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ISTANBUL KULTUR UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND

WAHHABISM AND THEIR COLLUSIONS AGAINST NASSERISM

Master of Arts Thesis by

Hussein T.H. Abushaaban

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Department: International Relations

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Abstract

The most prominent and effective Political Islam movements in the Arab region are the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia, each of which has its own theological, theoretical, and ideological foundations. Despite the interrelated intricacies of these foundational differences, the emergence of secular Nationalism, Pan-Arabism, and Nasserism had created the opportunity of collaboration and coordination between Saudi Wahhabism and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB). To the Saudis and other Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms, the Nationalist fervor was considered as a mounting challenge to their legitimacy of rule their people. To the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Nationalist project of Nasserism was, in principle, a counter-ideology of their Islamist project. Therefore, during the Nasserite and Sadatite periods, the peak of the Cold War, an unlikely coalition had been formed among the United Kingdom, the United States, Wahhabism, and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) to counter the Nationalist project of Nasser and to challenge his Soviet allies. Although the close collaboration between the Western Powers and the Muslim Brotherhood had never been official, some political analyses indicated that the headquarters in Switzerland and Germany were the hub for the Brothers to coordinate their media campaign and recruitment strategies to propagate Islamism, under the auspices and supervision of US and Western intelligence services. The Western aegis and Saudi bankrolling of the Islamism of Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamism in general, were motivated by the West's containment strategy of the Cold War against the Soviet expansionism rather than being inspired by religious obligations or kindliness.

KISA ÖZET

Arap coğrafyasındaki en önde gelen ve en etkili Siyasal İslam hareketleri, her biri kendi teolojik, teorik ve ideolojik temelleri olan Mısır'daki Müslüman Kardeşler ve Suudi Arabistan'daki Vehhabilik'tir. Bu temel farklılıklardaki karşılıklı karışıklıklar, laik Milliyetçiliğin doğuşu, Arapçılık, ve Nasırizm, Suudi Vehhabiliği ile Mısır Müslüman Kardeşler arasında işbirliği ve koordinasyon fırsatı oluşturdu. Suudilere ve diğer Arap Körfez Şeyhliklerine göre, Milliyetçi hareketliliğin, halklarını yönetmekteki meşruiyetleri açısından gittikçe artan bir zorluk olduğu düşünülmektedir. Mısır Müslüman Kardeşlere göre Nasırizm'in Milliyetçi projesi, ilkesel olarak, kendi İslami projelerinin bir karşı-ideolojisidir. Bu nedenle, Nasırizm ve Sadatiti dönemlerinde, Soğuk Savaşın zirvesinde, Nasır'ın Milliyetçilik projesine ve Sovyet müttefiklerine karşı Birleşik Krallık, Birleşik Devletler, Vehhabilik ve Müslüman Kardeşler arasında beklenmedik bir koalisyon kuruldu. Batılı Güçler ile Müslüman Kardeşler arasındaki işbirliği hiç bir zaman resmiyet kazanmamasına rağmen, bazı ifşa olmuş belgelerin ABD ve Batılı istihbarat servislerinin himayesinde ve denetiminde, İsviçre ve Almanya'yı Kardeşler için İslamiyet'i yaymak amaçlı medya kampanyalarını koordine etmede ve takviye stratejilerinde merkez olarak kullandığına işaret etmektedir. Batılı himayelerin ve Suudi Arabistan'ın Müslüm Kardeşlerin İslamcılığını ve genel İslamcılığı finanse etmesi dini yükümlülük veya nezaketten kaynaklanmaktan ziyade Batının Sovyet yayılmacılığına karşı çevreleme stratejisinden motive olmuştur.

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MB   Muslim Brotherhood

EMB   Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Brother   A member of Muslim Brotherhood

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

The sentiments of Political Islam have attracted a widespread currency in the political space in Arab world as well as a scholarly interest among politicians, leaders, and academicians. Nonetheless, the demarcation line of Islam as a political agenda and Islam as a religion is not specifically spelled out or explained in definitive terms, given the fact that Muslims in general are already adherent of Sharia Law. The dominance of Political Islam sentiments in the Arab world seems to be confusing and perplexing, and conflates the already blurred conception of what Political Islam is, what their theological and theoretical foundations are. The most prominent and prevalent Political Islam movements in the Arab world are the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB) and Wahhabism, where each one of them seems to have followed a different theological, theoretical, and ideological foundations, as well as different political objectives. These foundational differences could help to us to capture what each movement is up to and is set to achieve, and lay down their roles in the dynamics of global politics. To complement our understandings of what Political Islam is, the study will seek to examine the development of relationships between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian secular government during the Nasserite and Sadatite eras. Within these two periods, emphasis will be given to conceptualize the political objectives of EMB, along with Wahhabism, to counter-balance and dismantle Pan-Arabism, Nationalism, and Secularism.

1.1 Research Objectives

1. To investigate and understand Political Islam, the classification of its movements, and help explain the theological orientations of their differences, and identify their major movements in the Arab region

2. To investigate and understand the theoretical and ideological foundations of Wahhabism and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB)

3. To investigate and understand the interactions between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian governments developed during the Nasserite and Sadatite regimes, and how had the collusion of EMB with Saudi Wahhabism contributed to the failure of Nasser's Nationalism and the success of Sadat's Islamism

1.2 Research Questions

1. What is Political Islam, what are the basis of classifying political Islam movements, what are the theological orientations of these movements, and what are their major Political Islam movements in the Arab region?

2. What are the theoretical and ideological foundations of Wahhabism and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ?

3. How had the interactions between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian governments developed during the Nasserite and Sadatite regimes, and how had the collusion of EMB with Saudi Wahhabism contributed to the failure of Nasser's Nationalism and the success of Sadat's Islamism ?

1.3 Research Design

To understand the omnipresence of Political Islam in the Arab region, a discourse approach of theological, historical, and political perspectives seems to be an optimal option. The study will trace back and explain the origins of theological, ideological, and theoretical foundations of Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood, and their consequent political reflections onto the Arab region in re-drawing the political map in Egypt. Following the same route of investigation, the researcher will attempt to synthesize literature to extract and lay down the peculiarities of

the Arab region in terms of the colonial advances, and how these agonizing histories imprinted in the Arab mindset had finally found their ways into the form of buttressing support for Political Islam.

1.4 Contribution of Study

In general, the study aims to investigate Political Islam and hopes to uncover their effects in Arab politics in the region and makes sense of the dynamics of their prominent movements on social and political aspects. First, the study will attempt to explain the classification of Political Islam movements according to their theological foundations and political orientations, and identify the most powerful, effective and prominent movements. Second, the study will proceed to investigate and explain the theoretical and ideological underpinnings of Wahhabism and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as the most prominent movements. Third, the study will attempt to understand the political interactions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism with Egypt during Nasserite and Sadatite tenures, and the political implications and repercussions of such collaboration on the Arab region.

2.5 Political Islam

2.6 State and Religion Relationship

The relationship between the state and religion in Arab countries has some particularities that are not found in other religions (Belkaziz, 2013). First, Islam was revealed in Arabic language in the Arabian Peninsula, which is currently known as Saudi Arabia, and later spread into the Middle East and North Africa, MENA region, and other regions of central and south east regions (Campo, 2009, p. 53; Versteegh, 2016, pp. 423-426). Second, the separability of state and religion had never been thought about and Islamic laws were enacted in every aspect of life, especially during the early days of the Rightly Guided Caliphate. According to Islamic jurisprudence, the sources of Islamic Laws were extracted from the Quran, and Sunna, the Prophet's teachings and conducts (Winter, 2014, p. 238), and the 'Ulama', religious scholars who were responsible to interpret the Koran, explain and teach the 'true' religion to the new Muslims and converts (Motzki, 2002, pp. 2-10). Later on, with the spread of Islamic religion among non-Arab communities and the expansion of its territories outside the borders of the Arabian Peninsula, the connection of Arabic language and Islam was strengthened as based on religious, linguistic, and administrative grounds (Campo, 2009, p. 53). Moreover, due to the connection of Arabic language and Islamic Law or jurisprudence (Weiss, 2010, p. 113), the 'Ulama' were generally perceived as 'sacred' as they were controlling the interpretations and the jurisdiction of the scared text (Winter, 2014, p. 237). The imprint or spell of sacredness given to the 'Ulama' had been gradually encroached by the Caliphs/Presidents as a source of religious legitimacy to manipulate in order to cement their governance, especially in the Abbasid Caliphate (Kadi & Shahin, 2013, p. 83-84), which in turn, had laid down the nature of relationship between the state and religion in different formulas for centuries to come (Motzki,

2002, pp. 2-10). Since that date on, the functions of religious scholars and political leaders had become more conflated and blurred, and the interchangeability of functions had become the classical characteristic of the early (and current) Islamic governance (Kadi & Shahin, 2013, pp. 81-85; Qutb, 1964, p. 34). Kadi and Shahin (2013) argued that "the caliph was considered the leader of the Muslim community, just like the Prophet without the function of prophecy," a political doctrine that has much resemblance to the newly-coined term of Political Islam (p. 84). As a result of these contentious issues over religio-political conflicts, bloody conflicts and civil wars had erupted over the legitimacy of the ruler/s or the 'true' sect and these religious clashes and wars were not limited to the infamous sectarian division of Sunni-Shiite split but included the sub-sectarian division within the Sunni sect (Robinson, 2013, pp. 99-101).

2.7 Definitions

Researchers usually take different perspectives to define Political Islam where each one attempts to highlight a specific aspect of it. In defining the construct of Political Islam, Macías-Amoretti (2014) highlights the centrality of ethical and moral propagation embedded in its political agenda as inspired by Islamic religion (p. 1). Similarly, some scholars echo more or less the same definition (Roy, 1994; Meijer, 2009). Meijer (2009), for example, argues that Political Islam's conception of politics is limited, and is usually equated to virtue, piety, and mores, without serious empirical and political agendas that tackle "political programme, open debate, and the value of checks and balances in curtailing power and the flexibility to produce a stable political practice. Its basic flaw is to prefer purity and utopia above concrete results" (p. 4). Others extracted the definition of Political Islam in terms of its propaganda which calls for social justice, equal opportunities for political participation, economic opportunities, and fighting corruption, which brought Islamist to power "Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya" (Robbins & Rubin, 2017, pp. 4-5). To evade any confusion, Paramentier (2007) cautions that any definition of Political Islam should be approached separately and according to particular

movement within specified space and time, and explains that the essential denominator of Political Islam movements is their antagonism to secularity (Pp. 27-28). For example, Hermann (2003) elucidates that a difference should be made between Political Islam that had developed in secular Turkey and other Arab states. He contends that Political Islam in Turkey had developed in a democratic environment through parliamentary election within the frame of market economy where Political Islam in the Arab region, like Egypt, Algeria, and elsewhere had been motivated by anti-colonial influences and, later on, was directed against towards their oppressive governments (Hermann, 2003, p. 266). Hurvitz and Alshech (2017), for example, draw another line of distinction between the different groups of Political Islam. They classify Political Islam into moderate and militant movements whose ultimate objective is to bring a "political change and their agendas are inspired by their interpretations of Islam," despite the ideological doctrines and the working approaches employed to achieve these fantasies (Hurvitz & Alshech, p. 2078). Moderate Political Islam movements, Hurvitz and Alshech argue, that accept the rules of the political game that has "not been sanctioned by authoritative Muslim texts" and indulge into "political parties, the contemporary global order or pre-Islamic social entities such as tribes and ethnic groups" and are not really interested to establish the caliphate (p. 2079). Modern thoughts of Political Islam are not really interested to establish the Caliphate nor are based on Islamic theology; rather, the contemporary currents of Political Islam accept the principles of democracy, recognize the legitimacy of democracy and human rights principles, and are operating within the international order and its institutions (Hurvitz & Alshech, 2017, p. 2078).

Hurvitz and Alshech (2017) assert that militant Political Islam does not follow the same route of action and adopts a violent approach to realize its purpose (p. 2079). Beside these violent means of recruitments, militant Islamists tend to usurp the ethnical and tribal elements and bring them under re-Islamization indoctrination to join militant religious groups (Hurvitz & Alshech,

2017, p. 2079). Moreover, Liow's (2004) classification fell under more or less the same categorization (pp.184-185). On the other hand, however, the current emergence of Political Islam has fueled interest among scholars and produced different worldviews and reactions among the West that is reflected into their definition of what Political Islam is. In their explanation of Political Islam, Donker and Netterstrøm (2017) argue that Political Islam is not a monolithic ideology whose ultimate goal is to establish Sharia Law by intimidation or force (as in the case of Al-Qaida) nor is solely based on a dogmatic thinking that is not willing to incorporate progressive approach towards politics (pp.1-2). Rinehart (2009), on the other hand, had conducted a historical and a corpus study in which she examined the letters, brochures, and media emblems of Hassan AL-Banna, the founder of MB, demonstrated how the proclaimed peaceful agenda had already contained violent contents that had later been translated into violent activities (pp. 953-954). Although it is true that not all Political Islam movements have violent agendas, but the movements of Political Islam are not necessarily static, and the possibility to resorting to violence cannot be totally eliminated as a result of radicalized education materials in different parts of the world (Franken, 2017; García, 2016; Rinehart, 2009; Turner, 2020).

2.8 Classifications

In his book the Failure of Political Islam, Olivier Roy, more than twenty-five years ago, provided a comprehensive picture of the theoretical foundations of what Political Islam is in terms of theology and ideology as well as political agenda and internal structure. In Roy's configuration, Islam is perceived as falling into two categories: (1) traditional jurists, religious scholars who belong or are affiliated to the four schools of jurisdictions (Malikism, Hanabalism, Shaafism, and Hanafism), and (2) fundamentalist Islamists, leaders (not necessarily of religious schooling) who adopt a political agenda. The essential difference between the traditional jurists and fundamental Islamists, or fundamentalists, is the rejection of the theological legacies of

jurisdictions (Arabic: Fiqh), Quran interpretations (Arabic: Tafsir), and imitation (Arabic: Taqlid) and the adoption of innovation or logical reasoning (Arabic: Ijtihad) which explains why they are called reformist fundamentalists. Under this reformist category, three major movements can be detected: Wahhabism, Political Salafism, and Apolitical Salafism, all of which share same attitude in rejection the jurisdiction of the four schools; nonetheless, essential differences are still observed. Although Political Salafism, Apolitical Salafism and Wahhabism are based on the principle of Ijtihad (i.e., logical reasoning), the Political and Apolitical Salafism are based on the teachings of Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Jamal AL-Din AL-Afghani; whereas, Wahhabism is solely based on the teachings of Muhammad Abdel Wahab. The determining factor between the Apolitical Salafism from one hand and the Wahhabism and Political Salafism from the other is, as the term indicates, the employment of religion into politics. Wahhabism and Political Salafism are actively involved in politics, yet again, they demonstrate diversions on theological orientations and political grounds. Among the differences are the condition of political revolution, Sharia Law, and women. In Political Salafism, as manifested in Muslim brotherhood and Shiite Iran, Political Islam leaders, or Islamists adopt the revolutionary thinking of changing the secular regimes, Sharitization/Islamization of the society, and the integration of women in the political game (Roy, 1994).

2.9 Theological Differences

Political Islam movements characterize the departure of more than ten centuries of Islamic orthodoxy by the 'proclaimed' Salafists' writings of Muhammad Abdel Wahab, Muhamad Abduh, Jamal AL-Din AL-Afghani, and Rashid Rida who adopted Ijtihad, or logical reasoning, and denounced all the Islamic traditions of earlier scholars.

Roy (1994) states:

Islamism [Political Islam] was created both along the lines of and as a break from the *salafiyya* [Salafism]. The Islamists generally adopt Salafist theology: they preach a return to the Quran, the Sunna, and the *sharia* and reject the commentaries that have been part of the tradition (the gloss, the philosophy, but also the four major legal schools, the *mad- hahib*). They therefore demand the right to *ijtihad*, individual interpretation (Pp. 35-36).

By the introduction of the crucial principle of ijtihad, Islamists are willing to claim a wider political space at the expense of the religious authority (Roy, 1994, pp. 36-37). Although different forms of Political Islam currents were prevalent in earlier times, what was at stakes for the modern Islamists was the magnitude of political space they are claiming, even if they were of non-clerical backgrounds (Roy, 1994, pp. 36-37, 58). Ijtihad liberates the sacred texts from their restrictive nature and opens up the possibilities for their interpretations outside their contexts, which in turn, increases the religio-political space within which Islamists are operating by and leaves the religious corpus into "rhetoric, proverbs, epigraphs, and interpolations—in short, into a reservoir of quotes" that is no longer applicable in reality (Roy, 103). In short, Ijtihad provides the Islamists with the necessary religious legitimacy that is void of any restrictive texts or accountability, leaving the Islamists with absolute authority in religious and political spheres. Excluding all the traditions of Islamic jurisprudence and the reopening the door of Ijtihad provide the Islamists with the undisputed 'divine' authority they are waiting for to undertake their program of Islamization, without serious oppositions from the religious establishments in their respective countries. Roy (1994), for example, argues that "the demand for a resumption of ijtihad also aimed to destroy the Ulamas' monopoly to the religious corpus" (p. 33). Besides their rejection of traditionalist theology, they reject the principles of anthropology, sociology, and secularity. Islamists perceive the Muslim society as being greatly influenced by non-traditional and alien traces of imperialist effects, which as they perceive, are

the main culprit for the Muslim backwardness. Therefore, the solution to overcome backwardness and catching up with modern civilization, as perceived by Islamists, is to get involved in re-Islamizing the corrupted community through preaching and religious sermons. They place huge emphasis on piety, virtue and mores (Abdullah & Osman, 2018, p. 221; Meijer, 2009, p. 4; Roy, 1994, p. 24). The re-Islamization of the society in the Islamists' thought is derived from the principle of 'God's sovereignty,' Hakimiyya, which was developed into a full theory by the theoretician Brother Sayyid Qutb, echoing the earlier project of Hassan AL-Banna. The essence of this principle argues that Muslims should only obey legitimate leaders who are carrying out the implementation of Sharia Law. Inherently entailed in this doctrine is the legitimacy of revolt or terrorist activities against all secular governments that do not represent Islam in aspects of social, legal, cultural and economic lives. The Islamists' obsession of the social re-Islamization of the 'already' Muslim society might be perceived as a reflection of their theological understandings of the concept of 'oneness' which they are trying to apply into society. To the Islamists, the concept of "oneness" which stands as the essence of Islamic faith seems to be extrapolated into the society, and the society must be reflective of this "oneness". The application of the theological concept of "oneness" into the society implicates the construction of society that reflects the Islamist vision of society, social structure, norms, traditions, customs, values, beliefs, and religious and political views that do not accommodate negotiations or tolerate diversity (Roy, 1994, pp. 41-42).

Borrowing the theological term of 'oneness' into society still does not account for or propose to solve the sociological, ethnic, and tribal conflicts across the Arab region, most probably because such sociological facts are not perceived as problems in the first place. They refuse to accept the very basic principles of anthropology and sociology, the building blocks of modern nation states. Their perception of the Muslim society is wholly shaped in line with the concept of 'oneness', indicating that the Muslim community constitutes undivided whole, Ummah.

Therefore, they perceive the segmentation of the society that are based on the ethnic, tribal, or class divisions as a sin, plot, or a conspiracy. As Roy (1994) asserts that the Islamists do not really appreciate the writings of Ibn Khaldun, the outstanding sociologist, who invented the term, Asabiya, solidarity group, and his sociological literature stands as "highly suspect" (Roy, 1994, p. 71). To the Islamists, "the ideal Islamic society is defined as Ummah an egalitarian community of believers. The Political concept that expresses Ummah for Islamists is thus, tawhid, "oneness," the negation both of social classes and of national, ethnic, or tribal divisions" (Roy, 1994, p. 71). Consequently, any differences resulting from these sociological realities are thought of as negative and detrimental to the coherence of the society, leading to splitting, rupture, and deterioration. That precept can explain why Islamists reject the four schools of jurisprudence and the sectarian divisions. Extending the concept of "oneness" is the Islamists' rejection of the division of the four traditional Sunni Schools of jurisdiction (i.e., Maliki, Shaffei, Hanbali, & Hanafi), and do not admit any schismatic division between Sunni and Shiite school of thoughts, and consequently, Islamists reject the differences in tribes, social classes, ethnic differences, and any observable sociological realities (Roy, 1994, p. 71).

The Islamist mindset rejects the traditionalist jurisprudence and the empirical principles of sociology and anthropology; and instead, the Islamists want to establish a new sociological theory based on their own theological and sociological understandings. Based on these conceptions of the utopic Muslim society, they are willing to undertake the re-Islamization project as inspired and theorized by writings of Hassan AL-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. In simple words, their theory of re-Islamization adopts peaceful preaching and the use of violence if necessary to achieve a pious and virtuous Muslim community (Rinehart, 2009; Roy, 1994). The ideas of virtue and piety constitutes the building blocks of any presumed political model they are aspiring to establish, and maybe the only principle that is directing their political agenda. Roy (1994) states "the essential premise of the Islamist movement is that the political model it

proposes presupposes the virtue of individuals, but that this virtue can be acquired only if the society is truly Islamic (p. 27). Usually, the division drawn between moderate Islamists and radical Islamists in based on which approach of re-Islamization is adopted. Moderates adopt re-Islamistion from a bottom-up approach, a long-term process of preaching, teaching, media campaigns, charitable activities, welfare subsidies, etc. Moreover, Islamists were also involved into preaching and admonishing the political leaders and other officials to implement the Sharia Law. So, in principle, grassroots citizens and the elite were considered as un-Islamic and therefore they were targets of their re-Islamization project. The radical Islamists, on the other hand, do not accept any compromise, requiring a rapid execution of Sharia Law, through revolutionary program. The theological concepts of the power of excommunication and jahiliya, the state of ignorance, are extensively employed to justify their activities. In Roy exposition, Islamic movements may adopt one of two approaches to implement their re-Islamization project and bring about Political Islam into the forefront of political sphere. The first approach is the *revolutionary* one where the state exerts its power to re-Islamize the country through the introduction of new rules and regulations to bolster the Islamic identity of the society in question. The second approach is the reformist one which begins to re-Islamize the society from the bottom and gradually rebuild and reshape the Islamic identity among individuals (Roy, 1994, p. 24). Nonetheless, the division of these approaches is not mutually exclusive. A combination of the two approaches can be adopted to accelerate the accession to power as happened in Gaza Strip, Palestine, in 2006 (Milton-Edwards, 2007).

Concerning their internal structure, the Islamists political organization seems to resemble the Leninist Communist structure: Secretary General is likened to The Supreme Guide, Brother is likened to Comrade, and Council is likened to Central Committee (Roy, 1994, p. 47). Of great importance is the status of the Amir, a leader, who has a spiritual divinity and political authority, "many theoreticians accord him the right to Ijtihad which places him above the Ulamas," as

Roy argues (1994, p. 47). As discussed earlier, Islamists do not recognize the sectarian division as a barrier to Islamic unity, perceiving any theological or sociological differences as a characteristic of plot or conspiracy against the Muslim world. The Sunni Islamists' rapprochement to Shiite is not only theoretical but it is also extended to practice. Islamism, whether Shiite or Sunni, rejects the schismatic differences between the two schools and disregards the theological debate in favor for more pressing political issues. Sunni Islamism in the form of Muslim Brotherhood is more like Shiite Islamism in the sense that they both claim the right of interpreting the scared text and in putting a considerable emphasis on the charismatic leadership or the Amir (Roy, 1994, p. 123). The function of the Amir in Sunni Islamism resembles the function of the Imam in Shiite Islamism; they both have the power of interpreting the sacred text, excluding the traditionalist jurisdiction of the four schools. Despite the theological divisions of Sunnism and Shiism, Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, do not perceive such division as a crucial impediment to Islamic unification or a serious obstacle to prevent collaboration between Shiism and Sunnism.

In terms of Islamist political agenda, some scholars argue that there is no specific or recognizable political program because Islamists in principle do not recognize social sciences as an independent field of inquiry. Roy (1994) argues that "there is no true Islamist political thought, because Islamism rejects political philosophy and the human sciences as such. The magical appeal to virtue masks the impossibility of defining the Islamist political program in terms of the social reality" (p. 71). He continues to contend that the Sharia is not politically-based and does have any political foundation upon which sound social or political decisions can be extracted; however, Sharia creates a religious/divine space which can be manipulated to establish undisputed power and authority. To Islamists, the Sharia does not have a well-defined jurisdiction that can decide on daily matters or is dependent of official body, say, church or clergy. Instead, Roy (1994) argues that "th*e fatwa,* formal legal opinions that decide matters

not mentioned in the text, are always pronounced in the here and now and can be annulled by a subsequent authority" (p. 10). The Islamists perceive the Sharia, not as basic concepts of religion, but as an open source of jurisprudence that can be extended to cover all aspects of life "through induction, analogy, extension, commentary, and interpretation…[which] cannot be called into question, their extension is a matter of casuistics" (Roy, 1994, p. 10).

Leaders of Political Islam or Islamists postulate their ideal political model of Islamic State as being based solely on the concepts of virtue and modesty of the individuals, and therefore, they commit their political project to re-Islamizing the entire society to produce a pious society. They believe, as their writings indicate as will be shown soon, that if peaceful means of re-Islamistion did not work out or its pace was not as anticipated, the use of violence becomes a justified option. Despite differences over the approaches of re-Islamization, both moderate and radical Islamists adopt the main conception the presumed 'corrupted' society which need to be changed and both the power of excommunication, and to a lesser extent, the power of social ostracization, are implemented to achieve their objective (Milton-Edwards, 1999; Roy, 1994). The renunciation of any systematic Islamic jurisdiction and the rejection of the very empirical foundations of social sciences provide the most conducive environment for laying down a totalitarian governance that is similar in nature to Leninist Communism (Consea, 2018, pp. 13-14). Moreover, given the right to extract legal verdicts over all aspects of life, the Islamist model of state appears to be more similar to dictatorship with mystical aroma incarnated upon its leaders rather than a modern democracy.

2.10 Wahhabism and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB)

The most prominent movements of Sunni Political Islam in modern times seem to fall under two classifications: Wahhabism and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The selection of these two movements for discussion lies in the fact that they are the most omnipresent in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Wahhabism, for example, has spread all across the globe as bolstered by its

unlimited financial resources (Consea, 2018, pp. 17-25; Hashmi, 2016, pp. 1235-1238). The Egyptian MB seems to be the inspiration of most Political Islam movements in the Arab world as bolstered by anti-imperialist agenda (Campo, 2009, p. 506; Roy, 1994, pp. 110-111; Zeghal, 2013, pp. 381-282). Despite their omnipresence, these two movements demonstrate qualitative differences on their theological, administrative and organizational structures, as well as divergent political agendas. Based on the reformist ideas of Ibn Abdel Wahab, Wahhabism is a movement that depends mainly on the literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunna but without acknowledging the Islamic jurisprudence 'fiqh' as a legislature (Agoston & Masters, 2009, p. 260; Campo, 2009, p. 704; Eadeh, 2008, pp. 383-384). This means that Wahhabism does not commit itself to any school of legal jurisdictions, despite the claim that it follows the Hanbali school of thought. As a consequence, any legal verdicts over social, religious, economic, political matters, fall under the authority of religious scholars, giving them a carte blanch over all aspects of life in the Saudi society (Agoston & Masters, 2009, p. 260). The Egyptian MB, on the other hand, claims to follow the traditional schools of Sunnism as based on the four school of jurisdictions: Hanabalism, Hanafism, Shaafism, and Malikism (Campo, 2009, p. 506). Henceforth, the Egyptian MB seems to have a more organized legal and constitutional structures for their political agenda and more conducive and appealing to the public as compared to Wahhabism. On the administrative grounds, Wahhabism is fully embraced and adopted by the Saudi government as being the 'only' version of true Islam and it is enacted in all aspects of social and political lives. On the organizational structure, Saudi Arabia adopts a top-down approach to propagate Wahhabism doctrine abroad through sponsoring religious education, scholarships, donations, and other welfare and relief activities. On the other hand, the Egyptian MB is not fully recognized as a legal organization to practice its social and political activities freely in Egypt (Johnston, 2016, pp. 776-781). On the organizational structure, the Egyptian MB adopts a bottom-up approach of recruiting new members and mobilization,

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through religious sermons, Friday prayers, charitable work, and mosque gatherings (Campo, 2009, p. 506; Johnston, 2016, pp. 776-777, Hashmi, 2004, p. 105; Haynes, 2018, p. 2266; Terry, 2008, pp. 257-258). Nonetheless, the crucial difference between the two movements is their political agendas. Being a close ally to USA, Saudi Arabia adopts balanced positions towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Consea, 2018). On the other hand, the Egyptian MB is known to have been a hardline supporter of the Palestinian rights (Terry, 2008, pp. 257-258) and claim to espouse the rights of Muslims in the Arab and Muslim worlds (Zeghal, 2013, p. 381). Moreover, the Egyptian MB are considered Shiite sympathizers and do not perceive the sectarian division between the Sunnism and Shiism as an obstacle to unify efforts against the enemy of imperialist West (Hamid, 2020; Roy, 1994). Despite these observed differences, Wahhabism and Egyptian MB share the same antagonistic stance and belligerent feelings towards nationalism and secularism, and corroborated their work and coordination to decimate any nationalist project in the region (Zeghal, 2013, p. 381) as represented in the Nasserite Pan-Arabism.

4.0 Theoretical and Ideological foundations of Political Islam

4.1.1 Wahhabism

Long before the establishment of the Saudi Kingdom, and exactly in 1744, the Najd Pact was signed between Ibn Saud, who was the Sheikh of Najd province and the grandfather of Saud's family, and 'Imam' Muhammad bin Abdel Wahab AL-Sheikh (Consea, 2018). The pact was a sort of marriage of mutual benefits between the religious establishment and the political leadership at that time. The Najd Pact was in simple terms a coalition between the religious and political authorities in the Arabian Peninsula between Abdel Wahab, a fundamentalist Sunni scholar, and Ibn Saud, the Sheikh of Najd province as to how to coordinate and liaison their efforts and influences, and to define each one's roles and responsibilities in establishing the future kingdom. It was agreed that Abdel Wahab and his future Wahhabist disciples would control and dominate the religious establishment, offer a rubber-stamp support for the Saudi family, and impart a sense of legitimacy for their current and future political actions. In exchange, the Saudi family would adopt and circulate the Wahhabist doctrine as the 'true and pure' version of Islam in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, plus providing financial rewards and other privileges to its followers (Commins, 2016; Consea, 2018).

