009: 60-61; Gunter 2014: 23)

The Kurds have been regarded by Ba'ath since 1963 as a "foreign" population that poses a threat to the country. All Syrian ethnic and religious groups that questioned the idea of the unity of the Arab Nation were also endangered by the Ba'ath Party's constitution. In addition, they conducted an Arabization campaign in which they changed the Kurdish names of towns, streets, and buildings to their Arabic equivalents, outlawed Kurdish publications and media, forbade the teaching of Kurdish in schools, and prohibited the registration of newborns under Kurdish names. Additionally, those who identify as Kurds in Syria or call for their cultural and political rights face persecution, incarceration, and other forms of abuse, including the imprisonment of women and children for expressing their opinions, in this side; in an interview with one Syrian Kurdish political

activist, he narrated that, his father in 1964-1965 arrested for six months, because the police caught one man had a piece of paper written in the Kurdish Language, and when the police asked that man, from where he got that, he mentioned to the activist's father (Shamdeen Interview), also in 1967, all references to the Kurdish minority in Syria were removed from school geography textbooks, and government registry authorities started urging Kurds not to give their children Kurdish first names. (HRW 2009)

In 1970, after the coup of Hafiz As'ad 1970, by asserting that "The people in the Syrian Arab territory are a member of the Arab nation," they emphasized Arab nationalism and marginalized other ethnic identities while avoiding any mention of particularistic inclinations. The Syrian Ba'ath Party decided to advocate "the rewriting of Arab history" as a result in 1975. The preparation committee announced the guiding principle of rewriting Arab history and avoiding racism, extremism, and confessionalism as a result of this project. Because of this, certain Kurdish "heroes," like Salah al-Din Ayyubi, have gained national recognition without making any explicit claims about their racial roots. (Tejel 2009: 62-63). The example of Newroz, or New Year's Day, to the Kurds, on March 21, served as the most prominent illustration of the appropriation of Kurdish symbols. Through songs and dances, especially, this celebration evolved into a sort of Kurdish nationalist ceremony. After numerous incidents involving the Kurds and Syrian authorities during the administration of Hafiz al-As'ad, the Regime officially banned this event and tried to overshadow it by scheduling it to fall on a Mother's Day holiday. (Ibid: 64).

The Kurdish Language did not receive any relief under the reign of Hafiz al-As'ad. While Armenians and Assyrians had private schools, clubs, and cultural organizations where their own languages could be taught, the teaching of this language remained illegal. The public school became, for the Kurds, not only a center of Ba'athist indoctrination but also a place of Arabization during the 1970s. A strict monitoring system was put in place, and "spies" were used to prevent the kids from speaking Kurdish to one another. Children learned that extreme "defiance" could result in physical punishment. Measures of legal compulsion were strengthened under the Ba'athist dictatorship, forcing Kurdish writers and editors to have their books printed in Lebanon before they could be transported back into Syria illegally. (Ibid: 63; H.R.W. 2009; Mella Darwish 2017).

Most Syrian Kurds express their political activism through their culture and cultural activities rather than by adhering to political ideas. However, any cultural or political manifestation of

Kurdish nationalism that the state would view as endangering the integrity of the country or as an act of resistance against the state's authorities is likely to be met with great sensitivity by the government and state security forces. The government responds angrily to Kurdish cultural events because of this (ACCORD 2010: 40).

It is challenging to discern between political and non-political activities since the government often views Kurdish cultural initiatives as political. The authorities politicize everyday people who participate in Kurdish cultural events when they forbid them. As a result, those participating in Kurdish cultural events may be persecuted by the government and charged with a crime. Language, flags, dancing, and specific colours being prohibited causes the issue to become politicized, triggering fresh responses from the populace (Ibid: 41).

The Kurds may be subject to arbitrary imprisonment or arrest, particularly if they are accused of participating in activities the government views as a danger to state security. Concerning repression against Kurdish artists, such as authors, dancers and singers, the matter is whether or not the authorities perceive such activities to be political and especially separatist. If the authorities believe that the individual's actions are political, they will detain them and bring them before a court. Their people have occasionally been jailed for having Kurdish books on them (Ibid: 41).

Repression will follow any action the Syrian government views as political, regardless of how high-profile or low-profile it may be. For example, the government viewed the flying of a Kurdish flag as a political act. The security services would be alerted to Kurds participating in Kurdish cultural, artistic, political, and social activities. However, since it is always possible for the security services to detain a person without any legitimate justification, no specific action or pattern of behaviour is necessary to be put under pressure by the authorities. For example, the security services may utilize gatherings of three to four people at a person's house as a pretext to make an arrest (Ibid: 41).

There is an extraordinary degree of arbitrariness in the system regarding how the authorities will respond to those who express their Kurdish ancestry; therefore, it is impossible to predict how they would respond to Kurdish cultural expressions. Because they take part in Kurdish cultural events, Kurdish artists are being targeted, for example, in their homes. For instance, four musicians were detained by Syrian security forces for singing Kurdish songs during an al-Malkiyah wedding (Ibid: 42).

The authorities view involvement in cultural groups, like as dance, play, or folkloric groups, that don traditional Kurdish clothing and take part in funerals or other social rites as political, and as such they prohibit it. Since the authorities disapprove of Kurdish culture in Syria, journalists who write about it sometimes receive angry responses. In addition, the Syrian government targets publishers of publications concerning the Kurdish language or culture, and in some instances, these publishers have received severe fines or even four-month prison sentences. A group of teachers in Qamishli created private Kurdish language instruction for children and adults of private classes. However, the organization was banned, and some members were detained and tried in front of the Military Court (Ibid: 43).

Patterns of Syrian restriction against Syrian Kurds

Since it is a fundamental component of Kurdish culture, the government has been focusing on music. After Adib al-Shishakli was overthrown in 1954, Kurdish gramophone records and publications were confiscated, and their proprietors were imprisoned. The playing and distribution of Kurdish music and movies were prohibited by an order Najar al-'Attar, the cultural minister, issued in 1987; however, enforcement of this policy has loosened over time, and Kurdish music is now accepted in Kurdish communities and portions of urban centers. Even Nevertheless, the music available for purchase is still restricted because distributors and retailers still risk being imprisoned for selling Kurdish music, which may be seen as political or nationalist. Additionally, Decree 1865/S/25 from December 1989 forbade the singing of non-Arabic music at weddings and festivities. (Yelidiz 2005).

However, numerous toponymic Arabization directives have been published since the 1970s as a blatant indication of the Regime's intention to eradicate all non-Arab cultural and historical presence in Syria. Below is the sample of decrees that urbanized the Kurdish area and forbade the use of Kurdish as procedures for national melting and the denial of diversity and pluralism:

- Communiqué from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers No. 95 / B for the year 1970 stipulating to reduce the tyranny of foreign names in public and private places

- Where, According to Resolution 15 of 1971 issued by the Minister of Local Administration, the names of the villages of Amuda district and Qamishli district changed from their non-Arab (Kurdish) names to Arabic (including 90 villages),
- Resolution 580, issued by the Minister of Local Administration No. 496 on December 23, 1975, changed the names of villages and farms in the Aleppo Governorate.
- Based on administrative orders, 136 Kurdish villages and towns were Arabized in Al-Hasakah Governorate on 2/15/78
- Circular from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers to the concerned authorities in 1980 on the Arabization of the names of existing stores in the country
- On December 20, 1997, another resolution was to change the village's name to Hasaka.
- Based on the decision of the Aleppo Governorate Center District Council and the Decision of the Executive Office of the Aleppo Provincial Council No. 300, dated 3/23/1977:
- The decision of the Minister of Tourism for the year 1980 includes the selection of Arabic names only for tourist facilities and prohibits foreign names
- The Ministry of Local Administration also issued the communication No. (13/61 / A.D.) on April 26, 1987, not allowing Kurdish shop owners to name their shops other than Arabic names and that naming shop requires the approval of the Political Security
- The Governor of Al-Hasakah also issued Circular No. (5259) in November 1989: that despite the numerous instructions, including Circular No. (2013/Q/25) on October 11, 1986, some workers in the official authorities still use non-Arabic languages in their communications with Each other and in their dealings with the auditors who are present during the official working hours, and since this contradicts the provisions of the laws and instructions issued in this regard, all workers in the official departments and branches of institutions, companies, banks, city and town councils and other public sector entities are requested not to use the Arabic Language in communication, The directors of these authorities are charged with supervising the implementation of the decision, and the police command is also requested to circulate to all units to prevent appearances and non-Arabic songs that are held at parties and weddings and to take penalties against violators.

-Interior Minister Circular No. 122 of October 1998 prohibits naming newborns with Kurdish names.

- Based on the Hasaka Governorate Center District Council No. 36, dated 10/2/1998: Change the name of 97 villages.

- Al-Hasakah Governor's letter No. 276/b/ dated 3/14/1996 stipulates the necessity of closing shops with non-Arabic names.