Due to the tribal system of the Arabian Peninsula, there were many Sheikhs, leaders of tribes, each of whom controlled a different province, who were considered competing rivals for Ibn Saud (Vasiliev, 2000, p. 103). The most competitive rival was Sharif Hussein of Mecca who posed a serious challenge to Ibn Saud because the Sharif was claimed to have descended from the Prophet (Nuruzzaman, 2017; Ruggiu, 2018). During the World War One, the Ottoman influence was decreasing in the Arabian Peninsula while the British influence was increasing, and the idea prevalent among the British at that time was to debilitate and destabilize the

Ottoman's rule and to shift the Arabs' allegiances towards the British (Vasiliev, 2000). To achieve that end, the British made conflicting agreements and promises to the Arab leaders in the Arabian Peninsula, among of whom was the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, who was promised to be the king/caliph of an Arab state (not defined geographically) if he was able to win the war against the Ottomans (Terry, 2008, p. 373). To the contrary of what had been promised, the British revoked the promises they had made for Sharif Hussein after the victory of the Arab revolt against the Ottomans in 1918, they finally decided to support Ibn Saud due to his expansive control over the Arabian Peninsula, and increased their support and helped him to establish the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Terry, 2008; Vasiliev, 2000). In the process of establishing Ibn Saud's dominance and sovereignty, the disciples of Abdel-Wahab had, as stipulated in the Najd Pact earlier, waged a religiously fierce war against other tribes who were opposing the legitimacy of Ibn Saud, especially AL-Rashid who were loyal proponents of the Ottomans (Eadeh, 2008, pp. 161-162), and the Shiite and Non-Wahabist affiliates (Consea, 2018). It is worth mentioning that during that war, Ibn Saud had not only subdued and dominated the other provinces of the Arabian Peninsula, but extended his influence over the Yemeni land and annexed Asir and Najran, most probably because they were oil-rich provinces (Nuruzzaman, 2017). The influential role of Saudi-Wahhabist doctrine was not restricted to the social and political lives of the Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula.

The Saudi religious establishment had dearly adopted these dogmatic indoctrinations and fundamentalist views, and exerted relentless efforts to propagate and export these views to the Muslims all around the world whether to independent states or to Muslim communities. Due to the enormous rentier oil revenues, the Saudis were able to procure endless financial resources, which enabled them to disseminate their radicalist version of Islam. The Wahabist infiltration, as will be demonstrated below, took the shape of offering scholarships for Islamic studies in Saudi Universities, establishing charitable and welfare organizations in poor Islamic countries,

sponsoring Islamic educations and schools in Islamic countries and Muslim communities in the Western World (Consea, 2018; Franken, 2017; García, 2018). Other different ways of infiltration were operated through philanthropic activities, donations, grants, endowments and assistance. These benevolent activities have been dearly and warmly received from countries that were experiencing financial difficulties or hardships which include the Middle East (Makinda, 1993; Mather, 2014; Robbins & Rubin, 2013) and Southeast Asia (Abdullah & Osman, 2018; Olivier, 2016; Liow, 2004). On the other hand, however, the generosity of these benevolent and welfare activities was not received in as much the same eagerness and fervency in the Western World as in Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Franken, 2017; Jakubowicz, 2007; Muslih, 2019). In the Western World, serious concerns were raised over the contents of Islamic educations in their countries that is sponsored by Saudi Arabia; concerns were interested over the Wahhabist cultural effects on social cohesion, and societal and ethical implications on the principles of human rights, multiculturalism and pluralism in cosmopolitan society. Moreover, scholars and individuals alike have expressed their caveats over the connections between the Islamic education and the rising of fundamentalism and terrorism on their soil, while others casted suspicions over the generosity of the Saudi funds and related them to a 'presumed' project of Islamizing Western societies (Franken, 2017; García, 2018; Muslih, 2019).

But what is Wahhabism, does it differ from Sunnism, and if yes, in what ways is it different from Sunni Islam? As discussed earlier, Wahhabism is a religious reformist movement that had initially emerged in the Arabian Peninsula and spread worldwide. Wahhabism or Wahhabiya, as it is called in Arabic, had been established by Muhammad Ibn Abdel Wahab (1703–1792), a radical Muslim scholar who challenged the Ottomans' religious legitimacy to rule the Muslim Shrines of Mecca and Medina (Campo, 2009; Terry, 2008; Vasiliev, 2000). Ibn Abdel Wahab was born to a religious scholar of Hanbali school of thought who was a well-respected judge in

Najd area. To Wahhabists, the term 'Wahhabiya' is considered an unacceptable term which does not capture the essence of the message they were propagating. To avoid being accused of running a new cult, they preferred to be called Muwahhidun, an Arabic term which is used to refer to 'those who believe in One God' or 'monotheists'. In the words of Agoston and Masters (2009), Wahhabism is a "movement [that] challenged the political legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire by asserting that the House of Osman had usurped political authority in the Muslim world and that their rule was therefore illegitimate" (p. 260). One of the main convictions of this movement is 'the power of excommunication' or the Arabic term 'Takfir' which can be applied to practicing Muslims if they did not meet the righteous criteria of being a Muslim from the Wahabist perspective. Agoston and Masters (2009) explained that, enabled with this religious conviction, Wahhabists "could declare other Muslims "nonbelievers" if they failed to live up to the standards set by a strict adherence to Muslim law" (p. 260). This radical attitude towards other fellow Muslims had laid down the ideological foundations and the religious legitimacy for the future kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism was the theological and ideological doctrine that provided the legitimate military conquest of the Arabian Peninsula in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by Ibn Saud and his Wahhabist zealots, and Wahhabism continues to reverberate and influence the Islamic movements worldwide (Hashmi, 2004, p. 727).

On theological terms, the Wahhabist doctrine is based on the rejection and condemnation of the long-established legacy of 'fiqh' or 'Islamic Jurisprudence' that was laid down by the four Sunni Schools of Thought, Hanafism, Shaafism, Malikism, and Hanabalism. Although the Wahhabists claim that they are fervently affiliated with the Hanbalist school, they rejected all jurisprudence that does not rigidly follow the literal interpretations of the Quran and Sunna. In order to achieve a puritanical version of Islam, Wahhabists were not committed to any single school of jurisprudence "but rather based their beliefs on direct interpretations of the words of

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the Prophet. Wahhabis[ts] believed that other Muslims, such as the Sufis and the Shi'i, followed non-Islamic practices," which is inherently implicative of the religious illegitimacy of the Sufists Ottomans (Eadeh, 2008, p. 439). Instead, the Wahhabists adopted 'Ijtihad' or 'Independent Legal Judgment' that was very limited in scope and was based mainly on an ad hoc and superficial readings of the sacred text and without any well-concerted legislative jurisdiction. Wahhabists claim that they represent the true Sunnis by the following and adherence of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence. Yet, in reality, they reject all the jurisdiction of Hanbalist tradition as well as other schools on the bases that they did not follow strictly to the Quran and Hadith. Consequentially, Ibn Abdel Wahab and other reformists, like Shah Wali Allah (1703-1762) in India, were strong proponents of independent jurisdiction (Ijtihad) at that time. Their Ijtihad was a strict reflection of the Quran and Hadith, especially with regards to the penal code of adultery, drunkenness, and the failure to perform the daily obligations and Ramadan fasting (Hashmi, 2016, pp. 1236-1237).

Moreover, Wahhabists have rejected the principle of 'taqlid', a long-held doctrine of Islamic jurisprudence which included the traditional legislative literature of the four rightly-guided companions and earlier Sunni scholars on the grounds of unequal sanctity and inviolability to that of the Prophet Muhammad. Wahhabism rejects the long-standing principle of 'taqlid' or, the adherence to the cumulative tradition of jurisdiction that was descended by former scholars and upheld by most Sunni ulama, and disapproves the recognition of the traditions of the disciples of the prophet and that of the four first Caliphs (Campo, 2009, p. 704). Entailed in these dogmatic preoccupations, Wahhabism preaches for the Oneness of God, strict adherence to the literal and rigid, yet superficial and uneducated interpretations of the Quran and Sunna, and adopts a violent actualization of the Islamic ritual duties, including but not limited to, the five-times prayers, almsgiving, fasting the month of Ramadan, and the Hajj. Religious police, or 'Mutawa', was invented to enact these rituals by brute force. The Mutawa falls directly under

the Ulamas' auspices and is not accountable to any other judicial court or jurisdiction. However, that is not the end of the story. According to Wahhabist doctrine, performing all the religious rituals and duties is not enough for a Muslim to be included in the Islamic faith. Distorting and Manipulating the two Islamic conceptions of 'Bidaa' (i.e., innovations) and 'shirk' (i.e., idolatry), the Wahabist doctrine was preaching for blind obedience of fellow Muslims to their rulers, and in this case, Ibn Saud; otherwise, they are considered 'non-believers'. Campo (2009) explains that "any belief or practice that fell outside this narrow definition of Islam was held suspect as an illegitimate innovation (Bidaa) or idolatry (shirk) that could put a Muslim, even an observant Muslim, outside the bounds of the faith" (p. 704). Islam, according to the Wahhabist dogmatic thinking, seems to adopt an intellectual dogmatic mentality that does not provide any room for constructive discussions over any conflictual religious issues and does not promote any willingness to accommodate any disparities among sectarian divisions. Enforcing the conceptions of 'illegitimate innovations' and 'idolatry' from the Wahhabist perspective had obstructed any possibility of reconciliatory rapprochement and mitigated any chance to achieve religious pluralism among the sectarian divisions of the Muslim world. More importantly, these conceptions had cultivated a culture of unfriendliness, antipathy, and estrangement among Muslims inside and outside the Arabian Peninsula, and promoted a scholarship of antagonism and vendetta whose negative consequences are continuing to breed up to this moment. Ibn Abdel Wahab had also called Muslims to denounce and reprobate the belief of intersection of Saints and Shiite Imam; mainly, he wanted to eliminate practices such as the invocation to the dead people, sacred objects and places, and religious shrines. As a result of Wahhabist spread in Saudi Arabia was the destruction of Shiite shrines and the burial of unmarked graves (Campo, 2009, p. 704).

When Abdel Wahab began to preach for his new radical doctrine in different parts of the Arabian Peninsula, his fundamental teachings were not dearly welcomed among the Arabs and

he was expelled from many Arabian provinces, including his own home town of Uyayna (Campo, 2009, p, 705; Hashmi, 2016, p. 5). After being expelled from different locations in the Arabian Peninsula, Abdel Wahab finally settled in Diriyya in Najd, near to Riyadh, a province controlled by Ibn Saud. There he formed a coalition with Ibn Saud, who pledged to protect and support him militarily, in exchange for legitimizing the religiosity of Ibn Saud's rule all over the Arabian Peninsula (Campo, 2009, pp. 704-5; Hashmi, 2016, p. 5). Campo explains (2009) that "the Saudi shaykh [sheikh] supported the preacher's campaign to realize his reformist vision through proselytization (daawa) and warfare (Jihad), in exchange for obtaining the right to collect zakat (alms) and obtain religious legitimation for Saudi rule throughout the Najd" (pp. 704-5). This alliance was cemented with intermarriages between the two tribes and still continues to the present (Hashmi, 2016, pp. 1235-1238). Soon after the alliance was forged, Ibn Saud employed Wahhabism doctrine to his favor and began to recruit Wahabist zealots to conquer other parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Eadeh (2008) argues "Ibn Saud used Wahhabism to justify his conquests of Arabia, arguing that many Muslims had become unbelievers and that orthodox, or rightly guided, Muslims had the right or even the duty to conduct violent jihad (holy war) against the unbelievers" (p. 439). Based on such extremist religious verdict, it was a religious duty for the Wahhabists to purify Islam from heretics and apostates (as claimed) through violence and ethnic cleansings, which both Wahhabists and Saudi' tribesmen were willing to undertake. By the end of 1924, Ibn Saud with the help of Wahhabist zealots conquered Hejaz, the province of the holiest places for the Muslim World, and eliminated the Hashemite legacy in the region. Dominating Mecca and Medina provided Ibn Saud and the Wahhabists the religious legitimacy to propagate the puritan version of pristine Islam, as well as the opportunity to manipulate Islam for political reasons for years to come (Eadeh, 2008, p. 439).

In modern Saudi Arabia, Wahabist doctrine is still enacted and enforced through supreme council and religious police. The supreme council includes a collection of Wahabist scholars of Hanbalist jurisdiction who supervises the government performance and the implementation of Islamic Law. According to some scholars, there is no codification for the legal system in Saudi Arabia and judicial verdicts are left to the religious scholars (Campo, 2009). Campo (2009) claims that "major decisions are made only after consultation with the Supreme Council of the Ulama, who claim the right to issue legal opinions and judgments on the basis of ijtihad (independent legal reasoning), rather than legislative law (p. 706). Hashmi (2016) explains "the courts enforce a largely unwritten legal code that permits capital punishment for murder, rape, drug smuggling and adultery, amputation of the hands for theft, and flogging for drunkenness" (p. 1237). The Mutawa, on the other hand, is the association that is responsible for commanding the right and preventing the wrong through enacting religious order and piousness among the citizens of Saudi Arabia. In particular, the Mutawa are assigned the duties to observe and maintain the adherence to Wahabist conservatism which includes "gender segregation, dress codes, the bans on alcohol and gambling, and censorship of books, magazines, television, videos, and music" (Campo, 2009, p. 706). With regard to Human Rights, Wahhabism had ravaged the civil rights of the citizens of the Arabian Peninsula and confiscated their rights and freedoms (Sabban, 2005, p. 21). For example, females had not been allowed to drive or to travel alone for whatever reason, be it for education or medication, unless if she takes a permission from a brother, who might be younger than her with twenty years (Doumato, 2010, p. 426; Sabban, 2006, p. 21).

It is not untrue to assume that the Wahhabist influence was only channeled to the daily lifestyles, social restrictions and civil and political freedoms of the citizens of Arabian Peninsula. Campo (2009) argues that "they [Wahhabists] have had a significant impact on the ways Muslims understand and practice their religion in many parts of the world today" (p. 704).

The Wahhabist influence is of a universal character operated, manipulated, and facilitated by the huge oil-rents collected from petroleum exportation or what has been called petrodollars revenues (Consea, 2018; Hashmi, 2016). The huge oil-rents had provided Saudi Arabia with the most important tool to circulate its dogmatic doctrine of Wahhabism not only in Arab and Muslim Worlds but also in the Muslim communities in the Western World. Since early years, Saudi Arabia began to entrench its religious indoctrination through the establishments of numerous Non-Governmental Organizations, some of which are associated with United Nations. The Saudis established the World Islamic Congress, WIC, (1949), the Jerusalem General Islamic Congress, JGIC, (1953), the High Council for Muslim Affairs, HCMA, (1960), and the Muslim World League, MWL, (1962) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, WAMY, (1972), as an opposition political front for Nasserite Arabism (Consea, 2018). Moreover, in 1969, the Saudis established the Organization of Islamic Conference, OIC, which later had changed to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, OIC (Consea, 2018, p. 61). Backed up with unlimited budgets, these organizations have proven very effective in the political scene, starting from the defeat of Pan-Arabism, victory in Afghanistan, and the widespread of Wahhabism, in both versions of Quietist and Jihadist Salafist in almost all over the world (Hashmi, 2016, p. 1235-1238). As Pierre Consea notes that with the huge "resources at its disposal [Saudi Arabia], notably financial (US $6–7 billion a year), makes it a much better-endowed actor than Soviet propaganda was in its heyday (US $2 billion a year) and should logically be a factor in the debate on the financing of jihadism" (Consea, 2018, p.136). Moreover, it is estimated that Saudi Arabia had spent more than 70 billion dollars for its religious diplomacy, or the support, sponsorship, and export of Wahhabism outside its geographical borders, and that excludes the donations by the royal family and the religious establishment (Consea, 2018).

The propagation of Wahhabism followed a top-down approach, where the high officials in the royal palace and the religious establishment, mainly from AL-Sheikh family, had been actively involved in the process of Wahhabization of the citizens of Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere in the world. The acceleration of Wahhabization in Western world had been bolstered by the liberal views, religious pluralism, and the principles of secularism; whereas in south and central Asia, Africa, and Middle East, the reason had been the dire need for financial resources. The technique was simple but highly effective, money. Saudi Arabia had offered generous scholarships to Saudi religious universities with free accommodation and monthly salaries, on the condition that these students should return and circulate the Wahhabist doctrine in their home country (Abdullah & Osman, 2018; Consea, 2018; Olivier, 2016). Other point of interest is the educational Muslim establishments outside of Saudi Arabia, which might cover whole countries like Malaysia and Indonesia or any other Muslim communities in the Western World, Canada, Australia, etc. Exploiting the ethnic conflict in Malaysia and the Malays' interest to strengthen their Islamic identity, among other ethnic minorities, the Saudi funds found their way to spread its doctrine of Wahhabism (Olivier, 2016, p. 4). In explaining the reasons for religious radicalization in Malaysian society, Olivier (2016) states "there are also other factors in Malaysia, such as the infiltration of more traditional Islamic thinking via the funding by Saudi Arabia of mosques and religious schools, and the rise of NGOs that aggressively promote Malay rights" (p. 4). Moreover, Olivier (2016) contends that the religious students who have had their education in Saudi Arabia would involve in spreading more traditional version of religious education (p. 4). Similar to the Malaysian case, Indonesia had fallen under the Wahhabist influence under the lure of strengthening diplomatic relation with Saudi Arabia (Abdullah & Osman, 2018, p. 221). Saudi Arabia had provided a financial aid through international Islamic organization, the Indonesian Organization of Islamic Proselytization, for the building of mosques, religious schools, and the training of Imams according to Wahhabist

doctrine. Most importantly, it provided scholarships for Indonesian students to study in Saudi universities (Abdullah & Osman, 2018, p. 221).

Due to the overwhelming presence of Saudis in the Islamic NGOs spheres, the Wahhabist doctrine is being bolstered to infiltrate into other countries through direct control over the curricula, the teaching materials, and the supervision of the teaching process at administrative and cooperative levels (Consea, 2018). That is why some voices had recently been raised in the Western World, especially after being a victim of terrorist attacks, to inspect the teaching materials adopted by Islamic Schools in their home countries, their teachers' ethnic background and education, and their teachers' perceptions of tolerance, pluralism, and multiculturalism (Abdullah & Osman, 2018; Franken, 2017; Jakubowicz, 2007; García, 2018; Haddad & Balz, 2008; Muslih, 2019; Olivier, 2016; Zainal, 2018). The widespread of terrorist attacks from western-born Arabs or Muslims had initiated much interest in rethinking and re-examining the Wahhabist doctrine of the Islamic schools that are associated with Saudi ties or funds (Abdullah & Osman, 2018; Franken, 2017; Jakubowicz, 2007; García, 2018). Much research had been done to establish a relationship between terrorism and Islamic education in the Western world (Franken, 2017; García, 2018; Wainscott, 2015). Although a correlation and causal relationship has never been clearly and directly established (Wainscott, 2015, p. 636), research found that the Wahhabist doctrine includes much of intolerance, animosity and racial inclinations towards other religions and sectarian divisions. Wahhabism's main reason for the elimination of religious pluralism such as paganism, Shiism, and Sufism, was initially motivated to protect religion from corruption and deviation that were infiltrating into the right faith 'Wahhabism' and interfering with the "oneness" of God. Soon later, Wahhabism was directed against other Sunni schools of jurisdictions, as well as other religions and doctrines (Rich and MacQueen, 2017, p. 3).

Research had highlighted that the radically puritanical views, which once had been espoused by the founding fathers of Saudi Arabia, had been on the rise and breeding all across the Muslim world (Rakic & Jurisic, 2012; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006). Back in history, the Wahhabist Brotherhood had launched bloody campaigns against the members of other sectarian division, including Christians, Jews, and all Muslims who are non-Wahhabist, like Shiite, Sufist, nationalist, secularist, socialist, and communists (Hashmi, 2016, pp. 1235-1238). Consea argues that the Wahhabist doctrine approves discrimination, and even propagates violence against other sectarian divisions of Sunni Islam, practices institutional violence against Shiism, and carries out unwavering racial discrimination against secularists, nationalists, and other religion affiliates (Consea, 2018, p. 13). All non-Wahhabists were silenced or killed, thanks for the power of excommunication. The physical force was not only directed towards non-Wahhabists but it was applied towards the holy shrines of the other sects. To the Shiite doctrine, and with a lesser extent to the Sufists, some graveyards of the Prophet's companions and religious scholars, presumably of Prophet's descendances, are considered scared and are to be visited on regular basis, were pulverized to the ground and annihilated (Consea, 2018). Allen (2007) notes that "his [Ibn Abdel Wahab] thinking was such that only he alone was a Muslim, and everyone else was a mushriq [polytheist]" (p. 67). Regarding the relationship between Wahhabist doctrine and the daily lifestyles, social and personal freedoms, the list of dos and don'ts is divinely unquestionable and the basic principle to live up safely in Saudi Arabia is to have a rubber-stamp mentality and copycats' psyche. These wannabees must never to questions anything and they have to do what they are ordered to do, and by that, they are guided to the righteous path of Paradise.

4.1.2 The Emergence of Neo-Wahhabism

When Ibn Saud finally conquered the Hejaz in 1924, he had been faced with serious challenges in controlling the region. The Saudi Brothers, or the Saudi Ikhwan, the Wahhabist warriors who

had helped Ibn Saud to subdue the Arabian Peninsula, had demonstrated dissatisfactions and displeasures over Ibn Saud approach of pacification towards the Hejazi citizens. It is of utmost importance to distinguish between the Saudi Ikhwan and the Egyptian Ikhwan. Ikhwan in Arabic language literally translates into brothers. However, the reference of Ikhwan differs in the Saudi and the Egyptian contexts. In Egypt, Ikhwan refers to the members of the Muslim Brotherhood members. In Saudi Arabia, Ikhwan refers Wahhabist Warriors who helped Ibn Saud to conquer the Arabian Peninsula. As a more developed region than any other part of the Arabian Peninsula, the Hejaz represented more technological manifestations and luxurious lifestyles that were alien to the Wahhabist Ikhwan, and contradicted with the rigidity and austerity of the Wahhabist doctrine. The Ikhwans' discontent over 'civilized Hejaz' was a sort of mixture between rigid Wahhabist indoctrination and nomad savagery. When the Ikhwan conquered Hejaz, they began to pulverize the houses of the Prophet birthplace, Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, and Khadija, the wife of the Prophet (Vasiliev, 2000, p. 547). Planes, cars, telephones, radios, and even mirrors were all considered as devil's inventions. The Ikhwans were also infuriated over tobacco and alcohol consumption. Moreover, the Ikhwans were disgruntled over Ibn Saud' peaceful approach towards the Shiite inhabitants in AL-Hasa and AL-Qatif, a region of oil reservoir. One more incident that is worth mentioning, the Mahmal, the caravan that is used to transport the pilgrimage. In 1926, the Egyptian Mahmal, or the caravan, had arrived to Mecca to perform pilgrimage. Upon hearing the pilgrims singing religious sermons, the Ikhwan perceived the singing as an act of hostility, and killed over twenty of them. As a result, a diplomatic problem with Egypt's authority occurred. Even more seriously, the Ikhwan launched military incursions into Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait between the years (1926-1929) to promulgate their Wahhabist doctrine. Beginning to lose his control over the Wahhabists which began to cause serious problems with neighboring countries, Ibn Saud realized that he needed to regain control over them. As a result of negotiations with the British,

the British finally agreed to help and aided him with military equipment and they even participated in subduing the Ikhwan (Vasiliev, 2000). Although the Ikhwan revolt was finally crushed in 1929, the Wahhabist doctrine attracted more followers among the Saudis who deserted modern life and sought a refuge in the desert.

4.1.3 Juhayman's Revolution

With the modernization projects that were bolstered by petrodollars especially during the reign of King Faisal, Saudi Arabia began to take the shape of modern state and more technological innovations and luxurious goods and products were introduced. On the other hand, in order to counter Nasserite nationalism, King Faisal developed the agenda of religious diplomacy. Huge funds were directed to establish theological universities and religious education was given a high priority. Moreover, many MB members, who fled Nasser persecution were warmly received in Saudi Arabia. A pragmatic coalition was formed, disregarding their theological differences, to fight against a common enemy—the communist Nasserite nationalism. This sort of development in Saudi internal and external policy had created a "double-edge sword" (AL-Rasheed, 2014, p. 139). AL-Rasheed (2014) states that the "excessive wealth, corruption of the ruling group, the changing landscape of Saudi Arabia and the expansion of religious education in universities created by King Faysal in the early 1970s triggered the return of the Ikhwan" (p. 139). To the neo-Ikhwan, the corruption of Saudi Family and its Ulamas, the partnership with the United States, the spread of religious education had created serious discrepancies that were simmering and waiting the opportunity to erupt. Born in the Ikhwan settlement of Sajir in AL-Qasim, Juhayman, a former officer at the National Guard, began to develop his radical ideas when he had studied at state Wahhabist universities (Commins, 2016, p. 164). Realizing the laxity and degeneration of the Saudi family, the unequal distribution of fortune among the Saudi citizens, Juhayman began to convince himself as being divinely assigned the mission of overthrowing the corrupted Saudi family, thinking of his cousin, Muhammad Abdullah as the

true Mahdi, Messiah. Whether the Mahdi or nor not, the Juhayman's incident was a revolution against the Royal Family that seriously had shaken the kingdom and was nearly about to oust the Saud's family.

AL-Rasheed (2014) states:

Juhayman and his followers represented an Islamic uprising in protest at what its members described as the religious and moral laxity and degeneration of the Saudi rulers. This was the first time the Saudi royal family had been openly attacked for improper personal conduct and corruption since the reign of Ibn Saud (p. 139).

Juhayman's revolution was a sort of reflection of to the social challenges that were brought by the modernization projects and religious education initiated by King Faisal, and represented a conflictual conceptualization of modern social lifestyles which was complicated by the unequal distribution of fortune and the royal family oppressive practices. Juhayman AL-Otaybi, on November 20, 1979, seized the microphone after the Friday's prayer at the Grand Mosque in Mecca to declare the emergence of AL-Mahdi, or the Messiah, Muhammad Abdullah Qahtani, a cousin of AL-Otaybi, who is going to eradicate the corruption and spoilage of Saudi Family, and fulfill the earth of justice and goodness. Combined with two-hundred armed mutineers, they converted the Grand Mosque into a formidable fortress. These insurgents were pure Wahhabist who denounced the new lifestyles that had infiltrated into the Arabian Peninsula which were very far away from the proper lifestyle that should be followed as dictated by their interpretation of Islam. The idea of Messiah is reported in the Islamic traditions, which if the prophecy is true, it will ensue a full eradication of the Saudi Royal Family, and that is why it had exerted a shocking effect onto the Saudi Royal Family. Alarmed and terrified, the Saudi's fear was augmented by the fact that the sacred text of the Quran forbids the fight inside the Grand Mosque for whatsoever reason, and any military intervention needs a Fatwa, a religious

permit. An urgent meeting was called for to discuss the issue, and Ibn Baz, the Grand Mufti at that that time and a group of other senior Muftis had convened, who declared the authenticity of the emergence of Messiah to fight against the degeneration, libertinism, and decadency, but that is not applicable to the Saudi Royal Family. Therefore, a verdict was issued to use the military force to exterminate the insurgents.

Although the army, police, and national guards were dispatched to crush the uprising, they were not able regain control of the Grand Mosque. It was quite embarrassing for the regime that they were not able to broadcast the daily prayers from the Grand Mosque. The Saudi authorities did not know who the insurgents were, and at first estimation, they and the Americans thought it was a Khomeini-Shiite inspired group. With complete denial of any uprising in the Grand mosque, the Americans received confirmed information that the Grand Mosque is occupied by a terrorist group and released that to the media without the Saudi permission. The news enflamed the Muslims all around the world and demonstrations erupted in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Turkey, and Iran. The Muslim newspapers espoused the conspiracy theory and claimed that Israel and the United States orchestrated the whole thing to control the Muslim land (Trofimov, 2008, p. 108). In Pakistan, for example, the American Embassy was burnt over the accusation of the American involvement in the Grand Mosque's takeover. Believing that the Khomeini's involvement in the takeover in one way or another, the Americans dispatched USS kitty Hawk and USS Midway warships to the Gulf to secure Saudi Arabia from any Iranian dangers. On the other hand, the Iranians vehemently denied any involvement in the incident, and instead, accused the Americans of the heinous act.

On the battlefield, however, the Saudi forces had only controlled the first floor of the Grand Mosque after one week of a ferocious fight. Juhayman and his rebels retreated to the underground basement and the prayers could not resume unless a total control of the Grand Mosque could be achieved. Seeking American advice on the matter, a team of CIA operatives

assessed the situation and recommended the use of chemical agents. After few attempts of pumping gas into the underground premises of the Grand Mosque, the Saudis failed due to their ill-training and the resistance of the insurgents. Furthermore, with the uncontrollable spread of the gas in the surroundings and the nearby residential compounds, the Saudis in desperation concluded that they need outside help. At that point, the Saudis realized that they could not regain control over the Grand Mosque without seeking an outside help. But the question was: who would that be? The mission must be entrusted to a confidential partner as the sensitivity of situation requires the utmost secrecy. First, over the rumors that the Americans were involved, the Saudi authorities excluded the Americans as a partner in the mission lest they embarrass themselves by confirming the Pakistani and Iranian propaganda. Second, the Saudis were infuriated by the Americans who released the take-over of the Grand Mosque to the media, an act that confounded and humiliated the Saudi authorities. Third, Prince Turki, was ambivalent to seek American help. Although the CIA had already established assistance mission in the American military base in Taef, concerns over the secrecy of the mission was still in peril. The Saudi chief of intelligence, Prince Turki, was hesitant to seek the American help. He believed that CIA was strictly governed by congressional restrictions, which, may not help providing the urgent assistance needed. Furthermore, Prince Turki's hesitation was motivated by the American's inability to keep secrets; he was afraid that the Americans may leak the details of this assistance to the media as it happened before with George Cave, the CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia, over internal infighting of the House of Saud earlier in 1979 (Trofimov, 2008, pp. 185-187). With the exclusion of the Americans, other options were at the table. Morocco and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan proposed to help. However, king Khaled refused their help. He did not want to give any other Arab leaders the credit of being the liberators of the Holy Shrines, especially to king Hussein whose grandfathers were kicked out

of Hejaz more than fifty years ago. To Saudi family, it would be utterly unacceptable to seek the help of the Hashemites whom they expelled from Hejaz years ago,

To Saudi family, it would be utterly unacceptable and shameful if the Hashemites, whom the Saudis had expelled from Hejaz years ago, were able to liberate and restore the Grand Mosque in favor for the Saudis. If that happens, the Hashemites will claim the glory of liberating the holiest places in Islam, and will definitely, increase the potential of Hejazi upsurge in the future or cultivates the sentiments of separatism in that region (Trofimov, 2008, p. 186). Therefore, Arab assistance was rebuffed. Due to Prince Turki's strong personal connection with Count Alexandre de Marenches, the director of France's intelligence agency, who performed successfully secret operation in Central Africa, the French intelligence service was a very viable option. After being granted the permission of the French president, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the French intelligence service was assigned the mission (Trofimov, 2008, pp. 190-193). The French Captain, Paul Barril, was assigned the mission. He sought for a ton of CS gas, an irritating gas that blocks breathing, but he was instructed to finish the mission with the amount he already had, 300 kg. To make maximum use of the limited amount of CS gas he had, he and his team had drilled some holes where he suspected the insurgents were hiding and pumped gas through them (Hiro, 2014, p. 77). It is worth mentioning that it was not only the French who provided help to the Saudis. Pakistan also sent special forces to aid in the process. In response to Prince Fahd's appeal to Pakistan, General Zia UL-Haq dispatched a regiment of Special Services Group which was commanded by Brigadier Tariq Mehmood to Mecca. Its mission was to assist the Saudi forces to recapture the Grand Mosque. On 4 December, all of the insurgents were captured and the Grand Mosque was liberated (Hiro, 2014, p. 77).

Finally, with the help of the French intelligence service and the Pakistani special forces, the Saudi government was able to gain back the hold of the Grand Mosque on December 4, 1979, and on January 9, all the rebels were publicly beheaded (Consea, 2018; Hiro, 2014; Torifimov,

2008). Shaken by this ultra-conservative movement, the Saudi authority had responded with more Wahhabization to appease the anger of fundamentalists and extremists. To realize fundamentalist society, religious Islamic police "a Committee for the Prevention of Vice and the Propagation of Virtue", was legally established as an independent institution in 1980 whose leader was given a rank of minister (Consea, 2018, pp. 26-27). A new circle of human right's violations was resumed, but this time, the neo-wave of Wahhabization is getting more austere and rigid. Perceived as to be similar to the Ikhwan's revolt in 1926-1929, Juhayman's incident had redirected the modernization wheel backwards. To appease the anger over the new trend of neo-Wahhabists and prevent any revolutionary trend among the Saudi society, the optimal way for the Saudi authority to control people was to introduce new Wahhabist measures which extends the governments' hand to all aspects of the Saudi social life. Among the measures were the dismissal of female TV presenters, the closure of hairdressing salons, and the ban of female education abroad. Travels to USA and Western Europe were considered heinous acts due to their effects on the Muslim character. Furthermore, Islamic dress code was applied to non-Saudis, including Christians, and mixed-use beaches were closed down (Wynbrandt, 2010, pp. 241-242). Moreover, gender segregation in restaurants and banks were enacted, wearing the veil (Burqa) was compulsory, songs were banned from TV, satellites were filtered, video stores were closed down, celebration of non-religious holidays were banned, and women were banned from driving (Campo, 2009; Consea, 2018). More funds were directed to the buildings of new mosques, and religious teachings had increased (Consea, 2018).

In explaining the incident, AL-Rasheed (2014) argues that the Juhayman's revolution was an unexpected reflection to the modernization brought to a nomad community which is totally governed by Wahhabist mindset. The modern civilization and technological advances had changed the Saudi society and exerted influence over the lifestyles of the Saudis. Moreover, it might be argued as well that Saudis began to revoke and abandon the strictness of Wahhabism,

the long-held doctrine upon which the Saudi legitimacy is based on. Perceived as a social estrangement that is alien to the nomad-Wahhabist society, some revolutionary members such as Juhayman and his rebels wanted to take a political reaction to purify the society at their own hands.

AL-Rasheed (2014) states:

However, both the ruling group and ordinary Saudis understood that the rebellion was not about a false or true Mahdi, but was about a development that unleashed contradictory social outcomes and tensions not anticipated by a government that championed modernisation in the process of creating new grounds for legitimacy (p. 141).

It appears that the Saudi society had undergone serious changes under the Wahhabization and Modernization projects which are often contentious if not contradictory, which had finally brought Juhayman's revolution. The austere religious education in its Wahhabist version from the one hand and the adoption of Western lifestyle seemed to be incompatible dual pursuit, which, at the end, led the authorities to the dilemma of either adopting more Wahhabization or more modernization. It was obvious that the Saudi authorities would choose more Wahhabization over modernization to promote and empower their religious legitimacy inside and outside Saudi Arabia. When the Soviet Russians invaded Afghanistan in December 25, 1979, it was the perfect opportunity for the Saudi officials to appease the extremist's anger and assuage their fundamental aspiration for establishing the Islamic state. In line with the US policy as a part of the global war against communist Russia, thousands of Saudi fundamentalists were allowed to travel to Afghanistan in order to fight the communist and atheist Russians. Not only did Saudi Arabia played a facilitating role in sending extremists, called "mujahideen" but they were supported by Saudi finances (Consea, 2018). Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, the Iranian challenge to Saud Arabia had not been lessened or totally eliminated.

4.1.4 The Rise of Shiism

The late seventies were not a good omen for Saudi Arabia and the Juhayman incident was not the only one that shocked the kingdom. Between January 1978 and February 1979, the Iranian revolution was simmering, and it was the middle of 1979 that Ayatollah Khomeini was able to establish the Islamic Republic of Iran. The regime change itself was not a serious challenge for the Royal Family in Saudi Arabia; yet, the revolutionary tone of the Iranian regime and its Shiite expansionist doctrine were extremely alarming to the Sunni majority in the region. Earlier, and during the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi rule, Saudi Arabia was clearly observant of the growing expansionist ambitions of secular Iran, and consequently, employed different tactics, including the control of oil prices through OPEC and the huge US armament purchase (Saikal, 2019). The reduction of oil prices as a result of Saudis' increased oil production deprived the Shah from benefiting from the exportation of Iranian oil revenues upon which the Shah staked his modernization project on (Saikal, 2019, pp. 41-42). That tactic of reducing the oil prices was extremely detrimental to the Iranian economy, especially, in response to the huge modernization projects that were initiated during the Shah, and the Saudis were successful to deflect and fend off the Iranian courageous ambitions in the oil-rich region. Saikal (2019), for example, states that the reduction of prices rendered a "a serious shortfall in Tehran's income, forcing the Shah to raise a $500 million loan from Europe in order to meet the costs of his planned projects. By 1977, the budget deficit had increased to $4.5 billion" (pp. 41-42). Nevertheless, the newly emergent Shiite revolution had to be perceived from a different angle and with great caution due to its challenging theological component which might debilitate the securities of the Gulf states and wear out their proclaimed religious legitimacy, given the oppressed Shiite minorities in their countries (Roy, 1994, Saikal, 2019, Trofimov, 2008). The Islamic revolution had changed the political order in the region and created "deep ideological,

political, and security concerns for many neighboring Arab states, which feared the Republic would embolden Shia and other minorities to rise up across the region" (pp. 4-5). The Iranian revolution had not only been concerned to implement its Shiite theocracy within its borders; it had opted to export its revolution into other Islamic states (Donovan, 2014, pp. 86-88; Saikal, 2019, pp. 71-86). Donovan (2014) argues that the Islamic revolution was obviously involved in "revolutionary rhetoric with the hope it would spread" in the Arab Islamic region (p. 88).

Shiite Iran, under Khomeini and his successors, had embraced a mixture of revolutionary rhetoric therein he condemned colonialism and imperialism as incarnated in the US and the Western allies, excoriated in the process the Arabs' subordination and submissive attitude to their dominance, while espousing a universal stance towards defending the 'oppressed and impoverished people' either towards Shiite minorities in the Arab or Islamic worlds (Saikal, 2019, p. 71). Furthermore, the revolutionary rhetoric goes a step forward to adopt anti-hegemonic discourse and developed friendly relationships with socialist and anti-imperialist countries/entities in which they collaborated their efforts to work against US policy. For example, Karagiannis and McCauley (2013) state that "Bolivarian Venezuela and the Islamic Republic of Iran have formed a so-called ''axis of unity'' against the United States" (p. 168). Khomeini's rhetoric was global in nature; he wanted to liberate the oppressed nations and eliminate the extortionist imperialism of the United States as well the Western powers. He also challenged the Western dominance in the Middle East and denounced the unquestionable support for Israel, which he called as the colonialist and imperialist occupier of Palestine (Saikal, 2019, p. 71). Situating the political rhetoric within this global framework, the Iranian revolution had claimed the position that the Marxist-Leninist propaganda had once adopted, but the only difference seems to be the religious flavor that is associated with the Islamic revolution (Saikal, 2019, pp. 4, 51-52). The revolutionary attitude of the Islamic revolution, the Iranian expansionist ambition in the Arab oil-rich region, the religious Shiite minorities are all valid

concerns to increase panic and shake the cores of these kingdoms. Furthermore, and even the most important for the Wahhabist affiliated countries in the region, is the challenge of religious legitimacy upon which these countries are based on. Shiism, as will be shown below, has a crucial difference with Sunnism, and the essential reason seems to be the legitimacy of religious rule in the Islamic world.

4.1.5 The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist

According to Saikal (2019), the essential point of contention over the rule of governance between Shiism (the guardianship of Islamic jurist) and Sunnism (the caliphate) is the legitimacy of the person who is entitled to govern and lead the Islamic world. In plain words, the difference is that the Shiite theology requires the ruler to be descendant from Ali's offspring whereas in the Sunni theology does not require that condition. In the Sunni theology, the leader or the caliph is not necessarily to be a religious cleric; however, in the Shiite theology the leadership of the Islamic world must be limited to the house of Imam Ali and his descendants, the Twelve Imams and their grandsons. To explain, after the death of Prophet Muhammad, the Caliphate was established and the four caliphs who governed the Muslim world were Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman and Ali, consecutively. Nonetheless, the Shiites contend that the Prophet had assigned Ali as his direct successor as the caliph, and consequently, they presume that the first three caliphs unjustly confiscated this right. Moreover, they argue that the rule of Islamic world should be restored to the House of Ali and his offspring from the Sunni world. Such schismatic distinction characterizes the theocratic differences that are reflected into politics of the Muslim states at the current time. In line with the Shiite argument, Khomeini developed the concept of Velayat e Faqih, the guardianship of Islamic jurist, by which the faqih, or the jurist, acts as a deputy mouthpiece of the hidden Imam who had gone missing. To explain, Muhammad Hassan AL-Mahdi, the twelfth Imam who is supposed to provide the necessary jurisprudence and to rule the Islamic world, had gone missing. Therefore, the system of guardianship enables the

Islamic jurist to act as a deputy of the hidden Imam assuming a full sovereignty and authority over the people. The political system includes a national assembly whose members are elected but the word of God vested in the faqih "would nevertheless prevail over the will of the people on contentious governance issues" (Saikal, 2019, p. 8).

On the other hand, there are other characteristics of Shiite governance that were promoted by Khomeini. Khomeini advanced the idea that the only right interpretation of Islam was his version of it, which as he argued, is sufficiently enough to create an Islamic polity that can tackle internal and external issues (Saikal, 2019, pp. 3-4). By such conception, Khomeini denounced other versions of Islam such as the Sunnism, other Shiite sects as in Iraq, and, of course, secularism. To create an Islamic political theory that is conducive to the modern politics and effective in the face of the dynamic changes in international relations, he developed two interrelated concepts: Jihadi (combative) and Ijtihadi (reformist). The Jihadi concept refers to the Islamization of politics while the other refers to the logical reasoning in a way that can lay down the basis for strong Iran. He adopted the rhetoric of empowering the 'oppressed' against the 'oppressors' augmenting his arguments by drawing on theological and secular principles, which has much resemblance to the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric of proletariat and bourgeoise (Saikal, 2019, p. 4).

4.1.6 Mounting Challenge and Arabs' Reaction

Soon after the formation of revolutionary Iran had occurred, Islamist Iranians began a series of antagonistic rhetoric and destabilizing behaviors not only in Iraq (Donovan, 2014) but also many Arab states, Kuwait and Bahrain (Karsh, 2012; Pelletiere, 1992). Upon the Khomeini's ascendance to power, the Ba'athist regime in Iraq welcomed the Iranian leader and opted for good relations and economic cooperation. However, these warm advances were rebuffed, which in turn, shaped the structure of relationships between the two countries for years to come. The accession of Khomeini to power had changed the nature of the Iranian-Iraqi relations for

generations to come. Although the Baathist party had welcomed the new revolutionary regime in Iran, the Iranians did not reciprocate the cordiality of the Iraqi regime. The newly established policies of the Iranians demonstrated two poles "Iranian regional aspirations towards Pan-Shi′ism and Iraq concern[s] for state integrity and survival" (Donovan, 2014, p. 86). Donovan argues that Khomeini's ascendance to power had created the Iraqi's security problem due to the Iranian escalating rhetoric of Shiite exportation and regional expansionism. Due to its schismatic Shiite affiliation, Iranian propaganda had targeted the Shiite population in the Gulf states and urged them to revolt against their Sunni rulers. Among the provocations at the Iraqi front, they indicated that they were not obligated to abide to the Algiers Treaty signed in 1975 by deputy Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, and Shah Pahlavi that settled border conflicts (Bukovich, 2008, pp. 218-219). Verbal provocations in the form of Shiite exportation to Iraq and other lashing comments that were uttered by high rank Iranian officials (Donovan, 2014). Furthermore, the Iranians were accused of assassination attempt to the deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz, in April 1980 (Donovan, 2014, p. 89) and plotted a coup d'état in Bahrain and carried out other destabilizing activities in the region (Pelletiere, 1992, pp. 60-63). Due to these hostile activities of the Iranian leadership, Arab states sought to ensure the security of their countries. Despite their differences, the Arab leaders had naturally sided with Saddam Hussein, to fend off the Iranian expansionist ambition and any Shiite exportation, and forestall any potentially possible insurgency among Arab Shiite minorities among the Arab states. Moreover, Arab states were much concerned about to secure the waterways in the Gulf in order to keep the overflow of oil exportation, the main source of income in Gulf States. Therefore, the Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, vehemently supported the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein all along the eight years of war to procure their own security and safety (Karsh, 2012; Pelletiere, 1992). The Iranian-Iraqi war was a great opportunity to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to eradicate the disturbing Iranian influence that was first initiated by the Shah and

escalated during the Khomeini. The Saudis, backed up by most Arab Gulf countries, had supported the Sunni-minority government of Iraq, though secular in nature, against the Shiite-majority government of Iran. The Gulf countries have financially aided and supported Iraq for eight years because they wanted to beat off Iran of any geopolitical influence and thwart any advances in their own territories (Consea, 2018).

Soon, however, the rules of the game changed. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states not only turned their back on Iraq but they conspired at him and manipulated the oil prices (Tucker-Jones, 2014) as they once did the same to Shah's Iran (Saikal, 2019). Despite the huge financial resources transferred to Iraq during the war, Iraq had faced enormous financial troubles paying off the debts and revitalize the country's economy. Simultaneously, Kuwait which shared some oil-wills bordering Iraq was claimed to have withdrawn more than of its share from these wills, an action which infuriated the then Iraqi authorities.

Tucker-Jones (2014) notes:

One of Saddam's reasons for invading his neighbor [Kuwait] was that the Kuwaitis were pumping out such large quantities of oil that it was forcing down global oil prices. This in turn was affecting Iraqi oil revenues at time when Saddam was trying to replenish his country's coffers following the disastrous Iran–Iraq war (p. 76).

Moreover, the Gulf countries increased the production of oil, which in turn, decreased their prices, having a direct negative effect on Iraq's economy. Hillstrom (2004) notes "one factor in this ongoing border dispute was the South Rumaila oil field. This valuable oil reserve was squarely in the border region, and both countries wanted control over it" (p. 7). In the Summit of the Arab League, Saddam Hussein the then President of Iraq, brought this issue into public and expressed his suspicions over such menacing behavior. Hillstrom (2004) explains "Kuwait's actions contributed to a decline in oil prices, from $20.50 per barrel in early 1990 to

$13.60 per barrel in July. Every dollar drop in the price per barrel cost Iraq an estimated $1 billion per year. Hussein thus blamed Kuwait for making Iraq's financial problems worse" (p. 20). Dissatisfied over almost two years of negotiations over oil-wills share and their decreased prices, Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The invasion shocked the world. In response, a coalition force was formed, including Arab and Muslim countries, led by the US and other Western countries, which was sent to Saudi Arabia and Qatar to liberate Kuwait and to secure oil resources. It is noteworthy to mention that the religious establishments in most Arab countries had a released a fatwa, a religious permission, to approve the war against Iraq on the pretext of liberating Kuwait. None of these religious establishments had considered the economic ramifications of oil-production increase on the Iraqi economy. Moreover, most of Arab leaders sided with the coalition forces. Nonetheless, Yasser Arafat, the Chairperson of Palestinian Liberation Organization, PLO, sided with Iraq, an act that he was to regret later, and for which the Palestinians had paid a very high price (Hillstrom, 2004, p. 82). After the coalition's victory, thousands of Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait, and other retaliatory activities were directed towards the Palestinians in Kuwait and other Gulf countries. In 2003, the American-British invasion to Iraq was launched on the pretext of the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and again, with full support and approval of Gulf states, which allowed their military bases to be used by the coalition, Iraq was defeated and the tragedy of sectarian bloodshed began and still continues to the current time.

To conclude, the Saudi regime had been seeking religious legitimacy as a political tool to subdue opposition and eliminate dissidents. The strict application of Wahhabist mentality and the continuous indoctrination of the society had been reflected onto the violations of human rights and the personal freedoms of the citizens of the Arabian Peninsula. Rather than being channeled to modernization and education projects, the huge financial resources were directed to the propagation of the Wahhabist dogmatic thinking, inside and outside Saudi Arabia. In

response, some scholars have recently raised doubts over the Islamic Schools in western countries as they might be responsible, in some way or another, for the increasing religious radicalism and fundamentalism in the world. Due to the booming of oil-rentier industry, modernization and urbanization projects were introduced to the Saudi society in the 1970s, characterizing a shift from nomad Wahhabist understanding to cosmopolitanism, a shift that the society nor the authorities were not prepared for. As a result, a split in society had occurred which was reflected into the Juhayman's revolution between fundamentalists and ultra-fundamentalist Wahhabists. Juhayman's incident redirected the modernization backward and forced the authorities to adopt ultra-Wahhabist standings towards many respects of social life. With the rise of Shiism in Iran and its belligerent rhetoric in the region, Saudi Arabia and Arab Gulf states sided with and supported Iraq in its war against Iran for all along the eight years in order to beat off any Iranian encroachment in the region. With the end of the war, the Gulf states had suddenly shifted their stance from a supportive to indifferent position regarding the Iraqi economic interests. Believing that the Iranian threat was totally eliminated, the Arab Gulf states began to manipulate the oil prices, which in turn, caused a strong blow to the Iraqi economy which was already in grave need for cash to resume development and reconstruction. By all means, the invasion of Kuwait was not the optimal solution. Nonetheless, manipulating oil prices was, in fact, in sheer conflict of what they had been fighting for all along the eight years of war in terms of exposing themselves to the Iranian influence and endangering their own existence. After the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the two Gulf wars, Iran had not only exerted its influence into Iraq but also became a regional power that can postulate a serious danger to the Arab gulf states. The immaturity of increasing oil production and the consequences of Kuwait's invasion had directly contributed to the Shiite expansionism in the Persian/Arabian Gulf, invoking much of the instability and insecurity of the region, whose repercussions are still reflected into the region affecting much of its current politics.

3.2.3 The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB)

While Political Islam continued to exert its influence in the form of Wahhabism since the time of Ibn Abdel Wahab's Proselytization's project in the Arabian Peninsula, another form of Political Islam was crystalizing in a different fashion in Egypt, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB). As contended earlier, the Saudis had embraced a top-down approach to promote Wahhabism in the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere; nonetheless, Islamist zealots like the leaders of EMB, had resorted to bottom-up approach. When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk abolished the caliphate in 1924, the Muslim Arabs had experienced the agonizing defeat of the collapse of the fourth caliphate (Chamkhi, 2014, p. 455). Among the intellectuals who espoused the Islamic revival was Hassan AL-Banna of Egypt. Nostalgic to the Caliphate's legacy and its reconstruction, AL-Banna established the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, just four years after Ataturk's abolishment of the caliphate (Johnston, 2016, pp. 776-781; Terry, 2008, p. 257). AL-Banna, a primary school teacher, along with "a carpenter, a barber, a gardener, an ironer, a mechanic, and a cycle repairer" had established the Muslim Brotherhood (Kandil, 2016, p. 35). Muslim brotherhood was established as an Islamic civil and educational movement (of course, with political agenda of Islamization) whose ultimate goal was to revive and reinvigorate Islamic values, traditions, and culture (Terry, 2008, p. 267). To him, the then value system was deteriorating and heading away from Islam—its traditional gravity point, which should be redirected through education, civil, and charitable activities. Furthermore, due to the fragmentation of the Islamic world, after the abolishment of the caliphate, AL-Banna was convinced that all Muslims are brothers despite the geographical borders of the newly established states. His project of Muslims' unification was universal in theory, and he believed that Islamic ideology can be a unifying factor, despite the physical and political barriers (Terry, 2008, p. 257). Hassan AL-Banna was a charismatic personality who believed in peaceful means to actualize his political and social agendas via alternative education and media, as well as

charitable and voluntary activities operated in mosques and the group's circles (Rinehart, 2009). In response to the abolishment of the Caliphate, Hassan AL-Banna had established the Muslim Brotherhood whose main objective was to restore Islamic identity of the Muslim World and to call for more Islamic representations into the public sphere. Since its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood had become the largest Islamist organization in the Muslim world, spreading into eighty countries (Chamkhi, 2014, p. 455).

3.2.4 Presuppositions, Conceptions, and Ideology

Among the interesting presuppositions of EMB, and presumably its sister organizations, is the idea that EMB claims to represent the pristine version of Islam in its purest form, and the following the EMB equals the adherence of Islam. Islam in this sense is supposed to be the Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, the selection of the name is quite informative and telling. In contrast to political movements which carve up their names as derived from a common ideology (e.g., communism, liberalism, capitalism, etc.,), Muslim Brotherhood adopts a contentious label that is derived from the Quran, most probably to impart religious connotation, imbue divine halo, achieve ultimate legitimacy, and attract faithful devotion. To validate their argument from the Holy Quran, MB recruiters rely on the verse: 'And remember the favour of Allah which he bestowed upon you when you were enemies and He united your hearts in love, so that by His grace you became *as* brothers' (Qur'an 3: 103). Based on the lexical match between the Quranic verse and the name of the organization (Muslim Brotherhood), a conclusion is drawn that joining the Brotherhood reactivates one' faith and reinvigorates Islamic allegiance. Since the Quranic verse contained the word 'brothers', which is the same with the organization's name, the ending result is that being a Muslim equal being a member of the Brotherhood (Kandil, 2016, p. 13). To the brotherhood, Muslims are not perceived as good Muslims unless they join the MB; and therefore, Muslims are required to complement and furnish their Islamic faith by being admitted to the Brotherhood. The

presupposition does not end to this level; rather, it is elaborated to develop a typology of Islamic faith and a codification indexes upon which Muslims are evaluated and judged. For example, AL-Banna himself divided Muslims into four categories: (1) supporters out of belief, (2) supporters out of pragmatic reasons, (3) MB sympathizers/future supporters, and (4) unjust Muslims (AL-Banna, 1949, pp. 12-13). In such theological assortment, the presupposed assumption is that AL-Banna had assumed himself a religious authority, presumably with a Godly spirit, to have been bestowed upon him, and provides him and his followers after him with the right not only to speak in favor of other fellow Muslims, but to evaluate and judge their Islamic faith. The second assumption that arises from the presumed identicalness and ostensible sameness of MB and Islam is that once a person is committed to the organization, he or she cannot revoke their allegiances because that inherently means recanting Islam. Kandil (2016) notes that "by becoming a Brother you are not making a new commitment – a commitment you could later rescind – you are merely activating a so far dormant bond you had tacitly accepted when you first embraced Islam" (p. 50). Furthermore, another closely related assumed conception, once again a religious precept, is the 'Loyalty and Antipathy' (AL-Wala'a wal Bara'a) which is also derived from the Holy Quran: 'O you who have believed, do not take your fathers or your siblings as allies if they preferred disbelief over belief' (Quran 9: 23). Once again, depending of this holy verse, MB Islamists argue that Muslims shall reshape and readjust their emotional attachments and renounce any affection or passion for people outside the brotherhood, even family members and siblings. The brotherhood requires the new member to reject his/her old friends, siblings, brothers, sisters, and even parents in favor for the Brotherhood, as based on the aforementioned theological classification of AL-Banna. Kandil (2016) observes that "there are no good Muslims outside the Brotherhood and its orbit, and Brothers must rank organizational ties higher than any other, even those of family and friendship. Attachment to your Brothers entails separation from others" (p. 49). The current

conception inside the brotherhood is that the only Muslims who represent Islam is vested in their members; otherwise, all other Muslims are not necessarily infidels, rather they are negligent of their pristine Islam and henceforth, it is upon the Brotherhood's burden to reorient deluded Muslims and sinners back to their true faith (Kandil, 2016, p. 49).

More astoundingly are the position of the General Guide and the aura of privileges bestowed upon him. The general guide is a unique position in the Brotherhood and designates the highest religious authority in its hierarchical structure (AL-'Anānī, 2020; Kandil, 2016). According to Kandil (2016), the general guide functions as the deputy of the nonexistent caliph, who in turn, is believed to be incarnating the personality of the prophet. As an inherent result the general guide is the legitimate religious leader of all Muslims, the Imam, who must be obeyed unquestionably and without the slightest suspicions. The halo imbued upon the guide is even more astonishing and surprising which entitles him with a plethora of rights to be enacted over Muslims. According to Kandil (2016), the leader in Brotherhood enjoys the emotional bond of the father, the scientific scholarship of the professor, the spiritual aura of the mystic Imam, and the political and military leader in politics.

Kandil (2106) notes:

The relationship between leaders and followers is thus triangulated using these normally unrelated concepts: submission to the moral superiority of the father and the spiritual guide; submission to the knowledge and experience of the teacher; and submission to the bravery and wisdom of the warrior-ruler (p. 60).

Contemplating the functions of duties of the General Guide, there is a reason to believe that the Muslim Brotherhood has many resemblances to Shiism; the concept of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist; to Sufism, the concept of Wali (Saint) (Kandil, 2016, pp. 59-60). In both Shiism and Sufism, the claim is that the spiritual leader, be it the Faqih or the Wali, is the mouthpiece

of God, which in practice, is almost the same with the function of the General Guide (Kandil, 2016). AL-Banna's perception of the MB leader as the deputy caliph who must be obeyed until the caliphate is established is not that different from the Velayat e Faqih in Shiite Iran. Even the term the General Guide that is used in Shiite Iran is the same that is used in what is supposed to be Sunni MB. In Sufist theology, the Wali or the Saint is a divine person who is divinely instructed and he is perceived in an elevated position by his or her community and whose will shall be served unquestionably. The common denominator among Shiism, Sufism, and MB is the divinely spirit bestowed upon their saints and leaders which entitle them for absolute authority and unquestionable obedience (Kandil, 2016). Another crucial conception of the Muslim Brotherhood is *religious determinism*. Islamists, in particular the members and leaders of MB alike, perceive the reality through Islamic lenses in a way that achievements and successes in life are wholly shaped and solely dependent on personal piety and virtuous behavior (AL-'Anānī, 2020; Kandil, 2016; Roy, 1994). Contrary to what might come to ordinary minds, this belief is given ultra-emphasis and is extended at the expense of rationality and cautious logical reasoning. Material accomplishments, to the Brothers, are a direct result of divine actions which is bestowed to loyal and active believers, and not necessarily as a consequence of cause and effect equation. Not only that, but Islamists go on to propose a new interpretation of Islamic history, arguing the rise and fall of Islamic civilization was merely due to the piety and religiosity factors rather the materialistic variables, like for example, militancy, education, economy, and politics. Muslim Brotherhood's ideology attributes "worldly success to religious devotion" (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 175). They argue that the 1967 defeat was because the nationalist regime of Nasser had adopted communist and secular leniency, wholly atheist, and therefore God did not support the Muslims (AL-'Anānī, 2020; Mellor, 2017). According to scholars, the defeat was due to the importation of foreign ideology of socialism which in its nature is Un-Islamic (Mellor, 2017). The Islamists reinterpreted the Arab history according to

their agenda of Islamic thought and "projected the defeat as a divine punishment for trusting foreign ideologies such as Socialism, as the basis for modernization" (Mellor, 2017, p. 514). Sharia Law, to the MB Islamists, seems to be the compass of success and the solution for every malady, and "considered the 1967 defeat as a historical lesson to Arab rulers who adopted Western concepts such as socialism or nationalism" (Mellor, 2017, p. 528). To the Brothers, Sharia Law is not a set of religious duties that Muslims should do in order to be rewarded in the hereafter. Rather, the adherence to Sharia Law has a secret power of divinity, that if followed and practiced meticulously, would provide earthly gains and accomplishments. That being said, instead of adopting the scientific and empirical routes to achieve objectives, the cause-and-result relationships is holistically dependent on the secret divinity of the meticulous adherence of Sharia Law. By this view, the Brothers reinterprets the Islamic history and attribute the military and scientific achievements as a direct sequence of Islamic adherence to Sharia Law, disregarding any scientific or logical explanations at work (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 175).