- Al-Hasakah Governor Circular No. 7014/H/ dated 10/03/1996 and based on the letter of the Baath Party branch in the governorate No. 380/S/ dated 9/29/1996 prohibiting speaking in other than Arabic

- Decision of the Governor of Aleppo No. 786 dated 4/20/2000 based on Political Security request No. 1999 dated 4-10-2000, which stipulates the necessity of closing Kurdish tapes, cassettes, and video stores in the Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhoods

- This decision is circulated through the Director of Education in Al-Hasakah, No. 410/2, dated 27/7/1998: Change the name of 209 schools to match the names of the new villages

-Legislative Decree No. 55 on regulating private educational institutions for pre-university education, issued on 09-02-2004, had defined the concept of a linguistic informant as a private educational institution that conducts courses to teach "non-local" foreign languages, thus extending a legislative "safety" network that prevents Teaching local languages (inclusive Kurdish) in language laboratories. Note that this decree was overridden by the opening of the Institute for Teaching the Aramaic (Syriac) Language in the town of Maaloula years ago, and the Syrian Government turned a blind eye to teaching the Armenian Language in schools in Damascus and Aleppo in monastic schools or affiliated to the Armenian Archbishops in both cities (Haci 2012).

For more detail on the policy of Arabizing the names of Kurdish villages and towns, many studies appeared in the Arabic Language; a study issued by the Center for Kurdish Studies at the University of Dohuk in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq entitled: "The Policy of National Discrimination and the Government's Arabization Campaigns in Syria" in 2008, It also published

many statements from the Kurdish parties in Syria within their party bulletins documenting these practices, for example, a pamphlet from the Kurdish Democratic Alliance in Syria in the 1990s.

As Yildiz discussed, When Human Rights Watch petitioned the Syrian government to address the above-mentioned concerns regarding the Kurdish language in 1996, the government only addressed the issue of the language's prohibition in the workplace:

"The Syrian Constitution provide that Syria is part of the greater Arab Nation and that Arabic is its official language. It texts further that the ban on foreign languages in the workplace is not limited to the Kurdish Language but includes all languages other than Arabic" (Yeldiz 2005: 118).

language rights Denied the Kurds in Syria since 1962 Table (4)

Language rights	Syria	examples
Using the name of the language in writing	denial of the right	Interior Minister Circular No. 122 of October 1998
Speaking the language in public e.g. on the street, in bazars	denial of the right	Decision of the Governor of Aleppo No. 786 dated 4/20/2000
Listening to recorded music and radio in the language	denial of the right	Decision of the Governor of Aleppo No. 786 dated 4/20/2000
Production of movies and theatrical performances	denial of the right	
Owning, sale and purchase of books, journal, and records	denial of the right	
Circulation of print and audiovisuals in public libraries	denial of the right	
Broadcasting in the language	denial of the right	
Writing and printing	denial of the right	
Native-tongue education in primary schools	denial of the right D	It is banned by different articles in constitution and by

Secondary schools	D	ministry also, Legislative
Higher education	D	Decree No. 55 in 2004
Use of language in local administration	denial of the right	The Governor of Al-Hasakah also issued Circular No. (5259) in November 1989
Forming language academies, literary associations, ect..	denial of right	

As mentioned above, the Syrian Constitution did not recognize any other minorities present in Syria. Those constitutions were characterized by Arabism, reduced all nationalities to Arab nationalism, and did not recognize the existence of others, such as the Kurdish minority that was targeted in a systematic process in its identity, culture, and Language. The entire Syrian people with an Arab character. Every Syrian citizen must work to bring about the complete unification of the Arab nation or he will be in violation of the Constitution.

Moreover, the Syrian authority threatened any Kurdish activist, the Penal Code of the Syrian judicial, has many articles, for instance, some of the most used articles of the Syrian Penal Code against activists and political workers, even ordinary people:

Article 267 prescribes a penalty of imprisonment for any Syrian who has attempted acts, speeches, writings, or otherwise to sever part of Syrian territory into a State

Article 278 orders a penalty of imprisonment for Any person who violates the measures taken by the State during the war and any person who presents works, writings or speeches in Syria.

Article 285 prescribes a penalty of imprisonment for Anyone who has made a call to weaken national sentiment or wake up racist nudities.

Article 292 prescribes a penalty of imprisonment for those Who tried to skimp on state sovereignty as part of Syrian territory.

In addition, to this as Yunus Abakay argued in his Article, (Subjects in Contested Spaces: Securitization of Kurdish Language in Syria): The goal of the State's political body in reaching

such a performance ability was not limited to concealing the reality of repressive and ideological devices, but also extended to normalizing them, so that it performs its role through the intervention of a few completely ordinary individuals to correct some physical behavior such as speaking the Kurdish Language, or imposing actions or prevent it from happening. Within the framework of this game, individuals played the role of a bearer of power, by taking actions directed towards the actions of others in private areas based on the use of disciplinary discourses on the one hand, and by acting on the other hand, in accordance with some strategic rules to produce truth and leading to the emergence of collective intolerance Prejudice and to normalize (Abakay 2022: 97).

In addition, According to Human Rights Watch, the Syrian government apply Article 288 against any Syrian Kurdish individual, and the security services participate in what the authorities view as political activity, such as promoting political and cultural rights. (HRW 2009).

The Policy Language for other Actors in Syria

Out of the state and its institution policy, many sides had a role or still evoked the demands of Kurds to language rights; for instance, in the 1950s, with the expansion of the Syrian Communist Party among the Kurds of Syria, many Kurdish youths involved in the Party, and that timed the leader of SCP was Khaled Bakdash, he was Kurdish in origin and knowing the Kurdish language, when the branches of Party in Hassaka and Afrin asked to publish the bulletin of Party in the Kurdish language like Arabic and Armenian language, the party committee refused, and that was the main reason for those guys to leave the Party and joint to establish Kurdish Party, where the SCP adopted Arabs-pan and Arabic language (Hassaf 2017: 110- 113), in contrary in the 1980s, Syria's Labor Communist Party, which was acting as opposed Party, adopted the Indigenous peoples' right to self-determination while considering the Kurds one of them, that action reflects on the Party (LCP bulletin 1985; Dhahir 2020).

However, with the new millennium, and the new President of Syria in 2000, the new situation of Syrian policy reflected the internal situation of Syrian society where it gave hope for change in the situation, especially in what was called Damascus Spring; also, other actors in Syria involved to the Kurdish issue in Syria, bellow it will look over those projects that treat with it.

Before 2011:

The Damascus Declaration

In October 2005, the Syrian opposition released a statement of unanimity known as the Damascus Declaration (DD). It urged for "peaceful, incremental" transformation "built on the accord, and based on discussion and acknowledgement of the other" and attacked the Syrian government of the Assad dynasty as "authoritarian, dictatorial, and cliquish." (Carnegie web; Draege 2016)

The Declaration, which called for a "manage democratic solution to the Kurdish issue in Syria respecting nationality rights, culture, learning the national language, and the other constitutional, political, social, and legal rights," was signed by the majority of opposition individuals and parties.(Ibid)

The National Salvation Front in Syria

The other project that collects some opposition parties of Syria, The National Salvation Front in Syria, was a Syrian opposition political party founded and based in Belgium. Where the Kurds were also between them, only one sentence was mentioned (The rights of religious, ethnic, or sectarian minorities are protected.); otherwise, nothing was mentioned for the subsequent phases (Landis 2009).

the National Syrian Coalition

After the uprising in Syria, where the people sought to change to democracy state, they declared many statements, and the Kurds demanded in each meeting their rights; the tracker of the details of these meetings finds that it was the reason for the distinction between the Kurdish opposition and the opposition in the result there was a rare response to the demands, we can list them here:

the National Salvation conference was held in Istanbul in July 2011; the Kurdish representatives attended the conference only to walk out in protest of the absence of any seats for Kurdish representatives and against the use of the name of the Syrian Arab Republic, which denied the existence of other national groups in Syria (Allessop 2016: 200)

the Syrian National Council to establish an opposition body of the Syrian uprising, the refusals to consider relinquishing the inclusion of the word 'Arab' in the name and Identity of the state left Kurdish political organizations frustrated and excluded, as Kurds, from participation in efforts to

form a united representative opposition body, and the comments by leading members of the Syrian opposition that had the effect of alienating the Kurds, On October 26, Burhan Ghalioun, a leader of the SNC, said in an interview that:

“Of course, Syria is an Arab state . . . there is no discussion about this . . . there is no debate that Syria is an Arab country because the majority of the population are Arabs . . . The discussion is not about the Identity of Syria. Kurds . . . you cannot tell the Syrian Arabs that you are not Arabs” (Ibid)

In the Syrian Opposition Conference, The Syrian Opposition Conference, which was sponsored by the League of Arab States and convened in Cairo on March 7, 2012, endorsed a shared political vision for the characteristics of the transitional era, even though the draft was mentioned in the National Pact document enclosed: The Syrian state acknowledges the presence of Kurdish nationalism among its citizens, as well as their identity and legal national rights, in accordance with international covenants and charters and within the context of the country's unity. In Syria, Kurdish nationalism is regarded as a fundamental aspect of the Syrian people. Similar to the Syrian Turkmen and Syriac Assyrian nationalities, the state likewise recognizes their existence, identity, and national rights. They are seen as essential to Syrian society. (Carnegie 2013). however in, the final version dropped and cited: "It abolishes discriminatory decrees and laws against the Kurdish, Turkmen, Assyrian nationalities and any other spectrum of the Syrian people", and "Eliminate the effects of unfair discriminatory policies and laws against Kurdish nationalism in Syria and its repercussions", (Carnegie 2013) and that led the Kurdish representatives in the conference to withdrawal (Aljazeera 2013)

The Syrian High Negotiations Committee released a roadmap for Syria's democratic transition in September 2016. The formulation of the indicated transitional plan:

"Syria part of the Arab World, and Arabic is the official language of the state," (SHNC Documents 2019), in this way, the plan offered the future Syria legitimacy by giving preference to some religious and cultural groups over others.