The Brothers do not give piety a high weight and significance in worldly matters, they are more inclined to believe that the material side of life operates solely at God's consent, and therefore, Muslims should invoke God's content and satisfaction in order to procure achievements. Causality is encapsulated and conditioned by the divine spirit, and for the causality to work out, a pious community should be established as a predeterminant for development and modernity (Roy, 1994). In essence, the Brothers do not fully comply with the epistemological basis of modern sciences and they discourage their "adherents from developing concrete solutions to real-life problems" as based on their entrenched belief that God has exceptions for his devoted believer (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 176). Nonetheless, in order to be heard of and share power, the Brothers follow the commonsense logic and get involved in politics and "integrate themselves in local communities, run for elections, and develop their wealth in order to bring about this

religious transformation" (AL-ʿAnānī, p. 176). To the Muslim Brothers, commonsense logic seems to be selective rather than a consistent behavior that is applicable to all situations and conditions. While they perceive worldly accomplishments to be conditioned under God's consent, disregarding the whole process of causation, they seem to be well unware of the causation process when they operate their re-Islamization project "a project they aim to achieve gradually (AL-ʿAnānī, p. 176). This duality of logical reasoning is inconsistent and incongruent with the reality we are living in, to which I have no explanation. Such way of reasoning, among other things, had led the essentialist scholars to argue that Islamists do not really have serious political or economic projects since the ontological and the epistemological components are not existent in their mentalities (Tibi, 2012, pp. 194-196).

3.2.5 Internal Structure, Recruitment, & Indoctrination

In his analysis of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, AL-ʿAnānī (2016) employed social interactionist and social constructivist theories, along with the psychology and sociology of religion, to demystify how MB leaders recruit, indoctrinate, and construct the identities of their members, and how the whole process proceeds and develops. He argues that MB is not a religious congregation or theological organization but rather a community that is bent to reconstruct the community according to their perspective of what they perceive as a pristine Islamic community (AL-ʿAnānī, 2020). The ideologues and leaders of MB follow a sophisticated approach of dogmatizing its members through a full-fledged program and ideational framework which are translated into daily activities to reconstruct MB identity among the new members (AL-ʿAnānī, 2020, p. 4). There are five basic concepts of the MB: (1) the oath of allegiance, (2) Obedience, (3) trust, (4) commitment, and (5) loyalty. These concepts are not just to be memorized by the new members; rather, they shall be psychologically internalized and physically materialized into the behaviors and activities of sermons, seminars, training and camping. New and old members are expected to show unquestionable obedience

and complete commitment. AL-'Anānī (2020) contends that "the incessant processes of indoctrination, ritualization, and habituation reshape individuals' identities and foster a strong sense of self-identification" and the surrounding environment reconstruct his/her MB identity (p. 5).

MB recruiters use religion as an instrumentalization technique and as theoretical framework in order to mobilize for prospective members. The religious frame of reference which they depend on is quite appealing among Muslim communities in both rural and cosmopolitan areas. This background reference of religion facilitates the recruitment and indoctrination processes and enables the construction of the MB identity. Among the best effective strategies is the proselytization activities among mosque attendants, student congregations, and social and recreational activities. When religiously lenient individuals are detected in the preaching process, the first phase of recruitment begins in which the "subject [is exposed] to a gradual yet intensive process of indoctrination that reshapes their mindset and worldview" (AL-'Anānī, 2020, pp. 8-9). The MB recruiters are well aware of the grievances and sorrows of the Egyptians over corruption, unemployment, and other social injustices as well as the effectiveness of the religious frame of reference in the Egyptian society. Emboldened with these two psychological frames, the MB recruiters expose the religiously lenient subject to excessive indoctrination through the involvements of interactionist activities inside their groups to convince him/her to join them (AL-'Anānī, 2020, pp. 43-44). The recruitment strategy of the Brotherhood is uniquely special in which the recruiter or the 'hunter' attempts to infiltrate the 'prey's' private life and his own social, religious, and political values and conceptions in order to reshape them. In this process, the prey is being exposed to graduated psychological pressure and ideological indoctrination to join the Brotherhood. In the process, the prey is surrounded with Islamic symbols and idioms to create a conducive environment for the recruitment to succeed, and

capitalize on the individual's conservativeness and religiosity to accelerate the insinuation process (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 71).

In the process of chasing the prey, the MB recruiters penetrate the personal lives of potential subjects to manipulate their perceptions and judgments of the surrounding reality in order to reshape and appropriate their understanding of the outside world into the MB worldviews and perspectives. The subjects are not really aware of what is going on nor realizing that their identity is being gradually reshaped and reconstructed to meet the MB objectives because the religious message is an ordinary norm in the Muslim society. At the inception of recruitment, the recruiters inoculate the potential members with religious environment and Islamic values, exposing them to great psychological influence and emotional pressure without revealing their MB affiliations. AL-'Anānī (2020) states that "after a short period of time they gradually infuse their proselytizing message with the Brotherhood's ideology. Those who demonstrate religiosity and sympathy with the Brotherhood's cause become potential members… thereafter a new course of recruitment begins (p. 70). It is noteworthy to note that because the presupposition of the identicality of MB's message and the ordinary Islamic preaching, the subjects do not really recognize the difference, especially if they were from less privileged education or too young to perceive the difference, which in turn, facilitates and snowballs the recruitment process. In order to increase the recruitment pool, the MB depends on social networks, family ties, and personal connections. However, among the most important pool of recruitment is the 'martial connection'. Since the Muslim Brotherhood's ultimate objective is to establish a Muslim society, the Brother are encouraged to marry sister (i.e., MB female member) so they together can establish an Islamic family (AL-'Anānī, 2020, pp. 80-82; Kandil, 2016, p. 75). On the flipside, brothers are discouraged to marry from outside the MB circle because that action might threaten the member's affiliation or loyalty to the group. If a brother refuses the proposed match (future wife) from the brotherhood and decides to marry from his

own acquaintances who are not affiliated to the brotherhood, he is derogated and demonized. By such doing, the MB is creating a subculture and subcommunity within the wider culture and society which are expected to conflate transparency and increase nepotism and favoritism (AL-'Anānī, 2020, pp. 80-82).

Among the most controversial concepts of Muslim Brotherhood are the oath of allegiance and obedience. The newly recruited members shall abide to the internal bylaws of the organization and must represent a complete adherence to MB regulations and identity construction both in terms of mental and psychological representations and physical materialization. To achieve these mental and psychological manifestations, the new members shall confess an oath of allegiance to the leadership of the Brotherhood (i.e., the General Guide) and represent a complete submission and obedience to their direct leaders without any questioning or debating orders. Those who raise discussion/criticism or do not adhere to the regulations are "subject to punishment and disciplinary action by the branch head, which included but was not limited to a warning, fine, suspension, or even expulsion" (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 92). The oath of allegiance has an Islamic tradition when a couple of people pledged the oath in front of the Prophet to become Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood emulates the Prophet's action and require Muslims pledge the oath of allegiance to the General Guide as the de jure caliph. It is a symbol of allegiance from Muslims that require complete submission and ultimate subordination. The oath of allegiance imposes on the members to blindly obey the leadership without any questions, suspicions, or arguments since the leadership knows how to achieve the organization's objective. Members have no right to disagree or disobey; instead, they are expected to acquiesce to the orders even if they disapprove of them. Moreover, entailed in this oath of allegiance, members are asked to disregard their desires and wants in favor for the movement and its objectives (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 122).

Inherent in the meaning of the oath of allegiance is obedience, the second most controversial precept of the Muslim Brotherhood. Generating submissive members is a gradual process of psychological manipulation and ideological indoctrination that infiltrate into the very essence of their psyche, mental processing, and their private lives, which later on, become their reconstructed being—the MB identity (Kandil, 2016). Through interaction activities, gathering, and religious sermons, the new members undergo a process of reconceptualization of their standard beliefs and perspectives that were designed to conform and comply with MB's main tenets and objectives. Central to these indoctrination strategies is the complete obedience that is required from lower and higher members of the organization (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 119). Complete obedience from the members functions two important cementing effects. The first is summarized in the motto 'listen and obey' and the second in the motto 'do not argue'. These two inherent principles of obedience to high rank MB's officials can provide the necessary tools to silence internal oppositions and to subjugate dissenting members. Those members who demonstrate opposing ideas and discussions that are alien to the MB superiors or are conflictual to the MB's tenets and regulations are demonized and their personality is discredited. They are exposed to a huge smear campaigns and devaluation phase, and gradually, they become gradually marginalized.

With regard to the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood, Brown (2012) argues that the MB does not really have a crystal-clear theory of politics nor a clear-cut political agenda that procures a wide-spectrum of maneuvers to manipulate in the political scene. The mantra that 'Islam is the solution' is a broad and flexible framework, and does not really have a defined political ideology nor a transparent political program. Though Islamists' ideology encapsulates religious tones, the ideology in itself is vague and obscure, and is not deconstructed and translated into a political program. Brown (2012) notes that "Islamist movements modeled on the Muslim Brotherhood are indeed highly ideological. And their ideologies do inform their actions. But

their ideologies are also fairly general and allow considerable flexibility not on merely tactics but also on strategy and especially on the question of elections and even on democracy" (p. 60). In other words, the Muslim Brotherhood is highly ideological as an Islamist movement whose main objective is to re-Islamize the community of social grounds but has little to offer as a political program. Kandil (2016) notes "the Brotherhood has no concrete program for political, socioeconomic, and geopolitical transformation" (p. 107). Even after their accession to power in June 2012, the Brotherhood had no specific program for Egypt's political and economic challenges which was represented in their precarious performance and their inability to relieve people's persistent dissatisfactions. After the boasting of making radical changes to improve the Egyptian economy, Hassan Malik, a Brother businessman had finally admitted the soundness of old economic structure, yet it was burdened with huge corruption and embezzlements. So, the political program of the MB would leave the economic order in place and turns its attention to fight corruption (Kandil, 2016, p. 46).

There is a good reason to believe that MB has a social agenda of re-Islamization and yearning desire for political power; on the other hand, there is no serious ideological understanding of politics and economy to help meet people's aspirations. As Brown (2012) notes "movements based on the Muslim Brotherhood model have only vague ideology texts, and their leaders are generally highly practical people rather than ideologues or intellectuals. Indeed, the movements pride themselves on their practical natures" (p. 72). Furthermore, one of characteristics of the Muslim Brotherhood's performance does challenge the core of their Islamic agenda itself, and pose questions over whether they are true Islamists who want to propagate piety and virtue or they are power-seekers who are hiding behind a façade of false claims. Two points elucidate these claims: (1) extension of Islamic jurisdiction rule, and (2) withdrawal of former promises. First, in Islam, there is jurisdictional rule which provides a permission for that which had been prohibited (in Arabic: al-darurat tubih al-mahzurat) given specified conditions and certain

circumstances. The most cited exemplification for the rule is that alcohol can be permitted when there is no water available in order to survive. However, this rule is extended to include everything which made it very similar or even the same with the Machiavelli's principle of 'ends justify means.'

Kandil (2016) explains:

Brothers extended this rule, granting themselves the right to commit prohibitions to secure the organization. And they justify this jurisprudential move as follows: since the Brotherhood represents Islam, then its defeat is no less than the defeat of Islam, and surely anything goes when the fate of Islam itself is at stake. In a sense, this logic conflates two distinct principles: Islam's law of necessity, and Machiavelli's ends-justify-means principle… Islam does not condone making a virtue of necessity. Not so for Machiavelli, who permits immoral actions to secure moral ends.25 This is precisely what Brothers do. Though, in a Machiavellian twist of the first order, Brothers ground their actions in Islamic jurisprudence and curse the immorality of the Florentine theorist (p. 117).

This law of necessity allows MB Islamists a carte blanch of theological basis to do whatever at their hands to serve their organization without the least ethical principles or virtuous behaviors they had long been preaching for. Such theological reasoning provides the MB with the necessary jurisdictional injunctions and ethical flexibility to trespass the limits of accepted political behavior. On the pretext of protecting Islam, which is presumed to be meticulously represented in the Muslim Brotherhood, Kandil (2016) contends that the application of the law of necessity has been extended to cover wide range of unethical behaviors. For example, Kandil (2016) argues "nepotism was condoned to cultivate personal bonds and prevent the infiltration of security agents. Embezzlement went unpunished because scandals could tarnish the movement's reputation. Autocracy was excused by the need for swift action" (p. 117). And

after all, all is done to protect and save Islam. It appears that that Machiavelli's concept of 'ends justify means' is not even applicable in this context because the ends do not indicate any morality. Second, the withdrawal of promises is more or less the same story. During more than eighty years in shadows, the Muslim Brotherhood had long been propagating the rule of Sharia Law and they wanted to enforce it from above. However, when in power, the story changed quickly. The long-standing claim of establishing the Sharia Law had soon evaporated once they were in power after the 2011 revolution. For example, bank 'usurious' interest is accepted and International Monetary Fund loans were accepted to boost the economy during Morsi's rule. The ban of alcohol was not enacted to placate Western governments and the Sharia Penal code was never proposed lest international criticism (Kandil, 2016).

3.2.6 Sayyid Qutb's Ideology: Sovereignty and Ignorance

While Hassan AL-Banna had laid down the basic principles of the Muslim Brotherhood, it was Sayyid Qutb who proceeded a concerted effort to develop the theological foundations and the theoretical ideology for the Brotherhood for years to come. The essence of these foundations is based on two principles: (1) ignorance (Jahiliyyah), and (2) the sovereignty of God. The two terms are closely connected and each one explains and complements the other. Yet, ignorance, or Jahiliyyah, is a controversial term and its literal translation does not really capture the meaning it was intended for in the Arabic language. Therefore, a closer look is needed to uncover what it means so as an understanding of the theoretical ideology of Qutb and Muslim Brotherhood can go on uninterrupted. In a very detailed discussion of the term Jahiliyyah, Khatab (2006) examined the meaning of the term and its applications over different periods of time and how the term itself was used by Qutb and his followers to substantiate their claim for establishing the Islamic State. Delving into Arabic linguistics and intricate Arabic morphology, rhetoric, and figure of speech, Khatab (2006) compared the uses of Jahiliyyah in pre-Islamic and post-Islamic eras in order to arrive at a clear definition of what Qutb had exactly intended

it for. Among the proposed translation of the term Jahiliyyah are (1) ignorance as antithesis of science, knowledge, or civilization, (2) illiteracy, (3) antithesis of genteelness. All of these meanings are correct and can be used as valid translations for the word Jahiliyyah. Although the pre-Islamic poetry and literature had incorporated such varieties of meanings, all of them do not match what Qutb had intended it to mean (Khatab, 2006, pp. 31-32). The term jahiliyyah began to be revealed into the Quran after Prophet Muhammad had moved to Madinah and began to establish the Islamic state there.

Khatab (2006) states:

In the Qur'an, the term jahiliyyah is not antithetical to knowledge ('ilm), gentleness (hilm) or any of their word groups, and it does not mean lack of knowledge. The term jahiliyyah was itself used by the Qur'an in Madinah after the migration (hijrah) of Muhammad and his followers to Madinah and during the founding of the Islamic state. In this context, the Qur'anic usage of the term clearly expressed the political, social, economic, intellectual and moral connotations of the term jahiliyyah. In short, the Qur'anic concept of jahiliyyah is exclusively used as antithetical to the concept of Sovereignty, the highest governmental and legal authority. Submission to this Sovereignty is simply Islam (p. 43).

It seems that Qutb had followed the Quran's usage of the term and incorporated it into his theoretical ideology of society, politics, and the utopian Islamic state. In *Milestones*, Qutb expressed a couple of conceptions and terms, which in essence, denounce secularism, promote Islamic values and virtues, and emphasize the implementation of Sharia Law (Qutb, 1964, p. 6). Jahiliyyah is a condition or a state of mind where Muslims seek a social and political system that is not Islamic which Qutb perceives as the antithesis of God's sovereignty. God's sovereignty presumes full adherence of Muslims to Islamic Law and the disobedience of this sovereignty defines what Jahiliyyah is. Thus, jahiliyyah can be defined as any ideology of

governance that is not wholly based on the Sharia Law, and Muslims, should not deviate from the divine revelation and seek refuge in secular ideologies (Qutb, 1964, p. 34). In other words, those who are seeking earthly laws such as secularism, communism, imperialism, etc., are defying God's sovereignty on earth and submitting their dignity to other man rather than the God (Qutb, 1964, p. 6).

In Qutb's views, the world has only two classifications: Jahili and non-Jahili. In the Jahili category, Qutb includes Muslims of secular agenda on the pretext of defying God's sovereignty. Qutb's application of the term seems to be highly controversial because it has the power of classification that resembles in many respects the power of excommunication discussed earlier in Wahhabism. In expounding the Brotherhood's objectives, Qutb explicates that this organization adopts the teaching and preaching techniques to reinvigorate Islamic sentiments and values into the society and to uplift the Islamic religious identity into the public sphere. In addition, it uses violence and Jihad to dismantle the secular system and its institutions which are bent on preventing people from representing their religiosity and diverting them from God's Sovereignty (Qutb, 1964, p. 42). This idea justifies the use of violence against secular Muslim authorities and approves the power of classification/excommunication of other fellow Muslims based on the concept of jahiliyyah that Qutb developed. The power of classification (through the presumed Jahili system) claims to have the religious authority over the people to decide who the good and bad Muslims are. The sovereignty of God, in Qutb's conviction, does not tolerate any secular regulations to the community; nevertheless, he does not mention the mediators of God's sovereignty who are supposed to carry out the Islamic Law, most probably because it is supposed to be vested in the MB leaders. In the four legal schools of Islamic jurisdiction, the process of excommunication does not follow Qutb's plain justification, and it is even impossible to excommunicate any Muslim who confesses his/her Islamic faith. But it is no wonder that the process of excommunication is so easy for Islamists to excommunicate other

fellow Muslims because they reject the jurisdiction of the four legal schools of Islam (Roy, 1994, pp. 10, 33, 37, 58, 103). Such flawed premises and conclusion had laid down the crucial convictions of radical Islamists, which naturally, gave rise to terrorist groups that target their own communities on the basis of blasphemy and apostasy (Halverson, 2014, p. 88).

That being said, these tenets capture the mindset of MB leaders as well as uncover their social and political agenda, and explain the real reasons behind their philanthropic activities. It seems that the benevolent activities, preaching and social welfare programs are means to an end; that is, a gradual infiltration process to gain public support into the society in order to contest for the parliamentary or presidential elections as happened in 2012 in Egypt (AL-'Anānī, 2020). Nevertheless, when the MB could not reach the desired change by the peaceful means of preaching, resorting to violent force becomes their best second option. A considerable sector of the Egyptian society rejects the Muslim Brotherhood and perceives it as a clan or a subculture whose main aims are directed to reach power to achieve personal gains. The MB's consolidation of power during Morsi's tenure, its poor governance performance, and the marginalization of the *revolutionary youth* who ignited the revolution against Mubarak had all contributed to expose the MB's unwillingness to share power, dictatorial mentality, and more importantly, highlighted their intellectual bankruptcy (AL-'Anānī, 2020, pp. 155-161).

Opting for violent means is not more dangerous that the peaceful means of preaching. The preaching process is fundamentally based on the oath of allegiance and the complete obedience to the organization of MB (AL-'Anānī, 2020). As such, the so-called preaching turns out to be a systematic indoctrination process that is intended to change how people think and behave which cast doubts onto the real motives underlying the MB organization. The motto 'listen and obey' is a manipulative and detrimental tool that is more likely to breed members who are more likely to be resistant to open-mindedness, democratic thinking, and accommodating mentality of other ideas. This was clear in the exclusion of the revolutionary youth during Morsi' tenure

despite the MB's former promises of sharing power with other secular and national forces (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 156). Another aspect of this dogmatic breading is the MB's approach to philosophy and the epistemological foundations of modern science. Qutb notes that "our whole environment, people's beliefs and ideas, habits and arts, rules and laws—is Jahiliyyah, even to the extent that what to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also construct of Jahiliyyah!" (Qutb, 1964, p. 13). In an attempt to eradicate the western influence on the Arab and Muslim cultures, Qutb assumed that almost all aspects of Muslims' lives are corrupted and hold residues of un-Islamic beliefs. This purifying stance towards other cultures, ideas, perceptions, and more importantly the stance towards the foundations of science and philosophy, is astonishingly uncompromising, and in a sense, is trivial and absurd. But this fits perfectly well with the MB members and reflects their indoctrinated mentality and intellectual bankruptcy. During Morsi's regime, the MB had nothing to offer for the people to alleviate the economic crisis, except the deliverance of religious preaching and eloquent sermons. The MB's intellectual bankruptcy is a direct result of their rejection of philosophical thinking and debatable (social) sciences (Roy, 1994) on the pretext of being un-Islamic and having a colonial infiltration agenda (Qutb, 1964).

To conclude, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had long been interested to establish the Islamic State or the Caliphate. To proceed such goal, the MB had initiated a plethora of activities, wholly of social nature, ranging from preaching, religious sermons, seminars, and welfare programs, healthcare services, and education activities. The main objective of these activities seems to have been motivated to establish public support and popular electoral base for future parliamentary elections. This bottom-up re-Islamization program should not be perceived without cautious suspicions given the internal regulations and bylaws of the MB organization. Among the most alerting maxims is the motto of 'listen and obey' among its members which eliminates any democratic and constructive discussions among the MB

members. Moreover, the oath of allegiance and complete obedience required for its membership renders this so-called civil society a secret organization with clandestine motives. The exclusion of social sciences such as philosophy, sociology, politics, and culture as among the major constituents of modern states leaves the reader with the impression that the MB has no real or progressive political program for development. The MB accession to power in 2012 has proven such hypothesis. The MB proved to be incompetent at almost every aspect of governance including politics and economy. But the great shock to the people was the revoking of former promises to the *revolutionary youth* to share the power after the MB accession. Before the presidential election, the MB had promised the revolutionary youth to form a democratic parliament of all political parties. However, the MB had begun to ally itself with the military to consolidate power excluding all that was not MB affiliated. Once again, this demonstrated that the main goal of MB was not the political and economic reforms but was in reality the accession to power at all means.

CHAPTER FOUR

6.0 Interactions of EMB and Nasserite Egypt

6.1 The Monarchy, Democracy, and Muslim Identity

Since the occupation of Egypt in 1882 upwards, colonial Britain had initiated numerous developmental projects to promote the standards of living for the Egyptians (Goldschmidt, 2004, pp. 34, 48; Salama, 2018, p. 5). In terms of political advancement, democracy was introduced to Egyptians as a political system. Nonetheless, the Egyptian democracy was representing the interests of the British, the khedivate palace, and the minority elite, disregarding the sweeping majority of the Egyptians (Meijer, 2015, p. 5; Wickham, 2013, p. 22). Due to the conflictual interests of the tripartite government of British, Khedivate, and Egyptian elite, the newly-born Egyptian democracy was crippled and ineffective since the very start, and was mainly initiated to serve the British imperial interests (Meijer, 2015, p. 5; Wickham, 2013, p. 22). Within this background in mind, a great deal of disillusionment over the crippled democracy was building up against the tripartite government which had finally increased the Egyptians' suspicions towards democracy (Goldschmidt, 2004, pp. 39, 88-89). Moreover, the frustration over the crippled democracy had divided the Egyptian political landscape into Nationalist and Islamists (Curtis, 2012, p. 56) which continues to reverberate over the politics of Egypt up to the current moment (Gerges, 2019, p. 60). The nationalist movement that dominated the political scene was the WAFD, or the delegation in Arabic, which represented the Egyptians in Paris Peace Conference after the World War One in 1919 (Goldschmidt, 2004, pp. 67-69). It is important to mention that Egypt was granted independence after the 28 February Declaration of 1922 and a constitution was introduced. However, Britain continued to dominate the political and economic scenes of Egypt and undermine the Egyptian democracy (Frampton, 2019, pp. 12-13). It might be argued that the manipulative practices to

thwart the democracy of Egypt had contributed the rise of Political Islam in the form of Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, just six years after the independence declaration. Against this historical background, the political scene of Egypt had developed. Both the democratic WAFD and the Islamist MB had attempted to make changes into the Egyptian political and social scenes. The WAFD had tried to bring about political change through democratic and peaceful means and initiated attempts to reduce, or even eliminate, the British domination and influence over Egypt (Gerges, 2019, pp. 49-50). The MB, on the other hand, seemed to have been concerned to bring about attitudinal and societal reorientations towards Islamism than actual participation in the British democracy (Cook, 2013, p. 28). Hassan Al-Banna himself is reported to have contacted the King Farouk to usher him to initiate religious reforms and implement the Sharia Law (Cook, 2013, pp. 29-30; Gerges, 2019, p. 62). Nonetheless, his letters were ignored. The WAFD's failed attempt in democracy and the MB's inability to implement Sharia Law had created grave political and cultural bifurcation over the Egyptian political identity (Gerges, 2019, pp. 49-50). The nominal independence after the introduction of the constitution in 1923 had minimized the zeal for democracy, which in turn, had contributed to the rise of radical ideas of Islamism and Fascism in the 1930s and 1940s. Young Egypt, or Misr AL-Fatat, was formed in 1938 by a lawyer called Ahmad Hussein. Young Egypt adopted anti-colonial sentiments towards Britain and France whereas demonstrated sympathy and favoritism towards Fascism and Nazism. Interestingly, Young Egypt identified its ideology along the lines of Islamism and Nationalism (Gerges, 2019, pp. 60-61); nonetheless, the emergence of such a movement that combines the contradictory principles of Islamism and Fascism might be due to the German propaganda in the Middle East during the World War 2.

Caught between the Ottoman legacy of Islamist heritage and secular modernity of the West, which both failed to gain the independence of Egypt, had created a serious identity conflict for the Egyptians (Cook, 2013, pp. 84-85; Frampton, 2019, pp. 13-15). With the failure of

democracy, the British occupation, indebtedness to colonial powers, the abolishment of the caliphate, the newly-emerged scholarly works started to reaffirm the Islamic identity of the Egyptians, contrary to what had been celebrated before. Modernist writers like Abbas AL-Aqqad, Taha Hussein, and Muhamad Haykal, had emphasized the Islamic identity of the Egyptian society (Gerges, 2019, pp. 63-64). Reacting against the orientalist perspective that Muslims are intrinsically incapable of embarking on technological advancements and modernization projects by themselves, AL-Aqqad, for example, wrote a series of books (i.e., geniuses) to describe the leadership potentials of Caliphs. Moreover, Taha Hussein, who is considered a secular modernist wrote "on the margin of the Prophet's tradition" in which he celebrates the greatness of the Prophet. Haykal who is also secular nationalist had expressed similar sentiments towards Islam, and espoused the integration of Islam into the national mold of the Egyptian identity. Although these writers were not considered MB members or Islamist writers per se, their writings contributed to disseminate the Islamic ethos among the Egyptians, and augmented the Islamic element of the national identity. During the 1930s and 1940s, the Egyptian national identity was a rudimentary character that revolved around Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism; nonetheless, the Egyptians had not arrived at clear terms with a valid political system nor their national identity was resolved.

6.2 The Egyptian-Palestinian Relationships

The political and demographic developments in 1920s and 1940s in neighboring Palestine started to resonate in Egypt and bolstered ideological ideas of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism, generating sympathetic sentiments among the Egyptians towards the vulnerable Palestinians. Clashes erupted between the Immigrant Jews and Palestinians, which considerably increased in 1930s and 1940s, reverberated across the Arab and Muslim worlds, reminding them of "Europe's colonial legacy" (Gerges, 2019, p. 65). Despite the public Egyptian support for Palestine, the official political stance was unsupportive and was more concerned with its

domestic affairs. As Egypt was under British occupation, the general political stance among the Egyptian politicians was not to invoke any political action toward Palestine that might threaten the Egyptian-British relations, and consequently, affect the process of gaining independence. When clashes over the Western Wall of the Aqsa Mosque erupted in 1920s between the Jews and the Palestinians (Dawisha, 2003, p. 78), the Egyptian press under liberal democracy censored "Anti-Zionist articles, lest the coverage inflame public opinion at home." (Gerges, 2019, p. 66). The Muslim Brotherhood had dedicated huge resources to support the Palestinian cause and mobilized the public opinion against the imminent threat of establishing a Jewish home in Palestine (Curtis, 2012, p. 23). The MB had established the Secret Apparatus and the Special Apparatus whose sole objective, as proclaimed, was to liberate Palestine. The MB had been actively involved in the fight for the support of Palestine (Curtis, 2012, p. 23), and gained a "reputation for steadfastness and courage" (Gerges, 2019, p. 68). In 1946, King Farouk called for Arab Summit which issued a condemnation letter regarding the acceleration of the Jewish immigration to Palestine (Gerges, 2019). King Farouk ordered his war Minister Muhammad Haydar to prepare for the war to enter Palestine and the military officers estimated that the Egyptian army alone would be able to defeat the Israeli Army within two weeks without any assistance from any other Arab state (Gerges, 2019, p. 69, 154). The immaturity, irresponsibility, hubris, and bad organizational structure were the most catastrophic factors that contributed to the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1948 war. Moreover, the resounding defeat had exacted a "heavy toll on the credibility and legitimacy of the constitutional order" (Gerges, 2019, p. 69). The catastrophic defeat exacted over the Egyptian army in 1948 was tremendous and exposed how weak it was, and created frustration and anger among the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims alike. It was a sort of suicide to send the army without serious preparation, adequate artillery, and most importantly, the absence of coordination among the Arab armies. Experiencing the humiliating defeat by irregular Jewish forces, some of the Army officers

including colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had conjectured that the real battle was at home. Ascribing the defeat to the reckless policies of the palace and the servility of Egypt to Britain, Nasser and his comrades were intent on their way back to Egypt to topple down the monarchy (Gerges, 2019, p. 70). As a direct result of the defeat, Nasser and the army officers began to coordinate their clandestine efforts with the Muslim Brotherhood to overthrow the British-backed monarchy which was held responsible for the agonizing defeat. Disregarding the ideological differences between the MB and the army officers, both wanted to liberate Egypt from the British occupation, shared anti-hegemonic and anti-colonial sentiments, and wanted to modernize Egypt (Gerges, 2019, p. 71).

6.3 Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood Collusion

To understand the collaboration between the MB and the army officers, it is important to highlight the developmental aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood in historical and ideological terms. Since its establishment up until the middle of the 1950s, the MB ideology was solely based on the fragmentary collection of AL-Banna's legacy, but also included elements of anti-colonial and Pan-Arabist sentiments (Frampton, 2019, pp. 34-36). It was Sayyid Qutb who later had developed a formal theory of Islamist radicalism based on the Sovereignty of God and the Jahiliyyah system in the mid of 1950s (Qutb, 1964). However, during the 1940s, the congruities and commonalities between the disgruntled army officers and MB members outnumbered their differences and incongruities which facilitated a smooth cooperation and coordination to topple down the subservient monarchy (Cook, 2013, p. 53; Gordon, 1992, pp. 53-54). Furthermore, the Free Officers' interest in collaborating with the Muslim Brotherhood was motivated by sharing the popularity that the MB had enjoyed among the Egyptians. The MB had gained a considerable public support from the sweeping majority of the Egyptians and became a formidable organization that cannot be ignored or sidelined from any future post-colonial government that would assume power in Egypt. Taking this developmental aspect in

perspective, the differences between the MB and the army officers were not conspicuous enough to attract much frictional discordancy and conflictual dissension which facilitated their collusion and cooperation. Disgruntled over the submissive and subservient monarchical system, the catastrophic defeat of the 1948 war, the MB and the army officers had managed to find common grounds of shared interests to collaborate over, and they rightfully prioritized their national interest over other ideological differences. Setting the ideological differences aside, they both were interested to eradicate the British occupation, initiate development and welfare programs, and lead Egypt towards political and economic autonomy.

From the 1940s to the 1950s, the MB and the army officers needed each other; the MB wanted to infiltrate the army to orchestrate a putsch and the army officers wanted the back-up support of the MB (Gerges, 2019, pp. 89-93; Zollner, 2011, p. 26). The Muslim Brotherhood's collaboration with the Free Officers continued after the coup and had been rewarded by the coup's leadership. Upon the eruption of Kafr AL-Dawar incident in August 1952, a demonstration against low wages at AL-Dawar textile factory, Nasser's new regime had brutally crushed the demonstration (Cook, 2013, p. 49; Gerges, 2019, pp. 96-97). The two persons who were claimed to be responsible for organizing the demonstration were persecuted and hanged whereas hundreds of sympathizers (mostly from the remnants of WAFD party) were incarcerated in Nasser's military prisons in the desert after objections were raised against military 'fascist' rule (Cook, 2013, p. 49). The Muslim Brothers had not only remained silent, they launched a campaign to have those behind the strike persecuted and killed as traitors (Gerges, 2019, p. 97). In exchange of this silence, when Nasser dissolved political parties, he excluded the Muslim Brotherhood (Gerges, 2019, p. 93; Mellor, 2018, p. 60).

As noted earlier, AL-Banna had created the Secret Apparatus and the Special Apparatus as paramilitary wings for the Brotherhood. The Special Apparatus comprised of dissident military officers who participated in the 1948 war in Palestine and who were dissatisfied with the

British-backed monarchy and the subservient WAFD performance. The Special Apparatus had been interested to infiltrate the army and recruit army officers on the hope a military putsch would "the most effective means to seize power and transform society" (Gerges, 2019, p. 73). Among the recruited officers were Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar AL-Sadat who both had sworn the oath to AL-Banna, and in return, the MB expected them to be obedient and follow their orders (Gerges, 2019, p. 73). Both the MB and the army officers had established good relationships between the mid-forties till the mid-fifties, and coordinated their efforts in this direction as the need required. When the clashes between the MB and the palace escalated, the relationship between the MB and the army officers had strengthened and improved. In 1948, the prime minister, Mahmoud AL-Nuqrashi, ordered the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood which cost him his life. He was assassinated the same year. AL-Banna denied any link with the assassination but it was claimed that a member of the Secret Apparatus had carried out the operation. In retaliation, the secret forces of the palace assassinated AL-Banna the following year in 1949 (Gerges, 2019, p. 73). The MB pursued a lawsuit to cancel the disbanding resolution. Despite the interior minister had had the veto power, the government consented to revoke the dissolution order on the hope to counter the rising power of the communists, and coexistence between the WAFD and the MB continued on pragmatic grounds (Gerges, 2019, p. 74). Simultaneously, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to develop good relations with the members of the Free Officers.

6.4 Common Grounds, Ideology, and Power Consolidation

Both Muslim Brothers and the Free Officers have converged on the same objectives and shared identical sentiments towards the monarchy and its constitutional system. To them, the monarchy was a subservient entity to the colonial powers, mainly Britain, and the democratic system was perceived as inadequate government system conducive to the Egyptian society. Disillusioned over the British occupation of Egypt, both the Free Officers and the Muslim

Brothers had formed a nationalist movement and prioritized issues of independence, anti-hegemony, nationalist interest, development, and improvement of education over ideological differences. During that time, Muslim Brothers were natural allies to the Free Officers (Cook, 2013, p. 40; Gerges, 2019, p. 77). The Muslim Brothers had a huge grassroot support among the Egyptian society which the Free Officers had been courting to form a unified front against the monarchy. The Free Officers were very impressed by the steadfastness and courageous feats during their struggle in Palestine war in 1948, and their military operations against the British forces in the Suez Canal. To the Free officers, the Muslim Brothers were seen as a natural ally in their struggle for any future overthrow of the monarchy (Gerges, 2019, p. 74). When the 1952 coup had successfully ousted the monarchy, both the Free Officers and the Muslim Brothers who had contributed to its success claimed the ownership of the revolution. This point, as will be shown below, would constitute the backbone of the Egyptian politics for decades to come, whose political ramifications are still felt up to the current moment (Gerges, 2019, p. 75). Nonetheless, up to that point, the points of agreement transcended the points of disagreement, and there were many common grounds for binary collaboration. The British-backed monarchy and the ensued fake democracy were more than enough to convince the new regime of the futility of the constitutional system and the uselessness of democracy in the Egyptian context. That being said, the majority of the Free Officers and Muslim Brothers were contemplating more or less the same idea of the nascent government; that is, dictatorship. The only imaginable difference, as would expected, was either the legitimacy of totalitarianism should be based on Islamism or Nationalism. Since the introduction of the constitution in 1923, Egypt had gained independence, though it was nominal at some extent, Egypt had enjoyed a vivid political life, partisan politics; and democracy was elevated into the upfront of political scene. Despite its colonial and imperial interests in Egypt, the British's introduction of constitution had facilitated democracy in the Egyptian life and contributed to the rise of liberal

politics as based on people's legitimacy and free elections (Botman, 2008, p. 307). Capitalizing on the negative associations between democracy and colonial Britain, the Free Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood had begun to usurp these agonizing feelings into their favor in an attempt to demonize the democratic system and its futility in the Egyptian society. Due to the link between the British occupation from the one hand and the partisan politics, democracy, constitutionalism, and capitalism from the other, the whole democratic system was negatively associated to colonialism, imperialism, and the subjugation of foreign powers. Moreover, the WFAD party, the dominant and most respected at that time, had been accused of corruption and favoritism, and consequently, had been delegitimized by weak and ineffective performance. Therefore, the first step for the nativist government was to perform a clean break with the colonial past. The new military junta had abolished the constitution, dissolved the political parties, and purged the former political elite and institutions (Goldschmidt. 2004, pp. 88-90). The newly emerging elite, which was formed of nationalists, Islamists, leftists, etc., had all converged into anti-democratic and anti-liberal sentiments, but there had not been any unanimous agreement on a political ideology to guide the Free Officers for post-colonial Egypt nor a road-map to lead the transition to a civil authority (Gerges, 2019, pp. 78-83; Gordon, 1992, pp, 12, 33, 40). What was clear right after the coup was the departure from liberalist and constitutionalist' leanings towards authoritarianism and totalitarianism which were going to be represented through the ferocious purging of the old regime, the liquidation of its institutions and establishments, as well as the clampdown of its members. According to Gordon (1992), the scholarly elite, intellectuals and politicians, were divided into two categories of minimalists and maximalist (p. 64). Both expressed anti-democratic attitudes and approved of dictatorship. Yet, to the minimalist, like the prominent writer Ihsan Abdel Qudus, the approval of dictatorship was only temporary, and is only permitted to secure and stabilize the country's political situation. At the other side of the spectrum, was the maximalist, like Jurists Abdel Razaq AL-

Sanhouri and Suleiman Hafiz, who had campaigned vigorously against the return of liberalism and democracy. They cautioned that liberalism and democracy might restore the WAFDIST to power again, and urged the army to take control of the legislative and executive establishments (Gordon, 1992, p. 64). From the Islamist perspective, Qutb expressed exactly the same attitudes. Gerges (2019), stated that Qutb had "vocally and publicly called on the Free Officers to do away with representative democracy and to replace it with a just dictatorship" (p. 96).

The Free Officers instituted the Revolutionary Command Council, known shortly as RCC, which had replaced the constitution, evaded the checks and balances, and emerged as the sole legitimate authority after 1952 coup (Gerges, 2019, pp. 80-81). The cordial relations between the MB and the Free Officers had not survived long due to their power struggle for authority and dominance (Zollner, 2011). To the MB, the coup was a step forward to their utopian dream of establishing the Islamic State as their Guide, Hassan AL-Banna, had anticipated since the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood. To the Free Officers, the coup was an advancement towards a secular state, full independence, social justice and modernization. Relatively speaking, the MB had a sort of political program if it is to be compared with that of the Free Officers who had not had any ideology to guide them in time of need (Gordon, 1992, pp. 12, 33, 40). After all, they were all military officers, not politicians. Arabism had not been on the agenda of Nasser during his early days, or even years in the office. Due to the observed differences between the political programs of the MB and the Free Officers, the comradely friendship had begun to evaporate and tension started to transpire in terms of power struggle. Beyond the consensus over the dissatisfaction of the British occupation and the crippled democracy, the MB and the Free Officers did not have much in common as to the political future of Egypt. The agreement between the MB and the Free Officers was before the coup not after it. According to Zollner (2011), the MB relationship with the Free Officers can be summarized between two phases, and went from cooperation in the pre-coup era to contention

when the attempt on Nasser's life occurred on 26 October 1954 in AL-Manshiya, Alexandria (p. 25).

General Muhamad Naguib had successfully led the coup with the Free Officers and served as the official president of Egypt from June 1953 to November 1954. Nonetheless, Colonel Nasser was the mastermind of the coup and the strongest man among the Free Officers. It is oftenly argued that the Free Officers had split into two camps; those who preferred authoritarianism and those who wanted to restore the democratic life (Gerges, 2019, p. 81). Roughly speaking, the divide was between Nasser's camp who preferred authoritarianism, and Naguib's camp who preferred democracy (Gerges, 2019, p. 80). The first priority to Nasser before turning against the MB was to purge his competitors and rivals in the Military junta, especially General Naguib, the most popular leader who favored democracy and constitution over authoritarianism and dictatorship (Zollner, 2011, p. 35). Nasser began with neutralizing his comrades who had showed leniency towards democracy or demonstrated rival oppositions, including either from his army comrades or from the still-popular WAFD party. Nasser clamped down on the WAFD institutions and representatives, businessmen, land-lords, and purged almost the whole former elite from political scene (Gerges, 2019, p. 82). Obviously, Nasser did not believe in democracy and he never claimed to be a democratic. He perceived democracy as subjugation to colonial powers and is not helpful for the Egyptian society (Gerges, 2019, p. 88). To consolidate his power, Nasser abolished the political parties and confiscated their establishments and funds on January 1954. Moreover, he reinstated censorship on press after it had been lifted in August 1952. After the disbanding of political parties, the Free Officers established one-party system, the Liberation Rally, as an alternative to multiparty system to muster for popular support.

6.5 Nasser-Naguib Struggle

From the very beginning, the RCC was resolved to dismantle the old social, judiciary, and political structure of the old regime, and was intent to purge any sign of democracy that had

been left from the monarchy. In order to secure their grip of power over the political and social spaces, the RCC had formed the court of revolution as a supreme authority to undertake the consolidation of power and the purification of the remnants of the old regime, as well as the new rivals from the Free Officers (Gerges, 2019, p. 15; McNamara, 2003, p. 25; Zollner, 2011, p. 25). The general idea prevalent among the Free Officers was that the old regime, its institutions, its leaders, and networks were somehow connected to foreign powers of colonialism; and the revolution cannot succeed unless the old regime and its power structure be demolished and completely dismantled. For example, the military police arrested 43 leading figures of the old regime in September 1952, including Naguib AL-Hilali, the prime minister, and Murtada AL-Maraghi, the interior minister (Gerges, 2019, p. 87). Ibrahim Abdel Hadi, a political leader of AL-Haya AL-Saadiyya party, was sentenced to death on charges of treason and betrayal on October 1953. Later, the sentence was commuted into life in prison. Fuad Serajeddin and Mustafa AL-Nahhas, prominent WAFD leaders, were detained on similar charges, espionage and communication with foreign powers. AL-Nahhas was put under house arrest while Serajeddin was imprisoned in a military prison. The clamp down included the royal palace and family, Kareem Thabet, the press minister; Hafiz Afifi, Abbas Helmi, and Said Haleem who were from the royal family were imprisoned (Gerges, 2019, p. 88). All of these persecutions lacked transparency and honesty; they were all performed in closed doors without due judicial procedures or serious investigations. Furthermore, the incumbents of the judicial institutional apparatuses during the monarchy were replaced with military officers or with individuals who had cordial connections with the Free Officers. Abdel Razzaq AL-Sanhouri, a prominent lawmaker, who initially supported the Free Officers, lamented the dissolution of the 1923 constitution, which he perceived as more democratic and stands as viable vehicle for democratic transition after the coup. AL-Sanhouri had explicitly criticized the RCC measures

to seize democracy and that was more than enough to receive RCC's wrath and anger. He was beaten up and humiliated by thugs in front of his colleagues (Gerges, 2019, pp. 88-89).

After securing the knock-down of the old institutions and the incarceration of prominent potential rivals within the old regime as well as the outside social, institutional, and political spaces, Nasser and his comrades embarked on purging the internal rivals of the Free Officers. Naguib was given a special attention (McNamara, 2003, pp. 25-26). As an official leader of the coup, Naguib had a public support among the great masses of the Egyptians and he was perceived as the perfect character that can realize the people's dreams of real democracy and modernization (Gerges, 2019, p. 83). As a result, the two leaders competed for power and each one of them employed their cards to oust the other. The competitive rivalry was a sort of pro-Naguib camp who preferred democracy and Pro-Nasser Camp who preferred authoritarianism. On January 1953, thirty-five military officers were detained on charges of conspiracy against the new regime, and they were convicted and sent to prison. However, they were released on March 1954 in order to put down another split within the military who sided with Naguib. The power struggle between Pro-Nasser and Pro-Naguib continued, and it began to be clear that Naguib had been the weaker link while Nasser began to emerge victorious and more dominant. Even within Nasser's camp, Nasser began to eradicate all of the potential rivals or anyone who would express democratic sentiments or leanings. Yousef Siddiq, the military officer who performed the arrest of the former royal military officers, was forced to resign from the RCC in February 1953 and was exiled in Switzerland for voicing anti-dictatorial sentiments when he asked the military to return to its barracks and submit the authority to a civil government. After his return to Egypt that year, Siddiq was put under house arrest. Ahmad Shawqi, a member of the Free Officers who is second in rank after Naguib, was sentenced to ten years in a military prison on March 1954 for airing resentment over the dictatorship of the RCC, accusing the military of interfering in political life. Moreover, Hosni AL-Damanhouri, a member of the Free

Officers, was extremely tortured on allegations of causing internal conflicts among the Free Officers (Gerges, 2019, p. 83-85).

Having neutralized the judiciary system and the democratic institutions, Nasser embarked on eliminating his coup comrades—those who had the potential of leadership—General Naguib. Eliminating most of his close aides or those who espoused democracy, Nasser moved forward to tighten his grip on the RCC and to preside over the country. Sensing Nasser's ambition for power through the tactics used to eliminate his rivals, Naguib did not want to abdicate power to Nasser without a fight (McNamara, 2003, p. 25). The Muslim Brotherhood, who had collaborated with Nasser to overthrow the monarchy, began to recognize Nasser's marginalization practices, and the relationship between them soon deteriorated. Feeling betrayed by Nasser and his comrades, the MB sought in the disgruntled Naguib the perfect opportunity, and soon the two parties began to collaborate (Gerges, 2019, p. 85). The MB found in Naguib an "unlikely ally" (Gerges, 2019, p. 85). Both detested communism and socialism which emerged to be the likely ideology for the Free Officers. The unlikely coalition between Naguib and the MB was also bolstered by the legitimacy of the General from the side of the MB and the power base for the MB from the side of the General. Naguib realized the potential of the MB to rally for public support from the masses. Naguib also sought the back-up of the WAFD members and met with Mustafa Nahhas. Pro-Naguib protests erupted across the country from 1953 to 1954. Angered by Naguib's collaboration with the MB and the WAFD, Nasser ordered Naguib to resign from the RCC and passed an order to put Naguib under house arrest. However, due to massive demonstrations that swept the streets of Cairo, Naguib was reinstated on March, and Nasser appointed himself as the prime minister and his friend Abdel Hakim Amer, the chief commander of the armed forces. Nasser gave some concessions to the MB in order to taint and damage the cordial relationships and collaborations with Naguib. When the MB took the bait and distanced themselves with Naguib, Nasser put Naguib under house arrest

for the last time, and by such blow, Nasser emerged as the sole leader of Egypt. (Gerges, 2019, pp. 58-86; McNamara, 2003, p. 25).

6.6 The Free Officers and the Muslim Brothers

Deposing any potential rivals and strengthening the grip over the internal structure of the Free Officers, Nasser took further steps to extend his control over the broader political space, and turned against his former collaborators—the Muslim Brotherhood. The Free Officers is an underground movement that was established prior to the Palestine war of 1948 as a paramilitary group of disgruntled officers within the Egyptian army. The exact number of the Free Officers is not known for sure but it is estimated that the number is between 290-340 officers (Gerges, 2019, p. 91; Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 103). AL-Dubat AL-Ahrar, or the Free Officers, began to take shape as a clandestine military organization just prior the Palestine war, and since then, it developed into a fully-fledged secret group of all political orientations that was intent to overthrow the monarchy (Gerges, 2019, pp. 31, 90-91). Feeling the humiliating defeat of the Palestine war, these officers realized that the source of the defeat was from inside the Egyptian regime rather from the outside threat—Israel. On their way back to Egypt after the war, the Free Officers began to orchestrate a coup against the monarchy (Gerges, 2019, p. 171; Gordon, 1992, p. 58). Realizing the street power of the Muslim Brotherhood and the military feats of the MB in the war in Palestine, the Free Officers realized the importance of collaborating with the MB to bolster their public support and grassroots mobilization (Wynn, 1959, p. 108). It is argued that some of the Free Officers were MB members, including Gamal Abdel Nasser and AL-Sadat themselves who consecutively assumed presidency of Egypt (Gerges, 2019, p. 73). Nonetheless, the number of MB members in the Free Officers is not known for certain. The MB claims that more than half of the Free Officers were MB members; while, the Free Officers claim that the number of the MB in their movement was not that significant; and henceforth, the MB's role in the coup was minimal (Gerges, 2019, p. 91). However, according to Gordon

(1992), Nasser in the October 1949 resorted to Muslim Brotherhood to reorganize the movement of the Free Officers, and succeeded in recruiting Abdel Munim Abdel Rauf, Hasan Ibrahim, Khalid Muhyi AL-Din, Kamal AL-Din Hussein, which later expanded to include AL-Baghdadi, Abdel Hakim Amer, and Salah Salim (p. 47). Kandil (2016) argued that Nasser himself admitted that some of his officers were MB members "because he wanted to secure the support of all opposition groups, but he owed them no allegiance" (p. 129). It is not definitely clear the numbers of Free Officers who were affiliated to the MB, as each side presents the unfolding of events according to his point of view, yet what is clearly evident and definite was the close cooperation and coordination between the MB and the Free Officers (Gordon, 1992, pp. 44-46; Zollner, 2011, p. 26). Due to the inter-cooperation and collaboration between the Free Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood, the coup had been successful and each party began to claim the ownership of the victory. More specifically, because Abdel Nasser was himself an MB member, as it is presumed, the MB thought that the coup was the result of its own hard work and secret labor (Zollner, 2011, p. 26). After the coup had been successful, issues of conflicts between the Free Officers and the MB surfaced and a power struggle had become the common characteristic of the political scene in Egypt after the coup, especially after the 1954 (Gerges, 2019; Gordon, 1992; McNamara, 2003; Kandil, 2016; Zollner, 2011). Nasser was willing to integrate the MB into the new order, the government and the parliament, only as a junior entity that is directed and operated under his supervision and control. However, the Muslim Brotherhood wanted a veto power in pivotal role in the government and a significant role in the decision-making process and the internal policies (Gerges, 2019, p. 89). On 18 and 19 July in 1952, just a few days before the coup, Nasser and Abdel Hakim Amer, the later commander-in-chief, paid a visit to prominent MB leaders Salah Shadi, Abdel Qader Helmi, and Hassan Ashmawy, to inform them about the exact date of the coup (Gerges, 2019, p. 90; Gordon, 1992, pp. 53-54).

According to MB account, the Free Officers were part of the MB's Secret Apparatus and they had pledged the fealty, or Bay'a, to the MB (Zollner, 2011, p. 26). The MB, in return, had anticipated that the Free Officers will follow their orders and share power with the Muslim Brotherhood. That did not happen. Nasser was too ambitious and opted for a total control of Egypt (Gerges, 2019, p. 89; McNamara, 2003, pp. 25-26). Nasser's offer to the Muslim Brotherhood was to integrate them in the government on the basis of being subordinate to his direct orders and control which the MB refused (Gerges, 2019, p. 89; Kandil, 2016, p. 129). Nonetheless, there were internal voices within the Muslim Brotherhood that voiced discontent over the refusal of Nasser's offer (Gerges, 2019, pp. 106-108; Zollner, 2011, p. 25). The Supreme General Guide, Hasan AL-Hudaybi, refused Nasser's offer of subordinate integration; nonetheless, Abdel Rahman AL-Sanadi, the chief of the Secret Apparatus, was against the General Guide's decision and favored Nasser's offer. Although the MB had endured internal clashes and conflicts over the acceptance or refusal of Nasser's Offer, the MB managed to keep its internal structure in order, did not break up, and was loyal to its Supreme Guide (Gerges, 2019, pp. 106-108). Nonetheless, the collaboration continued and a period of cordial relationship between the MB and the Free Officers lasted for some time (Zollner, 2011, p. 25). Knowing of each other's potential, both the MB and the Free Officers perceived the utility of condoning the other. The MB had a street power and public support but did not have the actual official authority. On the other hand, the Free Officers had the official power but lacked the street power. Both parties were prudent enough not to bring up any ideological differences to the table before agreeing on a way out to such discrepancies (Gerges, 2019). Two months after the coup, Nasser arranged a meeting between AL-Hudaybi and Suleiman Hafiz, the interior minister, to find a legal way out and to exclude the MB of the repressive measures executed against the political parties. The MB and the Free Officers converged on the repressive measures taken by the RCC to eliminate democracy and the clamp down on the former

democratic institutions. Sayyid Qutb also supported the repressive measures against democracy and called for its total elimination from the political scene; he also suggested to replace democracy with just authoritarianism (Gerges, 2019, p. 96). Another historical incident that reveals the MB's true attitude towards democracy and the claim for espousing social justice is worth noting. In the city of Kafr AL-Dawar, some workers in a textile factory went into strike to protest low wages in August 1952. The MB sided with the nascent government and launched a media campaign against the rights of these workers (Cook, 2013, p. 297; Gerges, 2019, p. 96; Gordon, 1992, p. 99). Accusing the demonstrators as communists, the Muslim Brotherhood called these dissatisfied workers as the "enemies of the revolution" (Gordon, 1992, p. 99). As a result of this collaboration, Muhammad Mustafa Khamis and Muhammad Hassan AL-Baqri were sentenced to death and the remaining eleven working received fifteen years in prison (Gerges, 2019, p. 96). The incident indicates that both the MB and the Free Officers have the same negative sentiments towards democracy, civil rights, and social justice. Both seem to represent anti-democratic sensibilities and share more or less the same foundations of authoritarianism and brutality.

Given the same authoritarian nature of the two political entities that governed the political scene after the coup, the MB and the Free Officers were destined to come to blows at some point. After Nasser's refusal to grant the MB a significant role in the nascent government, the warm relationship began to deteriorate and took a confrontational aspect (Gerges, 2019, pp. 89, 92, 102; Zollner, 2011, p. 25). The power struggle between the MB and the Free Officers continued, and by time, the struggle began to take ideological nature. By the year of 1954, the power struggle culminated to point where both parties of the conflict were involved into a smear campaign to distort the other (Gerges, 2019, pp. 110-113). The MB accused the Free Officers of authoritarianism and dictatorship; whereas, the Free Officers represented the MB as abusers of religion. Nasser himself accused AL-Hudaybi with the intent of interfering of people's

private life and personal freedom, i.e., the imposition of Islamic Dress Code and the implementation of Sharia Law (Kandil, 2016, p. 47; Mellor, 2018, pp. 107, 111, 123). The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, represented itself as a victim of Nasser's dictatorship and brutality, and portrayed themselves as defenders of Islam, plurality, and democracy (Gerges, 2019, p. 94), and is still continuing to do so in the current time (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p, 142). In reality, however, as their histories attest, the MB and the Free Officers seem to have more or less the same dictatorial mindset, regardless of what their proposed claims are. The RCC and the MB had collaborated for almost two years, from 1952 to1954, to cleanse the remaining traces of democracy, approving the deposition of political leaders and the abolishment of the constitution, and silencing of any political or social oppositions (Gerges, 2019, pp. 72-74, 97-99; Zollner, 2011, p, 25). The struggle between the MB and the Free Officers was in essence a political rather than ideological, and the MB's rhetoric had gradually changed from supporting the coup towards criticizing it as the balance of power began to side with the Free Officers. Feeling gradually stripped off power and deposed of the political scene, the MB had been involved into formulating its propaganda in ideological terms, moving from approving to disapproving the coup. Lacking any political agenda, the Free Officers had no ideology to defend nor they had been able to come up with a one to guide the post-coup era. Instead, however, the Free Officers procured all the resources available to criticize the Islamic agenda that was proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood. The media campaign that was adopted to demonize the MB was vicious and ferocious (Gerges, 2019, pp. 94, 110, 113-114). That being said, this is not to exonerate the MB's traces of totalitarianism and authoritarianism but to highlight the severity of conflict between the two parties. The ensued reaction on the side of the MB was to play the victim's role that had fallen a prey to the ruthlessness of Nasser (Gerges, 2019, pp. 26, 94; AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 142).

6.7 The Fracture of Muslim Brotherhood

After the assassination of AL-Banna, the nomination of AL-Hudaybi had not been warmly welcomed by many in the Muslim Brotherhood either at the high-ranking incumbents or among regular members (Wickham, 2013, p. 26; Soage & Franganillo, 2010, p, 41; Zollner, 2011, p. 10). AL-Hudaybi was a judge and many perceived him as an outsider who lacked shrewdness and oratorical skills that were necessary to lead the organization. According to Zollner (2011), AL-Hudaybi "was accused of weakness, of failing to unify the organisation in its opposition to the political system and of letting down the Brotherhood in its efforts to contain Abd al-Nasir's despotic exertions" (P. 9). Zollner continues that other MB members perceive AL-Hudaybi's style of governance as despotic who was responsible of dismantling the democratic nature of the Muslim Brotherhood (2011, p. 9). AL-Hudaybi could not fill the space left by his former leader, the charismatic leadership of AL-Banna (Ranko, 2015, p. 66; Zollner, 2011, pp. 2, 9, 16, 33). The nomination of AL-Hudaybi had created a sort of internal fracture as well as a split of identity and authority. Many MB members questioned his credentials and leadership qualifications as to lead the organization. Just after three years of the assassination of AL-Banna in 1949, he paid a visit to King Farooq in order to normalize the relationships between the two sides (Zahid, 2014, pp. 77-78). The visit infuriated other MB members who accused AL-Hudaybi of compromising the palace in exchange of petty privileges if anything at all. Under AL-Hudaybi nomination, another phase of split of the MB had surfaced. The Secret Apparatus, which had been established under AL-Banna's direct supervision, had begun to spiral out of control under AL-Hudaybi's tenure. Nasser's offer to integrate the MB into the nascent government had been contended by the MB inner circles which had splintered the organization into two dissenting groups, those who approved the offer and those who did not (Gerges, 2019, pp. 90, 101, 106). Long before the success of the coup, AL-Hudaybi had embarked on a process to eliminate the violent elements of the MB, the Secret Apparatus, and it founding leaders,

Salah Shadi, Mahmud AL-Sabbagh, Abdel Rahman AL-Sanadi, and other leading figures (Mitchell, 1993, pp. 119-122). On the basis of the new doctrine adopted by AL-Hudaybi which propagates "preachers not judges", the new leadership under AL-Hudaybi sought to pacify the organization and cleanse senior leadership of the Secret Apparatus (Mitchell, 1993, p. 119; Ranko, 2015, pp. 61-62, 66-67). After the success of the coup, the internal power struggle of the MB had escalated and caused a serious internal rift among the Muslim Brotherhood, especially after Nasser's offer to integrate the MB in the nascent government. Of particular importance were Abdel Rahman AL-Sanadi, the chief director of the Secret Apparatus, and Mahmoud AL-Sabbagh, his deputy commander, who were disgruntled over the AL-Hudaybi's refusal of Nasser's offer (Gerges, 2019, p. 103). It is obvious that AL-Hudaybi did not follow AL-Banna's footsteps and he had a different strategy in mind (Ranko, 2015, pp. 61-62). His visit to the palace had angered many of his allies and close aides because the palace was the most likely culprit that was behind the assassination of AL-Banna (Zahid, 2014, p. 77). The visit indicated that AL-Hudaybi had followed a peaceful agenda towards the palace in order to solve the conflictual issues and normalize the relations between the two camps. AL-Hudaybi had perceived that the Secret Apparatus was a liability rather than an advantage, and was intent to dismantle its growing power. To the members of the Secret Apparatus, AL-Hudaybi's political agenda was a threat to the very existence to their survival and a deviation of the internal constitution of the MB (Mitchell, 1993, p. 119). Once tensions began to transpire to the surface between guardianship of the MB and the Secret Apparatus, AL-Hudaybi had embarked on neutralizing the dissent by containing the Secret Apparatus (Gordon, 1992, pp. 103-104). The tension within the MB was escalating since AL-Hudaybi's accession to power and reached a tipping point upon AL-Hudaybi's refusal of Nasser's offer. Gerges (2019) notes "Almost one-third of the constituent board of the Ikhwan sided with Nasser; and so did senior members of the Secret Apparatus, including its commander in chief, Abdel Rahman al-Sanadi" (p. 101).