In response to this Declaration, one of the Kurdish media platforms, at a series of seminars to cover the opinions of Kurds about it, the unanimously most of the representatives rejected that, and even

they asked the Kurdish parties who joint the Declaration to withdraw from the body (welatime 2016).

During the negotiation between the Kurdish National Council and the National Coalition of the Revolutionary Forces and the Syrian Opposition to reach an agreement and let Kurds join the body of opposition, where the Kurdish National Council in Syria called for the abolition of the policies and laws applicable to Syrian Kurds, including the ban on the use of the Kurdish language and the establishment of Kurdish schools, and compensation for those affected so farm both sides in Aug 2013 reached an agreement concluded: The National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces affirms its commitment to constitutional recognition of the Kurdish national Identity and recognizing the national rights of the Kurdish people within unity of the Syrian land and people (Carnegie 2013).

Later, during the period of conflict, the NCSROF renewed its speech; in this context, in the Syrian Revolution Charter on Human Rights and Public Freed, there is no explicit reference to the ethnicity of the state, and the word off (Arabs) dropped; however, it comes like this:

In the introduction: Right without discrimination of race, religion, gender, or colour...", it adopted the constitution of 1950 as a milestone for its legal.

Moreover, even though there is not an explicit article on the language, in section 15 (rights of education), article 11: The state guarantees respect for the cultural and linguistic rights of religious and ethnic components; The law regulates the addition of courses taught in universities and private schools in areas of unique population nature, in addition to the Arabic language as the official language in the country.

Whereas in article 6 in the same section: The curriculum is unified at the country level, regardless of the language used. The state sets, organizes, and supervises public examinations and awards and equalizes certificates (NCSROF website).

the National Coordination Committee for Democratic

On another side of the opposition, there is the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, which is represented the 'internal opposition', its documents mentioned that the Syrian people are one people whose cohesion has been founded throughout history on complete equality of citizenship regardless of origin, colour, sex, language, ethnicity, political opinion, religion or

sect. Furthermore, it assured that: the Kurdish national presence in Syria is an essential and historical part of the Syrian national fabric, which requires finding a just and democratic solution for Kurdish issue within the framework of the country's unity, land, and people, and working together for its constitutional approval, However, it does not give other details about the policy language for the future of Syria (NCCDC's Documents 2019).

On the other hand, the local councils of the Ministry of Local Administration in the Syrian Interim Government - Syrian Opposition Coalition - had abolished the Kurdish curricula and replaced them with Turkish and Arabic one; and only gave permission to give Kurdish students classes in Kurdish in allotment hours. This was after Operation Olive Branch on March 18, 2018, when the Syrian opposition controlled the Kurdish-majority region of Afrin. (STJ 2021).

Additionally, the institutions of the interim administration only issue documents in Arabic and Turkish in areas that are under occupation, giving no consideration to the local Kurdish language. All of these actions attest to the presence of a deliberate strategy to eradicate the Kurdish identity in this area and throughout Syria. (STJ report 2021).

The tensions and fault-lines affecting relations and cooperation between the Kurdish and Arab opposition in Syria were existence, adding to this the Kurdish fears about the future of Syria. The SNC was viewed as opposed to Kurdish demands for national recognition and decentralization in Syria and potentially even worse than the Ba'th Party. Some said that the SNC and the Ba'th Party were two sides of the same coin and that any Kurd remaining within the SNC would be considered a traitor (Allesop 2016: 200-201).

Summary of Chapter

In this Chapter, I discussed the rise of Arab Nationalism in Syria, and how the Arab Pan, through the Ba'ath party ideology dominated over the Syria (State and the Community), then I overviewed all Syrian constitutions, to show how the state didn't support the linguistic rights for other minorities in Syria, after that, I showed those government institutions that control the language policy in the country, where I found many ministries through its standard did not allow other language be used in the country, addition to this organizations, the state added a other tools, to control linguistic rights, through its Terrorism Court, and Penal code.

Considering this, I presented some pattern of how Syrian authorities' restriction the language rights against Kurds in Syria, also the Arabization process to assimilate the Kurdish community. Then I explained other actors in Syria (parties) how they look to language policy in Syria, especially after the 2011, when the Syrian conflict started.



Chapter Four: The Kurds Resistance Toward Syrian Policy

The previous chapter discussed how the Syrian governments took measures against the use and perceptibility of another language and against the Kurdish language, which is not content to forbid the language officially. Still, it was looking to Kurdish Identity as a security issue, where the ordinary people perceived the Kurdish language as an abject act counter in public spaces, where not only the state stood against the Kurds' rights but also the opposition factions when the conflict in Syria raised in 2011.

However, the chapter will chronology the Kurd's attempts to mobilize around cultural and language rights in Syria.

The Kurdish resistance

Romano suggested in his writings that the Kurdish movements in Syria may be understood as forms of collective resistance that can be evaluated using a comparable, and thus cumulative, analytical framework.; the cultural framework can act in:

- (1) the cultural toolboxes offered to potential rebels
- (2) the movement groups' strategic framing initiatives
- (3) the contests over the movement's framing with other collective actors, primarily the state and countermovement organizations (Romano 2006: 99)

In this sense, the Kurds in Syria tried to mobilize around the culture frame by discussion of Kurdish leaders in Syria how turned to culture field (Fuccaro 2003: 206-207; Strohmeier 2003: 128-129).

The statue of Kurdish Culture during the French mandate

As pointed out in previous chapters, the French Mandate had allowed Kurds to demand linguistic rights in Syria, where the Kurdish language seemed to be the only persistent indicator of Kurdish Cultural values in Syria. (Foccaru 2003,196). The first time there were demands for Kurd's rights was in 1924 (Jazari 2017: 419)

There were several French officers serving in Syria who had academic interests in Kurdish issues; The French Kurdologists established friendships with the enlightened and more cultivated Kurdish elite, which was mutually beneficial (Mirani: interview; Tejel 2009). Kurdish intellectuals were given a chance to participate in and contribute to Kurdish culture there, and the French Intelligence Service was required to provide Upper Jazira some degree of autonomy. At the time, Captain Pierre Terrier distinguished himself by carrying out his ideas in Upper Jazira. Terrier was aware of the colonization project of Jazira there since 1924 and was in charge of its conception. Additionally, they concentrated all matters pertaining to Franco-Kurdish ties in Syria. According to the Terrier Plan, the French government will approve the development of Kurdish night classes in Beirut, the opening of a Kurdish course at the Arab college for higher education in Damascus, and approval for the performance of the Kurdish revue. (Tejel 2009: 24-29; Fuccaro 2003: 190-195).

As mentioned above, for the role of Khoybun as a political committee for the Kurdish revolution in Turkey (Ararat), however, the Khoybun League engaged in a kind of cultural continuum. The Khoybun made progress in the cultural sphere by petitioning the mandatory authorities in favour of the teaching of Kurdish in schools and the creation of a boarding school to form the Kurdish elite. The Khoybun leaders expressed their wish to lead the Kurds toward western civilization and the declared necessity of modernizing Kurdish society "from the top-down." The Kurdish intellectuals believed that they had to revive the language, develop education in the Kurdish language, revive popular Kurdish literature, and provide all Kurds with general instruction in the Kurdish language and Latin characters in order to strengthen feelings of belonging to the Kurdish identity. In this vein, C. Baderkhan, the chairman of the Committee, has written: "Our independence depends on our language, and that can exist only through learning to read and write. (Badirkhan 1943: 1).