Many members of MB and the Secret Apparatus viewed the confrontation with Nasser is detrimental to the organization and against its long-held objectives. Many others perceived of the situation as AL-Hudaybi was overstepping his authority by the unnecessary confrontation with Nasser and AL-Hudaybi was risking the fate of the MB (Gerges, 2019, p. 101). Due to the internal authoritative structure of the MB, none of the MB members had seriously challenged the supreme authority of AL-Hudaybi. Resentment over AL-Hudaybi's rule from the Secret Apparatus and other MB members was only verbal and had not been translated into action but accusations and distortion campaigns continued. AL-Hudaybi and his camp had accused the Secret Apparatus of collaborating with Nasser and his army officers. An incident of interest is worth noting in this context. Within Nasser's offer for the MB to join the nascent government, there was a suggestion to nominate two MB members to join the cabinet, and the Free Officers and the MB agreed on two names: Sheikh Baquri and Ahmad Hosni. To the surprise to the Free Officers as well as to Muslim Brotherhood, AL-Hudaybi changed his mind and proposed a new list, contrary to the list that had been already approved of. Both parties perceived the action as a challenge to Nasser's authority. The leaders of the Secret Apparatus, AL-Sanadi and AL-Sabbagh, criticized such miscalculated move and publicly expressed their condemnation to AL-Hudaybi's behavior. They conceived the action as unnecessary confrontation with Nasser and is going to threaten the existence of the paramilitary organization (Gerges, 2019, pp. 103-104). Nasser refused the new list and retained the old one. Defying Nasser, AL-Hudaybi ordered Ahmad Hosni and sheikh Baquri to decline the nominations, and when they refused his orders, he forced them to resign on the basis of breaking the Bay'a, or fealty (Gerges, 2019, p. 104). The authoritarian nature of the MB in the process of decision-making had contributed to the internal fracture of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since his nomination, AL-Hudaybi was not well received among the high ranks of the MB nor among the Secret Apparatus as he was perceived as an outsider who lacked shrewdness, charisma, and long-sightedness. Many MB member

were skeptical and mistrustful of his leadership potentials to lead the organization. The internal conflicts ensued in AL-Hudaybi's tenure and his unjustifiable confrontation with Nasser had challenged the mere existence of the organization and was going to be a significant factor in its break-up (Gerges, 2019, p. 105; Ranko, 2015, p. 66; Zollner, 2011, p. 33).

The second step that contributed to the weakening of the Muslim Brotherhood was the revengeful dismissal of AL-Sanadi and high rank officers in the Secret Apparatus (Gordon, 1992, pp. 103-104; Mitchell, 1993, p. 119). Based on the claim that the Secret Apparatus had been collaborating with Nasser without the MB's approval, AL-Hudaybi began a cleansing process of those who had had a good relation with Nasser. Based on the same claim, AL-Hudaybi wanted to infiltrate the military wing by imposing his loyal men after the defiance shown by AL-Sanadi and his colleagues. He nominated Sayyid Fayez after AL-Sanadi was dismissed (Zollner, 2011, pp. 32-33). Knowing of the internal conflicts emerging from the political and military wing of the MB after the dismissal of AL-Sanadi, Nasser found it very opportune to turn the military wing against its leadership. Nasser collaborated with AL-Sanadi to depose AL-Hudaybi and to nominate a new Guide who will be willing to operate under Nasser's wing (Zollner, 2011, p. 32). The rebellion had failed and AL-Hudaybi remained in his position as the supreme guide. Sayyid Fayez was soon assassinated and it was claimed that some of AL-Sanadi operatives had assassinated him (Zollner, 2011, pp. 32-33). Intent to purge the Secret Apparatus of AL-Sanadi loyalists, supporters ,and pro-Nasser elements, AL-Hudaybi nominated Yusuf Tal'at as the commander of the Secret Apparatus. With the nomination of Tal'at, the strategy of the Secret Apparatus changed (Zollner, 2011, p. 35). The recruitment to the Apparatus was open to those who were willing to join as opposed to what had been the case during AL-Sanadi who preferred quality over quantity (Gerges, 2019, pp. 107-108). As the confrontation began to build up between AL-Hudaybi and the Free Officers, Tal'at and his close aides from the Secret Apparatus had met with some of secret MB members of the Free Officers

to discuss a plan to deal with the escalating tension between the MB and Nasser. They finally agreed on instigating a popular uprising by waging a systematic propaganda campaign to distort Nasser and his close aides in the Free Officers movement. The Secret Apparatus was responsible for the smear campaign which was coordinated and supervised by Sayyid Qutb, the then ideologue of the MB organization. Leaflets were distributed across the main cities of Egypt accusing Nasser and the Free officers with the worst words possible (Gerges, 2019, pp. 109-110). Fearing for his life and the possible retaliation of Nasser, AL-Hudaybi went into hiding and the Secret Apparatus and Qutb became in charge of the Muslim Brotherhood. Enjoying little support from the public, Nasser began to realize the dangers of the MB on his rule, especially after the failed coup of AL-Sanadi against AL-Hudaybi, and the increasing effects of the propaganda on the rank and file of the Egyptian people. In January 1954, Nasser finally decided to crackdown the Muslim Brotherhood and imprisoned most of its senior officers including AL-Hudaybi.

Furthermore, tensions exacerbated between the MB and the Free Officers over allegations that MB is negotiating the British for the procedures and conditions of evacuating Suez Canal (Curtis, 2012, pp. 56-60). While the Egyptian government was negotiating the British over the evacuation terms in 1954, it was revealed that AL-Hudaybi and his close aides had been secretly meeting with the British independently from the Egyptian government and it was allegedly claimed that the MB had concluded a secret treaty with the British (Gerges, 2019, pp. 112-113). According to the Egyptian government accounts, the presumed secret treaty of the MB-British sides gave more concessions to the British—a situation that can be likened to treason. By involving into the negotiation with the British, the MB gave the British the necessary leverage to be at advantage point to achieve better settlement of the evacuation. On the other hand, the MB publicly criticized the evacuation terms of the Egyptian-British agreement. On a tour to the

Arab countries, AL-Hudaybi publicly criticized the agreement and highlighted the concessions given to the British side (Gerges, 2019, p. 113).

At the end of August 1954, the Nasser regime retaliated by launching a propaganda offensive directed primarily at Hudaybi with the aim of discrediting him. The press campaign reminded Egyptians that Hudaybi had allegedly negotiated a "secret treaty" with the British and had made more damaging concessions than the government. In response, Hudaybi drafted a letter to Nasser, which was also distributed as a pamphlet on the streets of Cairo on August 22. In it, he denied the government's charge that he had conducted unilateral talks with the British and pleaded with Nasser to give the Ikhwan an opportunity to inform the public of their position. Addressing a large group of Ikhwan at the traditional weekly meeting two days later after the pamphlet distribution, Hudaybi was calm but unyielding. He reassured his excited and angry audience that he was prepared "for whatever comes" and reiterated a basic foundational principle of the Ikhwan that 'death in the path of God is the noblest of our wishes'. In response, the government fought back and launched a media campaign reminding the Egyptians of the MB's secret negotiations and the concessions they had given in the presumed concluded treaty with the British. Tensions went sore and the smear campaigns continued between the two sides but it was the Manshiya incident in Alexandria that sealed the MB fate (Gerges, 2019, pp.113-115). On October 26, 1954, an MB member, Mahmoud Abdel Latif, had attempted to assassinate Nasser while he was addressing workers and supporters in AL-Manshiya aggregation in Alexandria (Zollner, 2011, p. 36; Gordon, 1992, p, 184; Zollner, 2011, p. 36). That was the opportunity that Nasser had been waiting for; it was the perfect opportunity to justify the crackdown on the MB. When detained, Abdel Latif admitted that he had attempted the hit because Nasser had conceded the national rights of the Suez Canal to the British. Despite the repeated denials of the Muslim Brotherhood's involvement on the attempted hit on Nasser, the government went on purging and cleansing the organization's headquarters and institutions.

On the same day of the assassination, Nasser and his security forces clamped down on the MB's headquarters and arrested senior and junior members alike (Gerges, 2019, p. 120). Within popular applauds, the National guards, government workers and pro-Nasser supporters torched the MB's premises and ransacked their businesses and properties. All the pro-Hudaybi supporters and the senior leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were prosecuted on the People's Tribunal. By prosecuting almost all of the MB members, the organization had been severely crushed and Nasser emerged as the undisputable leader of Egypt.

6.8 The Lack of Ideology

According to some explanations, Nasser and the Free Officers had not had any idea beyond the putsch; they just wanted to depose the monarch and his corrupted regime (Cook, 2013, pp. 39-40; Gordon, 1992, p. 12), and Arab Nationalism as an ideology had not been in Nasser's mind up until crisis of Suez Canal (Zollner, 2011, p. 39). Cook (2012) noted that the Free Officers lacked any concerted ideology to guide their reform program, and most probably, their motivation was to appease their anger and humiliation over the defeat in Palestine war, rather than being interested to undertake real development (p. 40). The idea that Nasser and the Free Officers had not any political agenda is supported by the fact that the monarchy was not immediately abolished after the coup (Gordon, 1992, p. 60; Goldschmidt, 2004, pp. 104-105). The Crown Prince Ahmad Fuad was appointed as King Fuad by the Free Officers, and the legal status of Egypt continued to be a monarchy till 28 July 1953, when Muhammad Naguib was appointed as the president. Therefore, Nasser and the Free Officers were lacking any political program/agenda upon which the newly established government should rely. Due to the high public support for the MB, Nasser and the Free Officers were seeking the back-up of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to inculcate a sort of legitimacy and public support for the nascent government (Gerges, 2019, p. 79). As discussed earlier, Nasser had been interested to co-opt the Muslim Brotherhood into the upcoming government since the very onset of the coup. Nasser

lacked any political program or vision to direct his newly-established regime and he had been eagerly interested to lure the Muslim Brotherhood into the nascent government. To Nasser, the Muslim Brotherhood was going to provide the theoretical and ideological foundations that could inspire and guide the policies of Egypt after the coup. Zollner (2011) argued that the Free Officers were "in need for wide public support [and] the Brotherhood seemed to be a good partner" (p. 27). It is noteworthy to mention that Nasser's interest in sharing power with the MB was nominal and superficial, and he expected a complete subordination and submission of the MB to his totalitarian rule (Gerges, 2019, p. 89). His interest to share power seemed to have been motivated by invoking public support and generating legitimacy to his rule. The Free Officers lacked the massive public support that MB was enjoying among the masses of the Egyptians, let alone the dire need for a guiding ideology (Cook, 2013, pp. 39-40; Gordon, 1992, p. 12). Despite the repeated attempts to lure the Muslim Brotherhood into the nascent government, Nasser had not been successful and he had finally been forced to disregard this proposal. The Muslim Brotherhood refused Nasser's proposal of power sharing; it demanded an independent rule in the nascent government. More precisely, the MB wanted Nasser and the Free Officers to follow the orders of the Supreme Guide, AL-Hudaybi (Gerges, 2019, p. 92). Due to the impasse of this power struggle, Nasser had finally been able to incarcerate most of the MB members, especially after the attempt on his life on October 26, 1954, and emerged as the undisputed dictator of Egypt. Although Nasser and the Free Officers lacked a full-fledged theory/ideology of governance, there had been some perceptions and guidelines that were emerging from the legacy of British occupation. The crippled democracy that Egypt was suffering from during the British occupation seemed to have left unfavorable connotations among the masses of Egyptians towards democracy as a valid system of governance.

The British model of democracy for the Egyptians, which was mainly orchestrated to serve the interests of the British occupation and its clientele khedivate government (Botman, 2008, p,

307; Meijer, 2015, p. 5; Wickham, 2013, p. 22), had inculcated into some of the Free Officers, the MB, and the masses of the Egyptian population a sense of the futility towards democracy (Goldschmidt, 2004, pp. 39, 88-89). It might be argued that the British legacy had been among the contributing factors that created anti-democratic atmosphere that was gaining dominance during the fifties. Moreover, the resounding defeat of the Egyptian army in Palestine war in 1948 under the reign of king Farooq had been also a contributing factor to the demise of democracy in the Egyptian context (Botman, 1991, p. 50). That being said there was a tendency to cut clean with the legacy of British occupation and its imported democracy. After purging his opponents from the MB from the one side and the Free Officers who were pro-democratic from the other, Nasser and the anti-democratic members of the Free Officers began to push forward of what can be called "Just Dictatorship" as the political currency for the nascent regime. This 'Just Dictatorship' proposal included some related concepts of social justice, equality, sovereignty, and economic and educational developments (Gerges, 2019, pp. 75, 83, 205-206). Nevertheless, all of these ideas were not self-contained in a well-developed theory neither in the economy nor in politics; they were just sporadic ideas that were expressing the hopes and wishes of the people rather than and ideological program to be executed and followed (Cook, 2013, pp. 39-40; Gerges, 2019, p. 78; Gordon, 1992, p. 12).

6.9 The Golden Opportunity

The military government as represented into the Revolutionary Command Council, RCC, was encountering formidable challenges and hurdles at all levels, among of which is the agrarian sector. To the RCC, the control of flooding, the increase of the agricultural land, and the procurement of 10.000 kilowatt of electricity were the cornerstone of Egypt's development (Terry, 2008, p. 42). The Nile flooding, which was inflicting a huge damage on the agrarian sector on yearly basis, had exerted a huge deteriorating effect on the agricultural sector, let alone the physical dangers on people, properties and infrastructure (Fahim, 1981, p. 18). To

control the Nile flooding and modernize the agrarian sector, the national project of building a dam at the city of Aswan in the upper Egypt was proposed. The project of Aswan Dam was initially financed by the Western Nations and the World Bank, particularly, the US; nonetheless, over political disagreements with the United States, the outflow of the financing was finally stopped. In the early years in office, Nasser had been attempting to pursue a policy on non-alignment during the Cold War, and preferred to be neutral on issues of international concerns. However, the recognition of People's republic of China and the signing of arms deal with Czechoslovakia were perceived by the Americans as a break of political neutralism. Therefore, the Eisenhower administration withdrew the financial aid for the construction of the dam. In a retaliation move, Nasser resorted to nationalizing the Suez Canal to procure the financial leverage to support the building of the Aswan Dam (Terry, 2008, p. 42). Infuriated with the nationalization of the Suez Canal, France and Britain contrived a plan to re-conquer the canal along with another partner, Israel (Goldschmidt, 2004, pp. 124-125; Terry, 2008, p. 20).

Back in 1954, the British and Egyptian governments had signed an agreement by which Britain had agreed with withdraw its forces from the canal zone which was to completed in 1956 (Zelikow & May, 2018, p. 179). Of special interest in that agreement was Article 4 which stated that Britain has the right to defend any Arab country enlisted in the Arab League states (Egypt included) if any of them had been exposed to an external threat from another country. During the fifties, Britain and France's hegemony in the Middle East began to wane down (Zelikow & May, 2018, p. 179). Britain was losing dominance in the Arab region as a superpower; while France was infuriated by Nasser's support for the Algerian NLF, the National Liberation Front, which was taking military actions against the French forces in Algeria (Terry, 2008, p. 20). Britain and France were determined to undermine Nasser's role and re-occupy the Suez Canal which once was theirs during the khedivate and monarchy periods. Israel, from the other hand,

was seriously concerned over Nasser's popularity among the Arab nations and was scared that Nasser could mobilize Arabs against the Zionist state and destabilize its security (Goldschmidt, 2004, pp. 124-127; Terry, 2008, p. 20). The plan was that Israel would attack and conquer the Sinai Peninsula and station its forces just behind the Suez Canal. France and Britain, on the pretext of defending Egypt from the Israeli attack, would occupy the two banks of the Canal. The plan went smoothly as predetermined and Israel occupied Sinai Peninsula and the Allied forces of Britain and France occupied the Suez Canal with relative ease. Very opportune to expel the British and the French influence from the Middle East, the American president, Eisenhower, demanded the withdrawal of all the contriving countries, and within few months the crisis was ended and Egypt emerged as a victorious country (Gerges, 2019, p. 261; Goldschmidt, 2004, p, 125; Terry, 2008, p. 20).

Despite the military defeat at the allied forces of Britain, France, and Israel, Nasser transformed this military defeat into a political victory. During the crisis, the Egyptians demonstrated a strong and courageous resistance against the invasion, and the Egyptian media represented the military defeat as a political victory since the invading countries had finally been forced to withdraw from the Egyptian lands (Goldschmidt, 2004, pp. 124-127; Terry, 2008, p. 20). With the help of Sawt AL-Arab Radio, the voice of Arabs, Nasser was able to masterfully mobilize the whole Arab nation against the invasion and the withdrawal of the occupation skyrocketed his popularity among the Arab nation (Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 123). From thence, the Nasser's ideology of Pan-Arabism was born (Gerges, 2019, p. 188; Zollner, 2011, p. 39). The appeal to the Arab nation during the Canal crisis was the spark that Nasser had been waiting for—an ideology that he can appeal to in order to guide his political agenda and legitimize his rule. After four years of floundering over an appropriate political ideology, Nasser had found in Arab Nationalism what he had been looking for. The growing popularity of Arab Nationalism was considerably bolstered during the Suez crisis and Nasser not only emerged as the undisputable

leader of Egypt but the leader of the Arab nation. Agitated by the political victory of the Suez crisis and being celebrated as the long-awaited Arab leader, Nasser began to reflect his vision of Arab nationalism into his political behavior as will be shown next.

6.10 Arab Nationalism or Nasserism

Arab Nationalism is a scholarly movement of Arab scholars and politicians whose aim was to unite Arab states into one united Arab nation. Among the early scholars who developed a theoretical understanding of Arab Nationalism was Sati' AL-Husari who had championed the unity of Arab states as based on shared history, ethnicity, and language (Dawisha, 2003, pp. 49-51, 70). Within the populist Arab culture, Nasser had been perceived as the undisputed nationalist Arab leader who had been interested to unite the Arab Nations into one single Arab state (Terry, 2008, p, 305). Nevertheless, upon a closer inspection of Nasser's foreign policies, it is more precise to differentiate between Arab Nationalism and Nasserite Arab Nationalism, or Nasserism (Cook, 2013, p. 99; Ferris, 2015, p. 25; Ranko, 2015, p. 51; Wynn, 1959, p. 203). Although Arab Nationalism is not a self-contained theory that would inform the necessary socio-political steps and procedures that could lead to the unification of Arab states (Ferris, 2015, p. 26), Nasser's political behavior had not been consistently reflective or logically commensurate of what Arab Nationalism would imply or require, and the two are essential different from each other (Ranko, 2015, p. 51; Wynn, 1959, p. 2003). On a closer scrutiny, there is a good reason to believe that Nasserism, rather than Arab Nationalism, is more accurate description of Nasser's political behavior, as reflected into the Suez Canal crisis, the unification of Syria, war in Yemen, and the astounding defeat in Palestine war in 1967 (Ferris, 2015, pp. 25-26). In reality, the popularity of Nasser as a nationalist Arab leader had emerged after the after the Suez Canal Crisis, and he had never espoused or appealed to Arab Nationalism before that date. Due to his appeal to Arab sentiments among the Arab Nations during the tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956, Nasser had found in the positive and sympathetic reactions of the

Arab nations towards the invasion the proper ideology he had been waiting for upon which he can lean on to legitimize his rule. Before that, however, Nasser had never been thinking of Arab Nationalism as an ideology nor adopted any action that represented Pan-Arabism during his tenure between the period of 1952 and 1956 (Podeh, 2004, p. 25; Zollner, 2011, p. 39). That being said, the description that attributes Nasser's political behavior with Arab Nationalism is rather inaccurate, and needs to be reconsidered into a wider perspective. More importantly, it is more plausible to re-conceptualize the so-called Arab Nationalism, or Nasserism, as a sub-battle of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union during 1950's and 1960s, rather than a pure nationalist movement that had championed the interests of Arab nations (Ferris, 2015, p. 16). Moreover, Nasser's failure in the unity with Syria, the catastrophic military intervention in Yemen, and the defeat in the 1967 war were all examples of political and military adventurism that were in essence against the interests of Arab Nationalism. Therefore, there is a good reason to differentiate between Arab Nationalism and the Nasserite version of Arab nationalism, or Nasserism. The term Nasserism will be used to refer to Nasser's capitalization of Nationalist Arab sentiments to implement his own political and military adventurism in the Arab region.

Although Nasser had appealed to Arab Nationalism during and after the Suez Canal crisis, he was hesitant and reluctant to accept the unification proposal with Syria, a position that stands in contradiction to what he had been calling for. When first approached with the Syrian Foreign Minister, Salah AL-Din AL-Bitar, Nasser refused his proposal with the unification and went on into a list of demands—the most important of which were the dissolution of the Syrian political parties and the withdrawal of the Syrian army from politics (Yaqub, 2005, p. 185). When the Syrian side agreed on Nasser's conditions, the unification agreement was signed in February 1958, and the unified merger was officially called United Arab Republic. Ironically, however, Nasser and the Free Officers had relinquished Sudan which was at that time an integral part of

Egypt in 1954 (Dawisha, 2003, pp. 138-139; Ferris, 2015, p. 23; Hail, 1996, pp. 101-102), and accepted the unification with Syria in 1958 (Yaqub, 2005, p. 185). From a strategic perspective, especially in terms of water security, the unification with Sudan is more important to Egypt as they both share the same geography of the Nile Valley. That is not to say that the unification of Syria, which later collapsed, was not a good move towards the unity of Arab nation but the relinquish of Sudan was a strategic mistake, which re-attests that Nasser was a political adventurist rather than a Pan-Arab Nationalist who was seriously interested to unite the Arab nations. During the period of the merger from the 1958 till 1961, Nasser and his military officers had confiscated the political life of the Syrians and transformed Syria into a clientele province that was governed and operated by Nasser's military junta. The unification with Syria had finally collapsed, and with it, the positive sentiments towards Arab Nationalism had begun to decrease ever since.

Moreover, the uncalculated interventionist policies of Nasser in Yemen had undermined his popularity, public appeal, and the attraction towards Arab Nationalism in general. The war in Yemen erupted in 1962 when the army under the control of Abdullah AL-Sallall dethroned the Imam (i.e., king) Muhamad AL-Badr who had recently assumed power as the new king. Nasser found the coup a golden opportunity to redeem his failure in Syria and contain the Saudi influence in the Arab region. Soon the civil war in Yemen had developed into a proxy war where the United States and the Soviet Union were involved. Backed up with the American and British support, Saudi Arabia supported AL-Badr regime. On the other hand, backed up with the Soviet support, Egypt supported the Sallall's regime. The war had lasted five for years and the Egyptian army had finally been forced to withdraw from Yemen without any considerable gains. Feeling humiliated by the successive military defeats at the hands of the tribesmen of Yemen and the collapse of unity in Syria, Nasser's project of Arab Nationalism had been severely undermined and his image as a nationalist leader had already begun deteriorating ever

since. At home, the military invention began to have its ramifications on the Egyptian economy and certain food products and others began to disappear from the market. The huge debts to the Soviets over the arm deals, the cessation of American aid, the corruption of the Egyptian army, and the setbacks in Yemen had all contributed to the Egyptians' dissatisfaction over Nasser's internal and external policies (Ferris, 2015, pp. 193, 209, 219). The war in Yemen exerted a considerably high death toll and crippled the Egyptian economy, which in turn, began to have affected the popularity of Nasser, his self-image as the leader of Arab Nationalism, and more importantly, began to threaten his legitimacy to rule.

Again, Nasser's adventurist policies seem to be unstoppable and unbridled, yet uncalculated and ill-advised as ever it was. When clashes erupted at the Syrian-Israeli borders between the Palestinian fighters and Israeli forces at the northern-eastern front in 1967, Nasser saw in this incident as the golden opportunity to boost his legitimacy as the defender of Palestine, and to reaffirm his role as the undisputed hero of Arab Nationalism (Ferris, 2015, pp. 293-295). In support for the Palestinian fighters at the Syrian-Israeli front, Nasser closed down the gulf of Aqaba for Israeli shipping and demanded the removal of the UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force, from Sinai Peninsula. With these two Egyptian steps, the war became inevitable for Israel (Ferris, 2015, p. 304). Israel considered the closure of the gulf of Aqaba as a cause of bellicosity and demanded for the free shipping of the waterway. Disregarding the Israeli warnings, Nasser continued his course of uncalculated policies and did not acquiesce to the international calls for the reopening of the gulf of Aqaba. Following the Soviet advice of not provoking the Israelis, the Egyptians were assured of non-imminent Israeli aggression, which allowed Nasser for more political space to maneuver in order to pressure the Americans to acquiesce in to resume the economic aids that Egypt had desperately needed (Ferris, 2015, pp. 205, 2019). Nevertheless, Israel ceased this opportunity and launched a quick war on the two fronts, Egypt and Syria, and took over Gaza Strip, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and

whole Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights in Syria. With the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, a death certificate of Nasserism had been issued and the project of Arab Nationalism had been severely undermined (Consea, 2018, p. 15; Dawisha, 2003, p. 252; Ferris, 2015, 326; Gerges, 2019, p. 284). Nasser had really championed Arab Nationalism as his involvement policies in the Syrian, the Yemeni, and Palestine would attest. However, these interventionist policies were at best adventurist in nature and uncalculated, which may indicate, that Nasser's commitment to Arab Nationalism was, in essence, a means to an end, did not stand up the people's aspirations (Ferris, 2015, p. 15).

<center>**CHAPTER FIVE**</center>

7.0   Interactions of EMB and Sadatite Egypt

7.1.1 Politicization of Religion

Unlike the interaction between Nasserite Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, the interaction between the Sadatite Egypt and MB was positive and a supportive one. Lacking the charisma of Nasser, Sadat had hoped that the politicization of religion would reorient the public opinion towards Islamism and re-establish a new political ideology that would legitimize his rule (Frampton, 2019, pp. 322-323; Gerges, 2019, p. 314). Therefore, the resurgence of Political Islam in the political landscape of Egypt did not come out as a natural result of the failure of Arab Nationalism or Nasserism after the 1967 defeat. Rather, the emergence of Political Islam was a direct result of the Sadatite concerted efforts and state policies (Frampton, 2019, p. 323; Gerges, 2019, p. 314). With the accession of Sadat to presidency in 1970, he was determined to cut clean with the Nasser's legacy of secular Arab Nationalism (Podeh, 2004, p. 31), and found in Islamism the counter-ideology upon which he could establish his legitimacy (Gerges, 2019, p. 314; Curtis, 2012, p. 99; Zahid, 2014, p. 81). Sadat's alliance with Political Islam can be seen as a part of the global alliance against communism which was led by the US-West camp during the Cold War (Curtis, 2012, p. 107; Hibbard, 2012, p. 64; Kumar, 2016, pp. 2-5; Ozkan, 2019, p. 3). Sadat, as many western and US policy makers, recognized the potential power of Islamist ideology to counter the spread of communist and socialist sentiments. To achieve his objective, Sadat had taken crucial steps to back up his political agenda of Islamism which included the cleansing of Nasserite elements, Re-Islamization of society, and the adoption of Islamism as an ideology (Gerges, 2019, pp. 315-316).

7.1.2 The cleansing of Nasserism and Rise of Islamism

Just as Nasser incarcerated the members of Muslim Brotherhood and other rivals, Sadat did exactly the same but with the Free Officers, especially those who were loyalist to Nasserism (Gerges, 2019, pp. 315-317). While Nasser eliminated rivals like Naguib and other pro-democracy officers, and put most of the MB leaders in prison cells, Sadat emulated the same scenario with his former comrades of the Free Officers. Ironically, among the three officers who prosecuted the MB members in the "People's Tribunal" during Nasser regime was Sadat himself (Cook, 2013; p. 116; Gerges, 2019, p. 120; Gordon, 1991, p. 87). Once in presidency, Sadat shifted allegiance from secular Arab Nationalism which he was once an active part of it into Islamism (AL-'Anānī, 2020, pp. 6-7; Mellor, 2018, pp. 26, 63; Podeh & Winckler, 2009, p. 31; Zollner, 2011, p. 48), and turned against his comrades of the Free Officers whom he ruthlessly incarcerated in prison cells in a process called 'corrective revolution' (AL-Arian, 2014, p. 1; Cook, 2013, pp. 119-127; Frampton, 2019, p. 322; Gordon, 1991, p. 7; Podeh Winckler, 2009, p. 31; Wickham, 2013, pp. 29). Upon the alleged claim of an assassination attempt on his life on May 13, 1970, Sadat purged the old guards of the Nasserite regime, and locked down Nasser's most trusted aides and officers, including the vice president Ali Sabri, General Muhamad Fawzi, head of security Shaarawi Gomaa, and chief of Staff Sami Sharaf (Cook, 2013, p. 123; Gerges, 2019, p. 316; Kienle, 2001, p. 19). Sharaf who once ruled Egypt found himself incarcerated into a cell prison for ten years sentence. Sharaf considered Sadat's cleansing of the Nasserite legacy as to mount to a military putsch that was designed to empower the Islamist and wipe out Nasserism and Arab Nationalism. In order to consolidate his power, Sadat replaced the remaining Nasserite elements with his own trusted men in the government and other related institutions (Gerges, 2019, pp. 315-316).

After eliminating the Nasserite loyalists, Sadat moved forward to wipe out Nasser's legacy and propagate for his own political program in foreign policy and internal affairs. In terms of foreign

policy, Sadat, unlike his predecessor, shifted alliance to the American camp, and expelled the Soviet military expedition in 1972 (Cook, 2013, p. 132; Curtis, 2012, p. 107). In such doing, Sadat had hoped to end the status of Egypt's animosity towards the Americans that was prevalent during Nasser regime, and opted to seek the American assistance in the restoration of Sinai Peninsula (Rubin, 2010, pp. 26, 42-43). In terms of internal affairs, Sadat had replaced the state restrictions on the economy and released the economy for foreign investors and creditors. This open-door policy of economy to the foreign investments had forced the local factories to close down due to the inability of the local products to compete with the imported counterparts. Sadat had made the opposite of what Nasser had done. He allied with the Americans, liberated the economy, and supported the MB; literally, he demolished everything that Nasser had built (Gerges, 2019, pp. 317, 341). It is noteworthy in this regard to mention that Sadat had enabled the army to take over the state economic sectors, and enabled the army officers to possess, control, and manage the country's economy (Beattie, 2000, pp. 150-153; Moustafa, 2007, p. 5). Moreover, due to his coalition with the US-led camp, Sadat depended on the financial assistance from United States to support the Egyptian economy, and gradually, Egypt's sovereignty had begun to be appropriated in return with the financial support provided (AL-Arian, 2014, p. 28). The cleansing of Nasser's aides was complemented with a shift of allegiance and policy towards the West, and Sadat was determined to wipe out Nasserism not only from the political scene but also from the public's minds. To counter Nasserite sentiments that was prevalent during the early seventies and to erase the sentiments of Arab Nationalism, Sadat indulged into the re-Islamization of the state and society, a policy that he conceived would effectively combat and resist the legacy of Nasserism (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 147; Kandil, 2016, p. 130; Tadros, 2014, p. 72; Wickham, 2013, p. 30). Contrary to what laypeople believe, the resurgence of Political Islam had not suddenly popped up into the political scene as a result of the 1967 defeat. The emergence of Islamism had been gradually nurtured and sponsored in an

attempt to establish a legitimate ideology to stand against Arab Nationalism (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 147; Kandil, 2016, p. 82, 130; Mellor, 2018, p. 60). Sadat took crucial steps to empower the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic sentiments in general. He also called himself as the "pious president", and in a surprising act, he visited the military prisons holding a hammer in his hand, demolishing the prison walls to indicate his support for the freedom of political prisoners and human rights (Frampton, 2019, p. 323; Gerges, 2019, pp. 24, 322). In reality, Sadat freed hundreds of MB members in the early seventies (Frampton, 2019, pp. 320-321; Gerges, 2019, p. 321; Mellor, 2018, pp. 57, 77, 147; Pargeter, 2013, p. 27; Wickham, 2013, p. 30). Ironically, he was among the men who were responsible for their incarceration in humiliating prison cells, and being exposed to all sorts of torture and punishment during Nasser regime (Cook, 2013; pp. 116, 124; Gerges, 2019, p. 120; Gordon, 1991, p. 87). Moreover, Sadat freed Omar AL-Telmesany, the Supreme Guide, and allowed him and other MB members for religious activities and social work (Gerges, 2019, pp. 321-322). Furthermore, Sadat appointed Ahmad Kamal Abu Magd in 1971, an advocate who is known for his Islamic tendencies, as the general secretary of the Socialist Union Youth Organization to facilitate and empower the students' activities at university campuses (Cook, 2013, p. 123; Frampton, 2019, p. 232; Pargeter, 2013, p. 27). The Muslim Brotherhood was able to form their own benevolent organizations and congregations to help spread the call for religiosity and propagate their re-Islamization project. That being said the MB had been given the permission, though unofficially, to establish their publication centers, to print books, pamphlets, newspapers, and brochures to enable the spreading of religiosity among the different sectors of the Egyptian society (Frampton, 2019, pp. 323, 328; Gerges, 2019, pp. 321-323). Moreover, under state surveillance, the MB had been permitted to participate in the elections of the trade unions and universities, and to construct their own social organizations and networks. Backed from the state, the business elite had empowered Islamists to venture into shared investments with the government, and soon, certain Islamist businessmen

had accumulated financial empires with the help of the state. Furthermore, Sadat had amended the constitution of 1971 which included the principles of Sharia should be the main source of legislation (Cook, 2013, p. 124; Mellor, 2018, p. 63; Wickham, 2013, p. 31). The legacy of Sadat years in office is still resonating up until the current time, and according to some accounts, it was Sadat who planted and nurtured Islamism in the Egyptian society and dismantled the principles of secularism that once had been woven strongly into the Egyptian collective minds (AL-ʿAnānī, 2020, p. 147; Kandil, 2016, p. 130).

7.1.3 State Sponsorship Islamism

Just as Nasser had used Al-Azhar to counter the Muslim Brotherhood (Frampton, 2019, p. 294; Gordon, 1991, pp. 197-198; Hibbard, 2012, pp. 51-52), Sadat used the Muslim Brotherhood to counter Nasserism, socialism, and Arab Nationalism, and worked hard to tip the balance in favor of Islamism (AL-ʿAnānī, 2020, p. 147; Curtis, 2012, p. 99; Kandil, 2016, p. 130; Tadros, 2014, p. 72; Wickham, 2013, p. 30). Sadat was greatly concerned with the prevalent Nasserite sentiments among students and other urban organization at large, and the growing support of Nationalism during the early seventies. To combat this escalating trend among university students, trade unions, and other cosmopolitan organizations, Sadat turned the Muslim Brotherhood against other congregations of secularists, nationalists, and Nasserites. With the support of state sponsorship and supervision, the Muslim Brotherhood was helped to take over leaderships of student councils, trade unions; and to work freely to hold meetings, conferences, and other social activities to propagate for their re-Islamization project of the society (Cook, 2013, p. 125; Gerges, 2019, pp. 323-326; Pargeter, 2013, pp. 27-28; Ranko, 2015, p. 87). For example, when secular nationalists wanted to hold a meeting at the university campus, their request is declined from the high management of the university. On the other hand, when the MB wanted to do the same, they were granted the permission (Gerges, 2019, p, 324). With such subversive and other containment strategies, the Nationalists and Nasserites had been gradually

suppressed, and the rising star of MB began to shine on the whole Egyptian community (Curtis, 2012, p. 108; Gerges, 2019, p, 324; Pargeter, 2013, pp. 27-28). University campuses were the battlegrounds for the Nationalists and Islamists, and sometimes, verbal and physical clashes erupted which usually had been settled in favor of the Islamists. Furthermore, the second step of Sadat's list was the take-over of the deanships of universities, the high management posts, and the directorships of student councils (Mellor, 2018, p. 168; Pargeter, 2013, pp. 27-28). As a result of this take-over, the newly-appointed Islamists began to modify the secular curricula to fit their Islamic agenda and to indoctrinate the principles of Muslim Brotherhood. Among the changes that targeted universities was the segregation of Gender in university classes, the dedication of time intervals for prayers, the ban on music concerts, and the propagation of Islamic dress code (Gerges, 2019, p, 324) which began to have an effect on the society (Curtis, 2012, p. 108; Cook, 2013, p. 125; Mellor, 2018, p. 168). Simultaneously, the security forces cracked down the active members of Nasserites, Nationalists, and socialists, and prosecuted those who were anti-Sadatite political agenda. In sum, Sadat was determined to dismantle Nasserism, wipe out Nasser's legacy, and replace the ideology of Arab Nationalism with Islamism (Curtis, 2012, p. 108; Gerges, 2019, p. 323). Furthermore, Sadat redirected Egypt's internal and external policies from the left/socialist orientations to the extreme right, liberalization of economy, or Infitah Iqtisadi as it is called in Arabic (Adly, 2020, pp. 15, 98-99; Osman, 2013, p. 34; Shenker, 2017, p. 56; Soage & Franganillo, 2010, p. 43; Zahid, 2014, p. 42). He liberated the economy and allowed the private sector and foreign investments to work freely in the Egyptian market, which in turn, weakened the economy, increased the gap between the rich and the poor, and increased the poverty rate and corruption (Adly, 2020, p. 15; Beattie, 2000, p. 147; Ibrahim & Ibrahim, 2003, p. 36; Osman, 2013, p. 46; Soage & Franganillo, 2010, p. 43). Moreover, the open-door policy of economy had made the Egyptian

economy greatly dependent on foreign aids, especially, the US and Gulf states (Beattie, 2000, 147; Gerges, 2019, p. 318).

It was Sadat who empowered Muslim Brotherhood and gave them a foothold in the Egyptian society, and disassembled not only Nasserism and Arab Nationalism but also secularism and the civil nature of the state. Nevertheless, there is a reason to believe that both Nasser and Sadat were dictators, regardless of their political agendas, and each one wanted to impose their economic and political visions on Egypt and the Egyptian people, whether it was socialist or liberal, without much considerations to civil society and democracy. Nasser, and later Sadat, created the basics of police state, and security forces were tasked with the mission of clamping down on dissidents, whether MB members or the Free Officers during Nasser, or Nasserites and Nationalists during Sadat. During Nasser and Sadat, Egypt had undergone dramatic changes in internal and foreign policies, but one principle remained unchanged—the police nature of the state.

7.1.4 The October 1973 War

To consolidate Islamism at the internal front, Sadat allied himself with Saudi Arabia, and formed a bilateral front to counter socialism, communism, atheism, and Arab Nationalism (Curtis, 2012, pp. 107-108; Hibbard, 2012, p. 13; Kandil, 2016, pp. 32-33; Tadros, 2014, p. 72; Wickham, 2013, p. 30). In 1971, King Faisal agreed to integrate the Muslim Brotherhood into a coalition against the Nasserite legacy to bolster Islamist ideology and sentiments among the Egyptians (Heikal, 1983, pp. 79-80, 85, 115-116). Then, billions of Saudi dollars flooded the Egyptian treasury; these financial aids were channeled primarily for programs to counterweigh the secular Arab Nationalism. For example, King Faisal sent a gift of 100 million dollars to AL-Azhar to help the reverend religious institution to orchestrate and to engineer anti-nationalist propaganda based on Islamic grounds, and to propagate religiosity and Islamic sentiments. However, this financial aid was redirected to the Sadat's office (Gerges, 2019, p. 329); others

claimed that more than half of this amount was redirected to the prime minister at that time, Mamduh Salem (Heikal, 1983, pp. 115-116). In the Khartoum Summit after the defeat of 1967, Nasser himself swallowed his pride and accepted financial aids from the Gulf states, especially from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya (Baker, 1979, p. 137; Beattie, 2000, p. 7). Nasser, who had been in an all-out propaganda war against Gulf monarchies, had no chance but to accept collaboration with Saudi Arabia, especially after the repeated defeats in Yemen and the catastrophic defeat with Israel in 1967. After the defeat, Nasser began to rebuild the Egyptian army along with professional lines, and began to prepare and equip the army with modern artillery to restore the occupied territory of Sinai from Israel, which occurred after his death in October 1973. In the preparation to the October 1973 war to liberate Sinai Peninsula, Sadat wrapped himself with a religious garb and promoted Islamic symbolism among the military regiments (Frampton, 2019, p. 323; Gerges, 2019, pp. 24, 322). He dispatched religious preachers to the upfront of battleground to insinuate Islamic sentiments and religious emotions. In the state media, the war against Israel was framed in religious terms, and the official call of the war was Allah Akbar, God is Great. Pamphlets and brochures were circulated among army officers and soldiers that some pious people had seen the Prophet in their dreams saying that Allah will bring victory to the Egyptian side (Gerges, 2019, pp. 326-328).

Although the claim that Egypt won the war is debatable, Sadat boasted a full victory over Israel (Terry, 2008, p. 22). Moreover, he claimed that this "so called victory" is the result of his own efforts and preparations, and had nothing to do with Nasser's former preparations and the restructuring of the army (Gerges, 2019, p. 326). Bolstered by the Saudi-Egyptian alliance against Nasserism and Arab Nationalism, the sentiments of Political Islam were encouraged and found currency among laypeople and intellectuals alike, some of them were hardline Marxists like Adel Hussein and Tariq AL-Bishri (Gerges, 2019, p. 334). After the liberation of Sinai Peninsula, Secularists, Nationalists and Marxists alike began to reconsider their own

beliefs, and saw in Islamism an authentic ideology that is more conducive to the Arabic context, especially if it's accompanied with Saudi incentives (Curtis, 2012, p. 108; Shenker, 2017, 126; Wickham, 2002, p. 100). The temporary marriage of convenience between Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood during the Sadat era had empowered Islamism and religiosity, and restructured the secular community towards more fundamental and ultraconservative views of Islamic faith (Gerges, 2019, p. 334; Hibbard, 2012, p. 13; Wickham, 2002, pp. 100, 121-122). The exposure to different social and political programs, which were quite the opposite to each other during Nasser and Sadat, had created a massive rupture into the social, psychological and political structure of the Egyptian society. Moreover, the exposure to multiple versions of Islamism, like that of MB, Salafism, and Wahhabism, had complicated the social and political scenes of the Egyptian community, and created a sense of identity conflict among the Egyptians (Hibbard, 2012, p. 13; Wickham, 2002, pp. 100, 121-122). The flooding of Saudi financial aids to support Political Islam organizations in Egypt had reaffirmed the Islamic identity of the Egyptian community, yet created unanticipated outcome. The spread of Islamism in Egypt had finally spiraled out of state control, and radical Islamism began to infiltrate the community, which adopted violence to achieve their goal. Among of which was Jama'at al-Jihad, the Islamic group who finally managed to assassinate Sadat on October 6, 1981 (AL-Arian, 2014, p. 85).

7.1.5 Petrodollars, Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood

Apart from Sadat's attentive efforts to empower and elevate Islamism into the upfront of his political and social agendas, there were other important external actors that helped bolster the spread of Islamism and embolden its presence in the Egyptian community. First, the MB leaders who had escaped the persecution of Nasser to Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf region had been given a carful support and attention from the hosting governments (Tadros, 2014, p. 11). Many of them were appointed as university professors at Saudi universities and religious

establishments, and the Saudi government allowed them to develop the Saudi educational system along religious lines and provided them with the necessary administrative and financial support (Kandil, 2016, pp. 32-33; Wickham, 2013, pp. 301-302). As a result of this coalition, the Muslim Brotherhood with the help of Saudi finances had begun the circulation of religious publications, brochures, and pamphlets to propagate morality and piety among the Egyptians (Gerges, 2019, pp. 315, 329; Kandil, 2016, pp. 32-33). Second, the economic boom of the Gulf states after the 1973 oil crisis had also considerably impacted the spread of Islamism (Gerges, 2019, p. 330; Hibbard, 2012, p. 12; Wickham, 2013, p. 341). With the economic boom in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and the rise of oil prices, many Egyptians went there for job opportunities, and upon their return, they brought with them ultraconservative religious sentiments sympathetic to Wahhabism (Shenker, 2017, p. 126, Gerges, 2019, p. 315, 330). Many Egyptians, who had travelled to work or study in the Gulf states, had returned to Egypt with more stringent and ultraconservative interpretations of faith—Wahhabism and Salafism (Gerges, 2019, p. 330; Hibbard, 2012, p. 12; Tadros, 2014, p. 11). The interactions of these returnees with their families and the surrounding environment played an active role in changing and restructuring the society along Wahhabism and Salafism. For example, the Saudi lifestyle of dress code, Burqa, the segregation of gender, or the ban on music, were commonplace among these returnees. Free scholarships at Saudi universities for Egyptians and other Arab students had exerted another important effect, as upon their arrivals to their homes, they began to circulate and preach for the Wahhabist doctrine among the Egyptians (Gerges, 2019, p. 330; Hibbard, 2012, p. 12). It was not uncommon that these returnees followed Saudi religious scholars, like Ibn Baz or Uthaymiyeen, rather than adhering to Egyptian counterparts (Gerges, 2019, p. 331). Third, the spread of ultraconservative views in Egypt and elsewhere in the 1970s and upwards were the result of the huge investment of Saudi petrodollar in Political Islam. The uninterrupted Saudi financial aid and support during Sadat, and the early years of Mubarak, had

generated well-established grounds for the adoption of more ultra-conservative views (Gerges, 2019, pp. 328-239; Shenker, 2017, pp. 126, 242). Fourth, the MB members who had accumulated considerable wealth while being in exile in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf states had been encouraged to return to Egypt to help reconstruct the economy during Sadat era (Hibbard, 2012, p. 52). The return of MB members to Egypt with huge capital to invest in the Egyptian economy was not without negative impacts. Being exposed for a long time to Wahhabist inculcation and indoctrination, the MB members had absorbed these ultraconservative views, and began to propagate and implement them along their businesses, i.e., the segregation of gender, the wear of niqab, the encouragement of prayer, etc,. (Shenker, 2017, p. 126; Tadros, 2014, p. 11).

5.2.1 Collusion of EMB and Wahhabism

5.2.2 Colonial Legacy

The modern geographical map of the Middle East was drawn after the end of the World War One, mainly by British-French policy makers, and later shaped and influenced by the Americans (AL-Rasheed, 2014; Curtis, 2012, p. xii). The British who had helped the establishment of Arab states and oil-rich monarchies of the Arab region had not been only concerned with drawing the geographical map of their former colonies but they were also actively involved to extend the divide-to-rule policy into the communities of each single state (Curtis, 2012, p. xiv). By supporting and nurturing different forms of Political Islam in the Arab region, Britain will be able to create a political space and influence in their former colonies, and to leave behind proxy agents (either in the form states or organizations) to continue the implementation of their colonial policies (Curtis, 2012, pp. 62-63; Gerges, 2019, p. 54). Examples abound of proxy agent countries in the Middle East but only two examples are of concern in this research: Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia and Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. The British collusion with Political Islam in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and

Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia had been fruitful and rewarding in the defeat of Arab Nationalism and Nasserism (AL-ʿAnānī, 2020, p. 147; Curtis, 2012, p. 99; Frampton, 2019, p. 294; Gordon, 1991, pp. 197-198; Hibbard, 2012, pp. 51-52; Kandil, 2016, p. 130; Tadros, 2014, p. 72; Wickham, 2013, p. 30).

5.2.3 Proxy Agents

The establishment of Saudi Arabia in 1932 was largely a British creation which had long been supported by the British Army (Curtis, 2012, p. xii). The British helped Ibn Saud against his rival, Sharif Hussein of Mecca, and provided him with arms and military equipment, trained his army, and helped him vanquish the Ikhwan revolt in 1926-9 (Curtis, 2012, p. 13; Hiro, 2014, p. 16). Of equal importance, the British accepted, though unofficially, the dictatorial theocracy of Ibn Saud's rule and turned a blind eye to the brutality of Wahhabism (Curtis, 2012, pp. xvii, 12). To Ibn Saud, the British military patronage and its political support were of crucial importance to the creation and consolidation of this newly-established kingdom. In exchange for this British support, the founder of Saudi Arabia and his future successors shall reward this favor of protection by the following of the British economic and political policies. With the help of British patronage, Saudi Arabia had become a proxy state that was implementing the British national interest in the Middle East region, rather than the interest of its people or the Arab nation as whole (AL-Rasheed, 2014, p. 2).

Unlike Wahhabism, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt was not a British creation. But, the British had, at some point in time, financially contributed to its existence (Curtis, 2012, pp. 23-24). The British collusion with Muslim Brotherhood underwent ups and downs, which was dependent and governed by the benefits that each one was hoping to gain from the other—a collaboration that was purely pragmatic in nature. The British policy towards Muslim Brotherhood oscillated between suppression and collaboration during the 1940s (Curtis, 2012, pp. 24, 56). Fulfilling the call for Islamic unity, the Brotherhood had sent volunteers for Jihad

in Palestine between the years of 1936-9, and opposed the British policies in Palestine which was facilitating the immigration of the Jews into Palestine (Curtis, 2012, pp. 38-39). The growing anti-occupation sentiments and violence activities against the British in Palestine, Suez Canal, and the overall of Egypt, the British considered the organization as the most dangerous to its national interest. In 1941, AL-Banna was jailed by the Egyptian government under the recommendation of the British. Spending less than one year in prison, AL-Banna was released, and negotiations began to appease the organization and to purchase its silence. Accounts vary to whether the MB had accepted the offer or not right after the release of AL-Banna. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood had definitely begun to receive financial aids discreetly from the Egyptian government in 1942, which in turn, would introduce government agents into the Muslim Brotherhood to keep a close eye on its clandestine activities (Curtis, 2012, pp. 23-24). The Egyptian government would not have acted alone unless the patronage state, Britain, had approved the move, and gave a green light to this infiltration strategy. Egypt which was still a British protectorate in the 1940s found in the Muslim Brotherhood a political refuge to single out and contain the WAFD party, a secular nationalist party whose popularity was growing and gaining public support (Frampton, 2019, p. 45; Gerges, 2019, p. 74). King Farouk and his pro-British monarchy considered Political Islam in the form of Muslim Brotherhood the counter-balance they needed to tear out the rising support of nationalists, secularists, socialists and communists. The palace, under the recommendations of the British, began to officially support the Islamic sentiments in the Egyptian society (Curtis, 2012, p. 23). By accepting the aid, the MB had created a ground of collaboration and collusion, though indirect and unofficial, with the British and became a reserve tool or a political hand to which Britain can resort to if need requires. The obvious motivation of backing-up the MB was to tear out the rising popularity of nationalist movements in Egypt, tip the balance in favor of the Political Islam, and to create a proxy agent to help shape the political future of its former colony, Egypt

(Curtis, 2012, pp. 23-24). To the Brotherhood, the reasons for accepting the government aid were not clear. But one can conjecture that the reasons were based on pragmatic rationalization rather than on a strict moral spectrum of right and wrong. To spread the religious message to the Muslim community, the MB leadership might have perceived the financial and political aids as an opportunity to increase their activities of Islamization.

With the direct political and military support to Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia (AL-Rasheed, 2014, p. 16) and the indirect political and financial support to Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Curtis, 2012, pp. 23-24, 56), Britain had been successful to create a political secret hand in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and to leave behind a socio-political split in the community that proved to have been detrimental to both the Saudis and the Egyptians, and is expected to continue in the future (Gerges, 2019, p. 334; Hibbard, 2012, p. 13; Wickham, 2002, pp. 100, 121-122). The British encouragement of Political Islam in Saudi Arabia in the early 1920s and 1930s in the form of Wahhabism (AL-Rasheed, 2014, p. 2), and Egypt in the form of Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1940s was not benign (Curtis, 2012, p. 56), and apparently, was not bolstered for the sake of affirming the religious identity of the Arab nation. In the case of Saudi Arabia, when the Wahhabists revolted against the British existence in the Arabian Peninsula between 1926 and 1929, the British provided the military support for Ibn Saudi to crush the Wahhabists, and when he failed to do so, the British army launched airstrikes against the revolted Saudi Ikhwan (i.e., Wahhabist Warriors) and completely annihilated them in 1929 (AL-Rasheed, 2014, p. 66; Curtis, 2012, p. 13). This indicates the military and political support to Wahhabists was only channeled on pragmatic reasons—to crush the Hashemites of Mecca and AL-Rashids of Najd— and was not to challenge the British hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. In the case of Muslim Brotherhood, the British indirect support of the MB through the Egyptian government was not only to challenge the WAFD party (Curtis, 2012, p. 24), who adopted secular nationalist

agenda, but also to split the Egyptian community into the lines of secular and Islamist agendas (Wickham, 2002, pp. 100, 121-122) as will be explained below.

5.2.4 Islamism and Nationalism

Britain was not fully satisfied with drawing the geographical and political maps of the Arab states in the Middle East, but her intent to divide the socio-political structure of these states was actually unrivaled if the cases of Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood are considered (Curtis, 2012, pp. xiii, xiv, 85). As the time goes on, the proxy functions of Political Islam continue to unearth and transpire into the Political scene. In this context, Political Islam would be used as a cover term to designate the Islamism of Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. The reason for this application of the term originates from the intentional desire from MB's and Wahhabism's leadership to set aside, though temporarily, the theological and theoretical differences between them in order to fight against the common enemy of Nationalism and Nasserism during the 1950s and 1960s. This pragmatic convergence of Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism, as will be shown below, proved to be effective in dismantling the Arab Nationalist project. The 1952 coup in Egypt had ended the clientele monarchy of King Farouk, and established a sort of 'socialist' dictatorship led by Nasser (Gerges, 2019, pp. 78, 137). Nasser who lacked any political agenda had wanted to pursue an independent policy that is detached from any foreign influence and political pressure (Cook, 2013, pp. 39-40; Gordon, 1992, p. 12; Zollner, 2011, p. 39). Issues of conflicts began to emerge over the decrease of financing the Aswan Dam project, which finally had led Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956 (Frampton, 2019, p. 272; Goldschmidt, 2004, pp. 124-125; Terry, 2008, p. 20). The tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956 and the ensuing withdrawal of the invading forces had inspired Nasser with the potential appeal of the ideology of Pan-Arabism and Nationalism, and soon it became the adopted ideology of the Egyptian state (Zollner, 2011, p. 39). Soon after,

Nasser began to launch a systematic revolutionary rhetoric and propaganda against the monarchical regimes, calling for the unity of Arab countries against colonial powers and imperialism (Ferris, 2015, p. 13). The newly-established sheikhdoms of the Arabian Gulf spearheaded by Saudi Arabia became very appalled of the spread of the sentiments of Arab Nationalism (Ferris, 2015, pp. 15, 26). To the oil-rich Arab sheikhdoms, Arab Nationalism as espoused by Nasser would pose an imminent threat to their newly-born states and decimate their gains of fortune with other Arab Nations (Curtis, 2012, p. 47). Nasser's calls for Arab unity, whether genuine or not, were mixed with the aspiration for dominance, control, and totalitarianism. For example, the unification with Syria in 1958 had demonstrated the real face of Arab Nationalism (Ferris, 2015, p. 38). The Gulf states' fear of Nasser's propaganda was not unfounded due to Nasser's absolute thirst for power, dominance, and his expansionist aspiration in the Gulf states (Curtis, 2012, p. 83). The concerns of the oil-rich countries found attentive ears among the superpowers, mainly, Britain and the United States. Fearing the spread of the "virus of Arab Nationalism" among these rich countries, the British and the Americans were very responsive to react in order to contain this imminent danger (Curtis, 2012, p. 47). Within the wider perspective, the Cold War began in the middle of 1940s and the world was divided into two blocs, capitalist and communist, and almost each country had fallen under either camp (Hibbard, 2012, p. 64). Most the Middle East countries had sided with the capitalist camp. However, Nasser's alliance with the Soviets rather than his Nationalist agenda that alarmed the capitalist West; they feared from the extension of domino effect into oil-rich countries. The fall of the oil-rich countries into the hands of the Soviets would be catastrophic for the West's hegemony and dominance (Curtis, 2012, p. 62).

As a part of the global war on communism during the Cold War, the counter ideology that was adopted at that time was Political Islam (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 147; Kandil, 2016, p. 130; Mellor, 2018, p. 60; Tadros, 2014, p. 72; Wickham, 2013, p. 30). Situated in Switzerland and Germany

in the West (Curtis, 2012, p. 88) and in Saudi Arabia in the Arab region (Consea, 2018, p. 26), the headquarters of Political Islam in the form of Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood began to coordinate their efforts to destabilize the ideology of Arab Nationalism in the name of Islamism and religiosity. The newly emerged alliance between the imperial West and Wahhabism continued as it used to be in the past (AL-Rasheed, 2014, pp. 13, 28; Curtis, 2012, pp. 13-14), and this time, the new aspect of this alliance was the US entrance of the coalition as a powerful partner with Saudi Arabia (AL-Rasheed, 2014, p. 100). Since the tripartite withdrawal after the crisis of Suez Canal, the British influence in the Arab region had observably waned in favor of the United States (Ferris, 2015, p. 122; Terry, 2008, pp. 19-20); nevertheless, Britain continued to play a marginal yet an effective role in the region, usually in collaboration with the US. The Saudi regime continued its alliance with the capitalist powers, but in the fifties, the balance was tipped in favor of the Americans (AL-Rasheed, 2014, p. 100). However, the most astounding in this alliance was the introduction and integration of Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt into the alliance (Johnson, 2011, p. 128). The theological, ideological, theoretical and political differences had soon been neglected and dropped out in order to encounter the imminent threats of Nationalism (Consea, 2018, p. 26). Interestingly, the British old policy of divide and rule had once again proved effective. The appeasement of the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1940s had paid off and the British collaboration with the MB had been resumed and revived (Curtis, 2012, pp. 23-24). On the grounds of common enemy (i.e., Arab Nationalism), the Muslim Brotherhood had a role to play in this global coalition. The MB whose members who had been imprisoned and humiliated under Nasser regime were perceived as a liable ally to commit to the Islamic cause. They had the personal motive, the necessary commitment, or the vendetta to act against and dismantle Nasser's regime, his popularity and his proclaimed project of Arab Nationalism. The Brothers who were expelled or escaped from Nasser's regime were warmly received and celebrated into Saudi Arabia during Saud and

Faisal's tenures. Soon, the Brothers were integrated into the Saudi religious establishments, and many of them were appointed into academic positions at the Saudi prestigious religious universities (Consea, 2018, pp. 26, 57; Kandil, 2016, pp. 32-33; Wickham, 2013, pp. 301-302). Among the escapee was Muhamad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb, who ended up living and working in Saudi Arabia, where he continued to propagate his brother's radical ideas of Sovereignty and Ignorance (Gerges, 2019, p. 330). Qutb's radical ideas came in line with the Saudi's official policy, the escalating animosity towards Nasser's regime, and the declared propaganda war against Nationalism. Nevertheless, the theological and ideological differences between Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood were never discussed, spoken of, or heard about, and any differences were appeased by both sides, and when differences transpire onto the surface, they were soon ironed out. The common enemy of Nationalism united the two dominant Political Islam forces, Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood, into one single bloc which launched an all-out war taking different forms and fronts (Gerges, 2019, pp. 330-331).