Then, under the imputes of Khoybyn committee in Syria, and presence most of its leaders in Syria, the Kurds their started to petition to French authorities, While the French authorities did not reject the proposal, Fuccaro claims that the first petition was made in 1928 by five Kurdish deputies in the Syrian parliament asking for the recognition of Kurdish as the official language of the Kurdish areas and the development of an educational system in Kurdish. However, employing Kurdish as a medium of instruction ran into a number of significant challenges due to a severe lack of teaching resources and qualified instructors. (Fuccaro 2003) the other attempt was in 1928 where another

demands from the Kurds in Jarablus for Kurds rights and culture rights for Kurds (Jaziri 2017: 420), the second petition was in 1930, the Kurdish activist demands to open schools under the education minister in 1930 (Jaziri2017: 476)also in 1932, another petition from Hajo with 100 leaders to French authorities for Kurds right (Jaziri: 458).

The French mandatory authorities made several concessions to Kurdish Cultural aspirations and made emphasized the high spiritual; the value of the Kurdish cultural renaissance; In 1933, some Kurds were admitted to the military school of Hama, and a scholarship was granted each year to Kurdish students of the Jazira (Fuccaro 2003: 209).

The two languages taught in Syria's public schools were Arabic and French; Kurdish was therefore only regarded important in the private sector. After the Franco-Syrian Treaty was signed in 1936, the High Commission showed exceptional sensitivity to any criticism of Arab nationalists; Tejel argued that where Arab nationalists were unwilling to support widespread Kurdish teaching in order to comply with the High Commission's restrictions, those involved in the cultural revival came up with a variety of solutions to fill the gap, including night classes to teach Kurdish and various individual initiatives. (Tejel 2009: 26).

Some Kurdish Associations

During the period of the French mandate, education in the Kurdish language at the official schools in Syria was not permitted but publications in Kurdish were not banned. The first Kurdish book published in Syria was written by Huseyn Huznî Mukriyanî in 1925. by the 1930s, books in the Kurmanci dialect started getting published (Malmisanij 2006: 12).

However, under inspiring by Badirkhan's experience, many Kurdish associations were founded in Syria, where the Quranic schools, where there were more than ten schools in Jazira to teach student religion in the Kurdish language, by Kurdish activists were essential staging posts for spreading ideas, to express the Kurdish cultural movement, Jazira has the Kurdish Charitable Society, the Young Kurds Club (Ciwanên Kurd), and the Sharaf al-Din Bitlis Club. Kurdish Youth Clubs 1938 in Amuda/Jazira for teaching Kurdish language and literature, Kurdistan Clubs 1938 in Damascus, organized conferences and evening classes to teach the Kurdish alphabet in Latin characters. Hope/Hêvî Committer for Kurdish Students in Damascus in 1937, Salah Aldin Club in Damascus in 1938. (Tejel 2009: 23; Jaziri 473-475; Hassaf (1) 2017: 130).

Celadet Bedirxan, started publishing the Hawar magazine in the Latin alphabet in Damascus in 1932; He aimed to make the following contribution to Kurdish culture and identity: the propagation of the Kurdish alphabet; also, another magazine, Ronahî, was published by Celadet Bedirxan in Damascus between 1942 and 1945, - Roja Nû (1943–1946) and Stêr (1943–1945), also the books of the famous poet Cîgerxwîn were published in Syria in the 1940s for the first time. In addition to these there were around 15 books were published during this period (Malmisaniy 2006: 13)

Also, the Kurds had the chance to broadcast through Levant Radio in Beirut from 1941-to 1942, where they had 10 minutes each day to publish news in the Kurdish language in the middle east. (ibid 376); Beginning on March 5, 1941, there were twice-weekly 30-minute broadcasts in Kurdish on the radio. Despite their briefness, the broadcasts gave the Kurdish language broadcasts genuine and symbolic significance. (Tejel 2009: 23).

As above mentioned, in the autonomist movement in Jazira from 1936-to 1937, The Kurds demanded economic (such as the granting of credits for the improvement of Jazira's infrastructure, as well as subsidies for the Mandate of tribal leaders), cultural (such as the teaching of the Kurdish language), administrative (such as the choice of functionaries and police officers from among the native population), and judicial (such as the establishment of an independent judiciary). (McDowall 2020: 627-3; Tejel 2009; White 2011: 69-91). However, as Laila McQuade and Nabil Al-Tikriti argued, even though France had previously been committed to minority protection, it did not grant them a state where the Kurds were passed over during the 1936 Franco-Syrian Treaty, where it did not want to face threats from the National Bloc which has strain relations with Kurds. Added to this, the lack of an armed Kurdish movement against the Syrian Mandate made it easier for the French officials to deny them a state. Furthermore, the concentration of Kurds into small geographic areas helped mitigate the risk to France, as any potential rebellions would be more localized and easier to suppress. Also, The Kurdish leadership could not disrupt the economy as the 1936 general strike had (McQuade and Al-Tikriti 2015: 255-272).

The French government had provided some cultural freedom and a setting that was conducive to the development of Kurdish culture. However, Arab nationalists rejected providing the Kurdish minority political and linguistic rights when the French troops left Syria. (White 2009: 109-120).

During the 1940s, the Kurds lost their support after the Mandate ended, where many denunciations had fabricated against the Kurds; for instance, during the first coup in Syria in 1949, General Husni Alzaim, some Syrian nationalists claimed that the General wanted to establish a Kurdish state in Syria (Wilison Center Digital Archive), while this point Hassaf also argued it (Hassaf 2017: 35). However, there were some attempts to tower Kurdish rights; according to Hassaf, one Kurdish representative from Kurd Dagħ (Efrin) (Efrin)/ Afrin, Ahmed Jafar, in Syrian Perelman, 1954: "In the border areas, there are nearly a million people who do not know the Arabic language, and on this occasion, I requested in a previous speech that time be allocated on the Syrian radio in the Kurdish language" (Hassaf 2017: 24)

By the middle of 1950, Syria had a democratic environment, according to Darwish, who later served as the leader of one political party there. This prompted some Kurdish activists to create the Kurdish Democratic Youth Unity Association in 1953, which called for (in article 3 to Demanding the study of the Kurdish language in Kurdish schools and allowing the opening of Kurdish cultural, sports and social societies and clubs) (Hassaf 2017, Darwish 2000, Mirani), assisted to found the Association for the Revival of Kurdish Culture in 1955, which produced a number of books regarding the Kurdish question in Kurdish and Arabic. (Malmisanij 2006; Dariwsh 2000, 14; Hassaf 2017: 115- 116)

Later as Darwish and Hassaf had argued, this association was stepped to be the political Party, where they wrote the Statute in the Kurdish language (Darwish 2000: 19-19; Hassaf 2017: 128-165), and as they mentioned, the reason of established the Party, the lack of depriving them of political, social and cultural rights, also against the Arabization policy in the area, where the article 4 for its internal regulations: "Establishing cultural committees in Kurdish areas, publishing books, magazines and newspapers in Kurdish, translating into Kurdish and persuading the Government to open schools in Kurdish areas" (Hassaf 2017: 131), also, the periodic's of party was published in Kurdish language under name (Dengê Kurd/ Kurdish Voice) (Darwish 2000: 33), here, is vital to mentioned to one of Kurdish political leaders who had role in establishment of the Party, Abdulrahman Zabeehi from Iran and he was in Damascus in 1950s, mentioned in his memory ,that they encourage Kurds of Syria to focus their demands on the cultural rights in syria and not political (Shamdeen 2019: 32); this point was mentioned in the pretrial motions of Dr Nuraldeen

Zaza, the first chairmen for the Kurdish Party in Syria, when they presented before the President of the State Security Court, below parts of it:

Although incidents of segregation and racial discrimination take place and are applied in many journals, in various ways, I want to reveal to Your Excellency, before presenting the facts, the main reason for these unfortunate events and incidents, the main reason being: In the Northern Region of the United Arab Republic, a tangible and objective reality is the fact that the Kurdish people, who were and continue to live in their land within the scope of their the United Arab Republic, along with their Arab brothers, a people with their language, customs and traditions. He is jealous of these languages, customs and traditions and has preserved its potential for singing, poetry, and Music, which is no less fascinating than any adjacent languages. It has been upholding it, retaining its features throughout history and times, embracing Islam from the earliest days, and failing to place the Kurdish language and customs and traditions among the Kurdish people. We are now at a time when humankind is striving for the cooperation and understanding of people to achieve better progress and prosperity for mankind, consolidate peace and bring people and human dignity to a decent level. As I said, the Kurdish language and the Kurdish traditions of the Kurdish people and their adherence to them have never been a source of distinction and disagreement between the Arab and Kurdish peoples.

Forth in the court, he demanded:

The rise of the Kurdish language to the international sphere, being a living folk language, whose words, literature, and Music are echoed in several world broadcasts, primarily Radio Cairo, Iraq, Iran and the Soviet Union, and taught in schools and universities in several countries (Uppsala, Sweden, Yerevan, Moscow, London, Paris, Leningrad, Iran... etc.). Depriving the Kurdish people of the Northern Territory of their use and expressing their feelings and emotions while using means of violence and terrorism with their perpetrators, the Kurdish people are by necessity motivated to satisfy that natural desire in all possible ways and means (Zaza 2001; Hassaf 2017: 199).