5.2.5 Nasserist Challenge and Propaganda Wars

The West collusion with Islamism against Nationalism and Nasserism during the fifties and the sixties was not motivated by faith and religious commitments, nor by goodwill and kindliness; the collaboration was pragmatic par excellence (Curtis, 2012, p. 307). Apart from the verity or falsity of Nasser's claims, the mere nature of Nationalism and its widespread sentiments among the whole Arab nation had, to some extent, challenged the West and threatened their interest in the region, despite his utter failures at all fronts at the end (Curtis, 2012, p. 98). The West, along with their proxy agents in the region, had contributed to the failure of Nationalism, but this is not to exclude Nasser's dictatorship (Gerges, 2019, p. 81), and political immaturity, recklessness, and adventurism (Ferris, 2015, p. 23) as contributing factors. The idea of united Arab states of independent policy or the collapse of the Arab states under the influence of the Soviets is quite an appalling scenario, and either of which would challenge or even change the

balance of power in favor of the Soviet camp, a nightmare that shall not be achieved (Curtis, 2012, p. 43). Recognizing the importance of religious appeal among the masses of Muslim communities and Nasser's close alliance with the communist camp, the West had correctly engineered a propaganda campaign against Nasser anchored in Islamic religiosity and sacramental grounds (Curtis, 2012, p. 42). Under the approval of the hegemonic powers, the sponsorship of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the propaganda campaign designed their rhetoric within the spectrum of belief/disbelief, faith/atheism, godly/worldly, blasphemy/devotion, piety/impiety, and of course bad against bad people (Mellor, 2018, pp. 8, 71-72, 152). In the Arab popular culture, the conceptions of communism and atheism are usually indistinguishable in definitive terms, and more often than not, they are substitutable as if they were complete synonyms. Benefiting from this advantage point of indistinguishability, the propaganda campaign was probably destined to succeed from the very start in finding a foothold and support among those of religious attitudes and faith-lenient individuals. Garbed in the cloak of Political Islam, King Saud, and later king Faisal, framed the conflict with Nasser's Pan-Arabism in terms of a holy war between Islam and Atheism/Communism/Nationalism, a perspective that continues to reverberate in the politics of Arab region (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 147; Consea, 2018, p. 26; Kandil, 2016, p. 130; Mellor, 2018, p. 152; Tadros, 2014, p. 72; Wickham, 2013, p. 30).

Despite the accusations, Nasser was not a communist nor an atheist (Gerges, 2019, pp. 134, 188); rather, he was a sort of 'socialist' who wanted to carry out projects that could relieve the economic burden, reduce poverty levels, and develop the Egyptian economy (Gerges, 2019, pp. 75, 83, 205-206). Before Nasser, Egypt's fertile land was owned almost completely by few portions of landowners, less than six percent of the population owned sixty five percent of Egypt's land (Baker, 1979, p. 7). Nasser's socialist amendments of land reforms (Law No. 178, known as the Agrarian Reform Law) ameliorated the conditions of peasants, and to some extent,

raised their economic situations and social statuses (Ata-Alla, 1974, pp. 204-206). These socialist steps, though might resemble the communist perspective, were motivated by social equity programs and the elimination of autocracy and oppression. Although one cannot exclude other variables, as one might argue, such as totalitarianism and dictatorship, Nasser's land reforms benefited the peasants and alleviated poverty (Baker, 1979, p. 7). Unsurprisingly, the monarchical regimes led by Saudi Arabia did not want such a change in Egypt to popularize and spread among the Arab nation lest it could have a domino effect into other sheikhdoms in the Gulf region (Curtis, 2012, pp. 62, 83, Ferris, 2015, p. 62). To the monarchical regimes in the Gulf region, Nasser's appeal to Arab Nationalism and socio-economic agenda had weakened the internal structures of these communities, shaken their legitimacy, and exerted an existential threat and created a top-priority security concerns for these countries (Cook, 2013, p. 75). Nasser's populist propaganda of social equity and socialist program had been receiving public support and warm applause among the masses of Arabs in the whole region. Being ideologically and theoretically different from socialism and Nasser's socialist agenda, the monarchical regimes were fearful of Nasser' ability to mobilize the masses of their own countries against their legitimate leaderships, and dissipate their newly-gained fortune of oil revenues (Curtis, 2012, pp. 43, 98; Ferris, 2015, p. 40).

Nasser's obsessive adoption of the revolutionary route of regime change in the Arab states, that is similar in tone with that of the Soviets at that time, had alerted oil-rich monarchies to act fast and necessitated a full-fledged strategy and a coordinated policy to counter and contain Nasser expansionist agenda (Consea, 2018, p. 26). These reactionary regimes (as they are called by Nasser) had found in Islamism the potential counter ideology to challenge Nasser's socialist agenda and expansionist aspirations (AL-'Anānī, 2020, p. 147; Consea, 2018, p. 26; Kandil, 2016, p. 130; Mellor, 2018, p. 152; Wickham, 2013, p. 30). Nasser's catastrophic record in human rights violations, especially against the Muslim Brotherhood, had added to the credit

and appeal of Islamism (AL-ʿAnānī, 2020, p. 136; Kandil, 2016, p. 15). The Brothers who were incarcerated in humiliating conditions and the daily torture programs they were exposed to in the military prison cells had actually broken the Brotherhood, but on equal footing, had also increased its popularity. The cruel and merciless clampdown of the Brotherhood had backfired and begun to attract sympathy and compassion among ordinary Muslims inside and outside Egypt (Gerges, 2019, pp. 140-141), which was bolstered by the MB's victimization pretension (Mellor, 2018, p. 20) and magnified by the propaganda of Pro-Western regimes headed by Saudi Arabia (Consea, 2018, p. 62). The propaganda war launched by the Revolutionary and Reactionary regimes had escalated as time went by and exceeded the limits of media campaigns (Gerges, 2019, p. 277). When the unification of Syria and Egypt was achieved on the basis of Pan-Arabism in 1958 (Ferris, 2015, p. 38), the pro-Western coalition had been shocked and feared that this contagious scenario could be translated into other Arab states in the region, and finally threaten their own thrones. Sensing this imminent threat after the Egyptian-Syrian unification, Saudi Arabia had taken its counter policy into the next level of confrontation (Ferris, 2015, p. 20). Since the late fifties, Prince Faisal, the King Saud's younger brother, began to gain the control over the government and his control was extending to the palace and the royal guard regiment (Curtis, 2012, pp. 85-87). Since the 1958, Prince Faisal became, though unofficially, the actual leader of Saudi Arabia. Prince Faisal, and later as a king in 1964, spearheaded the all-out war against Arab Nationalism and Nasserism. In 1962, Saudi Arabia established the Muslim World League (MWL) in a conference held in Mecca and convened by Prince Faisal himself (Consea, 2018, p. 62; Curtis, 2012, p. 85). Moreover, to promote for the Islamic alliance as a foreign policy, King Faisal visited nine Muslim countries within a period of one year (1965-1966) to mobilize for his Wahhabist ideology. He also contributed the establishment of the Organization of Islamic Conference in 1969 to coordinate solidarity among Muslim states. MWL's mission was to form an alliance of Muslim World to counter

Nationalism and to Wahhabize Islam among the Arab nations. One article of the MWL's manifesto expounded that Arab Nationalism is the enemy of Islam, and Muslims should perceive Nationalists as the most dangerous adversaries to the Islamic communities (Curtis, 2012, pp. 84-86). Following the conference, Saudi Arabia instantly embarked on its Islamic mission of Wahhabization through sponsoring Islamic organizations and bankrolling Islamic movements all around the world. The MWL was managed and operated by the Saudi religious establishment and Saudi clerics. The MWL had adopted the official Saudi ideological indoctrination and involved in the Wahhabization of Islam all around the globe through its printed propaganda of books, brochures, pamphlets, conferences, as well as the initiation of Islamic welfare programs, the building of mosques, and the generous sponsoring of religious studies at Saudi universities (Consea, 2018, pp. 62-65; Curtis, 2012, pp. 115-116). Among the first members of MWL were the Brothers of Egypt, mainly Said Ramadan, who is considered the chief international organizer of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West (Curtis, 2012, pp. 39, 67, 85; Johnson, 2011, p. 128). Said Ramadan, with the financial support of Saudi Arabia, and possibly from the united states under the Eisenhower doctrine (Johnson, 2011, pp. 126-128) established the Islamic Center of Geneva, in 1961 which was considered as the international headquarters for the Muslim Brotherhood (Curtis, 2012, pp. 87-88). Switzerland and Germany became the international hubs and the nerve center for the Islamists and their operations. With the sponsorship of Saudi finances and Western patronage, large numbers of Muslim Brothers flooded to Europe, and mainly to Germany at the peak of Cold War in the sixties to help contribute to the outgoing propaganda war in the form of Islamism against the socialist camp and Nasser's Nationalism (Mellor, 2018, pp. 96, 138; Ozkan, 2019, p. 3). Among the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood were the building of mosques and charities, and the establishments of research centers to prepare for media campaigns, and to propagate for the Islamization and Wahhabization of the Arab world. With the accession of Faisal to power in 1964, the

collaboration of Wahhabist Saudi Arabia and the Brothers of Egypt had increased and became dramatically violent. Saudi Arabia funded numerous attempts on Nasser's life either by direct funding to the Brothers in the secret apparatus or conniving with officers from the army. Nasser's response was very harsh and carried out another break-down of the Brotherhood in 1954. In late 1965, the Egyptian authorities claimed the discovery of a huge plot to oust Nasser' regime which was backed by Saudi Arabia. Another brutal clampdown was carried out in response. On the trial in December 1965, Sayyid Qutb and Said Ramadan were accused among the conspirators. Qutb was executed the following year, while Ramadan, who is claimed to have connections with foreign intelligence services, received a life sentence in absentia (Curtis, 2012, p. 89).

5.2.6 War in Yemen

In 1962, Abdullah AL-Sallall, a Yemeni army officer succeeded in ousting the newly nominated Imam Muhammad AL-Badr, after the death of his father (Ferris, 2015, p. 40). The Imamate in Yemen was a sort of religious governance, which is similar to monarchy, was based on Zaydi-Shiite schism. Soon, the coup escalated into a full-fledged war between the Nationalists and the Islamists. Nasser backed the Nationalist movement led by Sallall whereas Faisal backed the ousted Imam. The ousted Imam asked the help and support from the Saudis to restore his rule in northern Yemen and his request was warmly accepted. A resistance front was formed of those who were loyal to the Imam, and as a result, the Saudi financial and military support had soon poured in (Ferris, 2015, pp. 40-43). It is noteworthy to mention that Nasser and some of the Free Officers were hesitant at first to support the Nationalists in Yemen (Gerges, 2019, p. 192). It was Sadat who pressed on the issue and began to show the advantages of a military intervention in Yemen (Ferris, 2015, p. 59). Soon, Nasser approved the intervention and backed up the revolution in Yemen. Due to Yemen's proximity to the huge oil reserves in Saudi Arabia, the war took the shape of a regional struggle that attracted superpowers at that time—the

capitalists and the communists. Saudi Arabia began to receive military aids and equipment, and a British regiment was dispatched to Saudi-Yemeni borders to train the Yemeni fighters (Curtis, 2012, pp. 83-84). Similarly, the Egyptians received Soviet military assistance and training (Ferris, 2015, pp. 85-86). The war in Yemen was extremely costly and had exerted a catastrophic damage to Nasser's regime. The tribal nature of Yemen and its hilly geographical structure had greatly contributed to the Egyptian loss in the war but Nasser never backed off. However, recent declassified documents claimed that Israel helped in the ousting of King Saud, Faisal's brother, and carried out a close military coordination with Saudi Arabia during the war in Yemen (Podeh, 2018, p. 568). Apart from Nasser's dictatorial regime, expansionist aspiration, and his risky gambles that inflicted astounding defeats in the Arab region, the Islamist-Western collusion was a determinant factor in incurring the defeat of Arab Nationalism. Islamists, whether Wahhabists or the Brothers, who were working under the approval of the Pro-Western alliance (Johnson, 2011, pp. 126-128), spared no effort to deflect the Nationalist project. The British and the Americans were concerned about losing their hegemonic dominance in the oil-rich region and the threat of the Soviet encroachment and the change of its political map (Curtis, 2012, pp. 83-84; Ferris, 2015, p. 62). The Monarchical regimes were alarmed from Nasser's expansionist aspiration in the Arab region and the public appeal of his propaganda to take an effect in dismantling their regimes. The Islamists, Wahhabists and the Brothers, found it a golden opportunity to have an international platform to propagate the message of Islamization and religiosity in the Arab and Western world. All of the objectives of these actors were coincided together to form a strong and effective coalition against Arab Nationalism and Nasserism.

CHAPTER SIX

6.0 Conclusion

Political Islam is not just the application of religion into politics as the common definition might suggest. Political Islam shall be perceived and approached from different perspectives and angles to understand the essence of its foundational tenets. First of all, one should consider the geographical and historical circumstances under which each organization had developed, as each movement might differ from its sister organizations. Besides that, one also needs to consider the global, regional, and colonial dynamics of the current policy that were current at their development. For example, it is not plausible to understand the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt without taking into consideration the British interreference in the politics of Egypt and the role it played in dividing the Egyptian community along the lines of nationalist secularists and Islamists. Similarly, it is implausible to make sense of Wahhabism unless one takes into consideration the tribal conflict between Ibn Saud of Najd and Sharif Hussein of Mecca, and the British role in tipping the balance of power in favor for the former. Islam for the inhabitant of the Arab region forms a '*tool of legitimacy*' that each leader in the region had contested and opted for, and on equal footing, the colonial powers had usurped Islamism to their favor in order to maintain the status quo of hegemony and dominance. Second, Political Islam is quite different from traditional Islam on different essential grounds despite the claims otherwise. Either Muslim Brotherhood nor Wahhabism follows a specific school of jurisdiction; they in reality, reject the four schools of jurisdiction, and their adherence to the traditional jurisprudence follows a pick-and-choose fashion. The dismissal of the tradition of the four schools and adoption of Ijtihad, or limited legal judgment, had freed their hands from the restrictive nature of the Islamic jurisdiction, and provided the Islamists a carte blanch to involve in politics and reconstruct the Islamic identity for their favors. The concept of Jahiliyyah

developed by Sayyid Qutb in the Muslim Brotherhood and the power of excommunication developed within Wahhabism are very much the same in nature, and they are applied against any individuals who demonstrate any dissidence or opposition to their policies. Third, Wahhabism and Muslims Brotherhood are politically motivated and their leaders are very keen to be integrated into the global order led by the US and the Western world. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, collaborated with the British, the Americans, and the Western powers, to deflect the Nationalist regime of Nasser. Wahhabists clerics, on the other hand, had never uttered any criticism against the Saudi Family, despite their corruption and moral libertinism need no substantiation. Finally, despite the differences of Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism on different grounds, they both converge under the slogans of piety and piousness to implement the colonial objectives of the US and the West, as represented into their collusions against Nasser and his legacy in the 50s till 70s.

Controversies over Nasser's policies still generate controversial debates up to the current time. To Arab Nationalists, Nasser was the charismatic hero who wanted to liberate the Arab states from foreign influence, unite the Arab world into one strong nation state, modernize the Arab nation and restore its lost pride. Despite the continued stumbles and setbacks, Nasser is considered the undisputed leader of Arab Nationalism who is usually remembered with emotions of sigh and heartbreak. Others would remember him with glee and utmost happiness because he cracked down the Muslim Brotherhood and incarcerated most of its members. On the other side, Nasser was perceived as the new pharaoh who collaborated with the Soviets to fight Islam, and imprisoned and tortured the Brothers. Framed in this simplistic argument, both proponents and opponents of Nasser disregard many aspects of political realities. Although Nasser raised the slogans of Arab Nationalism and was espousing and defending Arab causes in his press conferences, he lacked any concerted political agenda to implement the dreams of

Arab nations of unification and development. Nasser's failure in the unification with Syria and the catastrophic defeat in Yemen and the 1967 war were not policies that were reflective of or would be expected to have generated from a leadership which was wholeheartedly committed to Arab Nationalism. Rather, Nasser's policies in the Arab region were more conducive to be reflective of Nasserism than the manifestations of Arab Nationalism as an Arab person would expect. As noted earlier, Arab Nationalism or Pan-Arabism is not a political theory or a program; rather, it is a collection of ideas or dreams of the Arabs to be united under the banner of nation state principles, like language, ethnicity, and shared history. Nasser's adoption of these sentiments was not complemented with feasible political and economic programs; instead, it followed irrational, irresponsible and often unaccountable policies that were mixed with whims and fancies of being the sole inspired leader of Arab world. By the crack down on Naguib and Free Officers as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, and the elimination of political parties and other opponents, Nasser was pursuing his own political program of dictatorship rather than any proclaimed political program of Pan-Arabism. The failure of the unification with Syria was another shear example of Nasser's false pretension towards Arab Nationalism. The unification of Syria was served to Nasser on a silver platter when Syrian Nationalists sacrificed the Syrian sovereignty in favor of the bigger and unified Arab nation. Being obsessed of power, Nasser dissolved the Syrian parliament and confiscated the political life of the Syrians, and ran Syria as an Egyptian governate or province. Therefore, there is a reason to believe that Nasser was not representative of Pan-Arabism or the mouthpiece of Arab Nationalism; rather, Nasser insinuated and implemented his own political agenda in the cover name of Arab Nationalism. Nasser's gamble in Yemen was yet another decisive blow to Arab Nationalism. Nasser's intervention of Yemen in favor of Sallal's regime in 1962, just three years after the failure in the unification with Syria, had undermined his proclaimed agenda of Pan-Arabism and delegitimized his rule. Surely, Arabs killing Arabs is not a welcoming policy

that would attract the support of Arab public opinion. Lacking the legitimate ethics of military intervention against another Arab country, Nasser's downfall had been predetermined. Considered as a backyard of Saudi Arabia, unconditional and unprecedented military and financial support were channeled to the deposed Imam of Yemen to restore the Imamate. Fearing the imminent threat of the revolution in Yemen to spread into their territories, the Arab Gulf kingdoms had allied with Saudi Arabia in its war against Nasser in Yemen. The American and the British concluded many arms deals with Saudi Arabia in her support against Nasser. Being bogged down in the Yemen War since the early days, Nasser did not back down and continued the military operations despite the limited financial and military resources. Egypt was not a regional power to undertake an interventionist gamble very far away from its geographical borders. Instead, Egypt was facing an economic crisis due to the cessation of American financial aids that usually come in wheat. Moreover, Egypt which had been occupied for seventy years by the British, had more than enough to mind its own businesses. Egypt was facing severe and serious challenges at its internal front such as education, illiteracy, economy, agriculture, modernization and social equality. Spending all of the Egyptian reserve of gold and cash, Egypt began more and more dependent on the Soviet financial and military aids. As the war in Yemen continued, Egypt's debt to the Soviet Union skyrocketed to more than one billion dollars. It is noteworthy to mention that Yemen war had been a good opportunity for high military officers to take over the state's finances which established an unseen empire of corruption which Egypt is still suffering from up to the current moment. The war became stalemate and the death toll was estimated to reach 70 000 Egyptians. Before achieving any observable or considerable victory in Yemen, Nasser provoked Israel by the closure of Aqaba waterway in front of Israeli ships in support for the Palestinian fighters who were launching military operations in the Syrian-Israeli borders. Despite the Israeli warnings, Nasser continued the closure of Aqaba Gulf and the inevitable had finally happened. Israel launched a quick war

and won over four countries, Jordan, Syrian, Egypt and Palestine. The defeat of 1967 concluded the fate of Arab Nationalism, and necessitated a new ideology to be able to cope with the newly emerged challenges after the defeat—the liberation of Sinai Peninsula.

If we were to evaluate political behavior of in terms of the resulting outcome, Nasser would have failed the test on all levels of internal and external policies. The establishment of dictatorship, the strengthening power of the army and security forces, the failure of unification of Syria, the catastrophic defeat in Yemen, the bankruptcy of the treasury, and the defeat in 1967 war are all the direct result of Nasser's proclaimed agenda of Arab Nationalism. Therefore, there is a good reason to argue that Nasser reflected a policy of too ambitious leader who lacked political professionalism and shrewdness. The political semi-victory of 1956 war had overestimated his self-inflation and made him think he had become a superpower in the Arab region. The withdrawal of the British, French, and Israel armies from Egypt in 1956 had made Nasser to claim it as a military victory of two superpower who had once humiliated the Egyptian army. However, Nasser had forgotten, perhaps intentionally to feed his egoism and self-esteem, that the withdrawal could not have been implemented if Eisenhower had not intervened in favor of Egypt. Nasser's shrewdness had betrayed him and missed the point of Eisenhower's behavior. Forcing the three occupying armies, Eisenhower's intervention was an apparent example of US unquestionable dominance and hegemony in the Middle East region. Nevertheless, Nasser had had some major contributions to the Egyptians. The building of Aswan dam, the distribution of land to peasants, and the nationalization of Suez Canal. The Aswan dam protected Egypt from the yearly flooding of the Nile and procured thousands of hectares of arable land. During the khedivate and monarchy periods, Egypt followed feudalism and the minority elite owned most of the arable land which divided the Egyptian community into the minority rich and the majority poor. Nasser's program of land distribution had decreased the gap between the rich and the poor, and initiated a sort of social equity among the

Egyptians. Overall, Nasser's policies were not commensurate of people's expectations of the immense challenges that had been exacerbated since the beginning of foreign influence on Egypt. Under Nasser's rule, Egypt treasury was dissipated in the gamble of Yemen war; and Egypt fell under Soviet debt, and the Soviet military influence. More importantly, Nasser's uncalculated provocation of Israel cost the Egyptians the loss of Sinai; cost the Palestinians the loss of East Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza Strip, and the Syrians the loss of Golan Heights. The six days war had created much of the conflicts in the Middle East, and the astounding defeat continues to evoke emotions of humiliation and disgrace among the whole Arab world.

On the other hand, Sadat's policy was quite the opposite. Sadat perceived the political game from the opposite direction to that of Nasser. Although Sadat was one of Nasser's closest' aides and was one of the officers who was responsible for the incarceration of hundreds of MB members, Sadat rolled back on his own beliefs of the Free Officers whom he once was one of them. Among the Free Officers, Sadat was considered "the yes man" of Nasser whom he never challenged or argued with. It is also said that Sadat was among the few fervent proponents of the Egyptian intervention in Yemen which many senior officers like Sami Sharaf and Hussein AL-Shaffei objected. Nasser himself was not so enthusiastic about the intervention and hesitant to involve in such a war. Nevertheless, Sadat recanted his commitments to Arab nationalism and Nasserism once he firmly established himself in power. While Nasser's policy had benefited Egyptians in the agricultural and economic sectors, and some Arab states like Algeria whom he militarily supported against the French occupation, Sadat was mainly concerned with Egypt alone and did not bother with any other Arab issue. Nasser's adoption of socialism had helped a considerable number of Egyptian peasants and other impoverished citizens to benefit from these government amendments. The establishment of the Egyptian iron steel factory at Helwan (Meijer, 2015) and textile factories created thousands of job opportunities, and to some

degree, alleviated the level of poverty among the Egyptians. Instead of pursuing Nasser's socialist program or inventing a new strategy to alleviate Egypt's chronic diseases of poverty and illiteracy, Sadat preferred to follow another route. Sadat's own philosophy of economic development was to follow the capitalist camp and to open up the Egyptian market to foreign investors and creditors. By such doing, Egypt had not become a capitalist country, but instead, it fell a prey to the global market economy, and the local industries and entrepreneurs lost competition capabilities and were finally forced to shut down. Apparently, Sadat's partial adoption of capitalist economy was not commensurate of Egypt's educational, industrial and economic structure. But it might be assumed that Sadat did so to woo the Americans to his side and make sure that Sadat's policy is the opposite to that of Nasser. The opening up of the economy or as it is called in Arabic "infitah" benefited the elite to increase their fortune at the expense of the middle class which began to surface as the result of Nasser's socialist development programs. Most of the elite who benefited from the release of economic restrictions were the inner circles of Sadat and the army. The corruption of the Egyptian army began to escalate during the Yemen war. In an attempt to buy the Yemeni resistance, the Egyptian authority was giving bribes in cash money to the tribesmen so as they refrain from fighting the Egyptian army. Therefore, the infantry regiments stationed in Yemen began to receive money for distribution to the Yemeni fighters; nonetheless, most of the money is redirected to the Egyptian military officers. Ironically, the Yemenis would take the money in the daylight and would fight the Egyptians at night. Some money found their way to the Yemenis while most of it were taken by the high command of the army, and since that time up to the present the corruption of the army continues. During Sadat, the army had established its share in the Egyptian economy, and the army's investments spread into considerable sectors of the Egyptian economy. With the abandonment of socialism and the expulsion of the Soviet military advisors—the second courtship with the US-camp—Sadat ensured the financial

support from Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, and the yearly American aid after the conclusion of camp David accords. As the result of the release of economy, Sadat's uncalculated economic policies, and the escalating corruption, a revolution erupted in January 1977. The direct result of the revolution, which was called the "bread revolution", was the huge rise of prices for the basic food products. The "thugs revolution" as Sadat called it continued to escalate and spread over to most Egypt provinces. In return, the government had finally acquiesced to the public demands and amended its economic policies.

Another characteristic of Sadat's regime was the unofficial nurture and support of Muslim Brotherhood and Political Islam in general. While the cleansing of Nasserites, the release of the economy, the expulsion of the Soviet Advisors designated the new shift of foreign policy, the promotion of Islamism designated the search of legitimacy and ideology. Sadat, as Nasser, had no specific ideology nor a political program. However, while Nasser was a demagogue and populist who had appealed to a large people of the Egyptians and Arab citizens, Sadat had not been able to be so because he lacked the popular appeal among the masses. In order to bolster the legitimacy of his rule, Sadat surmised that the adoption of Islamism is going to establish the necessary foundations for his absolute dominance. Knowing the importance of religious appeal among the Egyptians, and the widespread of public support of Muslim Brotherhood (that he himself had participated to crush it down), Sadat manipulated the MB to operate in order to boost the legitimacy he desperately needed. The final phase of Sadat's policy, and probably the most detrimental to Arab Nationalism, was the Camp David accord. The Camp David accord was a unilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel, by which the most prominent article dictates the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai Peninsula. However, the unilateral aspect of the agreement indicated the separation of Egypt from the other Arab states which were involved the 1967 war; namely, Palestine, Jordan, and Syria. Sadat acted alone and distanced himself from the consequences that his predecessor had inflected on the whole region—an act

that had been widely perceived as a treason in the Arab world. Sadat was only concerned to liberate his own occupied territories, Sinai Peninsula, and his policy of Egypt-First was prevalent in the course of the negotiations. The act-alone policy of Egypt without serious concerns of the parties whose lands were occupied in the 1967 war had severed once and for all the Arab bond and buried the dream of Arab Nationalism of unification.

As a conclusion, Islamism or Nationalism in Saudi Arabia and Egypt had wholly been perceived as a tool for the implementation and perpetuation of dictatorial mindset of the Arab leaders, and had only been upheld and maintained to serve the benefits and favors for those who espouse these slogans, regardless of people's aspirations for independence, freedom, and prosperity. The function of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia was to rubber-stamp any decision that the Saudi family would ask for, and the Ulamas' copycat behaviors is to impart the religious flavor to these decisions as was the case in Juhayman's' revolution. Similarly, the function of Muslim Brotherhood was not completely different from that of Wahhabism, despite for a short time. The collaboration between the Free Officers and Muslim Brotherhood before the coup and the backing of each other's side after it were clear examples that they both were two sides of the same coin. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood backed up the nascent dictatorship on the hope that it will grant them a veto power on major decision-makings on the assumption that Nasser and his aides were MB members. To return the favor, the Free Officers did not disband the Muslim Brotherhood and kept cordial relations with it till thorny issues can be solved. The demonization phase of each other's emerged only when both parties wanted to control the political scene alone without the participation of the other. The victimization phase that ensued the incarceration of the Brothers does not exonerate their complicity in Nasser's dictatorship and their justification of his totalitarianism. Although Nasser was responsible for the incarceration of Muslim Brotherhood, the dictatorial internal structure of the Muslim Brotherhood bears its share of responsibility inasmuch as Nasser did. Internal voices of the

Muslim brotherhood like AL-Sanadi and AL-Sabbagh did not approve the defiance of Nasser, and were more prone to accept his offer of power sharing. The victimization role that the MB is trying invoke is not a valid representation of what had actually happened, and the incarceration of the Brothers is always represented without Nasser's offer of power sharing with the Muslim Brotherhood. To borrow from psychology, it appears to be that the Brothers lack accountability to their behaviors and do not admit their mistakes, perhaps because they have the impression that they are impeccable and infallible individuals who are above the abilities of average people. The same behavior has repeated itself recently in after the rise of Muslim Brotherhood to power in 2012. Mors's collaboration with the military against the '*revolutionary youth*' who initiated the revolution attests that its mindset has never changed, and their real motivations were the accession to power and authority. Once again, the mentioning of their collusion with the military against the will of people is not highlighted or talked about.

In a nutshell, Islamism in its two forms of Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood are forms of political propaganda that seeks the legitimacy to rule that are implemented through sheepishness and piousness to gain authority and control. Both Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood as well as the Nasserism are dictatorial regimes that each one of them used appealing terms, whether Islamism or Nationalism, to impart a sense of legitimacy to their rules and to perpetuate their adventurism and reckless behaviors. If real development and prosperity shall be pursued in the Arab region, we shall distance ourselves from ideological indoctrinations, dictatorial mentalities, and power struggle, and involve instead in real democracy in order to meet the aspirations of our people and help alleviate their daily hardships.

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