Through this plea in the 1960s, it was evident that culture and language rights were at the top of Kurds' demands in Syria. Moreover, as Mirani mentioned, Other national symbols were hibernating, so the Kurds in Syria paid attention to the language (Mirani interview), and the Slogan

Securing cultural and social rights were top of all bulletins Syrian Kurdish Parties (Sahmdeen: interview).

Since 1963, the Kurds had been governed by emergency law, with all of its requirements and limitations. Additionally, the survival of Kurdish tribes was challenged by laws that placed restrictions on Kurdish language and folklore and directly attacked the Kurdish identity. One such principle was Arab nationalism. They responded by maintaining the uniqueness of their resistance techniques. (Tejel 2009: 84).

When the Ba'th came to power, Arab nationalism denied other non-Arab communities their symbolic resources; in this context, the majority of Kurds chose, as Tejel put it, a policy of "dissimulation" (Ibid: 83). This sociological idea is comparable to the theological concept of taqiyya, in which the players hide their peculiarities or distinguishing characteristics in order to subvert the official unanimist doctrine at its core. But when circumstances allow, the hidden group emerges and reveals its distinctions. (ibid).

Tejel contends that the Kurdish political movement in Syria, however, sprang from the Syrian political, where the dictatorship produced the laws that built the system and selected a non-confrontational strategy, viewing both political and violent resistance as suicidal. The Kurdish parties were unable to begin serious political campaigns and propaganda, and as a result, they were unable to assert their legitimacy and begin talks with the central government; though, it had to maintain collective action in time and space; however, it had able to guide the groups' actions within certain limits, where, The Kurdish parties demanded the protection of the Syrian Kurds' Kurdish identity and the protection of their cultural rights. (Allsop 2016: 15; Tejel 2009).

The "culture framing" of the community is the primary purpose of political parties. This cultural framing of Kurdish communities was accomplished despite significant difficulties during the 1960s and 1970s; after 1980, the parties and the Syrian government permitted cultural activities to flourish. This was mostly accomplished by organizing Kurdish students in Aleppo and Damascus through institutions including schools, theater and folk ensembles, and athletic associations.(tejel 2009: 93).

This situation little changed or loosened, in the 1980s, for different reasons; one of them was the ascension of the Islamic movement in the late 1970s and beginning of 1980, which pushed Assad

to depend on the Kurdish community, the contrary to facials some events also the other was the price to use the other Kurdish political parties, especially PKK, wherein his efforts to demanded to give some fields to this movement between Kurds of Syria for recruit, the other point was the efforts of Labor communist league in Syria, to close to Kurds after declared Its support for the Kurdish people in Syria and the region in determining their destiny. Other movements opposed or ignored this issue, while the Communist Labour Party newspaper and its publications condemned discrimination against Syria's Kurds. Moreover, participating members of the Party in demonstrating in 1986 the background of killing one young man in Newroz 1986, also the demand of the Party to establish Committees Form; in this sense, The Syrian regime has always considered potential cooperation between Kurdish and Syrian Arab political groups a red line and has suppressed any signs aiming to do so (Dhahir 2020).

The partnership between the Syrian state and the PKK formed a strategic alliance against the Turkish government in the 1980s, causing a substantial cultural upheaval in light of the cooperation of the Syrian dictatorship with other Kurdish organizations in Iraq and Turkey. Meanwhile, to have greater room for maneuvering, the PKK grabbed control of the cultural framework of the Syrian Kurds. The PKK did not stop at assuring Kurdish culture's increased visibility; it also contributed to its reinvention. (Tejel 2009).

Mostly, other Kurdish parties in Syria acted to teach the Kurdish language to the people through secret courses in houses; interviews with Kurdish leaders in those parties confirmed this point; for instance, PhD Azad Ali Party that he is acting within it since the 1990s, they did many courses in private houses, but even though the authorities fought it and they detained those who participated in (Ali: interview).

In this sense, a group of Kurd's activations established a Kurdish language committee in 2007 (in secret), and they started to schedule language lessons in the Kurdish language to teach the grammar and literature.

After outbreak of the conflict in Syria in March 2011, the Kurds involved in this fight, through the path of the conflict, the Syrian regime evocated form Kurdish area (Allsopp and Wilgenburg 2019: 200- 207), where it was first time that the power of the Syrian state loose in this area, that created a space there, even the Kurds have many groups and they have different desired toward new Syria, but they share same points regarding the language, and that was obvious with the all of interviewers

(the Kurdish language have to be legal with constitution) but they have different point of view how they do it (Gunter argued this in his work), while in the area were many media platforms (radio, newspaper, TV) in Kurdish language, also many syndicates and Union had established, like the Kurds Writers Union, Kurds Intellectuals Federation, Kurdish Language Committee, which was responsible to teach Kurdish language, later by change the situation and creation a de facto authority in North East of Syria (Gunes 2019: 61-81; burc 2020: 80; Lowe 2014: 225-240),started to create defacto situation in all institutions, between of it the education institution, where the self-rule The "social contract" declares straight out in its prelude:

This agreement is freely declared and established by we, the inhabitants of the Regions of Afrin, Jazira (Hasaka, DeirZor), and Kobane (Ein Arab), a union of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Arameans, Armenians, and Chechens. (Schmidinger 2018: 130)

Additionally, Kurdish, Arabic, and Syriac are recognized as official languages under Article 9 of this social contract, and all populations are entitled to instruction in their native tongues. Moreover, all international civil, political, cultural, social, and economic rights and obligations are guaranteed in article 22. Article 23/1 states that everyone has the freedom to express their ethnicity, culture, and language, Article 32/b states that all communities' political, economic, and cultural expression is protected when exercising their right to freedom of association. in the article 91: The educational system of the autonomous regions is based on heterogeneity, and the cantons' curricula must take into account the rich historical, cultural, and linguistic heritage of their citizens. also, this self-rule established The Body of Education, The Body of Culture (The Constitution of the Rojava Cantons); in an interview with the deputy of the Kurdish Language Committee, she mentioned that the committee is involved in all processes of the education system in the de facto management in the area (course, books, teachers) (Viyan interview)

However, the interviewers mentioned that even though this system was suitable for the people of the region and saved them rights (Abdulah, interview), it was an advanced step to support the Kurdish language and other languages, even though this system is ideology system related to the PKK ideology, where this point is a weak point to this system (Miran interview), where it led to a version of people and come back to state education (Sulaiman interview), also the regime forced the UN committee to do not confirm this curriculum, and that was the problem to teach people in the Kurdish language (Shamdeen interview). However, in general, the new education system in

the area was favourable, where those who were responsible for enforcement of it desires to this situation de fact and the educated people in other languages than official language be tools for others right (Khalil interview), or will people be in a new confrontation with the state after more than ten years they free to study by their language (Jango interview).

Newroz

The Kurds in Syria showed their resistance against the Syrian policy in some ways, like culture, and we can see that in the celebration of Newroz (Aydin 2005), or through Music, where the only listen to Kurdish Music was stood surety to arrest the person (Hassaf (2) 2017: 31), and in some cases to be killed (in a radio interview). Given Syria's general antipathy towards the Kurds, it is easy to see that Newroz causes tension each year. Because of this, it has occasionally been prohibited in Syria and, even when it is, it is subject to various limitations. During celebrations, Syrian police and security forces maintain a strong presence in the Kurdish areas, and the scope of Newroz celebrations in each region is up to the discretion of provincial governors and security personnel. Kurds are frequently prohibited from traveling to celebrations and from donning the Kurdish colors of red, yellow, and green. (researcher).

In 1986, Large-scale Kurdish rallies in Damascus during the Newroz celebration were cut short when the police opened fire, killing a young kid. Following the events in Damascus and other places, especially in Afrin, where several Kurds were killed when the police attempted to scatter celebrators and protestors, other Kurds were detained. Following these occurrences, Hafiz al-Asad issued a proclamation designating March 21 as Mother's Day. He is said to have believed that by designating March 21 as an Arab national holiday, tensions would be reduced. Unfortunately, as was evident in 1995 at the Newroz celebration, conflicts still exist. Around 60 Kurds were detained by Syrian authorities when they gathered to celebrate their holiday. In 1997, authorities again made arrests after alleging that numerous Kurds had distributed records with Kurdish nationalist lyrics. (Yeldiz 2005).

On March 20, 2006, the police detained a number of people who were celebrating Nowruz in a Kurdish neighborhood of Aleppo. A group of Kurdish activists was violently dispersed by the authorities. the security prevented Kurds from celebrating Nowruz in March 2009 and jailed scores of people on charges of "acts, writings, and statements that encourage sectarian, racial,

and religious discord" and rioting. On Newroz, 2008, some teenagers had been killed by security authorities. (HRW 2009).

With the beginning new millennium, the situation of Syrian policy changed in the regional and local towards the Kurds; locally, Syrian authorities lost its influence over Kurds, whereas, after the Adana Agreement with Turkey, Syria deported the leader of PKK, this point reflected on the Kurdish political arena in Syria, (Gunter 2000) left a space open for new contending parties and independent activists at the beginning of the 2000s, especially for new young generations. Two significant events constitute essential landmarks in this development, namely the so-called Damascus Spring and the Qamishli Revolt. The latter mobilized the Kurdish community on a broader scale, especially young people in the Kurdish areas and Damascus and Aleppo became involved in collective action (McKeever 2021).

Syrian Kurds have more confidence to strive for more rights in Syria as a result of the 2004 protests. The Syrian leadership was alarmed by this growing aggressiveness, and the government declared that it would no longer accept any Kurdish activities. However, Kurdish activists persisted in making their presence felt by planning celebrations of their Kurdish identity and protesting anti-Kurdish laws. (HRW 2009)

After 2011, where the protests that began in Dar' in the south of Syria and then predominantly extended to the Arab regions of Syria were the result of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in the spring of 2011. The protests sparked extremely varied responses from Kurdish political actors. After extensive talks, the Kurdish National Council (Encûmena Nîştimanî ya Kurdî, KNC) was established on October 26, 2011. The KNC was undoubtedly the largest collaboration of Syrian Kurdish parties to date. The KNC had 16 different parties as of the beginning of 2012. And took the KRG model as its vision, the form of Kurdish territorial autonomy (Halhalli 2018: 33). In contrast, one Syrian Kurdish party (Democratic Union Party/ PYD) affiliated to PKK, the PYD refused to participate in this umbrella, and the PYD stepped up its efforts to establish independent oppositionist coalitions and administrative structures. On December 16, 2011, the PYD announced the creation of the People's Council of West Kurdistan (Meclisa Gel a Rojavayê Kurdistanê), which was meant to be an alliance but only consisted of PYD front groups, such as its Yekîtiya Star for women or its Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk for civil society umbrella (TEV-DEM). In actuality, the PYD and its own mass and front organizations became under the umbrella of the People's Council

of West Kurdistan following the PKK model in its vision (Schmiding 2018: 87-88), this model as called “Rojava” is a novel approach to the issue of the Middle Eastern minority' right to self-determination, including the Kurds. The emphasis is shifted from the lack of a nation-state for Kurdistan to the importance of bottom-up politics as a counter-hegemonic force developed via radical self-governance, and the reimagining of nationhood beyond ethnic dogmatism (Burc 2020: 82).

Both sides entered opposing alliances in seeing the events in Syria, from one side, on August 27, 2013, the KNC joined the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces. It has been a member of the High Negotiation Committee in Geneva since the Riyadh Opposition Conference in December 2015 (Kurdish National Council in Syria Website), where the KNC and NCSROF signed an agreement it comes in first article of it: “ The National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary affirms its commitment to the constitutional recognition of the Kurdish people’s national identity, considering the Kurdish issue an essential part of the national cause and general democracy in the country and recognizing the national rights of the Kurdish people within the context of the unity of the Syrian people and land.” (ARK News, Website), in other words, the Council views itself as a member of the Syrian revolution to defend Kurdish rights.

On another side, the PYD had already established a National Coordination Committee for the Forces for Democratic Change (NCC) at the all-Syrian level in September 2011, which was made up of 12 minor leftist Arab and Syro-Aramaic opposition parties and adopted an initially moderate attitude toward the regime. The NCC, in contrast to the majority of other opposition organizations, opposed both a bloody uprising and an outside military invasion (Schmiding 2018: 85-86), that mean, PYD stayed out of anti-regime protests.

However, with the different path of the Kurdish movement, both sides agree on points about the Kurdish linguistic rights and cultural issue in Syria, the Kurdish movements have proposed the following:

- 1- The formal acknowledgement of Kurdish as Syria's second language, with everything that this recognition involves, in any future constitution of Syria.
- 2- Establishment of a Special Government Directorate for Kurdish Language and Culture by the Central Government of Syria in order to advance and develop the Kurdish language and culture.

- 3- Support the use of the Kurdish language in public schools in locations where the Kurdish population is predominant.
- 4- Support the creation of private educational facilities for the study of Kurdish as a second language by Kurds living outside of Kurdish-populated areas.
- 5- Due to neglect and their prior position of non-recognition, special schools have been established to train educators, interpreters, and media professionals in the Kurdish language for use in administrative, health, and other public service institutions.
- 6- adopting specific measures to promote Kurdish cultural, media, and artistic expressions to attain equality with the majority in Syrian society.
- 7- Elimination of all prior discriminatory legislative restrictions on using Kurdish names for people, places, and holidays.
- 8- Kurdish language instruction and study will be gradually included in all public and private schools, including universities. The autonomous governments in Afrin, Kobani, and Aljazeera have so far employed several models.
- 9- Support from the public for Kurdish literary, artistic, and printing institutions to overcome historical injustices and limitations

Summary Chapter

Since the establishment of the Syrian State after the First World War in 1920, the Kurdish language has never been recognized as an official language, except for its use in private institutions and semi-official spheres between 1937 and 1941 and other places during the French Mandate period (1920-1946).

It has remained underdeveloped because it lacked official recognition and support. Some Kurdish journals by Jeladet and Kamran Badirkhan were also published, for example, Hawar between 1932 and 1935 and 1941 to 1943; Ronahi between 1942 and 1945; and Roja Nu between 1943 and 1946, along with some radio broadcasts from Beirut between 1943 and 1946.

The Syrian governments have never formally permitted expressions of Kurdish culture, folklore, or language since the country gained independence in 1946. Some administrations have occasionally supported it informally by turning a blind eye to certain Kurdish cultural, linguistic, and even political activities. Syria's government has typically denied Kurdish identity, language, and culture.

Since 1963, they have been repressed, forbade, and punished under the Baath regimes with extremely harsh legal sanctions such incarceration and expulsion from schools, universities, and employment. Simple possession of Kurdish books and other works of literature may result in lengthy prison terms.

Even if conditions have improved since 2011, there is still a severe dearth of infrastructure and resources for the development of the Kurdish language and culture in Syria.

This chapter discussed the attempts of Kurds in Syria to demand their rights, where those attempts varied between the legal petition through Parliament, or as deal with the regime, or their attempt to keep the Kurdish identity at a low level by hidden and acting in a secret way to teach language, or direct confrontation and recently army conflict; however, on the other side, outside the authorities, the oppositions and even in general level, the Syrian Arabs how they are looking with doubt eyes to non-Syrian Arabic, especially to the Kurds, where in the future of Syria it will need considerable efforts to fill the political gap between different parties there.

Chapter Five: Linguicide, and the Language Rights framework

The fundamental goal of Kurdish political activists was to alter liberal democracy in accordance with leftist libertarian and egalitarian ideas. Universal human rights became the main agenda for the expression of Kurdishness. As a result, the rise of fresh definitions of Kurdish identity and activity propelled Kurdishness onto the world scene. With the liberalization and democratization of the Kurdish political movement, the question and redefining of Kurdish identity became a crucial problem.

Previous chapters discussed the language rights and argued those theories that give way to keeping other languages in the country, and the language policy of Syria toward its minorities, mainly the Kurds there; then it discussed how the Kurds in Syria struggle to save their language.

Cultural and linguistic rights will be covered in this chapter in light of international treaties and human rights law.

The Linguicide

Raphael Lemkin's notion of genocide from the 1940s is where the idea of linguicide originated. Lemkin argues that genocide is not just or even primarily mass murder because it is distinguished from other crimes against humanity and war crimes by its basis on racial, national, or religious concerns. Lemkin believes that one of the main types of genocide is cultural genocide, which is the systematic eradication of customs, beliefs, languages, and other characteristics that set one group of people apart. As defined in the draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, linguicide is the intentional and systematic eradication of a language.

The text of Article I (3), defines acts of cultural genocide as those that "(a) forcibly transfer children to another human group; (b) forcibly and systematically exile individuals representing the culture of a group; or (c) prohibit the use of the national language even in private intercourse," is particularly pertinent in this case.

Even though Article I (c)—Linguicide—was not included in the Genocide Convention's final wording, it should nevertheless be recognized as a crucial step in the genocidal process. (Salih 2019).

Language shifts caused by sociolinguistic processes, language shifts caused by the physical extinction of a people, and language shifts caused by the organic growth of a language are the three main types of language death that are typically mentioned (tribe, nation, and others), According to Wurm, we can categorize languages into five categories based on the degree to which they are endangered:

endangerment and classify languages Table 5

The Statue	Description
possibly in danger	which, to the extent that the language is not being systematically passed on in the educational system, typically denotes a lack of prestige in the native country, economic hardship, pressure from more prominent languages in the general domain, and social fragmentation in private;
Endangered	There is a discrepancy in the way that adults teach language to children, both in the classroom and at home;
Seriously/severely endangered	proficient speakers in this scenario are over 50 years old, and this language has lost its social status over a generation ago;
Moribund	Several individuals of this ethnic group, primarily the extremely elderly, speak the language.
Extinct	Where no speakers remain, and few living people in the community remember the

	language, there is an indefinite possibility of revival
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(Bednarowicz 2014)

In most situations, the first two languages are spoken by minorities in the state where the population in question resides. While certain minority languages, like French in Canada, Catalan in Spain, and Assamese in India, have some form of official status in the state or a specific portion of the state, a much larger number of minority languages around the world have no official status at all. The results for speakers of non-official languages amount to a significant linguistic and social power gap. The majority of or the entirety of government, the legal system, education, print media, and broadcasting are done in other languages. The future of minority languages depends on how willing minority peoples are to maintain the bi- or multilingualism that now distinguishes many of them. If mother-tongue speakers of a minority language without official status want to benefit from those activities or participate in them, they must either speak another language or have the help of bilingual intermediaries. Ideology and cultural values, as opposed to objective criteria like population numbers, a thriving economy, or political sovereignty, are what determine this process. Minority populations are subordinate populations; thus the dominant group's ideas are just as crucial to the outcome as those of the minorities themselves. (Dorian 2014:284-5).

Syria's efforts to eradicate the Kurdish language and culture must be compared to the rights that a language ought to have in order to be more thoroughly analyzed. It must begin by defining what a mother tongue is since linguistic genocide may only occur in respect to a group's mother tongue..

Definitions of a mother tongue

It was previously defined using a number of criteria, the definitions for the criterion are listed in Table 1 as well:

Definitions of a mother tongue, Table 6

Criterion	Definition
Origin	The language(s) one learned first
Identification	

Internal	The language(s) one identifies with
External	The language(s) one is identifies as a native speakers of by others
Competence	The language(s) one knows best
Function	The language(s) one uses most

We have four theses about the definitions:

- A. Depending on the term chosen, the same person may speak various mother tongues.
- B. According to all the criteria, a person could have two or more mother tongues.
- C. According to every other factor save origin, a person's mother language may change throughout their lifetime, sometimes even more than once.
- D. It is possible to arrange the meanings hierarchically based on how well they uphold linguistic human rights. The definitions based on function and competence are more basic, whereas the definition combining internal identification and origin demonstrates a greater knowledge of linguistic human rights. This assumes that the other parties recognize a person's internal identity. (Bucak and Skutnabb-Kanges 1994: 361-362).

As a result, eliminating a language can be a highly powerful means to eliminate the foundation of group identification and membership. However, overt attempts to annihilate a language are not always the first step in the process of linguistic death. Language restrictions, "language death" (caused by migration, natural causes of death, or political suppression), and "linguicism," which is an idea akin to racism, sexism, classism, and ageism, are all examples of the linguistic continuum. Language-based linguisticism is described by Skutnabb-Kangas as "ideologies, institutions, and practices utilized to legitimize, carry out, and replicate an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) across communities." All of these measures lead to the steady, more-or-less deterioration of group identification and cohesion over time.

According to Skutnabb-Kangas, One of the processes in the repressive linguistic death tactics used by the state is (a) trying to kill a language (without killing its speakers); (b) letting a language die; (c) allowing coexistence; (d) only partially supporting some language functions; and (e) switching to

a new official language. Most of these tactics have historically been used in various ways against the Kurdish population in Syria. (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1996).

Lemkin's theory of cultural genocide was put into practice by completely excluding the Kurdish language. Additionally, Sunbaking, according to Phillipson. Therefore, it is simple to understand how what Syria does fits the UN's definition of linguistic genocide.

As was previously noted, the Syrian government has used a variety of methods to repress Kurdish ethnic identity. The use of the Kurdish language is either prohibited, registration of children with Kurdish names is refused, the original Kurdish place names are replaced with new Arabic names, or businesses with names other than Arabic are forbidden, and of course, Kurdish private schools are not permitted, as are books or other materials written in Kurdish. (HRW 1996)

Syria absolutely rejects the idea that there are multiple ethnic groups with Arab nationality, and the Syrian Constitution officially refers to its population as "Arabs." National integrity is forged by integrating all communities irrespective of their ethnic origin. The law precludes the formation of any nation or minority distinct from the Arab nation. Attempts to promote the cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurds have been officially dismissed as trying to 'create' minorities and thus undermine the unity of the Arab nation.

Even though Article 9 of the 2012 Constitution states that "protecting the cultural variety of the Syrian society with all its strains, as it is a national heritage that promotes national unity within the territory of Syrian Arab Republic," the Kurds in regime-held areas have not been permitted to teach their language in government schools or to open schools that are specifically designed to teach Kurdish since its adoption; in 2019, Assad claimed that his government did not avert the problem. (Alhurra 2019), in another side, the Education Minister said in one interview; he said: If any school request, the Ministry will study it, and they allow two hours, as well as the Assyrian and Circassian language. The Kurds can also learn their language in two hours, and it is a national language like the rest of the languages in Syria (Syrian Today 2021), while the government pressured UNICEF to do not the adoption of the rolling curricular in the Kurdish area (Shamdeen interview).

Tove Skutnabb-Kangas countered that a new form of repressive, neoliberal governance has evolved from international language rights. In one of the more incisive versions of her theory, she

states: Modern language rights advocacy, like human rights advocacy more generally, is distrustful of the demos and thinks it's important to limit democracy to defend minority rights. In summary, knowledgeable regional or international governance is favoured by the well-liked national government. (Skutnabb-Kangas 2012: 250)

Comparison with existing Human Rights Conventions

As discussed in the previous chapter, how the Kurds reacted against those policies; cultural rights are protected in several international treaties, protect those rights, and asked all parties to commit by its declarations, those declarations are including:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948:

As a means of fostering mutual respect, tolerance, and friendship across nations, racial or religious groups, the right to education is guaranteed.

In this regard, the UN document states that the Syrian government's representative supported the idea of including the concept of "cultural genocide" in the Convention (accepted by the United Nations in 1948), as well as mentioned in the Syrian Constitution that it guarantees the cultural rights of minorities on its territory and also guarantees their right to learn their mother tongue in schools; however, the Constitution being discussed was the one from 1930, and in later constitutions, the provision referring to minorities' rights had been removed.

Later, one instrument for ensuring the right to education in one's mother tongue as a means of promoting respect for other fundamental freedoms and rights is the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR).

Article 13 of the ICESCR, which ensures the right to academic freedom, commits States to upholding peoples' freedom to start their own educational institutions or send their children to private schools.

This states that Minority groups should have the option of receiving private instruction in their home tongue, and that States may establish minimum requirements for such institutions.

ICESCR emphasizes that it "enables all persons to participate effectively in a free society and promotes understanding among all ethnic, national, racial, and religious groups; and the States

should ensure that the educational institutions do not result in extreme disparities of educational opportunities for minority groups."

Similar to this, Article 26 of the declaration requires all signatory states to equalize their citizens in order to ensure that they are protected from discrimination. Additionally, Article 27 of the declaration states that minorities shall not be denied the right to use their language in a community, as language is considered to be one of the fundamental human rights. In this sense, the Syrian government ratified this Covenant on April 21, 1969, but has reserved the right to implement it through the specific binding of its Constitution. In other words, according to Syria's Constitution, only Arabic is an official language of the State, and no other language has been permitted to deliver education, effectively excluding its minorities, particularly its Kurds, where that reservation undermined the right's very essence. (UN Treaty Body Database),

Whereas Article 26 of the declaration required all signatory nations to equalize their citizens in order to ensure that they are effectively protected from discrimination and that this included nation and language, Article 27 of the declaration also stated that minorities shall not be denied the right to use their language in community with other members of their group, considering language to be one of the fundamental human rights. in this sense, Syrian government ratified this Covenant on 21 April 1969 (UN Treaty Body Database), However, Syria has issued a reservation to this provision, effectively excluding its application to the Kurds, a reservation that substantially undermines the right's very essence.

The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly according to Resolution No. 47/135 of 1992, was among the later international texts that emphasize and expound on this case. According to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was approved in 1992 by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007 under Resolution 61/295, states are required to take appropriate action to ensure that, whenever possible, members of minorities have good opportunities to learn their mother tongue and receive instruction in it.

However, the 1993 Declaration mandated that those who are members of minorities have the right to establish and maintain their groups as well as the right to participate in national and regional decisions affecting the minority to which they belong.

According to this Declaration, a state cannot prevent its minorities from using their languages or establishing associations. However, it is a duty to ensure that a minority can set up associations, participate in decision making, and publish in its language without discrimination.

Additionally, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (ICRC) includes provisions on language rights in education and urges States to foster respect for the child's parents and cultural identity; however, the ICRC also offers some crucial protections that can be used to promote mother-tongue language rights, including "Article 8 (right to preserve identity without unlawful interference) and Article 31(1) (right to participate freely in cultural life)".

Additional International agreements

These are non-legally enforceable agreements whose clauses expand on the aforementioned duties; include:

1. the UN Declaration regarding the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992).
2. the UNESCO Convention regarding the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003).
3. the UN Declaration about the Rights of Indigenous People (2007).
4. the 2000 Dakar Framework for Action: Education for All; and
5. the 2000 UN Millennium Development Goals.

According to the European Commission of Human Rights, Article 10 (the right to freedom of expression), Article 14 (the prohibition against discrimination), and Article 2 of Protocol 1 (the universal right to education) are the main provisions that may serve to protect mother-tongue education. Syria signed this Protocol on April 18, 2001 but has not yet ratified it.

in addition to these declarations, there are many Conferences and Meetings, for instance, In paragraph 45 of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as in paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, and 40 of the Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension in 1990, it is made clear that national minorities should have the right

to preserve their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious identity and the right to ask for voluntary and public assistance to do so in educational institutions.

Additionally, the Arab Charter of Human Rights, to which Syria belongs, safeguards the right of minority groups to enjoy their culture. As an ethnic minority in Syria, we are protected by this right under Article 2/1: Whole peoples have the right to self-determination and the freedom to pursue their political, social, and cultural development. Additionally, under Article 25: People belonging to minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture and use their native language (Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004).

The Kurds should be permitted to freely enjoy all aspects of Kurdish culture, including their language, history, traditions, and religions, in accordance with all of the aforementioned declarations and Charters. On the contrary, Syrian limitations on the use and practice of the Kurdish language make it difficult or impossible for many Kurds within its boundaries to enjoy Kurdish culture. The goal of the policy of suppressing the Kurdish language and culture is to force the Kurds to assimilate into the culture of the country in question; in Syria, this goal is to assimilate the Kurds into the Arab identity. (Yeldiz 2005: 116-117).

Moreover, in 2004, in its report to the UN Human Rights Committee, Syria noted that "the Kurds have representatives in the Parliament and some of them had attained official posts. Thus, Kurds are fully integrated into Syrian society where they act and react with other Syrian citizens." (HRW 2009)

Had Syria ratified the Framework Convention on Minorities, it would be obliged to recognize that minorities' linguistic rights in private and public, orally and in writing, guarantee minorities the right to maintain educational establishments and teach their mother tongue.

Possible responses to maintain the policy language in Syria

Since limits on linguistic and cultural expression prevent access to many of the most important institutions in establishing identities, such as schools and the media, they are essential to an individual's ability to completely and effectively express their identity. Minorities who are denied linguistic and cultural rights are also denied access to their literature and histories, which limits their capacity to understand the world from their own perspectives.

Furthermore, when minorities are denied cultural and linguistic rights, the state makes it abundantly clear that those minorities are not valued or accepted; this has the overall effect of making minorities feel like outsiders, demeaning them, and excluding them from traditional notions of the state.

On the other hand, it is believed to cultivate something valuable, namely a more wealthy, more open, and vibrant society, when a state permits or supports the flowering of various identities and cultures within its borders. As a result, safeguarding cultural and linguistic rights within a state's borders is crucial for advancing global peace and security. (Yildiz and Muller 2008: 77-81).

The fact that Syria is a multi-ethnic nation was ignored by the country's successive authorities and governments, but the deliberate omission of ethnic languages was a significant political factor in Syria, especially for Kurds, where the perception of ethnic minorities as being ignored played a crucial role in the country's political life. Additionally, it was evident during the Syrian crisis how divided Syrian society was and how the Kurds, among other groups, affected Syrian unity. It is crucial to understand that linguistic variety and public policy are closely related. Protecting the ethnic tongue has a significant impact on Syrian politics and policy.

In this regard, in addition to the international texts discussed in this study, language planning and linguistic fairness for all Syrian components can be approached from the perspective of human rights. Additionally, it is feasible to gain from the constitutions of nations that have gone through similar situations to Syria. In this point, all interviewees responded that the level of the language rights depends on the resolution that Syria will reach in the future and depend on the type of new system for Syria. However, it can take benefits from other than models, whether from the laws of those countries in which the Kurds are present (Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Armenia), commensurate with the situation in Syria or from Arab countries that have linguistic minorities as well.

For instance, the Iraqi constitution guarantees the right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongues, in government or private educational institutions following educational regulations, where the Kurdish language situation is close to Syrian policy, in light of both country has a same official language; additionally, both countries under Ba'th administration adopted Arabism; additionally, both nations have a diverse population; additionally, the constitution of 2005 recognized the importance of linguistic variety as well as the rights of speakers of ethnic languages. It was clear in Article (4) how the constitution treated languages:

The first Article of the constitution recognized Arabic and Kurdish as the two official languages of Iraq. It also granted other Iraqi minorities the right to guarantee the education of their children in their mother tongues in government-run educational institutions, also, the constitution defined the scope of the term "official language" and how to apply it through:

- official newspaper, in the two languages.

- one of these languages can be used in conversation, Speech, and expression in official domains.

C. official papers and correspondence in both languages are approved for publishing.

D. schools that teach the two languages following the educational system.

E. both languages shall be use in any matter enjoined by the principle of equality.

Third: The federal and official institutions and agencies in the Kurdistan region shall use both languages.

Fourth: Two other official languages in the administrative units where they have a high population density are the Syriac and Turkmen languages.

Fifth: A general vote must be held before any region or governorate can add another local language to its list of official languages (Iraq constitution 2005).

Summary of Chapter

In this Chapter, I continued to argue the language rights and the Syrian Policy toward the Kurdish language as a linguicide policy. Then I reviewed the international declaration that supports language rights for Kurds, where it was clear that despite Syria's commitments as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other the International Covenants, the Kurds in Syria continue to face several challenges. The Syrian government acknowledges Kurdish children's right to primary education, but not one in their mother tongue. As a result, Kurdish kids are forced to memorize historical accounts that make them invisible in the nation while studying Syrian Arab textbooks. Finally, I briefly recommended one language rights solution model with the Iraq example.

Conclusion

Language and ethnicity function are distinguishing factors for each group. They perceive their languages as one of the most significant markers of their ethnic-national identity and consider its official recognition a determinant factor in their overall political representation.

However, as Vali argued, the suppression, denial, and exclusion of the non-sovereign communities/identities is the condition of the possibility of the political and legal unity of the Nation represented by the State by presenting it as a uniform entity with a single identity. The reduction of the people to the Nation is an effect of political power: it is the effect of the founding act of the State. The logical connection between the nation-state and the stateless people/nation is thus forged by the violence of the founding act of the State: they are the conditions of possibility of one another, standing in a relationship of identity indifference (Vali 2020: 651-652).

The violence perpetrated on the Kurdish community by the founding acts at the founding moments of the sovereign State was met with opposition by leading political forces in the Kurdish community. Kurdish opposition to sovereign domination frequently turned with varying degrees of popular participation to armed conflict, as will discuss in the next chapter, resisted the suppression of Kurdish identity. The struggle to recognize Kurdish rights to an autonomous existence as a distinct ethnic, and linguistic community constituted the core of the Kurdish question. In this context, the Kurdish question is the political articulation and representation of the Kurds' resistance against sovereign suppression and denial of their identity and rights and their struggle to recognize their identity and may to the right to govern themselves in their territory. This sense indicates that the Kurdish question is grounded in the dialectical nexus of an antagonism created and nurtured by the violence of the founding acts of the sovereign State. The suppression and denial of Kurdish identity were constitutionally sanctioned and perpetuated in the sovereign power structure in this nation-state. The State's constitutional law continues to exclude Kurdish identity from the legal, and political process, from the constitutionally recognized domain of legitimate political conduct, forcing it into an extrajudicial space ruled maybe by violence. Thus, Kurds became objects of extrajudicial violence perpetrated on them by sovereign powers as they resisted sovereign domination and the imposition of sovereign identity on their communities.

In Syria, The Syrian governments have never formally permitted expressions of Kurdish culture, folklore, or language since the country gained independence in 1946. Some administrations have

occasionally supported it informally by turning a blind eye to certain Kurdish cultural, linguistic, and even political activities. Syria's government has typically denied Kurdish identity, language, and culture.

Since 1963, they have been repressed, forbade, and punished under the Baath regimes with extremely harsh legal sanctions such incarceration and expulsion from schools, universities, and employment. Simple possession of Kurdish books and other works of literature may result in lengthy prison terms.

In response to that, there has been little organized Kurdish political activism to change this unfair and discriminatory policy in the fifty years since such discrimination became pervasive in Syria. (Allsopp 2015), until 2011, when the situation changed and the Kurdish movement in Syria has a crucial role in the Syrian conflict, where they raise their demands to the radical side.

Even if conditions have improved since 2011, there is still a severe dearth of infrastructure and resources for the development of the Kurdish language and culture in Syria, where not the constitution nor the community acceptable the diversity in the country.

The State's language discrimination and use of Arabic have produced a reverse effect, particularly among the Kurdish community. Moreover, the multiethnic character of the polity in the absence of the violent state imposition of Arabic after the uprising has provided breeding for various linguistic nationalism. This situation in the North has proven vital for the revival of Kurdish.

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